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Summary 
Auditing has grown substantially in recent times, expanding into different parts 
of the world through a network of international audit firms (dominated mainly by 
the Big Six or more recently the Big Five). The growth of auditing and audit 
firms has not been hindered significantly by consistent criticism, doubts and 
debates about the value of the auditing function and what it can deliver in 
countries with long established audit traditions. Much of such criticism and 
debates usually surface in the aftermath of major financial scandals and corporate 
collapses and have increasingly been captured of the term of the "audit 
expectation gap" -a phrase referring to the difference 
between what auditors 
perceive as their duty and what the users of financial statements expect from 
auditors. Research has examined the main elements of the audit expectations 
gap, including the nature of assurance, audit reporting, auditor independence and 
regulation/liability of auditors. Few research studies, however have focused on 
examining the audit function through a case study of a major financial scandal. 
Even fewer studies have paid attention or researched the audit function in non- 
Anglo-American contexts. This is the primary aim of the thesis. To explore such 
a research area, this study uses the scandal that surrounded Grupo Torras, the 
Kuwait Investment Office's (KIO) investment holding group in Spain. The 
collapse of the group in 1992 offers the opportunity to examine auditing in Spain, 
a country with notably high expectations of auditing in recent times, and Kuwait, 
a developing country recently having returned to democracy. The issue of the 
audit expectations gap in Kuwait is also explored using a questionnaire survey of 
the views of auditors, directors and users in Kuwait. Such survey represents the 
first comprehensive survey of auditing expectations in the Gulf region - an 
increasingly significant economic area given the growth in oil revenues. The 
case study reveals different response to the scandal. In Spain, criticism and 
debates started to surface immediately after the scandal while in Kuwait no major 
criticism or debate about the audit function has taken place. The case study 
shows how auditing was unable to cope in a complicated financial and political 
environment, where senior powerful managers, were involved in mismanagement 
and fraud. Despite the limitations of the auditing function in practice, the 
questionnaire survey shows only a limited audit expectations gap in Kuwait and 
considerable degree of satisfaction among people in Kuwait with auditing. This 
shows that the image of auditing is mostly based on perception rather than on its 
ability to perform in practice and raises a range of important issues for the future, 
especially giving the growing doubts about the uniform nature of auditing service 
provided by "multinational" audit firms. 
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The auditing function has been immersed in controversies and criticisms since the 
late 19th century. Chandler and Edwards (1996) argued that not only have the 
profession's problems remained the same from the last century but also the 
profession responses have remained the same. Many of the persistent issues that 
have dogged the profession throughout the years have been included under the 
label of the "Audit Expectation Gap" since 1974 (Humphrey, '1997). The Audit 
Expectation Gap refers to the difference between what the users of financial 
statements see as the duty of the auditor and what the auditors perceive as their 
duty. The main issues identified with such a gap are long-standing ones that 
include debates about audit assurance, audit reporting, regulation of the auditing 
profession, independence of auditors and auditors liability. These controversial 
issues usually surface in the aftermath of causes celebres in different parts of the 
world. In recent years, spectacular financial scandals around the world (e. g. 
BCCI, Barings, Maxwell, Savings & Loans) have all questioned the role and 
function of auditing, with aggrieved shareholders and other stakeholders asking 
the typical question of "where were the auditors? ". 
Despite the crisis that surrounds the profession, it seems to withstand the 
consequences of such controversies through a mixture of strategies. A popular 
method is to stress the unreasonable nature of public expectations, blaming the 
audit expectation gap for the perception of audit failure (see Power, 1997). The 
audit firms also usually dismiss audit failure as an isolated incident not 
representative of the general work of their audit firms (Kaplan, 1987). The 
profession has been maintaining income growth by providing non-audit services 
to their audit clients, with the fees from such services in some instances 
superseding those from audit. Targeting the middle tier audit market is another 
method adopted by the Big Six audit firms to fuel their growth. In the last 
decade, the Big Six audit firms have embarked on expansion into new or virgin 
markets for audit services, especially in Eastern Europe, Russia and China. The 
spread of audit in some of these new regions is seen as a mechanism for 
enhancing transparency and accountability in new democracies. 
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Despite the criticism of the profession and its apparent ability to live with the 
crises and to expand around the world, there still remains a great deal to be 
learned about auditing. Hopwood (1996) argued that despite the overriding 
importance of auditing to the accounting profession and its regulation, auditing 
"remains a relatively poorly understood phenomenon" (p. 217). He thought that 
most of the research on auditing either focused on the economic aspects of 
auditing or technical aspects highlighted in the professional pronouncements. He 
believed that it would be more fruitful to study "audit in action", focusing on the 
wider "organisational, regulatory and societal contexts in which it functions" 
(p. 218). Few case studies have investigated the development of auditing in 
practice and even fewer have been conducted in non Anglo-American contexts. 
Several accounting journals have started to develop such studies in recent years 
(e. g. European Accounting Review, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
Critical Perspective on Accounting, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, International Journal of Auditing) but studies in non Anglo-American 
contexts remain a rarity, despite the world-wide growth and internationalisation 
of auditing. Such contexts are of particular interest in that Anglo-American 
auditing systems are largely being employed/exported on the belief that they can 
serve as a crucial mechanism for enhancing transparency, improving corporate 
governance and accountability. However, implementing such Anglo-American 
systems at face value in different countries with different cultures might not be 
either compatible or constructive given the different corporate governance 
structures inherent in non Anglo-American different contexts. At present, there is 
little evidence available as to what audit has achieved in these 'developing' 
countries. Accordingly, studies are needed in such contexts to examine how audit 
has been received and what contribution it has made to processes of corporate 
governance, accountability and boarder notions of enhancing democracy in 'new 
democracies'. 
This study aims to contribute to such research arena by examining auditing in 
practice in Kuwait, through a twofold approach. The first approach entails 
exploring the major corporate collapse of a Spanish corporation owned by the 
3 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter I 
Kuwait Investment Office (KIO). KIO was established in London in the 1950's 
as a result of the British government, then Kuwait's official protector, lobbying 
the Kuwaiti ruler to invest his country's oil revenues in Britain. The London 
based investment office has grown throughout the years, investing Kuwait's oil 
revenues around the world. The portfolio of KIO's 'investments was estimated at 
$l 00bn in 1990 before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The investment revenues of 
KIO exceeded those of oil in the years between 1986-1989, for instance in 1989 
investments revenue were estimated at $8.8bn while oil revenues estimated at 
$7.7bn. Seeking to diversify its investments, KIO started investing in Spain from 
1986, banking on the potential growth of the Spanish economy in the aftermath 
of joining the European Community. KIO's investments in Spain grew 
substantially throughout the years, climaxing to $5.5bn in mid-1992 which made 
it Spain's biggest single investor. Grupo Torras (GT), the conglomerate group 
created by KIO, however collapsed in 1992 giving rise to Spain's biggest collapse 
in the post Franco era. The devastating collapse of Grupo Torras revealed large 
scales of fraud, misappropriation of funds and mismanagement by the senior 
management of KIO and Grupo Torras. The case of Grupo Torras is used here as 
a vehicle for enhancing the understanding of the implications of the role and 
performance of audit firms in practice in Kuwait, Spain and Britain. 
Spain provides an interesting research site in that it gives the opportunity to study 
the operation of auditing in a new democracy (established in 1975 following the 
death of Franco). The accounting profession in Spain is regulated by a 
government-appointed body, Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoria de Cuentas 
(ICAC). Following entry into the European community and the adoption of the 
fourth directive in 1988, auditing became a statutory requirement for all public 
companies. This change was met with positive attitudes financial reporting was 
expected to be more transparent and auditing expectations were generally high 
(see Garcia Benau and Humphrey, 1992). However, Positive declarations about 
auditing have become far fewer in the aftermath of a string of recent financial 
scandals in Spain in the early 1990's (e. g. PSV, Grupo Torras, Banesto) and talk 
of an audit expectation gap started to emerge. In particular, the GT case enables 
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a detailed reflection on the state of auditing in Spain, especially given that the GT 
affair made history in Spanish auditing circles when Coopers & Lybrand, the 
auditors of GT, were the first Big Six audit firm to be fined £175,000 by ICAC 
for their audit of GT. KIO laid another milestone in Spanish accounting history 
when its management refused to sign the group accounts that showed the group 
made losses rather than the profits claimed by GT, again raising doubts about 
what can be achieved through the function of auditing in Spain. 
It is interesting to look at Kuwait's experience with auditing as it provides a 
contrasting context. Unlike Britain and Spain, Kuwait is a developing nation 
with an emerging new democracy. The government, through the Ministry of 
Commerce, regulates the accounting profession in Kuwait. In addition, unlike 
Britain, which has a long history of expectation gaps, and Spain where the gap is 
growing, it is unknown in Kuwait whether or not an expectation gap exists. The 
KIO case provides interesting evidence on the ability of auditors to understand 
the fallout from scandals and how the profession handled it. It also provides an 
opportunity to trace what audit was doing in terms of delivering enhanced 
accountability and openness in the operations of a major Kuwaiti organisation. 
The collapse of KIO's Spanish investments will also help to shed some light on 
the role of the Audit Bureau, the public sector auditing body in Kuwait, which is 
in some form of competition with the international audit firms. The implications 
for auditing of the offshore financial centres will also be an issue for examination, 
given that the accounting firms involved in the KIO case have been promoting 
and engineering tax minimising schemes through international tax havens. 
The KIO case study has been constructed from interviews with key people 
involved with the case and a detailed examination of all the official investigation 
reports of KIO/GT, legal judgements issued about the case, press reports 
published in the UK, Kuwait, USA and Spain (the latter involving a process of 
translation into English) and the financial statements of Grupo Torras and some 
of its main subsidiaries. While the criticisms of researchers that financial 
collapses are not representative of normal standards of audit work are recognised 
(see Lee, 1993), the case reveals a number of concerns with audit practice which 
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are common across many scandals (e. g. the significance for auditing of dominant 
senior managers, complicated transactions etc. ). The study also seeks to 
overcome such criticisms of generalisability by conducting a questionnaire 
survey seeking contemporary views of auditing in Kuwait. 
This survey of audit expectations in Kuwait represents the second major 
empirical element of the thesis. It was conducted to gain a broader insight into 
people's view of auditing and to consider the effect of the KIO case and the 
implications that its seen to have had for auditing in Kuwait, and to assess the 
international significance of themes to emerge from the empirical analysis. The 
aftermath of big scandals can make people start to question the role of auditing 
and change their attitudes toward auditors which can lead to an expectations gap. 
The questionnaire examined the expectations that people have of auditors in 
Kuwait comparing the views of Big Six auditors with views of the Kuwaiti Audit 
Bureau, which had been given a larger role and remit after the scandal. The 
comparison was also useful as the Audit Bureau claims to conduct audit with 
100% testing levels in contrast to the accounting firms who rely on sampling 
techniques. Calls for joint-audits in Spain (as a way to boost auditor's 
independence) were dismissed by the Big Six firms in the aftermath of the GT 
scandal. However, joint audits were introduced in Kuwait to protect 
shareholders' interests. The questionnaire sought to examine peoples' attitudes 
towards this law in Kuwait. The lack of debates in Kuwait about the role of 
auditors in the collapse was also addressed through questions about the 
respondents' knowledge of the work of KIO's auditors, the objectives of KIO's 
external audit and the type of information that should be published by KIO. In 
comparing auditors, financial directors and user groups from some the private and 
public sectors, the survey provides the first comprehensive empirical assessment 
of auditing expectations in Kuwait. 
The thesis is organised into nine subsequent chapters. The second chapter reviews 
the relevant literature on auditing, exploring the main dimensions and 
characteristics of the audit expectation gap. The chapter argues that despite the 
problematic nature of the audit expectation gap the audit firms seem to survive 
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and grow around the world. The chapter also discusses wide range of recent 
debates and official reports on the future of the profession and the emergence of 
the assurance services as an important new market for the new millennium. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the need for international examination of the 
auditing profession in action. The third chapter outlines the aims of the study and 
the chosen research methodology, namely an international case study and 
questionnaire survey. The strengths and limitation of the study and the problems 
experienced in conducting it are also explored in this chapter. 
The fourth chapter sets the context for the Kuwaiti environment in which KIO 
has been operating and controlled. It provides some reflection on the social, 
political and economical aspects of Kuwait. The fifth chapter reviews the 
historical development of accounting and auditing in Kuwait as it is essential in 
order to understand the different aspect of the case. The sixth chapter similarly 
explores development of accounting in Spain, both before and after Spain's 
entrance into European Community 
The seventh chapter documents the historical account of the case starting with the 
establishment of KIO and its younger parent, the Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA), to understand the environment that shaped the development of these 
organisations and their dual role in understanding overseas investments for 
Kuwait. It begins with a brief description of the rise and fall of Grupo Torras and 
the events and court cases that has arisen since. Subsequently, the chapter 
explores the main discussions of the KIO case, including discussions of the 
secrecy doctrine adopted by both organisations, the absence of a clear investment 
strategy and the lack of control and corporate accountability. 
The eighth chapter is devoted to assessing the contributions of different auditors 
in the KIO case. This involves an examination of the financial statements of 
Grupo Torras and its key subsidiaries, in addition to other official reports such as 
those of ICAC (the Spanish audit regulatory body) and the Kuwait parliament. 
The remainder of the chapter uses such examination to assess the implications of 
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the KIO's scandal for accounting and auditing practice in Spain, Kuwait and 
internationally. 
The ninth chapter starts with a description of the way in which the questionnaire 
was constructed and distributed in Kuwait. This followed by an analysis of the 
questionnaire's main empirical results and the major themes to emerge from 
them. The concluding chapter summarises the key findings from the case study 
and the questionnaire survey. It assesses the contribution of the thesis to the 
existing auditing literature and considers its specific implications for the future of 
auditing in Kuwait. Overall, the thesis seeks to provide a much-needed analysis 
of the developing role of audit in a non Anglo-American context, focusing 
primarily on Kuwait and Spain. The thesis achieves this using a combination of 
case study of corporate collapse of Kuwaiti investments in Spain and 
questionnaire survey of the audit expectation gap in Kuwait. Together these offer 
a range of new insights into the practice and significance of audit in an emerging 
democracy, while also serving to raise a number of important questions as to the 
international consistency and effectiveness of leading auditing firms' practices. 
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Auditing: A Growing Profession Always in Crisis? 
Walid AJHusaini Chapter 2 
2.1 Introduction 
The recent scale of financial scandals around the globe has shadowed the role 
and function of company auditing with controversy and dissatisfaction. The 
United Nations criticised the Big Five audit firms for issuing unqualified audit 
reports for corporations in Asia only for it to be revealed within a short period of 
time that they had a going concern problem (FT, 30 October 1998). The World 
Bank also called on the Big Five to withhold from using their name to sign audit 
reports in Asia unless international standards were adopted (FT, 19 October 
1998). The Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, also criticised the auditors for 
not withstanding the pressure from corporate managers for adopting what he 
described as "Hocus-Pocus" accounting. He said "too many corporate managers, 
auditors, and analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks" 
(http: //www. sec. gov/news/speeches/spc220. txt, 1/10/1998). These criticisms are 
not something new to the profession with controversy related to auditing being 
well documented. Indeed, the problems and debates about auditing known as 
Audit Expectation Gap have not seemed to hinder the growth of auditing. The 
auditing function continues to expand into other forms such as environmental, 
medical, educational etc. (Power, 1994). Auditing is also expanding into new 
democracies such as those of Eastern Europe. The Big Five accounting firms 
continue to grow world wide in attempts to globalise their services. Advances in, 
and the sheer growth of, information technology are currently a major force for 
re-thinking the role of the accounting profession and the structure of audit firms, 
mainly in Anglo-American countries. These efforts are targeted to two 
directions, the future of the accounting profession in general while the other on 
the assurance services. Some of these developments are already taking place in 
some parts of the world. The recent acquisition of andpartnerships with some of 
law firms by audit firms support the prospective of establishing multidisciplinary 
firms. 
However, it seems to be very strange that the audit and assurance function is 
growing when it remains so difficult to answer straightforward questions such as 
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"Why audit? " (Power, 1997). Some would go so far as to argue that that auditors 
do not have a duty to detect fraud, they do not have responsibility to third parties 
and that their report is based on an ambiguous terminology such as "True and 
Fair View" or "Present Fairly". Even auditor's independence looks increasingly 
questionable when so many firms provide consulting services to audit clients. 
The apparent shortcomings of auditing and the firms that provide it have raised 
some serious questions about the appropriateness of such function in general and 
in an international context in particular. 
This chapter will examine the literature to reflect on how auditing and the 
international audit firms are surviving confidence crises and growing globally. 
The first section will describe the crises in auditing with emphasis on the 
expectation gap. The second section will document the growth of the audit firms 
around the world and the prospect of this continuing in the future. The final 
section will discuss the lack of evidence on the work of the Big Five and the 
importance of examining the practice of auditing in non Anglo-American 
contexts, especially given the international growth of auditing. 
2.2 Anditini in Crisis 
The role of auditors has long been hailed as an unglamorous boring task 
(Belkaoui, 1985, Jones, 1995). However, since the 1980s auditing research has 
grown in the USA and UK (Gwilliam, 1987) and it is seen as an interesting 
research task (Power, 1997). The expanding interest in auditing research can be 
attributed to the growth of the auditing function around the world and the 
subsequent application of auditing in other fields (e. g. value for money auditing, 
environmental auditing, medical audits). The spread of auditing into other fields 
in countries like the UK have given rise to claims of living in an audit society 
(Power, 1997). This growth seems strange if one considers the problematic 
nature of auditing throughout history. The break out of financial scandals usually 
calls into question the role of auditing and auditors but somehow the profession 
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has always seemed to wither out these difficulties. However, surviving the 
different crises has not succeeded in resolving many of the recurring issues that 
been labelled in the 1970's as the "Audit Expectations Gap". The audit 
expectations gap can be defined as the difference between what the auditors 
perceive as their responsibility and what people believe their duty should be. 
While the term `expectations gap' first appeared in the USA in 1974, it has been 
claimed that research on the expectations gap reveals a longer history with 
ambiguities in the roles, responsibilities and performance of auditors having 
existed for over 100 years (Humphrey, 1997). Henderson (1997) claimed that 
while the expectations gap was not identified by name in Australia until the 
1980's, some of its characteristics were evident in the 1960's and 1970's. 
Chandler and Edwards (1996) have also demonstrated that several of the issues 
currently creating the expectations gap were valid concerns about the audit 
function in the late nineteenth century. The issues they identified included the 
role and scope of the audit, audit reporting, auditor independence, competition 
between auditors, the level of litigation against auditors and auditor regulation. 
The emergence of financial scandals and the failure of auditors to detect such 
scandals have repeatedly led to the establishment of committees to examine 
criticisms of the accounting profession'. These have commonly concluded that 
an audit expectations gap was in existence (for details, see Humphrey 1997). 
Currently the expectations gap is no longer limited to Anglo-American countries 
(USA, UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) as it surfacing in 
countries like Italy, Spain, Japan and South Africa. Many of the issues and 
debates about the audit expectations gap revolve around five main issues namely: 
audit assurance, audit reporting, auditor independence, regulation of auditing and 
auditor liability. The rest of this section will review each of these issues in turn. 
In the USA (Cohen Commission (1974), Metcalf Committee (1975), Moss Committee (1976) Canada 
(Adams Committee) and the UK (Accounting Standards Committee's corporate report 1975, DTI investigations in 1970's, and Auditing Practices Committee 1980). 
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2.2.1 Audit Assurance 
A major concern with assurance is related to auditors' responsibility for the 
detection of fraud, which seems to be as big a debating point as it used to be in 
the 1890's (Chandler and Edwards, 1996). Since its emergence until the 1940's, 
the corporate audit function had the detection of fraud as its primary objective. 
During that period whenever a major financial scandal or corporate collapse 
unfolded debates about the value of auditing surfaced and lawsuits against the 
auditors sometimes followed. However, in the post-1940s era, detection of fraud 
was no longer a main auditing objective, with the emphasis being on whether the 
financial statements presented true and fair view. Humphrey et al (1993) saw the 
profession as being behind this change rather than it being a response to changes 
in the business environment or users' needs. 
Minimising auditors' responsibility for the detection of fraud, however, did not 
end the criticism of auditors when major corporations collapses. The huge effects 
of financial scandals and corporate collapses on the public welfare around the 
world seem to make the detection of fraud an issue that won't go away. The 
public still perceives auditor success and failure largely through the frequency of 
such scandals and the auditors' apparent success or failure rate at detecting major 
fraud. These perceptions of the users of financial statements can be supported by 
research findings on the audit expectations gap. Surveys of users of financial 
statements regularly show that auditing is seen as a certification of the soundness 
of the financial statements. However, the accounting profession generally refutes 
such notions of certification, claiming that the public misunderstands the auditing 
function and should be educated about such claim. This perception, though, 
might not just be the outcome of ignorant public but also can be seen as being 
assisted by the profession. This can be seen when auditors promote auditing as 
crucial element against the fight against fraud when it advances their self interest 
while disclaiming such objective when it doesn't serve their interest (Sikka et al, 
1998). 
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"The "common sense" association of fraud detection with audits was 
amplified by early auditing writers who assisted the accountancy 
profession in securing its social standing. Subsequently, as audits by 
professional accountants became institutionalised, the priority of fraud 
detection became downgraded, at least in the professional literature. " 
(Sikka et al, 1998, p. 318). 
The profession sees the detection of fraud as the responsibility of the 
management. John Shutkin, Peat Marwick's associate general counsel, said it is 
not practical for accountants to take responsibility for rooting out managerial 
messes and evildoings. He said that given current auditing standards "you can 
perform an audit entirely consistent with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
and not detect fraud that exists". "That's simply the way life is" (Forbes, August 
21,1989, p. 51). Humphrey et al (1993) found it contradictory that the profession 
publicly acknowledged the limited capacity of auditors to detect fraud while at 
the same time offering "forensic auditing" for extra charges. Further, while the 
profession publicly denies any responsibility for fraud detection, it seemed to be 
continuing to employ audit techniques that seems to be directed towards 
detecting fraud. 
In recent years, the debates and concerns about the auditing function that usually 
emerge in the aftermath of the financial scandals have led to changes in auditing 
standards (Vanasco, 1998). For example, in the USA, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued standard No. 53 in 1988, The 
Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, as a part 
of the audit expectation gap standards. The standard was seen as "cosmetic at 
best" as it failed to change the perception's of auditor responsibility towards 
fraud (Albrecht and Willingham, 1992, p. 102). It did not lead to a change in the 
way audit conducted and it did not limit auditor's liability (Albrecht and 
Willingham, 1992). The AICPA's Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued in 
1997 Standard No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, in 
response to the concerns of the Public Oversight Board (Journal of Accountancy, 
April 1997) about an "eroding of public confidence in the audit function" (The 
Accountant, September 1998, p. 13). This standard merely clarifies the auditor's 
responsibilities towards the issue of detection of fraud (Mancino, 1997). 
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However, despite the changes in auditing standards, the auditor's duty regarding 
the detection of fraud remains similar. For instance, Porter (1997) concluded 
from an examination of auditing standards in five Anglo-American countries 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, and USA), that the auditor's duty to detect 
fraud was little different. The auditor's duty is limited to planning and 
performing the audit to provide a reasonable expectation that material 
misstatements will be detected. This limited role has been criticised and regular 
calls have been made for fuller detection responsibility: 
"... the expectations gap should be met the other way around-by 
accountants providing the audit that the public wants and apparently 
thinks it is getting already... Fraud detection must become a primary 
objective, not an incidental by-product, of the audit. " (Kaplan, 1987, p. 4). 
The controversies in relation to fraud have extended to the issue of the auditor's 
duty to report fraud to third parties. Unlike the issue of detection of fraud, Porter 
(1997) found that there is discrepancy among the five Anglo-American countries 
in reference to reporting fraud to third parties. Auditors in Canada, New Zealand 
and the USA have a "limited and narrowly defined" duty to report fraud to third 
parties (p. 42). On the other hand, audit standards in the UK and Australia require 
auditors to report material fraud to third parties albeit with some difference in the 
"tenor" of standards - the former being affirmative with the latter adopting a more 
cautious "reluctant" tone (Porter, 1997, p. 42). The International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) (1999) believes that it would be "unreasonable" to require 
the auditor to report on acts of corruption "without the requisite legal 
infrastructure being enacted, the equivalent obligations being placed on other 
business professions and institutions and the public being supportive of the 
requirement". 
In recent developments in the UK, the APB's Audit Agenda (1994) proposed that 
companies should commission periodic forensic audits. The Audit Faculty of the 
Institute of Charted Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) has also raised 
the issue of forensic audits and made several recommendations for the 
government, regulators, the accounting profession, company directors and 
business organisations to tackle the issue of fraud. The report suggested that for 
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the profession to meet reasonable public expectations it needs to undertake 
several steps including the re-examination of the auditor's role in the detection of 
fraud and be prepared to assume a more active role (for details, see ICAEW, 
1996b). For a more recent response in this direction, the APB's recently 
published report on the auditor's role with respect to fraud provides a useful 
analysis of the complexity of the underlying issues (see APB, 1998). 
Calls have also been made for auditors to provide other forms of assurance (see 
European Commission, 1996; Humphrey, 1997; Percy, 1997). These could 
include assessing and reporting on management performance, internal control 
(ICAS, 1993; APB, 1994) and going concern. The UK accounting profession 
proposed to offer several assurances if the government would agree to limit its 
legal liability (FT, 2/5/1996, p. 9). The Federation des Experts Comptables 
Europeens (FEE) concurs that wider assurances would be difficult to provide 
given the failure of the European Commission to limit auditor liability 
(Accountancy Age, 31/10/1996, p. 2). Although professional bodies thought that 
it would be unreasonable to provide guarantees of no fraud, on occasions they 
have given some support to auditors reporting on the effectiveness of internal 
control in minimising the possibility of fraud taking place (ICAS, 1993; APB 
1994) although current corporate governance regulations do not require auditors 
to report on internal control effectiveness. GAO (1996) argued that "auditor 
reporting on the effectiveness of internal control is fundamental in successfully 
addressing the public expectation gap for fraud" (p. 10). While the accounting 
profession in the USA supports calls for reporting on internal control it has not 
linked this issue to fraud detection and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) has yet to support such calls (GAO, 1996). Recently in the UK, the 
Turnbull Committee, which was set up by the ICAEW, finalised a consultation 
paper (ICAEW, 1999) proposing that the board directors of listed companies 
carry out, at least once a year, a review of the company's internal control and 
report to the shareholders that they have conducted such a review. The review is 
expected to go beyond financial risks and cover all kinds of risks. The 
consultation paper, however, did not require the auditors to express an opinion on 
the effectiveness of the internal controls. 
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2.2.2 The Audit Reporting 
Since the 19`h century there has been a difference in opinions concerning the 
form of wording to be used in audit reports (Chandler and Edwards, 1996). 
Several changes have been made to the form and content of audit reports to 
tackle perceived misunderstandings of the message provided by the audit report. 
In the USA in 1988, the short report format used for forty years2 was replaced by 
a longer audit report as a part of attempts to close the expectation gap. The 
longer audit report served mainly to clarify the respective roles of the auditor and 
the management in preparing the financial statements. However, it struggled to 
change the users' perceptions of auditing (Jaenicke and Wright, 1992). In the 
UK, the APB introduced in 1993 a longer audit report as a response to the 
expectation gap. Empirical research by Irenes et al (1997) showed that while the 
expanded audit report in the UK have improved users' perceptions in some 
aspects (e. g. auditor's independence) it served to widen the gap in other aspects 
such as fraud. They believed that the "expansion of the report also serves to 
increase users' perceptions of the usefulness of the audit without any additional 
audit activity being performed" (p. 714). However, others questioned the impact 
of such changes as they give the readers of the report no more information about 
the results of a specific audit (for a discussion see Humphrey, 1997). Changing 
the audit reporting format can be seen to have a double edged status "as the more 
specific the professional communication becomes the more they undermine the 
mystical qualities of professional expertise and judgement" (Humphrey, 1997, 
p-18). Concerns with and calls for changing the terminology used in the audit 
reports dates back at least to late 1960's when William Roth, then Chairman of 
the AICPA committee on Auditing Procedures, saw the label "present fairly" as 
widely misunderstood and claimed that the term "GAAP" was meaningless (for 
details see Previts and Merino, 1998). Ironically, the same labels that were 
criticised in the 1960's are still being used in the current financial statements and 
2 This short report format introduced in 1948 was no longer referring to the examination of internal 
control and to a detailed audit of all transactions. Changes were introduced in 1973 to this short report 
highlighting the scope of audit and the nature of auditing procedures (for details see Previts and 
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there seems little intention on the part of the profession to change them. The 
APB in the UK (1992) did propose the introduction of a free-form audit report as 
a way of improving the communication between the auditor and the shareholders. 
Percy (1997) has made similar calls, advocating a "discursive" form of reporting 
that explains in layman's language what is reported and what kind of assurance is 
provided. Hatherly et al 's (1998) experimental study on the usefulness of a free- 
form report found that it significantly changes users' perceptions of the audit 
process - enhancing the "value and credibility of the audit" (p. 30). However, 
there has been no official attempt in the UK to put such a reporting system into 
operational practice. 
2.2.3 Auditor Independence 
"Many auditing firms act as recruitment consultants for companies, hiring 
the very directors who then hire the auditors. A highly undesirable 
situation now exists. Auditors provide all kinds of services to companies; 
these include, printing T-shirts, badges, laying golf courses, tax avoidance 
schemes, creative accounting schemes, insolvency, advising banks to put 
companies into receivership and preparing profit forecasts. The auditors 
are explicitly acting as extensions of company personnel and finance 
departments. They are party to the creation, recording and execution of 
transactions; and yet they claim to independently audit the resulting 
transactions. This is clearly impossible. " (Mitchell et al, 1993, P. 15) 
The main force behind the creation of the audit function was to use the service of 
an independent professional to report on the way the management was running 
the owners' companies or organisations. Therefore if an auditor was not 
independent or not perceived to be independent from client management then the 
value of auditing seemed questionable. Not surprisingly doubts about the auditor 
independence have prevailed for a long time given the role the management play 
in appointing the audit firm for both audit work3 and non-audit services. The 
later type of services has been responsible for much ' of the controversy about 
auditor's independence in recent years. Mitchell et al (1993) claimed that audit 
Merino, 1998). 
3 It is usually the case that the appointment of auditors is approved by the shareholders at the general 
annual-meeting. However, the role of shareholders is only a ceremonial one where they usually 
rubberstamp the management choice of auditors. 
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firms provision of ever expanding non-audit services to their audit clients is 
compromising their independence. The non-audit services represent a very high 
proportion of audit firms' income in many parts of the world. Many of the audit 
firms in the UK derive larger fees from non-audit work than from audit work. 
33% of FT-SE 100 companies paid their auditor more for non-audit fees than for 
audit fees in 1995 (Accountancy, October 1996, pp. 18-19). Ezzamel et al's 
(1996) examination of a sample of quoted companies in the UK has revealed that 
"non-audit work for large audit clients provides a major source of income for 
audit firms (amounting to as much as 87% of total audit fees in 1992/1993" (p. 
13). In the USA, Palmrose's (1988) analysis of a sample of public and closely- 
held companies obtaining non-audit services revealed that only 13% of these 
companies did not acquire from their auditors some nonaudit services (p. 67). 
Moreover, regulators have concerns about auditors providing too much non-audit 
services to their clients. For example, a governmental agency in Norway fired 
KPMG from the audit of Fokus (a Norwegian Bank) because they offered too 
many advisory services. KPMG's total fee was NOK 4.4m while merely NOK 
1.4m related to audit work (Rudd, 1992). Several countries (e. g. Italy, Japan, 
Kuwait) around the world prohibit auditors from providing non-audit services to 
their clients, while it is restricted in other countries such as Netherlands, France, 
Germany. 
The argument against auditors providing non-audit services to their audit clients 
rests in the belief that the huge financial stakes from audit and non-audit services 
might entice auditors to approve inappropriate accounting methods. There is also 
concern that auditors will be reluctant to criticise the work of their firm's 
colleagues who offer consulting work to their audit client. Advocates of 
providing non-audit services to audit clients claim that it improves the auditor's 
understanding of the client's business, which ultimately improves the quality of 
the audit. The research on the impact of non-auditing services on independence 
produces conflicting results. Some of the researchers have shown that providing 
non-audit services to audit clients is impairing independence. Briloff (1985) 
responded to the profession's claim that there are no hard cases demonstrating 
conflict between non-audit services and auditor independence by illustrating a 
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few examples of what he sees or claims to be conflict "in fact". Mitchell et al 
(1993) claimed that DTI investigation reports examining collapsed companies 
have cited the selling of non-auditing services as a factor in audit failures. 
Bartlett (1993) study showed that CPA's and bankers regarded an audit firm to 
be more independent when that firm provides audit services only. Firth (1997) 
analysis demonstrated that companies that have higher agency-cost (e. g. large 
number of shareholders, high debts to total assets) would acquire smaller 
purchases of non-audit services from their auditors. Beattie et al (1999) 
concluded, from their survey of the independence of auditor in the UK, that 
financial directors and audit partners perceived economic dependence and non- 
audit services as a major threat to the auditor's independence. Other researchers, 
however, have argued that providing non-audit work to audit clients enhances 
auditor independence while others claim that evidence shows that it does not 
impair independence. Goldman and Barleu (1974) claimed that the auditors who 
provide non-audit services to their audit clients are less susceptible to threats of 
dismissal as a result of the client's reliance on the auditor. Grout et al (1994) 
argued that actions such as prohibiting the sale of non-audit services to audit 
clients might be counterproductive as it "eliminates synergy and thereby reduces 
the value of incumbency" (p. 331). Craswell (1999) concluded from his 
examination of the impact of non-auditing services on the auditor's reporting 
decision that providing non-audit services had no impact on auditors' reporting 
preferences. 
A contributory factor to the polemical nature of debate over non-audit services is 
the lack of disclosure of data about audit and non-audit fees in many parts of the 
world. It is a statutory disclosure requirement in just a few countries - for 
example, in Australia, Norway and UK. Bartlett (1993) attributed such a state of 
affairs to a failure to define independence adequately. 
Given the inconsistent evidence on the impact of non-audit services on auditor 
independence, competing calls for both prohibiting and permitting such services 
are still often in evidence. Several accounting researchers have called on the 
accounting profession to stop offering consulting services to their audit clients in 
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order to maintain their independence (Kaplan, 1987; Briloff, 1985; Mitchell et al, 
1993) - arguing that the firms should give a priority to their audit work as other 
organisations can provide consulting services. Providing non-audit work to audit 
clients is seen as leading to unfair competition as a result of the audit firms 
monopoly over the audit function. Therefore, Mitchell et al (1993) called for 
opening the doors to other corporations to provide audit services given that audit 
firms have the opportunity to compete against consulting firms. Such calls have 
also come more recently from a Dutch government sponsored committee which 
recommended opening the audit market to non-accountants (European 
Accounting Bulletin, 12/9/1997). Nevertheless, many of the accounting 
professional bodies (e. g. ICAI, 1992; APB, 1994; FEE, 1996; AICPA, 1997) 
oppose prohibiting auditors from providing consultancy. 
The issue of auditor independence is not only about the negative aspects of 
auditors selling consulting services to their audit clients. Providing non-audit 
services to audit clients has been blamed for the creation of what is known as 
"lowballing". The lowballing tactic refers to a situation where an audit firm sets 
its audit fee at less than cost in early years with the hope of setting off such losses 
in the future by selling their audit clients a portfolio of management consultancy 
work. However, even here there are counter-arguments that banning lowballing 
could harm independence (see, for example Grout et al, 1994). IFAC revised its 
code of ethics (first issued in July 1996) in January, 1998. This revised code did 
not regard lowballing as improper but rather it required that the quality of the 
work should not be impaired (IFAC, 1998, p. 55-56). 
A long relationship between the client and the audit firm has also been seen as a 
major concern for auditor's independence, creating too cosy a relationship 
between the audit firm and the management. Consequently, auditor rotation has 
been heralded as an important way of securing auditor's independence. FEE 
(1996), however, is not in favour of statuary rotation of auditors, sighting 
research in the USA that suggests that most of audit failures occur in the first 2 
years of an appointment. Furthermore, the proposal of both the European 
Commission (1996) and European contact group (1996) to rotate auditors 
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internally, as a way of tackling the cosy relations concern, was rejected by FEE. 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (1992) also did not favour 
auditor rotation, citing high initial costs for the incoming auditor - costs which 
increased the likelihood of failure to detect major fraud. Arrunada and Paz-Ares 
(1997) examination of the impact that the mandatory rotation of company 
auditors has on audit cost and quality made them conclude that, on both issues, 
rotation is counterproductive. They concluded that mandatory rotation increased 
the cost of audit, reduced competition in the marketplace, decreased the auditor's 
ability to detect fraud in the initial audits and, overall, harmed auditor 
independence (for a discussion of the arguments on both sides, see Catanach and 
Walker, 1999). Despite the profession's stance against audit rotation and the 
inconclusive evidence on its effectiveness, countries like Germany have adopted 
a rule (effective from 2001) requiring auditors of stock listed companies to be 
rotated internally every seven years. 
Recent concerns about auditor independence in the USA led the SEC and the 
AICPA to establish, in May 1997, the Independence Standards Board (ISB), a 
body moulded on the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), to set 
standards for auditor independence. The SEC authorised the ISB to write 
independence 
standards for public companies and develop guidance on specific 
auditor independence issues. The chairman of the ISB, William Allen, explained 
the motivations behind the establishment of the new body indicating that 
"the reason that the ISB came about was that the SEC had set few specific 
guidelines for auditor independence, the AICPA saw a need for standards, 
and Big Six chief executives feared the prospect of over-regulation" (The 
Accountant, May 1998, p. 19). 
In October 1997, a white paper (AICPA, 1997) was submitted to the ISB on 
behalf of the AICPA in response to the ISB's chairman "request for educational 
materials bearing on the conceptual framework for protection and enhancing 
auditor independence" (p. 1). The AICPA claimed that moves for a change from 
current system for securing independence were motivated by the failure of the 
current system to serve the public interest rather than in response to audit quality or 
a lack of auditor independence. The paper claimed that few legal claims against 
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audit firms allege lack of independence for audit failures and that there was no 
evidence from the claims that providing non-audit services to audit clients impairs 
independence. Rather the AICPA maintained that the more non-audit services 
provided to audit clients the higher audit quality is going to be and the higher the 
benefits for the clients and public. Accordingly the AICPA argued that the new 
conceptual framework for independence should not consider the relation between 
non-audit services and independence as a result of the lack of empirical evidence to 
support such relation. The paper proposed that the ISB should take into 
consideration "economic and other determinants of auditor independence" (for 
details see AICPA, 1997). It asserted that accounting firms are inclined to 
safeguard their independence given their economic interest in their reputation. 
This argument echoed Moizer's (1997b) belief that the independence of a self- 
interested auditor is enhanced by the fact that dishonest reporting leads to legal 
costs and loss of reputation which result in loss of income. Moreover, the 
AICPA's white paper highlighted the importance of considering the economic 
aspects of not only the audit firm but also of the individual auditor in designing 
safeguards for enhancing independence. The AICPA's white paper raised 
controversy with its proposal that the ISB should only consider auditor 
independence "in fact". The paper claimed that auditor independence in 
appearance should only be considered after conducting comprehensive research 
on the issue of auditor independence in appearance. The ISB did not adopt the 
AICPA's white paper as a basis for developing its independence standards. 
Rather the white paper led to a heated debate about independence in the USA 
(for some of these debates see Carmichael, 1998; Elliott and Jacobson, 1998; 
Carmichael, 1999; Kinney, 1999). The ISB (1999) issued its first independence 
standard, Independence Discussions with Audit Committees, requiring auditors of 
companies under the securities acts to confirm their independence to the 
company's audit committee or the board of directors on annual basis. In this 
confirmation, the auditor would also offer to meet with the committee or the 
board to further discuss his independence. In Europe, FEE, on behalf of the 
European Commission, recently issued a new code for auditor's independence 
aiming at harmonising the independence rules across the European Union. 
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2.2.4 Audit Regulation and Liability 
The self-regulatory role of the profession was called into question at an early 
stage in the history of the accounting profession (see Lee, 1995, Chandler and 
Edwards, 1996). Generally the fall out from financial scandals led to calls for 
reviewing and occasionally changing the regulation of the profession. Most of 
the debates about regulation focus on the issue of monitoring the performance of 
the profession and disciplining members for substandard work. The monitoring 
function is under the control of the profession in the USA and UK. In the USA, 
the quality of audit firms is monitored through a peer review system. Under that 
system audit firms are required, at least once every three years, to engage 
independent peers to review its quality control system. The Public Oversight 
Board supervise and report on the peer review program. Briloff (1993) 
questioned the SEC's belief in a peer review process that issued "clean opinions" 
for reviewed firms which later turnout to be inadequate. Fogarty (1996) criticised 
the peer review program for focusing on the performance of audit firms and 
failing to examine the performance of individual auditors. In the UK, the 
monitoring function is divided between the Joint Monitoring Unit (JMU), which 
covers the chartered institutes of England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland, and 
the ACCA monitoring unit, which covers the Chartered Association of Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) and the Association of Authorised Public Accountants 
(AAPA). In 1993, at the time of the KIO case, the JMU revealed that the 
majority of audit firms had unsatisfactory levels of compliance with the standards 
set by the DTI and JMU (e. g. Chartered Accountants 55%, Certified Accountants 
55%, Authorised Accountants 65%, for details see FT, 3/2/93, p. 22). 
Nevertheless, Moizer (1994) concluded, from his examination of the audit 
monitoring process in the UK, that self-regulation was "being operated 
conscientiously" but would be more effective if an independent review board 
were to examine the findings of the monitoring units (p. 5). However, he 
highlighted that the JMU and ACCA monitoring bodies were only really 
concerned with compliance with auditing standards/regulations and were 
overlooking issues concerning the inherent quality of audit (e. g. were auditors not 
only complying with standards but the making the best judgement). 
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Disciplinary mechanisms of auditors in the USA are entrusted to the SEC and 
state professional boards. Briloff (1993) believed that small audit firms are more 
susceptible to the SEC's disciplinary actions than large audit firms. In the UK, 
the investigation and disciplining of auditors has been delegated to the Joint 
Disciplinary Scheme (JDS). The JDS was seen as reluctant to punish disgruntled 
professionals, being criticised for the long time it takes before disciplining 
auditors. It also was criticised for presenting its verdicts in "semi judicial 
language" with no historical background and failing to reveal where the 
disciplined auditors were working at the time of their verdict. However, more 
recently its decision on Astra Holdings has addressed some of these concerns, 
providing a verdict in a clear language with historical background and sighting 
where the disciplined auditors worked at the time of the decision (for details see 
FT, 20/8/1998, p. 9). The ICAI's (1992) commission of inquiry into the 
expectation of users recognised the degree of concern about the disciplinary 
process (i. e. secretive, lengthy, reluctance of professional bodies to make the 
findings public). However, it reaffirmed its preference for self-disciplinary 
procedures. Doubts have also been expressed about the dual role of professional 
bodies acting as a regulator and promoter of the interest of the profession. 
Willmott et al (1993) concluded from their examination of the governance studies 
of ICAEW in the 1980's that is was difficult for professional bodies to 
reconcile/balance its role as a promoter of members' interest with those of the 
public. Self regulation is seen as protecting the profession from external 
regulation and preserving the status quo as the profession seems to only act when 
it faces the danger of government intervention (Byington and Sutton 1991, Lee, 
1995). The role of self-regulators of the accounting profession has often been 
seen as one promoting the profession rather than improving its quality. Fogarty 
et al's (1997) examination, for example, of the data gathered by the state 
accountancy board in Ohio as a part of proactive practice review showed that less 
than 10% of the report submitted by accountants (presumably as their best work) 
were error free. Presentation of their findings to the state board, however, 
resulted in no action by the board but rather raised doubts about their research 
findings. Cooper et al (1996) saw the government's desire to promote the UK 
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auditing profession in Europe led it to ignore the needs for strengthening state 
regulation. They also saw the eighth directive being constituted as a mechanism 
for promoting the UK auditing profession rather than as a basis for promoting 
best regulatory practice and improving audit quality. 
Calls have regularly been made in the UK for independent regulation of the 
profession (see Humphrey, 1997). Some researchers see the professional bodies 
as unfit to act as regulator and want an independent regulator to be established 
(Mitchell et al, 1993). Some audit firms have even made similar calls. Nick 
Land, Senior partner at Ernst & Young, said "The present regime of self- 
regulation by various separate bodies which have little or no contact with each 
other is inherently incapable of countering public criticism of the auditing 
profession. " (FT, 9/5/1995, p. 20). Recently the Labour government in the UK 
issued a consultation paper (DTI, 1998) for an independent regulation of the 
profession in fulfilment of their manifesto promise in the 1997 election. The 
paper proposes the establishment of a new body, the Foundation, that will legally 
own the Review Board, the Auditing Practices Board (APB), Investigation and 
Discipline Board (IDB) and Ethics Standards Board (ESB). Members of 
Foundation, who have to be from outside the accounting profession, will be 
nominated by non accountancy bodies (e. g. Bank of England, London Stock 
Exchange). In turn, the Foundation will appoint members of the four boards, 
making sure that at least 60% of their members are independent of the profession 
(representing consumers and wider public interest groups). The profession will 
no longer be controlling ethical issues related to the profession as these will be 
the duty of the new ESB. Similarly, investigation and disciplining of members in 
relation to major audit failures will be conducted by the new IDB that will 
replace the JDS. The Review Board will scrutinise both the activities of the three 
boards under the umbrella of the foundation, together with the activities that will 
still remain under the control of the professional bodies (i. e. monitoring, training, 
qualification, registration and other types of disciplinary actions not covered by 
the IDB). The DTI's paper acknowledges the concerns about the independence of 
the new body given that the profession will be funding that body. Accordingly, 
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the DTI believes that setting up the appropriate funding safeguards is necessary 
to overcome this problem. 
Although the independent regulation of the profession has been heralded as a 
major step in improving the performance and accountability of audit firms, it 
seems doubtful that such development will be capable of regulating the 
international accounting firms. The global nature of auditing firms, which many 
already seen as multinational firms, question the ability of national institutions to 
regulate the profession. In the UK the profession is seen by some 
researchers/politicians as incapable of disciplining international audit firms in the 
UK (Mitchell et al, 1993). Existing regulatory systems were designed to regulate 
small profession rather than international accounting firms such as the Big Six 
(Baker and Hayes, 1997). Therefore, it seems that the feeling of the ICAEW's 
2005 working party (ICAEW, 1996a) that the regulation of the profession would 
be more appropriate at an international level. 
Auditors' liability is another aspect that has strongly dominated the debates on 
regulation. Financial scandals throughout history have led to lawsuits against the 
auditors. Cases against the auditors for negligent work in the UK came as early 
as 1895 in London and General Bank Ltd. (Taylor, 1961) and in USA as early as 
1931 in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co. The courts have instituted a 
process of expanding and limiting the auditor liability throughout these years 
(Napier, 1998, Siliciano, 1997). In the landmark case of Caparo v. Dickman, the 
House of Lords in the UK limited the auditor's liability to the shareholders as a 
group. Several landmarks rulings have influenced the auditor's legal liability in 
the USA (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co limited auditor's liability in 
1931, Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler expanded auditor's liability in 1983 while Bily v. 
Arthur Anderson limited auditor's liability in 1992 - for more details see 
Siliciano, 1997). While the majority of auditors tend to settle their claims out of 
court, the few cases that are heard in court focus on the scope of audit and 
causation and not on issues of auditor's negligence (Gwilliam, 1997). 
In the last decade, financial scandals and audit failures have placed the profession 
under an increasing string of lawsuits for improper audits around the word. 
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Subsequently the liability claims have led the auditing firms to launch a 
campaign to minimise their legal liability. The audit firms portrayed their legal 
liabilities as a doomsday risk and claim that they are being pursued because they 
are seen as having "deep pockets". Walker (1993) claimed that "auditors see 
themselves as victims - poor, innocent bystanders who just happened to 
be in the 
wrong place at the wrong time"(p. 28). They don't see the quality of their work 
as the reason behind such claims. The auditors have been depicting themselves as 
victims of greed and mechanism for investor's insurance against business risks 
rather than as a deficiency in the work and quality of auditing. 
"Claims against auditors are not, on the whole, driven by professional 
malpractice, or for that matter by the existing state of law regarding the 
standards of liability. Claims arise from the economic hazards of the 
clients audited, fuelled by the opportunism, greed and talent of specialists 
in suing the audit profession" (Murray quoted at United Nations, 1996, 
P. 1). 
The profession claims that the joint and several liability role is not fair given that 
the auditor usually pays 100% of claims while he might be responsible for only 
1% of the claims. Many of the legal claims against auditors have been seen as 
frivolous lawsuits (also see Palmrose, 1997). The Big Six audit firms have 
maintained that the growing numbers of legal cases against them makes it 
difficult for them to acquire appropriate insurance coverage. The finding of 
Moizer and Hansford-Smith (1998) seems to support the claim of the Big Six as 
their research showed that Big Six audit firms can only obtain partial insurance 
coverage for some type of risks, while non-Big Six audit firms can receive full 
insurance coverage. They attributed the difficulty of obtaining full insurance 
coverage to the fact that payments for auditor liability have been infrequent and 
that the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiffs is unpredictable. The 
accounting profession also claims that the difficulty of obtaining insurance 
coverage to cover the huge claims against them might lead to the collapse of a 
firm (as it did in the USA with Leventhal & Howarth) and that this fear lead 
many auditors to leave the profession and also makes recruitment of new auditors 
more difficult (FEE, 1996; Dalton et al, 1997). IFAC commissioned London 
Economics (LE) in late 1997 to undertake an independent economic study (LE, 
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1998) of audit liability regimes. The focus of the study was on four main issues. 
These include: 1. the reliance of institutional shareholders and others on the 
auditor as risk insurance in the case of fraud or collapse rather than exercising 
their role in the corporate governance process; 2. the rejection of some clients on 
the basis of the difficulty of auditing them, which in turn restricts their access to 
capital markets; 3. the use of defensive audit practices by audit firms to limit 
such liability, and 4. Whether the threat of liability has a role in improving audit 
quality. LE (1998) claimed that professional indemnity insurance and LLP status 
are not effective in limiting liability as the former might lead to the deep pockets 
syndrome while the later does not protect the assets of the firm. Consequently, 
LE (1998) claimed that there is an economic case for replacing joint and several 
liability with proportional liability and imposing a statutory cap on audit liability. 
The auditing profession is campaigning to limit audit liability both nationally and 
internationally. The main changes sought inter alia are replacing the joint and 
several liability concept with a proportionate liability, placing a statutory cap on 
auditor liability, enabling the auditor to limit his liability by contracting with the 
client and allowing the auditor the freedom of organisational options4. Nationally 
they have teamed up with politicians to lobby their position and gain 
concessions5. At an international level, they have the attention of global 
4 In addition to the major amendments sought above, IFAC (1995) identified the following: Provide 
disincentives for plaintiffs filing frivolous lawsuits; adopt a statutory requirement for professional 
advisors and directors of companies to have adequate insurance cover.; limit auditor responsibilities to 
third parties; strengthen privity standards; and reduce the statute of limitations (for details, see IFAC, 
1995). 
In 1994 in the UK, accounting firms and professional bodies had 16 Members of Parliament on their 
paying list as consultants, including prominent figures such as the former Prime Minister, Edward 
Heath, who acts as a consultant for Arthur Anderson. (The Accountant, December 1994, p. 1 & p. 8) 
Moreover, they employed Ian Greer Associates, a lobbying company close to the former minister Neil 
Hamilton (who was involved with cash for question affairs), to lobby their cause in parliament. In 
America, they contributed $2.3 million to support House and Senate candidates in the 1994 election 
(Shields, 1994). 
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organisations such as the United Nations (UN), International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) and Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE). 
These organisations are communicating the same arguments advanced by the 
audit firms that their role and duties are misunderstood and unfairly criticised. 
Moreover, decreasing the liability of audit firms is being promoted as in the 
public interest (IFAC, 1996, FEE, 1996). IFAC (1996) claimed that "... holding 
all auditors liable for damages to an indefinite number of persons for an indefinite 
amount of money, is, ultimately, not in the public's best interest". Using the 
argument of "public interest" is not something new in the profession, for example 
Lee (1995) showed that the accounting profession, since its formation in the UK 
and USA, has used the public interest argument to promote and protect its 
economic self-interest. 
Summary of Arguments For and Against Limiting the Auditor's Legal Liability 
Advocates of Limiting Legal 
Liability 
Opponents for Limiting Legal 
Liability 
" Legal claims against the auditors " Legal liability safeguard auditor 
are motivated by `Deep Pockets' independence 
rather than the quality of audits " Usually courts limit auditor legal 
" Auditors unfairly targeted as they liability to the company or 
pay 100% of damages while they shareholders and therefore it is 
might by I% responsible difficult to claim against auditors 
" Auditors have difficulty in even if negligent (Caparo Case) 
obtaining indemnity insurance " The auditors overstate their legal 
which makes audit firms liability and it is difficult to verify 
susceptible to bankruptcy their figures and claims 
" Audit firms claim that many people " Many of the legal cases are initiated 
are leaving the profession while it's by audit firms against each other 
difficult to recruit new people as a " Many countries are now providing 
result of concerns over liability more protective organisational 
models (e. g. LLPs) 
" Auditors prefer to settle out of court 
rather than defend their position 
" Introduction of new laws that have 
already limited auditors' liabilities 
Acemoglu and Gietzmann (1997) saw imposing legal liability on auditors as 
possibly being essential to ensure their independence but emphasised that care 
must be taken in imposing a proper level of liability. They claim that setting the 
auditor's liability "too high" might lead to the collapse of the audit market, while 
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setting it "too low" might lead to compromising auditor independence (p. 372). 
Power (1998) argued that while auditors want to limit their liability they don't 
want to go too far in lowering public expectations about what the audit process 
can deliver. He saw highly protective legal judgements, as Caparo, may be 
eroding the value of the audit product. 
Some of the research findings on auditor liability undermine the profession's case 
for limiting liability. Palmrose (1994) analysis of 227 cases filed against auditors 
between the period of 1960-1994 with "complete outcome"6 has revealed that in 
88% of cases auditors were joint defendants and contributed, on average only 
21% of payments. She also concluded that in 53% of the cases, the defendants 
pay between $1 million and $5 million. The analysis showed that in almost half 
the cases, auditors did not pay any damages (48%) and when they are required to 
pay damages, the amount. almost always (91% of the cases) was less than $10 
million. Palmrose claimed that it appears that when auditors are required to 
contribute to defence payments, they most frequently (63% of the cases) 
contribute less than 10%. More often than not auditors are non-contributors or 
secondary contributors to the total amounts paid to plaintiffs. Palmrose also 
observed that when auditors pay 100% of the total defence payments, these tend 
to be in the lower range (less than $10 million). The analysis also suggests that 
auditors are not the only defendants with resources, thereby undermining the 
claim of "Deep Pockets". Auditors tend to be non-contributors or secondary 
contributors even when total payments are large. The study showed that the 
dismissal rate for cases against the auditors (at 48%) was is higher than that of 
other defendants (26%). The high dismissal rate against auditors supports 
Siliciano's (1997) claim that "for years the accounting profession enjoyed a 
relative immunity from liability under the Ultramares rule that was unmatched by 
any other potential defendant class" (p. 349). Fuerman (1999) concluded, from 
his analysis of 446 securities lawsuits filed against companies in the USA during 
6 Palmrose (1994) defined "complete outcome" as cases where the complete outcome of the cases 
known, which is either settlement with plaintiffs to avoid litigation, adjudication (court decisions on 
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the period 1992 to 1995, that "nonculpable auditors were not routinely named 
defendants" in these lawsuits (p. 331). Furthermore, a Law Commission in the 
UK, established to report on the possibility of reforming the law of joint and 
several liability, concluded that "the current systems protect the interest of the 
victims and launching an action under joint and several liability is difficult for 
victims to prove anyway" (DTI, 1996). Professor Andrew Burrows, the head of 
the team that conducted the study, said "the accountants' case for reform was 
flawed, that it was based on `myths', and if successful would undermine an 
historic protection for the victims of professional negligence" (FT, 7/11/96, p. 
16). Different courts in different countries are also proving very reluctant to 
extend auditor's legal liability to third parties. This is clearly seen in the Caparo 
case in the UK, which is being used, by other courts in Anglo-American countries 
as the basis for their decisions to limit liabilities to third parties (e. g. Australia, 
Canada, ). Some researchers have also questioned the motives of the profession's 
liability campaign. In the UK, Mitchell et al (1994) argued that "there is no 
economic, moral or ethical case for giving further concessions to the auditing 
industry" (p. 2). Cousins et al (1998) believe that the liability claims are being 
used to deflect attention from concerns about the performance of audit firms. 
"Recurring audit failures might have persuaded the industry to improve 
the quality of its work, compensate injured stakeholders and even 
consider returning the audit fee. The reverse has happened. The auditing 
industry is campaigning for even more liability concessions to protect it 
from possible lawsuits resulting from its own failure. " (p. 6). 
Cousins et al (1998,1999) saw the evidence presented by the profession as 
selective and not representative. They claim that liability figures provided by the 
profession are unverifiable, overstated, include liability for consulting figures and 
in many cases relate to audit firms suing each other. Sikka and Willmott (1995) 
illustrated that DTI reports in the UK have revealed a web of allegations by audit 
firms against each other7. The Big Six's adoption of lowballing tactics has also 
motions for dismissal, summary judgement, and trails) or judicially approved settlements. 
7A 
recent example is the collapse of Barings Bank Coopers & Lybrand in London and Singapore is 
being sued by Ernst & Young, the group administrator. Coopers & Lybrand - Singapore is also being 
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been blamed for some of their legal liability problems - suggesting that such 
problems are self-inflicted. BDO Stoy Hayward, for instance, criticised the Big 
Six in this respect: 
"It is ironic that in the drive to gain new business, the giant accountancy 
firms have chosen to compete by cutting audit fees at a time when the 
public expectations of auditors are not being met and the rate of litigation 
against these firms is rising rapidly" (Accountancy, June 1995, p. 13). 
The current campaign is enjoying some success in some regions in relation to 
specific calls for limiting the auditor's liability. Auditors are now having the 
chance to incorporate as Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) in the USA and 
Canada, while draft laws for LLP's have just been introduced to the parliament in 
the UK. New laws and regulations limiting the auditor's liability have been 
introduced (e. g. the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was introduced in 
the USA in 1995) or are under consideration (e. g. the Standing Senate Committee 
on Banking, Trade and Commerce in Canada recommended the adoption of 
proportionate liability as a replacement for joint and several liability). However, 
it could be argued that the position of the audit firms is best described by Lee's 
(1992) claim that "they protest too much". A vivid example supporting Lee's 
argument can be seen in the USA where the failures of numerous Savings & 
Loans organisations provided the motive for the accounting profession to launch 
anti-litigation legislation (International Accounting Bulletin, October 25 1995, 
p. 7). In 1995, the American congress passed the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, overriding President Clinton's veto. This new law requires proof of 
fraud to bring a legal action and diminishes liability for secondary defendants, 
such as accountants, who were not knowingly part of a corporate fraud. The act 
also contains stiff penalties for those who file frivolous actions (The Accountant, 
August 10,1997). Moreover, audit firms now can be formed as Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLP) in forty-seven states. Richard Murray (Deloitte & Touche 
Tohmatsu International's liability insurance expert) believes that concerns about 
sued by Price Waterhouse, the administrator of Barings Futures Singapore (BFS). Moreover, Ernst & 
Young and Price Waterhouse are suing Deloitte & Touche Singapore for BFS audits in 1992 and 1993 
(International Accounting Bulletin, 6/8/97). 
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US litigation crises threatening the future of the big audit firms are justified, but 
suspect "the worst may well be over..... Every Big Six firm has at some time or 
another, been the subject of allegedly well substantiated rumours that their 
existence is threatened by litigation. But it hasn't happened and I have no reason 
to believe that it's going to happen in the future" (International Accounting 
Bulletin, May 26 1995, p. 11). However, the American audit firms feel that all of 
these changes are not enough and favour legislation that would limit class action 
lawsuits to federal courts. These firms also want the law to clarify that they 
would only be found liable for conduct that is intentionally fraudulent 
(International Accounting Bulletin, August 6 1997). 
Analysis of the profession's campaign and its supportive research shows how the 
profession is rather selective and contradictory in presenting its case for limiting 
liability. Much of the professional and academic research that supports limiting 
auditor's liability fails to highlight the fact that many of the legal cases are filed 
by audit firms (in capacity as liquidator) against other audit firms. It is easier for 
audit firms as a liquidator to file suits against auditors than for individual 
shareholders or other stakeholders given the limitation of Caparo decision 
(Napier, 1998). The Big Six also fail to acknowledge that many of their 
controversial legal suits against them are related to non-audit services. For 
example, E&Y-USA was hit in late 1997 by the largest-ever-damages claim 
brought against a US accounting firm of $4bn (a claim related to consulting work 
for the failed clothing store chain Merry Go Around, rather than for audit work 
(IAB, 17/12/97). Calls for limiting auditor liability claim that legal cases are 
nothing to do with the quality of audit work but, rather, are motivated by greed 
and misunderstandings of the audit function. Investigations of financial scandals, 
however, undermine these claims. For instance, GAO (1989) investigated 
auditors' work for 11 out of the 29 S&L's that failed in Dallas-Texas between 
1985-1987. GAO (1989) concluded that in "6 of the 11 S&Ls, the CPA did not 
adequately audit/ or report the S&Ls' financial or internal control problems in 
accordance with professional standards" (p. 1). Concerns for the public interest 
are usually advanced as arguments for limiting liability - although, the 
profession's ultimate goal in the UK of replacing joint and several liability was 
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seen by the law commission (DTI, 1996) and Peter Mandelson, the then DTI 
Secretary, as not in the public interest. 
Not withstanding the contradiction between the claims of the profession and 
those of opponents of limiting liability, contradiction are also evident among the 
profession itself. London Economics (1998) study claimed that legal liability 
does not improve the quality of audit, while the AICPA's white paper to ISB 
(AICPA, 1997) argued that auditor liability safeguards independence and makes 
redundant restrictions on providing non-audit services. Further, its study, 
labelled as an independent study of auditor liability, was seen as "biased and 
lacking intellectual rigour" by professional bodies such as ACCA in the UK. The 
ACCA's head of technical services, Roger Adams, indicated that "the paper 
produces a stream of theoretical arguments that are not underpinned by hard 
empirical evidence. " (Accountancy, July 1998, p. 17). The biases of the LE study . 
can also been in the way it neglected the issue of auditor suing each others and 
that legal liability claims also related to non-audit services and ignored the 
limitation of auditor liability to the company (according to the Caparo rulings) in 
the UK. 
2.2.5 The Profession's Response to the Audit Expectations Gap 
The debates that are identified as the audit expectations gap have captured to a 
large extent the problems with auditing and the feelings that it is unable to 
deliver what it should be doing. The debates and problems seem to be triggered 
by major corporate scandals throughout history, which regularly calls for more 
assurance in terms of fraud detection and reporting on internal control. Changes 
in the form of the audit report have also been introduced in the aftermath of 
financial scandals. Debates about auditor independence usually surface as a 
result of financial scandals, as do discussions about the legal liability of auditors 
and talk of changes in auditor regulation. The profession's response to the audit 
expectations gap debate can be characterised as actions mostly driven by 
professional self interest rather than public interest. The popular response for the 
profession is one of blaming the victim, i. e. claiming that the public 
misunderstands the role of the audit function and should be better educated about 
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it (see Liggio, 1974; ICAI, 1992). Introducing new standards in an attempt to 
close the audit expectation gap is another action pursed by the profession. Baker 
(1993) saw the issuing of the nine Audit Expectation Gap standards in the USA 
in 1987 as designed to foil any attempts by Congress or the SEC to change the 
self-regulation of the profession. He doubted the effectiveness of such standards 
in terms of reducing the conflict between the auditor's duty to the public and the 
need to satisfy audit clients. 
The profession over the last hundred years has played an active role in limiting 
its responsibility. It seems paradoxical that given the level of audit scandals 
around the world the accounting profession, rather than providing what the 
public wants from auditing (e. g. fraud detection, non-ambiguous audit reports), is 
calling and campaigning for limited legal responsibility. This negative response 
from the profession, however, is criticised as being nothing new. 
"Because of the limitations of the procedures at hand, auditors came to 
the conclusion that they were no longer responsible for detecting fraud. 
And over time, the number of other things for which they decided they 
weren't responsible grew-and grew. Finally, auditors arrived at the 
conviction that they aren't responsible for anything. " (Walker, 1993, 
p. 28). 
Many of the profession's efforts to address the expectations gap show that it 
responds to the concerns raised by the gap without making much change to the 
auditing function. Educating the public about auditing, issuing audit 
expectations gap standards and limiting audit liability do not entail changes in the 
way auditing is conducted. Fogarty et al (1991) labelled the profession's 
response as a strategy of "doing nothing". They concluded that this strategy of 
doing nothing requires extraordinary effort but it revealed a profession able not 
only to survive but also prosper. Henderson's (1997) analysis of the response of 
the Australian profession to the expectation gap, revealed the adoption of a 
variation of this strategy in the 1970's and 1980's. In the 1970's the profession 
kept silent on the issue, blaming no one until the confidence crises in auditing 
had passed. In the 1980's, successive professional committees were appointed to 
examine the expectation gap issue until the crisis withered. While the strategy of 
doing nothing might indeed be crucial for the survival of the profession, 
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however, it seems to fail to bridge the expectations gap. 
Initially the issues or problems identified in the expectations gap gives the 
perception that the problems are contemporary. The profession claims that 
constantly changing public expectations and its endeavour to meet these 
expectations are the main culprits. As Shaun O'Malley, (then) Chairman and 
senior partner at Price Waterhouse wrote 
"Some observers have suggested that public expectations are a constantly 
moving target. Any effort on the profession's part to meet these 
expectations at a given point in time seems to generate newer and even 
more unrealistic expectations. The resulting disappointment produces 
more criticism of the auditor's performance, more litigation, and more 
pressure for even further expansion of the auditor's responsibilities" 
(O'Malley, 1993, p. 85). 
However, these problems generally seem to be fairly constant if one looks at the 
historical analysis conducted during the 1980's and 1990's. Briloff (1993) 
highlighted the continuity of the profession's problems in his testimony to the 
American congress in 1985 under the title "Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme 
chose". He explained his title to the congress noting that it 
"... was the third occasion when I was invited by that Congressional 
Committee to present my views regarding the effectiveness of the 
accounting profession in the fulfilment of the responsibilities vested in it 
by society, and the effectiveness of the securities and Exchange 
Commission in the fulfilment of its oversight role. " (p. 73). 
Briloff (1993) showed that the same problems and issues he testified on in 1976, 
1982 and 1985 were still persisting in the 1990's but in higher magnitude and 
with more significant implications. The profession's control over the audit 
expectations gap debates and its management of these debates to its own 
advantage has been blamed for the persistence of such gap. Power (1997) has 
argued that the audit expectations gap is an asset for the profession. In 
controlling the audit expectations gap debates, the profession can blame 
unreasonable audit expectations for the concerns with auditing rather than 
deficiencies in that function. Moreover, the profession's limited response to the 
expectations gap, which usually do not entail changes to the audit function, can 
be used to depict the profession responding to the changes in users' expectations. 
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Besides the claim that the profession is controlling the expectation gap, others 
blame the profession for the creation of the expectation gap. While Liggio 
(1974) attributed the expectation gap to an education problem, he acknowledged 
that the profession is partially responsible for the creation of the gap. 
"... It is not fair to blame only the user of the financials for this 
misunderstanding-for this expectation is aided and abetted by the 
profession. The accounting profession helped create these expectations 
when, in the mid-1930's, it successfully tried to have its report (opinion) 
on the financial statements of a company considered as a "certificate. " 
(Liggio, 1974, p. 29). 
Other researchers have also argued that the profession is behind the creation of 
one of the important element of the expectation gap, i. e. the liability crisis. 
"What auditors know and what different parts of society expect and desire 
auditors to be capable of knowing will not always, or ever, coincide. This 
means that the question of auditor liability will never be decisively 
solved, that pressures always exist to push the auditor in new directions, 
that auditors are constantly tempted to create expectations of what they 
can achieve,... " (Power, 1998, p. 79). 
Miller (1999) blames the "moral and ethical degradation of the accountancy 
profession" for the liability problems (p. 355). In addition, Sikka et al (1998) 
acknowledge the role of the profession in creating the expectation gap but they 
believe that other factors impact on auditing. They have argued that it is 
impossible to eliminate the audit expectations gap given the difficulty of agreeing 
on the meaning of audit. They illustrated through the examination of the history 
of association of auditing to detection and reporting on fraud in the UK that 
"pressures to refine or revise the meaning of audit are closely linked to the social, 
economic and political developments of the time" (p. 320). 
2.3 Growth of the Auditing Function 
Power (1994) argued that auditing has never been placed under so much 
criticism. Yet the profession is more dominant in communicating its point of 
view. A classic example can be seen in the issue of auditor liability. The 
profession has dominated the auditor liability debate depicting itself as the victim 
of a deep pockets syndrome whenever major financial scandals arises. It is 
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becoming very difficult to argue against the profession's claims and campaigns 
given the fact that these pursued in global contexts. Auditor liability has become 
an international problem and one that has to be resolved in a global context. 
International organisations have taken an interest in the problem of auditor 
liability. For example, the United Nations organised a symposium on auditor 
liability in 1996, IFAC conducted international survey of auditor liability in 1996 
then followed it by commissioning London Economics to undertake what is 
depicted as independent research on the issue. FEE undertook its own study of 
auditor liability in 1996 while the European Commission in its Green Paper in 
1996 concluded that it was difficult to legislate on auditor liability at the EC level 
but then, after pressure from the profession, it agreed to launch a detailed 
investigation of the auditor liability. The profession's power can be seen in the 
case of PW and E&Y in the UK where they took a major role in getting LLP law 
to be enacted in Jersey. Cousins et al (1998) saw the two firms as trying to "hold 
the parliament to ransom", to force the government to introduce a LLP law in the 
UK (p. 38). 
The dominance of the profession is most visibly expressed in its ability to thrive 
despite all the audit scandals and accordant worries about the quality of the audit 
function. The last three decades have witnessed considerable expansion in the 
work and revenues of the Big Six (Big Eight before 1989) accounting firms 
around the world. The annual fees of these firms was about $44bn in 1996 (see 
Table 2-1). National Economic Research Associates8 (NERA) concluded in its 
report published in 1992 that the Big Six in Europe were the largest in terms of 
fees and in terms of staff. The study revealed that the Big Six audited 100% of 
the top 200 businesses in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands and controlled more 
than half the audit work in Germany and Portugal. In 1996, the Big Six also 
controlled most of the audit market in countries like the UK, the USA, Japan and 
Germany (Nobes and Parker, 1998, p. 447). There has to be some suspicion that 
8 NERA was commissioned in 1989 by the European Commission/Union's competition directorate to 
help the European Commission assess policy options (such as auditor rotation, providing non-audit 
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audit markets are becoming saturated, while the trend in international corporate 
mergers and acquisitions creates fewer large clients and puts audit firms under 
pressure to keep their audit clients. This saturation in the audit market has made 
the Big Six pursue the middle tier audit market in countries like the USA and the 
UK to guarantee their revenue growth. Peel (1997) study of auditor 
concentration in the UK showed an increase in the Big Six's concentration in the 
audit market for listed companies reaching 78.4% in 1994/1995 and 47.9% for 
public unquoted companies. His analysis also revealed that the Big Six in 
1994/1995 were auditing a substantial 58.2% of companies in the UK middle 
market (£5m to £200m sales range). Belkaoui (1985) reported a similar pattern in 
the USA in the 1980's. 
Tnhla 9.1 _ 
RavpniuPC and Qrnwth of the Rip Six Wnrlrlwirle 
Name 
1996 
Revenues 
($/million) 
1995 
Revenues 
($/million) 
1994 
Revenues 
($/million) 
1996 
Growth 
rate(%) 
1995 
Growth 
rate(%) 
Anderson Worldwide 9,498.5 8,134.1 6,700.0 16.8 20.9 
KPMG 8,100.0 7,500.0 6,600.0 8.0 13.6 
Ernst & Young 7,800.0 6,900.0 6,015.0 13.0 14.2 
Coopers & Lybrand 6,800.0 6,200.0 5,500.0 9.7 12.7 
Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu International 
6500.0 
' 
5,950.0 5,200.0 9.2 14.4 
Price Waterhouse 5,020.0 4,460.0 3,975.0 12.6 12.1 
Source: International Accounting Bulletin, 21/12/1995, p. 7 and 13/12/1996, p. 8. 
Another strategy for the Big Six to maintain growth is to pursue international 
expansion in 'virgin' markets - where they did not practice before. These firms 
are now offering their services in virtually all parts of the world from the former 
communist countries in Europe to communist China9. The expansion of the Big 
Six from developed capitalist countries to such new regions is part of their plan 
to create a global audit market. The growing strength of the harmonisation effort 
for accounting standards is seen as beneficial for both international accounting 
firms and individual accounting practitioners (Chandler, 1992). Harmonised 
practice and lower barriers to entry would give auditors the opportunity to 
practice in almost any country they wish to work in. This opportunity to lower 
services to audit clients etc.. ). 
9 Price Waterhouse was the first Big Six firm to establish full fledged member firm in communist 
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barriers to accounting practice is strongly emphasised in Europe (FEE, 1996, EC, 
1996, ICAEW, 1996a). Calls towards an international audit qualifications is seen 
by some of the Big Six as necessary for the free movement of auditors around the 
world. Recently, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) adopted the Disciplines 
on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector (WTO, 1998) directed at 
removing barriers for trade in accounting services in countries committed to the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The regulation, prescribes 
guidelines on licensing and qualification requirements and procedures that should 
be considered to remove any restrictions on freedom of practise. 
Despite the international growth of the Big Six, NERA's study controversially 
concluded that these firms were not "genuinely considered international firms but 
rather networks that share resources". Nevertheless, recent developments 
suggest that audit firms are closer to becoming global audit firms. The ICAEW's 
2005 working party (ICAEW, 1996a) prediction that the Big Six will globalise 
further and emerge as the Big Five or Four is gaining ground as recently four of 
the Big Six were in the process of merger sighting globalisation as their 
motivations for the merger. Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse 
succeeded in gaining the approval for their merger from regulators around the 
world creating the world's largest accounting firms in July 1998 with combined 
fees for both organisations exceeded $13bn. The newly merged firm cited the 
increasing globalisation of their clients as being behind their move. The 
combined firm claimed that it "will have the global reach, the global strength, 
and the integrated management structure to meet the future challenges and 
opportunities our clients will face" (C&L, 19 September 1997, 
http: //www. us. coopers. com/news/091897. html). On the other hand, the merger 
plan for KPMG and E&Y was called off by E&Y as a result of client and 
regulatory pressure. Nick Land, E&Y-UK's senior partner said "There is no 
doubt that, around the world, regulators were going to take a very tough view of 
both of these mergers. Part of that was the client reaction, which was never 
brilliant in the UK - clients were ambivalent or neutral about it at best - but it had 
China in December 1996 (International Accounting Bulletin, 23/1/1997, p. 1). 
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spread to other countries and has fuelled the increase in regulatory concern. " 
(The Accountant, March 1998, p. 5). Accordingly, KPMG pursued another 
medium for becoming a global audit firm. KPMG's chairman, Colin Sharman, 
told partners from around the world that "for years we have been talking about 
being more global. Now we are going to make it happen. " Mr Sharman created 
a global leadership organisation and, tellingly, the top jobs are not held by 
partners with a national role (FT, 17 September 1998). 
Multi Disciplinary Partnerships (MDP), also known as the one-stop shopping 
service (and identified in the ICAEW (1996a) report as characteristic of the future 
of accounting firms) are already taking place. Audit firms providing legal 
services is the fastest form of MDP in Europe. MDP are already in place in 
countries like Germany (where it is legally possible) while in other countries 
changes in the law are being made. For example, in the UK the Law Society is 
under pressure from the labour government and the Office of Fair Trading to 
remove a ban in its rules on the forming of the MDP (IAB, 17 December, 1997). 
Also the French government has appointed a former minister to assess the 
possibility of legalising MDP (The Accountant, September 1998, p. 5). In 
January 1998, PW's global network of affiliated law firms covered 38 countries, 
with PW Russia's law department being one of Moscow's leading firms 
(European Accounting Bulletin, 22/1/98). Even the in USA, it seems the grounds 
are prepared for the establishment of MDP's - given that the landmark case filed 
by Texas lawyers against Arthur Anderson accusing it of engaging in the 
unauthorised practice of law in the state was dismissed by the Texas court (The 
Accountant, September 1998, p. 5). 
It is important not to view the rise in auditing revenues in absolute terms as 
auditing is decreasing as a percentage of the total revenues of the Big Six firms. 
Hanlon (1996), for example, documented the decrease in the contribution of audit 
to the total income of audit firms in the UK and Europe, a development caused by 
the growth rate in management consultancy and corporate finance. Currently the 
Big Six are rated at the top of the ten best consulting corporations around the 
world (see Table 2-2). It has been predicted that these firms will grow further in 
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this field in the future (see ICAEW, 1996a) - especially given the advantage that 
these firms have in using their close relationship with their audit clients to 
provide additional consulting services. Of additional significance is that audit 
itself seems to be assuming a more consulting orientation at the leading edge of 
audit practice. 
Table 2.2 - The World's Ten I. arpest Consultancies Ranked by Revenues 
1996 1995 Growth Effective Number of 
Number Total 
Firm Revenues Revenues 
rate(%) date consultants of staff ($/million) ($/million) partners 
Anderson 
Consulting 
5,302.0 4,224.0 25.5 Dec 96 37,389 1,036 44,801 
Ernst & Young 2,010.4 1,523.0 32.0 Sep 96 10,657 n/a n/a 
McKinsey & Co 2,000.0 1,800.0 11.1 Dec 96 3,994 587 7,527 
KPMG 
International 1,836. Ob 1,544. Ob 18.9 Sep 96 10,763 888 11,888 
Deloitte & 
Touche 
Consulting 
1,550.0 1,200.0 29.2 Aug 96 N/a n/a 10,000 
Group/DTTI 
Coopers & 
Lybrand 1,422.0 1,221.0 16.5 
Sep 96 8,511 564 10,298 
Arthur Andersen 1,379.6 1,169.5 18.0 Aug 96 N/a n/a n/a 
Price Waterhouse 1,200.0 964.0 24.5 Jun 96 8,900 470 10,300 
Mercer 
Consulting 1,159.2 1,056.4 9.7 Dec 96 N/a n/a 9,241 
Group 
Towers Perrin 1,001.3 867.9 15.4 Dec 96 6,500 635 6,888 
Source: Management Consultant International, 16/7/1997. 
2.3.1 Re-engineering the Audit Function 
The last few years have seen a growing public recognition by senior members of 
the profession that audit needs to change. Gerry Acher, Head of the ICAEW's 
Audit Faculty and Head of Audit at KPMG put the need for change very clearly: 
"During the last two decades, the auditor has fallen away from being the 
company's key adviser and in many companies no longer sits at the top 
table. But this must be reversed; auditors, if they are to provide a service, 
add value and act as an adviser must earn their way back to the top table. 
But they cannot do it alone. " (KPMG Press Office, 1996). 
Similarly, Jon Madonna, the former Chairman of KPMG, stressed that audit 
firms have to adapt to this new reality. 
"The traditional service revenue is declining. It's a fact, okay? You can't 
get enough revenue from this stuff to exist 20 years from today. The only 
way you can do it is you've got to do new stuff. Okay? This is the deal: 
All of these firms, including ours, are almost 100 years old. We have 
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been in the same business all 100 years. This business is really in big 
change, okay? So now there are three options. You can deny it. Or you 
can profitably wind down. Or you can change. Those are the three 
options. Okay? It is very difficult for people to accept that, very 
difficult. " (Quoted in Financial World, 27/9/1994, p. 30). 
The ICAEW's 2005 working party on the future of chartered accountants also 
believes that income and employment opportunities in traditional auditing will 
fall. One clear dimension in the response of the large accounting firms has been 
to seek to re-engineer the audit function, with what is referred to as Value Added 
Audits. Philip Laskawy, the international chairman of Ernst & Young, explains 
the concept: 
"The idea is to help the client improve the way they operate their business 
as part of the audit process, mainly focusing on market intelligence and 
business processes. So we give the client good advice on how they can be 
more efficient or better at what they're doing. That's not an additional 
consulting service. That's part of the audit. " (Quoted in Financial World, 
09-27-1994, p. 30). 
The UK audit profession adoption of the added-value audit strategy is seen as an 
attempt to make audit `sexy' (Accountancy Age, 27 March 1997, pp. 12-17). 
The added value audit has a number of different dimensions including changing 
the audit mentality from 'find and fix' to 'anticipate and prevent', providing both 
internal and external audit functions, moving the audit scope beyond the 
accounting department to the business as a whole, changing the focus from the 
balance sheet to a business-wide examination (Accountancy Age, 27 March 
1997, p. 12-17). The ICAEW's 2005 (ICAEW, 1996a) working party expects the 
Big Six to grow faster than the underlying economy by exploring the 
opportunities in added-value areas such as tax planning, corporate finance and 
business advice. 
This promotion of added value audits probably had its roots in the mid to late 
1980s (for a discussion see Humphrey and Moizer, 1990). Since then, and aided 
by developments in risk based methodologies, that added-value dimensions of 
the audit have not been seen as 'bolted-on' free extra services, but coming directly 
from the business focus/orientation of the audit. Auditors have become more 
concerned with understanding key risk areas and key business processes in going 
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about their audit work. At profession-wide level during the late 1980s/early 
1990s, many of the development reports exploring future development 
possibilities were rather narrowly concerned with audit expectations gap's related 
issues including attempts to enhance auditor reputation and deter change in the 
regulatory environment. For instance in the UK, the APB's (1992) consultation 
paper "The Future Development of Auditing" was issued in an attempt to address 
some of the controversial issues incorporated in the audit expectation gap (e. g. 
independence, liability). Similar understanding can be seen in the 1993 
conference held in London on "The Future of Auditing Practice and 
Regulation"10. However, as with the promotion of value-added audits, recent 
studies/reports reflect a broadening in focus. 
Official reports (e. g. see ICAEW, 1996a, AICPA, 1997, CICA, 1996, CICA, 
1998, ICAA/ASCPA, 1997, ICAA, 1998) no longer seem to be concerned 
primarily with the audit expectations gap, nor are they aiming at improving the 
reputation of the auditor and fend of intervention by regulators. Rather these 
reports appear more concerned with redefining auditing and exploring new 
opportunities for growth for accountants beyond financial auditing. These 
studies attribute the change of focus to their claim that the audit market is static 
in many western countries and that rapid growth in this market is unlikely in the 
future. The effects of competition and cost cutting exercises on audit fees are 
also being identified as a source behind such change. The advance of information 
technology and the need for providing assurance on the accuracy of information 
is also a major reason. The reports can be categorised into two groups: reports 
concerned with the future of the profession in general, while other reports are 
focusing on new opportunities in new "assurance services". The first type of 
reports are more concerned with the forces that are going to influence the future 
of the certified or chartered accountants and what their role will be in the future, 
especially in the first two decades of the new millennium. The discussion of 
10 The main topics in the conference programme included among others: evidence on the audit 
expectations gap, strategies for eliminating the expectations gap, regulation of the profession, fraud and 
the auditor, reforming the audit report. 
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these issues was instigated in the UK by a consultation paper undertaken by the 
ICAEW's 2005 working party. Similar debates in the USA, Canada and 
Australia have been promoted through vision projects or taskforces. These 
"vision" reports or projects have tried to identify a mission statement (the needs 
the profession serves and the core competencies it posses) and a vision statement 
(identifying the market forces and competition that is going to shape the future). 
The vision projects in the USA and Canada were based on the findings of focus 
groups, interviews and questionnaires, while the Australian assurance project is 
based on the assessment of the other vision reports/studies and the ICAEW's 
study. Regardless of the name of the report or project or the way it gathered, the 
reports seem to address similar issues. They identify the prominent drivers for 
change (i. e. growth in information technology, static growth in the audit market, 
change in work patterns, globalisation or internationalisation of business). The 
implications for accountants are highlighted both in terms of sectors and 
discipline. The studies also explore the key opportunities for growth in the future 
(e. g. growth in internal auditing, new types of multidisciplinary audits, new 
assurance services etc. ). 
New assurance services are one of the key opportunities that have been examined 
by an assurance committee in the USA and by a task force in Canada and 
Australia. The reports highlighted a shift from auditing to business or 
information assurance services. The AICPA (1997) assurance committee, known 
as the Elliot Committee after the name of its chairman, and the CICA (1998) 
Task Force on Assurance Services are setting the agenda for this shift. The joint 
Assurance Services Task Force to the Institute of Chartered Accounts in Australia 
(ICAA) and the Australian Society of CPA's (ASCPA) have adopted the 
American agenda. The AICPA report predicated that even though financial audit 
is no longer a growth area, it is important to provide a "door" for new assurance 
services. It highlights that in order to use auditing as a background for promoting 
these services it would be useful to enhance the image of auditing in detecting 
fraud and illegal acts to promote the reputation of the auditor as an obvious 
choice for providing the new services. These reports view the development in 
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information technology and electronic commerce as creating demand for 
assurance services in terms of the accuracy of information and the legitimacy and 
reliability of the electronic commerce provider. The profession acknowledges the 
fact that unlike statutory auditing, accountants do not have a statutory monopoly 
over assurance services. Accordingly, they feel that it is imperative for the 
profession to establish itself as the obvious provider of assurance services given 
their access to audit clients and their claimed reputation for independence, 
concern for the public interest and quality control systems in place. The 
profession feels that it is important to acquire new competencies in order to be 
competing for the new services. The need for new competencies and assurance 
services require change in the education curriculum. The assurance committee 
felt that users of the financial statements wants more than traditional periodic, 
historical, cost based financial statements. They want real time/continuous, 
perspective, value based and comprehensive (including relevant non-financial) 
data and therefore audit firms needs to develop assurance services around the 
needs of the users. The report sees the focus of assurance shifting from reliability 
to relevance. The AICPA (1997). identified six core opportunities while CICA 
(1998) identified nine opportunities, with both institutions already setting up 
committees for Web Assurance and Eldercare. 
The profession seems to be promoting itself as the best provider of such services 
based on what are quite controversial and highly debated qualities (i. e. reputation 
for independence, concern for public interest, quality control system - matters 
which have all been included as a core elements of the audit expectations gap). 
This questionable position might explain the recent tackling of the independence 
issue in the USA and the establishment of the Independence Standards Board, the 
AICPA White Paper to the ISB highlighted the issue of new technology and new 
services as a reason for needing to address the issue of independence. Concern 
for the public interest is another debatable issue that the profession promotes as 
one of its strengths. This claim stands in contrast to the recent campaigns where 
the profession strongly calls for abolishing the joint and several liability law 
despite such changes being opposed by the Law Commission in the UK (DTI, 
1996) for being against the public interest. Advancing the public interest to 
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promote professional self interest has been well documented 
in historical 
analyses of the profession (e. g. see Willmott, 1989; Hanlon, 1996). Indeed, 
professional studies have highlighted the importance of limiting auditor liability 
in order to grow and provide new services. This might explain the surge in the 
profession's campaign to limit liability in an inherently riskier environment 
where the demand for faster, online corporate reporting. It might well be that the 
legal liability campaigns of the profession go beyond the current litigation 
problems to cover the potential liability difficulties that might emerge from 
providing new assurance such as Web Trust (for discussion of auditor liability for 
Web Trust, see Pacini and Sinason, 1999). 
Much of the development and debate on the future of the profession and the 
assurance services are limited to Anglo-American countries, with no such 
debates taking place in other contexts. This highlights the fact that many of the 
profession's services are designed in Anglo-American contexts and only 
subsequently applied to other contexts that might have different cultures and 
needs. The profession seems like it is on a discovery mission for what it is going 
to be the role of professional accountants. This discovery process is an ongoing 
one that has not stopped with the publication of the recent studies and reports. 
The AICPA published its assurance report only on an electronic format in the 
Internet as it is going to update it on a continuing basis. The same can be seen 
with the work of the CPA Vision Project in the USA, which is based on the 
Internet, with people commenting and introducing their ideas on a continuous 
basis. 
Many of the new developments seem to be introduced by the audit firms to 
sustain revenue growth rather than in response to public interest demands for 
change in audit technologies. It is questionable to what extent the re-engineered 
audit is being demanded by the auditor's clients or the users of financial 
statements. Some changes have not always been unanimously supported by Big 
Six firms. For example, Rodger Hughes, partner at Price Waterhouse, believes 
that "this over selling of audit is a product of the recession is not in the interest of 
the profession as it creates more confusion about the audit and widens the 
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expectation gap" (Accountancy Age 27 March 1997, p. 12-17). Humphrey et al 
(1992) saw audit reforms as a protective measure aiming to safeguard the status 
quo and showed how the profession promoted these extra services as an 
extension to an accepted product rather than as response to a defective product. 
Hatherly (1997) interpreted the re-engineered audit as a supply-sided 
phenomenon which is used merely as a vehicle for the big auditing firms to show 
off their skills; he said "after all, if executives want consultancy services they 
would surely prefer to buy as required rather than face a compulsory purchase 
order by their statutory auditors" (Accountancy Age, 17/4/1997, p. 17). Indeed it 
is predicated that if these new services do not add any benefits for the clients it 
will fail. 
"If what you are planning to do truly adds value for the clients, you can 
benefit from creating that additional value. If it doesn't do anything extra 
for the clients and just benefits you, then it is almost certainly 
unsustainable, and will fail. " (Maister, 1997 p. 179). 
The proposed changes in the auditing and assurance function tend to affect 
certain key dimensions of the audit function. The value-added audit seems to 
shift the role of auditing from compliance based to more consulting-advisory 
services. This change in role is affecting the most fundamental role of auditing, 
i. e. auditor independence. Klarskov Jeppesen (1998) argued that combing 
auditing and consulting under the process of the re-invention of auditing makes 
auditor independence no longer possible. These changes and transformations in 
the auditing function makes difficult to understand what is the auditing and 
where it is going. 
Regardless of the position and role of auditing, the never-ending issue of the 
expectation gap would appear to have become less dominant in recent years. The 
large audit firms appear relatively immune to the negative publicity created by 
audit scandals. This immunity has been attributed to the decentralised way these 
firms are organised in one country (Kaplan, 1987), that is if one firm in the same 
country has been acting unprofessionally that would not be taken as 
representative of its work in other countries. Moizer's (1997a) study of auditors' 
reputation in five countries revealed that top tier audit firms tend to be associated 
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with a higher quality service in most of these countries. He also concluded that 
top tier audit firms make an economic difference either directly in the form of 
higher fees or indirectly in the form of more favourable market prices for audited 
companies. Other research by Moizer (1998), which compared corporate 
management's satisfaction levels with auditors in the UK in both 1987 and 1996, 
revealed that auditors are still highly regarded for the service they provide. 
Accordingly, the Big Six are growing and dominating the audit market around 
the world despite clear conceptual worries with the status of auditing in the 
academic literature. 
2.4 The Lack of Evidence on the Work of the Big Six, Especially in 
Non Anglo-American Contexts 
The above discussions have shown how the development of the accounting 
profession has been besieged by doubts and criticisms of the profession in 
several key areas throughout most of the last hundred years or so. Despite all the 
audit scandals and the persistence of the audit expectations gap, the accounting 
profession increasingly represented via the Big Six firms, has been constantly 
growing in many parts of the world. The Big Six have expanded into new 
regions such as Central and Eastern Europe to overcome the problem of 
stagnated audit markets in the developed western world. This market stagnation 
also seems to have led to the re-inventing or re-engineering of auditing. The 
current and expected future development in information technology has led the 
accounting profession to explore and contemplate the future of the profession and 
what type of services it is going to provide. 
While audit firms are supposed to make the work and operations of corporations 
and organisations transparent, they elect to disclose very little about their 
operations and results. These firms work behind closed doors would only 
publish limited information about their work and their results. For instance, 
recently in the UK, the Big Six has even stopped disclosing the annual table 
showing each firm's income. However, a few audit firms (KPMG, Ernst & 
Young, BDO Stoy Hayward and Pannell Kerr Forster) have set precedents by 
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publishing, for the first time in the UK's history, full financial statements. 
KPMG's publication was in compliance with the requirement for incorporating 
its audit section as a limited liability company "PLC-Style". 
KPMG senior partner Colin Sharman said, "The very high percentages in 
favour of financial disclosure by and auditing of large accountancy firms 
is clear indication that clients want openness. No one criticised KPMG 
when we revealed our financial information and maybe others should be 
considering following our lead. Clients have a right to expect financial 
disclosure from the very people who inspect their own books. 
Employees, too, have a right to know a firm's full financial performance" 
(http: //www. kpmg. co. uk/uk/about/press/961014b. html). 
The publication of the financial statements of the other three firms was 
interpreted as an attempt to fend off rumours about the viability and position of 
these firms (FT, 5/12/1996, p. 11; The Accountant, January 1997, p. 12). 
However, once LLP is enacted in the UK, all audit firms that chose to become 
LLPs will be required to publish its financial statements. The secrecy of some of 
the Big Six is obsessive to a degree where the spokesperson of Arthur Andersen, 
even refuses to identify the countries in which the firm operates, claiming it is 
proprietary information (Shields, 1994). 
The literature clearly shows that there is still a great deal that remains to be 
understood about auditing in practice and the audit firms that conduct it. 
Hopwood (1996) argued that despite the overriding importance of auditing to the 
accounting profession and its regulation, auditing "remains a relatively poorly 
understood phenomenon" (p. 217). He thought that most of the research on 
auditing either focused on the economic aspects of auditing or its technical 
aspects highlighted in the professional pronouncements. He believed that it 
would be more fruitful to study "audit in action" focusing on the wider 
"organisational, regulatory and societal contexts in which it functions" (p. 218). 
There are a number of research papers in Anglo-American contexts that 
challenge the profession's claim of neutrality, professionalism and care for the 
public interest. Some of this research has questioned the findings of audit 
judgement research (for a summary of audit judgement research see Trotman, 
1998) that hypothesises that the auditing process to a large extent is a cognitive 
one. Instead, the auditing process is seen as one that also involves "gut feel" 
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(Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Pentland, 1993). Power (1995) also argued that 
the professional audit judgement process is influenced by social factors, as the 
approval of peer groups is essential to accept an action as a professional 
judgement. Humphrey and Moizer (1990) similarly found that audit planning 
activities are mythological as they were less scientific and more rationalistic than 
was widely believed. Pentland (1993) saw audit mechanics or rituals as a way 
for the auditing engagement team, the audit firms and the investing community to 
believe in the numbers or to "get comfortable with them" (p. 620). The ritualistic 
nature of the auditing process was also seen as a way of hiding professional 
conflicts of interest and providing legitimacy for the profession's controversial 
actions (Mills and Bettner, 1992). Other research has questioned the profession's 
commitment to serving the public interest (Willmott, 1989, Sikka et al, 1989), its 
claims of a liability crisis (Cousins et al 1998,1999; Green, 1999) and the 
independence of auditors. Hendrickson (1998) argued that the auditor was never 
independent. 
"In my view, auditors were not independent of their clients in the basic 
relationship either in fact or in appearance when Congress passed the 
Securities Act of 1933 (The Truth in Securities Act). Nor are they 
independent of their clients today and for the same reason: the basic 
auditor-client relationship creates a direct conflict between the auditor's 
professional responsibilities to investors and the public and their 
opportunities for personal gain. " (Hendrickson, 1998, p. 501). 
Few case studies have investigated the development of auditing in practice, with 
even fewer case studies being conducted in a non Anglo-American context - 
although several accounting journals have started to develop such studies in 
recent years (e. g. European Accounting Review, Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, International Journal ofAuditing). 
The current domination and spread of the, Anglo-American originated, Big Six in 
audit market of many parts of the world is seen as one of the main factors behind 
the global domination of the Anglo-American accounting model (Briston, 
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1989)1 1. The strategy of the Big Six to expand into a new or virgin audit markets 
will most likely lead to further expansion of the Anglo-American model. The 
involvement of the Big Six in devising audit laws in Eastern Europe might also 
lead to the spread of the Anglo-American model - as Seal et al (1996) have 
acknowledged regarding the role of the Big Six in advising the Czech 
government on setting laws. Moreover, the strong UK/US influence on the 
major international accounting organisations (e. g. IASC, IFAC) is also seen as 
responsible for the spread of the Anglo-American model. However, even if one 
assumes that the Anglo-American model is fault free and satisfying the 
expectations of users in Anglo-American context, that does not provide sufficient 
justification for adopting it into other contexts. Assuming that the Anglo- 
American model is relevant to other parts of the world seems to ignore the 
economic, societal and political factors in such different countries. While the 
main types of users of financial statements around the world maybe similar, their 
needs are different in each country. Accounting and auditing practices also play 
different roles in corporate governance processes in various countries around the 
world. Vanasco's (1996) survey of the issue of independence in several countries 
led him to conclude that the effectiveness of auditor independence might be 
hindered in the different cultures. Indeed difference in culture and accounting 
practice among the members of the European Union was attributed to the failure 
to harmonise independence rules in the Eighth Directive (Evans and Nobes, 
1998). The disagreement over the issue of Anglo-American domination can also 
be highlighted within members of the European Union, such as the preference in 
Germany for the application of the prudence principle. If Western countries in 
the EC are in disagreement over the principle then it is no wonder if some of the 
Anglo-American models and concepts are not accepted in other parts of the 
world such as in Asia and Arab countries. 
Further, the Anglo-American model of accounting is riddled with problems and 
11 This spread is also attributed to other factors such as British colonialism, the UK professional 
accounting institutes influence on the accountancy bodies in former British colonies, economic aid 
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criticisms in Anglo-American countries (where this accounting model was 
conceived to cater for particular economical and social needs). Therefore, 
applying or moulding the Anglo-American accounting model into different 
contexts should not be taken at face value. A good example can be seen in the 
vague British concept known as "True and Fair View". Britain fought hard to 
include it in the European "Fourth Directive", without having a definition of it in 
either the Companies Acts, Accounting Standards, Auditing Standards or 
Professional Pronouncements (Walton, 1993). In addition, no body in Britain 
seems to know exactly what the term really means, with auditors having 
reservations about the phrase and believing that it is likely to be applied 
inconsistently by the European community member states (see Higson and Blake, 
1993). Consequently, if a developing country wants to benefit from the Anglo- 
American model then they should examine the experiences of non Anglo- 
American countries in adopting that model and what lessons can be learned. 
Evidently, more studies are needed to examine the audit function and 
international audit firms in non Anglo-American contexts, especially given the 
fact of Anglo-American domination and the ICAEW's 2005 working party's 
(ICAEW, I996a) anticipation of the further spread of the Anglo-American model 
in the future. 
The last few years have seen an increase in calls for better understanding of the 
work of the Big Six in non Anglo-American countries and in regions where 
auditing has just recently been introduced. Hopwood (1996), furthermore, 
highlighted the limited number of studies on the internationalisation of auditing. 
Research on the role of auditing and audit firms in non Anglo-American contexts 
started developing with the emphasis on such issues in a number of various 
European countries (mainly examined in the European Accounting Review). The 
increased importance of the auditing function and the need to focus on the 
international aspects of that function led to the launch of the International 
Journal of Auditing in 1997. Recent examples of this type of research can be 
seen in studies on the development of the auditing profession in Greece. In his 
agreements (Hove, 1986) and registration in the US stock exchange. 
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examination of the Greek auditing profession between 1945-1955, Ballas (1998) 
argued that it did not emerge in response to the needs of the capital market, as is 
usually the case in Anglo-American countries. Rather it was established by the 
Greek state to promote its interests - the Greek government believing auditing 
was a useful mechanism for economic and political control. Caramanis (1999) 
examined the conflict between the Big Six and the local firms over the 
liberalisation of the audit market in Greece. He concluded that the Big Six's 
lobbying of the Greek Government was the major reason behind the liberalisation 
of the audit market in the early 1990's, as the Big Six firms (previously) were 
restricted from performing statutory audits. Caramanis (1998) found that the Big 
Six were not viewed as better in Greece. He also argued that the liberalisation 
process changed both auditor behaviour and audit practice in Greece, placing 
more emphasis on providing consulting services and less on public audit 
functions. There have also been studies recently of the emerging accounting 
profession in the Central and Eastern European countries. Cooper et al's (1998) 
examination of the entrance of one of the Big Six audit firms in Russia showed a 
process of nationalism and imperialism. The North American firms sought 
involvement in Russia to serve their multinational corporations that invest there 
while the Europeans saw the expansion as an opportunity to invest in new 
markets. Auditing in Central and Eastern Europe countries has also been the 
focus of other studies such as those focusing on various issues relating to 
auditing in the Czech Republic, including the development of the profession 
(Seal et al, 1996), the quality of auditors (Sucher et al, 1998), the changing role 
of audit (Sucher and Zelenka, 1998). However, very few, if any, of these studies 
focus on auditing in the Middle East and the Gulf States. Needles' (1997) 
examination of international accounting research published in the International 
Journal ofAccounting during the period 1965-1996 showed very little research in 
that journal about accounting in the Middle East (only nine throughout the period 
- and just one article about accounting in Kuwait in the period of 1986-1996). 
There is virtually no published research on the audit expectations gap or any of 
the major issues that constitute the gap in this geographical region. Most of the 
research on auditing in the Gulf States tends to focus on comparative studies (e. g. 
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Al-Hussni, 1989) and empirical studies (e. g. Al-Mudhaf, 1990). Further, the only 
research on auditing and the accounting profession in Kuwait that has adopted a 
critical perspective have been presented in conferences (Fakhra, 1996a, 1996b, 
1999). 
2.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has sought to capture the key dimensions of debates on auditing 
expectations. It has tried to illustrate the problematic nature of the audit function 
throughout history, especially in the aftermath of major financial scandals, and 
discussed the form and content of the so-called "Audit Expectation Gap". The 
profession's long-standing response to the gap has been to blame the public for 
misunderstanding the role of auditors and call for better education and methods 
of communications to be improved. The profession typically seems either to 
disclaim more responsibility (e. g. limiting auditor liability) or embark on 
simplistic measures (e. g. changing the format of auditor report), which regularly 
get shown to be ineffective in terms of reducing/removing the gap. In the 
profession's defence, it has to be said that empirical research and surveys often 
give conflicting results or arguments, with the subject seeming to be one of 
endless debate but limited action. This may be a direct reflection of a lack of 
available information on the practice and impact of audit work- and the 
profession desire for audit to remain a relatively 'mysterious' function. It might 
be even argued that the profession is now well capable of living with the audit 
expectations gap. After all, the negative publicity of corporate collapses and the 
talk of an expectations gap has not restricted the global growth of the audit 
function (and the revenues of the Big Six audit firms) throughout most of the 
developed world. Thus, while there are growing doubts about auditor 
independence (see Hendrickson, 1998; Hopwood, 1998; Klarskov Jeppesen, 
1998) or concerns over the real nature of any claimed liability crisis (See Lee, 
1992; Cousins et al, 1998) the profession is seeking to expand and develop with a 
re-engineered audit function, placed under a broad umbrella of professional 
services (seeing attempts to acquire law firms in different parts of the world as a 
part of multidisciplinary firms). The profession is active in studying the future of 
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the audit function and role of assurance service. Expanding into emerging audit 
markets (e. g. China, Eastern Europe) has become an increasingly popular 
strategy for audit firms to sustain their growth rates. 
This chapter has argued that the profession and its major firms are expanding into 
such regions and providing new services without a clear independent vision of 
what auditing is really achieving. A lot of research has highlighted the social, 
political and economical aspects of the audit function and questioned claims that 
auditing is a technical, neutral, professional task. Nevertheless, many research 
issues still remain relatively unexplored in relation to auditing and the work of 
audit firms in practice. This is especially so in non Anglo-American contexts 
and emerging democracies with very recent audit histories. To date, most of this 
latter research has focused on auditing in European countries (mainly on Western 
Europe), with very few, if any, studies focusing on the role of auditing and the 
accountancy profession in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf region in 
specific. There is a need for better understanding of auditing in this region, 
especially given the economic power of countries in this part of the world and the 
clear differences in culture and social traditions. 
The literature on the history of auditing has shown that doubts and criticisms of 
the profession are usually felt in the aftermath of corporate scandals. In many of 
the financial scandals the mythology of the audit function has failed to live up to 
the expectation of the public. In this study, the collapse of the Kuwait 
Investment Office's investments in Spain in 1992 will be examined in order to 
enhance the understanding of the work of auditing firms in a non Anglo- 
American context. The focus will be largely on the role of auditors in Kuwait 
(the main investor in the case) but also to lesser degree on the auditors in the 
countries that played a major role in the investments (that is Spain and Britain). 
Examination of the British experience in auditing provides a useful benchmark, 
given Britain's long history of democracy, with accounting and auditing used as 
corporate governance tools and the profession being self regulated. 
The re-introduction of democracy in Spain in the mid 1970s, after the death of 
General Franco, allows the opportunity to study auditing in a newly established 
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democracy. Spain's membership in the European community and the adoption of 
the fourth directive was met with very positive attitudes and the beliefs that 
financial reporting would be more transparent and there was little sign of major 
audit expectations gap. However, this attitude seems to have changed after a 
string of recent financial scandals in Spain (e. g. Grupo Torras, Banesto, PSV) 
and talk of an audit expectations gap has started to emerge (Garcia Benau and 
Barbadillo, 1996). Therefore, the Spanish connection is especially useful, 
showing the audit function in a developed nation with a non Anglo-American 
model and where the perception of auditing is shifting from positive to negative. 
Unlike Britain and Spain, Kuwait is a developing nation and a new democracy in 
the Gulf region. Therefore, it provides an additional comparison, and offers the 
opportunity to see what role is being played by and expected of auditing - and to 
what extent Anglo-American traditions of corporate governance are being 
followed. In practice, the thesis will examine the people's perception of auditing 
and auditors after the scandal of KIO's investments and other scandals and 
corporate collapses of recent years, assessing the extent to which there is an audit 
expectations gap Kuwait. The study will also explore the role of auditors in both 
the private and public sectors in Kuwait (i. e. the Audit Bureau and Audit Firms), 
as both types of auditors were involved in the KIO case. 
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3.1 Introduction 
There is an extensive range of texts that address the different research 
methodologies in accounting and other fields. There are books that discuss 
research methods in general (Bell, 1991, Robson, 1995). There are those that 
discuss specific methodologies, such as case studies (e. g. Hamel et al, 1993, Yin, 
1994, Stake, 1995), while others discuss research methodology in specific fields. 
Gill and Johnson (1991) focused on research methods for managers while Ryan 
et al (1993) concentrated on those in the field of finance and accounting. Rather 
than listing the relative strengths and weaknesses of all the available research 
methods (something which is adequately covered in existing methodology texts), 
this chapter seeks to clarify the basic aims of the research undertaken here and the 
reasons for selecting the various research methods. 
The chapter starts with an outline of the aims of the study and discusses how 
these are addressed through both qualitative and quantitative research methods - 
in the form of a detailed case study and a major questionnaire survey. The 
chapter details the construction of the case study and summarises the approach 
taken with the questionnaire survey (more details about the questionnaire are 
provided in Chapter 9). The methodological strengths and the limitations of the 
study are considered, with the final part of the chapter reviewing a range of 
problems encountered in conducting the research. 
3.2 Aims of the Study 
The literature survey in the previous chapter has shown that despite the growth of 
auditing in recent times it still remains a problematical phenomenon with very 
little known about it beyond the claims of what it supposedly can deliver. 
Hopwood (1996) argued there is little understanding of the audit function in 
practice and called for more studies of auditing in action in different national 
settings. The main focus of audit research has been on Anglo-American 
countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, USA). Accordingly, Garcia 
Benau and Humphrey (1992) have called for more studies of auditing in non- 
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Anglo-American context, while Christiansen and Loft (1992) highlighted the 
importance of examining the increasing internationalisation of the auditing 
function. Such calls have produced studies of auditing in its international context 
in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in Asia (see Sakagami et al, 1999; Ping Hao, 
1999). Despite such development, very few studies have used case study 
research. This study hopes to contribute to the limited research on auditing 
in 
practice through a detailed case study of the collapse of KIO's Spanish 
investments. The case is also useful in examining auditing in the non Anglo- 
American contexts of Kuwait and Spain. Studying auditing in a Kuwaiti context 
is not limited to the case study but extends to the questionnaire survey of the 
audit expectations gap in Kuwait. This examination of the audit function in 
Kuwait will contribute to the limited research on that function in the Middle East 
in general and in the Gulf states in particular. Indeed, it is surprising that very 
little research on auditing in the Gulf region has been conducted given the 
economic power of the Gulf states, the nature of Islamic society and the 
worldwide nature of the investments being made by Arabian corporations. The 
case study will also examine auditing in Spain, a non Anglo-American country, 
that returned to democracy in the mid 1970's and embraced auditing in the late 
1980's. It will be interesting to analyse how auditing has fared after the positive 
way statutory auditing was received in the late 1980's. 
The focus of the case in relation to the role of auditing and auditors starts with a 
documentation of the role of the different auditors in Kuwait, Spain and London. 
This will involve exploring what auditors did or did not do before the scandal?. 
The literature shows that corporate collapses usually lead to debates about 
auditing and audit firms. Consequently it will be useful to see if such findings can 
be seen in Kuwait and Spain after the financial scandals in both countries in the 
early 1990's. This will address the perceptions and responses of the public, 
government and media to the role of auditor from the collapse of KIO and other 
organisations in Spain and Kuwait (e. g. Were they blamed? Were they criticised 
by the press? Were they sued? ). The study will also examine the role of the 
accounting profession and the responses of the Big Six international firms to the 
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fallout from the scandal (e. g. How did they react to the collapse? How did they 
defend themselves? ). Further, the involvement of the Kuwaiti Audit Bureau and 
external auditors in the operations of KIO provides an opportunity to explore the 
role and the comparative status of the public and private audit. The case will 
reflect on what auditors delivered in practice and the extent to which this differed 
from people's general expectations of auditors. 
3.3 Chosen Research Methodology 
Humphrey (1997) identified three approaches to audit theory - philosophical, 
market based and critical, stressing the value of moving beyond procedural 
perspectives on auditing. Moreover, Dillard (1991) advanced the critical social 
science perspective to study crises in accounting. In undertaking this thesis, I 
have adopted a critical perspective in the sense of not accepting claims of 
auditing as a neutral, technical process and maintaining a desire to question 
official perceptions of auditing. This study seeks to achieve such a task through 
multiple research methods. It uses both an international case study and a 
questionnaire survey. The case study is well suited to examine the claim made 
for auditing and what it achieves. The fact that the work and action of auditing 
firms is difficult to observe and often can only be seen when financial scandals 
and audit failure unfold, makes a case study an appropriate way of examining the 
role of auditing in an international context. Additionally, the questionnaire 
survey will present an empirical examination of the issue of the audit 
expectations gap in Kuwait. It will be an interesting tool to see how auditing and 
audit firms are perceived in Kuwait in the aftermath of major corporate scandal. 
Hooks (1991) argued that the sole use of an empirical research method is unable 
to explain social behaviour. Accordingly, the dual use of both quantitative and 
qualitative research methodologies is useful in overcoming the shortcomings of 
an exclusive reliance on one type of methodology. 
3.3.1 An International Case Study 
Much of the Big Six's work is based on their claims to expertise and 
professionalism. However, these claims are often challenged or look questionable 
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when audit scandals unfold. These scandals offer the opportunity of examining 
the audit function in its operational settings, taking into account the social, 
political and economical aspects of auditing. Lee (1993) felt that corporate 
failures are useful to emphasise general points about auditing. However, he 
thought that given the limited number of complete court cases it is "wrong and 
potentially misleading" to make judgements solely on press reports (p. xiv). Lee's 
arguments could repudiate the use of scandals as a valuable source of information 
for studying auditing practice, given the fact that many financial scandals are 
settled out of court. However, in contrast, Stamp (1980) considers financial 
failures to be a very important source for studying the secretive audit function. He 
saw such secrecy as keeping very low the likelihood of discovering audit failures. 
Consequently, examination of audit scandals can serve to improve auditing given 
the amount of information available from the investigation of the failures; 
information which would otherwise not have been available. Erickson et al 
(2000) seem to agree that audit failure provides a research opportunity that 
otherwise wouldn't be possible. They argued that their ability to examine auditor 
deposition testimony and audit working papers (papers usually not available for 
examination by researchers) in civil legal cases against auditors of the failed 
Lincoln Savings and Loan, made their case study "uniquely suited to provide 
insights into important unanswered questions" (Erickson et al, 2000, p. 3). Knapp 
(1996) saw the examination of case studies as a part of teaching students about the 
real life outcome of audit failure for society and the profession. Frecknall Hughes 
et al (1998) argued that incorporating audit scandals into the auditing curriculum 
can serve to expose students to a "more realistic picture of the audit function in 
practice" (P. 89). Stamp (1980) felt that studying audit scandals enabled the 
mistakes of the past to be avoided -a point emphasised in other 
editorial/commentaries in the professional press: 
"... anyone who has been following the corporate collapses and financial 
scandals of the last eighteen months cannot avoid a sense of dejä vu. It is 
inevitable as it is right that questions are bound to be asked. How could a 
set of respected professionals be made so irrelevant, so malleable by just 
one man, however remarkable? The problem is that for all the 
accountancy profession, all questions in relation to corporate governance 
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and the role of the auditor have been asked before. And yet neither the 
leading firms nor the leaders of the institutes seem prepared to do 
anything beyond muttering platitudes to try change the situation. How 
many billions must disappear, how may huge companies crash before 
accountants and auditors act decisively?... Events say the profession 
should act decisively to put its own house in order. Recent history 
suggests it will do nothing of the sort" (opinion in Accountancy Age on 
the scandal of Maxwell, 12/12/91, p. 14). 
"It has long been held a truism that those who ignore history are doomed 
to repeat the mistakes of the ? ast. With this in mind, it would seem 
appropriate at the end of the 20t century to retrace the development of the 
public accounting profession in the United states to see what guidance the 
past may offer to the future. " (Wallace Olson, former president of the 
AICPA, the CPA Journal, July 1999). 
Recently case studies in accounting have become more widely accepted and used 
as a research method in accounting, especially in the field of management 
accounting and control. The case study is seen as a mechanism for exploring an 
alternative perspectives on accounting. In his definition of the characteristics of a 
case study approach, Yin (1994) argues that it investigates contemporary 
phenomena within a real life context; in situations where the boundaries between 
phenomena and context are not clearly evident and multiple sources of evidence 
are used. However, there is a recognised shortage of case study research in 
accounting (Scapens, 1990, Ryan et al, 1992) and in auditing in particular 
(Hopwood, 1996; Ashton and Cianci, 1998). Furthermore, Humphrey and 
Scapens (1996) argued that many critical accounting case studies has been based 
on research disciplines outside the accounting research. They indicated that case 
studies can move beyond the illustrations of a particular social theories to a 
bigger role in terms of developing social theories of organisational accounting 
practice 
The KIO scandal can be seen to be a case study with much potential in that it 
offers the opportunity to study auditing and work of the international audit firms 
in a truly international context, covering countries such as Spain, Kuwait, and 
UK. The analysis of the case was conducted using different sources. These 
included interviews with key figures close to the KIO scandal and its 
investigation, the financial statements of Grupo Torras and major subsidiaries, 
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the reports of the official investigation of the KIO affair in Kuwait, Spain and 
Britain. and press reports of the case in Kuwait, Spain, UK and other countries. 
3.3.1.1 Interviews 
The secrecy that surrounds the operations of KIO/KIA meant that a great deal of 
information about these institutions and their operations was not publicly 
available. Numerous researchers (Al-Awadi, 1975, Al-Temeemy, 1993, Al- 
Ebraheem, 1991) have sighted the difficulty of analysing KIO's operations and 
strategies given the fact that KIO operations have always been one of Kuwait's 
precious secrets. Given this, interviews with key officials about the collapse of 
KIO case was seen as an important method to clarify and gather information that 
is not publicly clear or available. Securing interviews with people close to 
KIA/KIO was not simple given the secrecy of these organisations and the 
ongoing nature of legal procedures in Spain and London against the former 
managers of KIO and GT - both parties in the legal cases preferred not to 
comment until the cases were resolved. Despite these difficulties, interviews 
were secured with eleven people with current (i. e. at the time of the interview) 
close involvement with KIA/KIO or were involved in investigations of KIO/KIA. 
This was done mainly through informal channels (i. e. friendships or personal 
recommendations) and in most cases anonymity was guaranteed. However, some 
of the people interviewed were reluctant to disclose much information, sighting 
their unawareness of certain issues, while others claimed that they didn't 
remember some of the issues. A common observation among a number of 
interviewees was that they knew little about the role of auditing and that of the 
external auditor at KIO (especially the role of the external auditor before the 
establishment of KIA). This put considerable emphasis on obtaining information 
from other sources including official investigations, judgements. 
The former senior managers of KIO had been expected to be the most informed 
people about the history and the role of the external auditor of KIO given their 
long employment in the London office. However, it was not possible to secure 
interviews with some key former managers of KIO and Grupo Torras who were 
being legally pursued by GT in Spain and in Kuwait. Communication was made, 
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after a lengthy exercise to find his contact address, with the 
lawyer of a former 
manager about the possibility of conducting an interview. The 
lawyer indicated 
that his client would need information as to whom I had already interviewed as a 
prerequisite for me being granted an interview. His request was 
denied as I had 
promised to preserve their anonymity. In order to clarify the role of the external 
auditor of KIO and KIA , 
KPMG-London, was contacted. KPMG- London, 
however, was also reluctant to grant an interview or to disclose even the simplest 
information about their audit of KIO/KIA (e. g. Were they the auditors of KIO?, If 
so, from what date? ) citing client confidentiality and referring me to KIA in 
Kuwait (this issue is discussed in more details in Chapter 8). 
Interviews were also conducted in Kuwait to explore certain general aspects 
concerning the role of the auditing profession in Kuwait. These interviews were 
conducted randomly with a qualified auditors from the Big Six, medium audit 
firms, small audit firms and the Audit Bureau. The topics for discussion included 
the history of the accounting profession, the perception of the Big Six in Kuwait, 
competition in the Kuwaiti audit market, the quality of services provided by audit 
firms, perceptions of the Audit Bureau and views of the laws governing the work 
of audit firms. These topics were also discussed with a number of financial 
controllers at various companies, commercial loans lending officers, and a 
representative from the Ministry of Commerce (the profession's regulator). 19 
interviews were conducted in relation to this part of the study. 
3.3.1.2 Additional Information Sources for the Case Study 
In constructing the KIO case study, sources of information have been drawn from 
Kuwait, Spain and the UK - in three different languages. Reports of the official 
investigations of KIO's investments conducted by the Kuwaiti Parliament in 
1993 and the Kuwaiti Audit Bureau in 1993 and 1994 have all been examined, as 
have the financial statements of Grupo Torras and selected subsidiaries before 
and after the collapse of the group. Additional sources has involved examining 
the sanctioning reports of the Spanish auditor of GT (published by ICAC the 
Spanish regulatory body) and the legal judgements of the High Court and the 
House of Lords on whether the British/English courts have jurisdictions to hear 
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the civil case filed by Grupo Torras against the former managers and other parties 
alleged to have played a part in misusing group funds. These judgements spell 
out the full legal allegations made by Torras against the former managers and 
others (including accountants and accounting firms). The study also considered 
the legal judgement of the case filed by Grupo Torras against the former 
managers of KIO and GT that was handed out in the last few months of writing 
the thesis. 
Published information in newspapers printed in Kuwait, Spain, England and USA 
was used as an additional major source of data for undertaking the case study. 
The difficulty of relying on newspapers rests in the belief that they usually have 
political or other specific agendas and consequently try to promote one position 
over the other'. Nevertheless, the newspapers can be reliable when considering 
the official documents and occasionally confidential documents which they obtain 
and publish in full (e. g. the resignation letter of former members of KIO's board - 
see appendix 1). In addition, the Kuwaiti newspapers' publication of the full 
transcripts of parliamentary sessions each week can be a credible source of data. 
Moreover, the interviews conducted by the press with key figures responsible for 
the collapse of GT can directly communicate the point view of these individuals, 
something that otherwise wouldn't be possible given their reluctance to talk to 
researchers. Furthermore, the accuracy of information reported was checked with 
primary and secondary sources whenever possible. For example, the accuracy of 
some of the transactions reported in the press were discussed in the interviews. 
Financial figures reported in the press were checked with those in the financial 
statements. 
Researching the case study was made rather difficult by the lack of academic 
papers or books about KIO and its operations. The huge scale of the scandal did 
'This can be seen in Spain where the Kuwaiti members of the new management team of GT perceived 
some Spanish newspapers (El-Pais) to be supportive of KIO's position or to have aversion to de la Rosa 
(Diario 16) while others (El-Mundo, Expansion) were seen as supportive of de la Rosa and critical of 
KIO (for more details see the FEAC, 1993b). This can also be vividly seen in Kuwait. For example, 
after the parliament's questioning of the Kuwaiti finance minister in July 1997, the merchants' backed 
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not stimulate much additional independent analysis. A Kuwaiti author has 
contributed to the issue with a series of three one sided books (Al-Hajiri, 1993a, 
1993b, 1995)2, although these have tended to be a visible justification of the work 
of the former managers and a personal attack on the new managers. In the same 
sense, Whittington's (1993) book about De la Rosa and KIO, was very critical of 
the new managers of KIO and sought to convey De la Rosa's argument that the 
new managers are the main reason behind the collapse of GT. A Spanish book on 
De la Rosa (see Perez and Hocajo, 1996) took a more critical view of his actions. 
However, as with the other books there is a worry as to the balanced nature of 
arguments put forward and all of them spend little, if any time, discussing the role 
of audit. 
3.3.2 Questionnaire Survey 
To complement the specific findings emerging from the case study, a 
questionnaire survey was designed to obtain more general reflections on the KIO 
case and to examine the issue of the audit expectation gap in Kuwait. The 
questionnaire was circulated to four separate groups - auditors from audit firms, 
auditors form the Audit Bureau, users of financial statements and financial 
directors. The questionnaire survey addresses three main issues. First, it seeks to 
examine expectations of the audit function in Kuwait and the role of auditors 
from both audit firms (private sector) and the Audit Bureau (public sector). 
Secondly, it explores specific issues relating to the KIO case and people's 
perceptions of the role of auditors in the KIO scandal. Finally, the questionnaire 
explores attitudes toward different proposals to improve corporate governance in 
Kuwait. The questionnaire comprises four main sections: Audit Firms, Audit 
Bureau, KIO Case, future of Corporate Governance in Kuwait. The Audit Firms 
section includes issues such as the role and quality of external auditors and the 
auditing process, legal responsibility of auditors to shareholders, the status of the 
statutory requirement for two independent external auditors in Kuwait and the 
daily newspaper, Al-Qabas, reported in 16/7/1997 that the questioning was a success while the Al- 
Sabah backed, Al-Watan, reported the questioning as a failure. 
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regulation of audit firms. The Audit Bureau section addresses the role played by 
the Bureau and how successful it is at different activities. The KIO section 
addresses issues relating to the collapse of KIO's investments in Spain, including 
the respondents' familiarity with KIO's auditors, the degree of information made 
public about KIO's activities, why KIO was audited externally and whom they 
consider to be the most independent auditors in Kuwait. General questions are 
also asked about the KIO scandal and who was perceived to be at fault for the 
collapse of Grupo Torras. Finally, the questionnaire seeks views on ways to 
improve the future of corporate governance in Kuwait. 
3.4 The Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
A major strength of the study lies in its international span. The KIO/GT case 
covers the work and reactions of auditors in three different countries. The study 
also manages to combine a detailed analysis of audit practice in a case of 
international scope and significance, with a questionnaire survey exploring 
perceptions and implications of the scandal in Kuwait. The survey generated a 
very good response rate of 45%, adding strength and validity to its findings. The 
survey is also noteworthy as it allows for a comparison of views on the work of 
auditors in the private and public sectors. Overall, it stands as the first empirical 
survey of auditing and the audit expectations gap in Kuwait. The significance of 
the study is enhanced further by the wide range of methods which have been used 
to generate research findings. Behind the case history and survey construction, 
lies a very considerable amount of work interviewing key players, analysing 
academic and professional articles on auditing, corporate governance and broader 
social traditions (in three different languages) and reviewing in detail a range of 
official regulatory reports and court judgements. 
The study has some limitations. It might be argued that the KIO case is a one off 
but many of the issues in the case are, nevertheless, evident in other scandals in 
Kuwait and other parts of the world. For instance, strong management 
2 There is a belief that the former managers used a fake author name to produce these books to attack 
the character of the new managers and promote their image. 
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influencing the audit process is a common theme in many of the audit scandals. 
Such recurrent themes raise conceptual questions about general standards of audit 
practice. The study did not attempt to visit Spain given the difficulty of 
conducting interviews in Spanish, but has sought to compensate by a detailed 
documentary evidence of the GT affair. One limitation of the questionnaire 
survey is that there was no ex-ante view of auditing in Kuwait before the collapse 
of the KIO case. This makes it difficult to say if the audit expectation changed in 
Kuwait after the scandal. However, the survey is useful in showing what people 
generally think of auditing, private audit firms and the Audit Bureau in the 
aftermath of the scandal. 
3.5 Problems Encountered Researching the Case 
The involvement of members of the elite families in the KIO's scandal and the 
secretive tradition of KIO was a problem for the conduct of the research. While 
undertaking the case study of KIO, I encountered discouraging attitudes from 
many people in Kuwait. At one point in time, an official from my sponsor, 
Kuwait University, told me "don't get us into trouble". Other senior KIA official 
told me that the KIO scandal is "a mine-field" while some volunteered to provide 
me with publicly available legal documentation but then appeared to have second 
thoughts and tried to avoid me. At one point, a very senior KIA official, when he 
saw my questionnaire survey, accused my supervisor of using me to do research 
on behalf of the former managers of KIO. The case usage of Spanish materials to 
examine the KIO study led to a lengthy translation process using scanning 
equipment and translation software (from Spanish to English). This task was a 
cumbersome and lengthy process which also required the use of specialised 
dictionaries. Difficulties were also experienced in attempting to acquire several 
references and sources. For instance, the parliament has gathered a number of 
documents about the KIO case from their investigation of the KIO affair in 1993. 
Communication with the parliament was made for copies of, or access to, these 
materials. However, the parliament only provided very limited and not very 
useful materials sighting that the rest are confidential (despite some of them being 
publicly available in the UK - e. g. see, Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
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Report, 1988). The restriction of information was not restricted to KIO affairs but 
was seen in other issues relating to audit firms. For example, the Fatwa and 
Legislation department at the Ministry of Justice conducted an investigation in the 
mid 1980's on the collapse of the unofficial stock market, known as the Al- 
Manakh Crisis. This investigation was reported to have found several audit firms 
involved in unprofessional practices. Communication was made with the head of 
the investigation team about the report but he indicated that he couldn't release the 
report and suggested that I should contact the Cabinet Assembly about it. The 
Secretary General of the assembly told me that it does do not have contact with 
the public and he reverted me back to the head of the investigation team for a 
copy. The poor organisation and availability of data makes the task of researching 
auditing and the accounting profession not a simple task. Al-Rashed (1996) 
asserted that examining the accounting profession in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) is a "mission impossible" due to the lack of statistical data on the 
profession. This seems to be the case, as when I contacted the Ministry of 
Commerce in Kuwait, the profession's regulator, it did not have information about 
the profession at hand. It took the ministry two months to prepare me a simple 
table showing the number of registered auditors in Kuwait. In putting together 
this thesis, I have sought to overcome such difficulties to the best of my abilities 
and economic/political resources. The case material in chapters 7 and 8 still leave 
some questions unanswered but in the circumstances this was inevitable. That 
said, the case material possibly stands out as the most detailed and broad ranging 
assessments of the KIO/GT affair currently in the public domain. Together with 
the questionnaire survey it allows for some detailed and timely reflections on the 
role and the advancement of auditing in non-Anglo-American contexts. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the limited studies on auditing in practice in non 
Anglo-American contexts, with the collapse of KIO's Spanish investments being 
used as a vehicle for examining auditing in Kuwait and Spain. The involvement 
of members of the royal family in the scandal of KIO and the secretive nature of 
KIO have not made the research task an easy one. The litigation proceedings filed 
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in Madrid and London between KIO/GT and its former managers likewise did not 
help in terms of access. The study tried to overcome the complexity and the 
difficulty of acquiring facts and information about the KIO through interviews, 
press reports, financial statements and reports of official investigations. It is 
difficult to acknowledge one correct and absolute view on the KIO case, the 
primary purpose of the study has been to use the available sources of evidence to 
explore the context within which auditing in being practised in developing 
democracies such as Kuwait (and to a lesser extent, Spain) and the implications of 
the case for the case for future operations of such a system. The study's 
combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods offers the best 
possible way, in the circumstances, of studying the details of audit practice in 
actions and considering the key policy issues regarding the accountability of audit 
in Kuwait and the shape and significance of corporate governance in Kuwait. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The state of Kuwait is situated in the North east of the Arabian Peninsula with an 
area of 15228 sq. km. Its northern border is shared with Iraq and the Western and 
Southern borders are shared with Saudi Arabia. In addition, a neutral zone 
between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was partitioned in 1966, giving Kuwait an 
additional 2590 sq. km of land. The 199-km gulf coastline borders Kuwait from 
the east. There are ten Kuwaiti islands', none of which are populated. The 
population of Kuwait in 1995 was approximately 1.58 million, 41.6% of whom 
are Kuwaitis. 
The foundation of the nation of Kuwait can be traced to the early eighteen 
century when a clan of the Anaizz tribe emigrated from the northern part of 
central Arabia to Kuwait, which was under the province of Al-Hasa2 at that time 
(Abu-Hakima, 1983). Kuwait later secured its independence from Al-Hasa, with 
the first tribal election for sheikhdom being conducted in 1756. The first sheikh, 
Sabah the First, was chosen from the Al-Sabah family, who have ruled the 
country ever since. During the eighteenth century Kuwait strategic harbour, 
which provided a land route for Indian imports to Syria via Kuwait, grew in 
prominence, gaining much trade from ports in Iraq, the Persian occupation of 
Basra and its harbour from 1776-1779, and conflicts between Britain and Persia 
(Al-Ebraheem, 1980). The development of the Kuwaiti harbour enabled Kuwait 
to prosper, with people duly migrating to it from neighbouring countries. 
Moreover, the Persian occupation of Basra and a widespread plague encouraged 
the migration of Iraqi merchants (and their capital) to Kuwait. The British owned 
Eastern India Company shifted its business from Basra to Kuwait as a result of 
the disputes between Britain and the Ottomanian Empire by the late 1770's 
(Assiri, 1994). Britain also switched its desert post from Zabiar3 to Kuwait in 
' One of the islands, Failaka, was densely populated in the pre-gulf war period. 
2 Al-Hasa is a province in Saudi Arabia. 
3A town in Southern Iraq. 
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1775. This shift marked the first official relations between Britain and Kuwait 
(Al-Ebraheem, 1980). 
Kuwait's harsh weather and infertile land made the sea its major source of income 
in the eighteenth century. Kuwaiti traders sailed from Kuwait to India and Africa 
to trade in pearls, dates, and gold. Diving for pearls was prominent in Kuwait 
while fishing was common too (but able to satisfy local consumption - Khouja 
and Sadler, 1979). 
The Kuwaiti-British relations flourished in the nineteenth century, with Sheikh 
Mubarak, Kuwait's ruler, signing an agreement in 1899 with the British Empire 
that turned Kuwait into a British protectorate. This agreement was the result of 
the Kuwait sheikh's concern with his position if a proposed joint plan went ahead 
for Turkey and Germany to build a railway from Central Europe to the harbour of 
Kuwait. The British were not enthusiastic about another country competing and 
controlling the gulf area and the trade route to India. The agreement required 
Kuwait to seek Britain's permission before leasing, disposing or giving 
concession to any individual power of land in the sheikhdom. British consent 
was also required from Kuwait before it could receive agents or representatives of 
foreign governments (for the full text of the original agreement see Abu-Hakima, 
1983). Even though, an agreement existed, there was no official declaration by 
the British government stating that Kuwait was under its protection until 1914 
with this coming after the outbreak of the first world war, in which Sheikh 
Mubarak joined the British in their fight against the Turks in Mesopotamia4. This 
recognition stated that Kuwait was an independent government under the 
protection of the British empire. Before he died in 1915, Sheikh Mubarak 
established what is still the current system in Kuwait, whereby a new ruler is 
chosen from his descendants (Khouja and Sadler, 1979). 
There were several negotiations for oil drilling concessions in Kuwait during the 
ruling period of Kuwait's tenth ruler, Sheikh Ahamed Al-Jaber. But, none of 
4 An ancient region in part of what is now Iraq. 
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them were successful until 1934, when the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (British) 
and Gulf Oil (American) secured a joint concession and established the Kuwait 
Oil Company (KOC) with initial capital of £50,000. KOC signed a 75 year 
agreement with the Sheikh of Kuwait; entitling Kuwait to annual royalties on any 
oil extracted (Khouja and Sadler, 1979). The exploration started in 1935 and oil 
was discovered in 1938, but drilling ceased between 1942-1945 due to the 
outbreak of the Second World War (Al-Ebraheem, 1980). The first Kuwaiti oil 
shipment was in 1946 and quite rapidly, oil took over from pearling, seafaring 
and fishing as Kuwait's major source of income (Khouja and Sadler, 1979). 
Kuwait granted other oil drilling concessions after the end of World War II. 
Six days after the declaration of Kuwait as an independent state on June 19th, 
1961, Iraq claimed Kuwait as an Iraqi territory and was intent on capturing it. 
However, the Kuwaiti government swiftly signed a protection agreement with the 
British government a week later, which was followed by British soldiers being 
sent to Kuwait to deter Iraq from its aggression (Joyce, 1998). In 1961, the 
Kuwaiti dinar replaced the gulf rupee5 as the official currency of Kuwait (Al- 
Bahar, 1986). The high cost of acquiring the rupee and the fluctuations in its 
exchange rate made Kuwait think of issuing its own national currency. A basket 
of undisclosed foreign currencies (with the dollar believed to have had the 
highest share) was used to set the exchange rate of the Kuwaiti Dinar currently 
equals (1KD = £2). In 1962 an election was held in Kuwait to establish the 
Constituent Assembly and to draft Kuwait's constitution. Having achieved its 
purpose, the Constituent Assembly was superseded in 1963 by the first Kuwaiti 
elected Parliament, starting a democratic system of government in Kuwait. Two 
3 Prior to the First World War several currencies were changing hands in Kuwait such as the 
Indian rupee, the gold English pound, and the Ottamanian lire. Nevertheless, the significance rise 
of the trade relations between Kuwait and India after the First World War made the Indian rupee 
the official currency in Kuwait. The high demand for the Indian rupee prompted the Indian 
government to introduce a special rupee for the Gulf countries in 1959 (Al-Bahar, 1986). 
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years later, in 1965, Kuwait was recognised as the one hundred and eleventh 
member of the United Nations. 
Kuwait has grown enormously from the 1960's to the 1990's and is now one of 
the richest countries in the world. The huge wealth of Kuwait has made it 
susceptible to attacks by Iraq and history repeated itself in August of 1990 when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait and claimed it as an Iraqi province. However, the world 
community stood up to this aggression from the beginning. Twenty-six countries 
participated in the allied forces that ended the suffering of Kuwaiti citizens, who 
for seven months were hostages to the terror and aggression of the Iraqis. The 
aftermath of this occupation left Kuwait in turmoil, with 613 oil wells set alight 
by the Iraqi troops and the raging fires causing one of the biggest environmental 
disasters in the world. Most of Kuwait's infrastructure was destroyed or looted, 
while the psychological problems of the Kuwaiti citizens are tremendous. More 
than 200 Kuwaitis were killed, while more than 600 are still hostages in Iraqi's 
prisons (Al-Ebraheem, 1992). 
The brief historical background discussed above highlights the key events in the 
history of the state of Kuwait. The rest of the chapter will discuss key elements 
about Kuwait's society, political life and economy that will assist in 
understanding the different influences on Kuwaiti corporations (such as KIO and 
KIA). This review will also help in understanding the environment that audit 
firms function in and the role they play. Accordingly, this chapter will assist in 
understanding the general environment in which the KIO scandal was unfolding. 
Thus, this chapter will begin with a discussion of several issues related to 
Kuwaiti society. These include the social make-up of Kuwait, the role of `Wasta' 
in different aspects of everyday life in Kuwait and the employment characteristics 
of the Kuwaiti society. Public policy of Kuwait is examined through an analysis 
of the nature of executive, legislative and judicial power. Different aspects of 
Kuwait's economy will be studied, including the role of the public and private 
sectors in the economy and the role of the oil sector. The characteristics of the 
government financial policy and recent budget deficit will be discussed. These 
will focus on where KIO and its parent KIA, while the recent remedies to tackle 
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the budget deficit will also be discussed (highlighting privatisation moves and 
other efforts to tackle the budget deficit. The chapter will also address different 
major issues in Kuwait's history such as the A1-Manakh Crisis. 
4.2 Kuwait's Society 
4.2.1 Social Strata 
The rapid growth in Kuwait's economy, as the result of the discovery and 
production of oil, and the need for development of the country attracted foreign 
workers to emigrate to Kuwait - workers who were badly needed to cover for the 
shortage in labour. The lack of control on the flow of foreign immigrants has 
created an imbalance in Kuwait's population. The total population increased 
from 206,473 in 1957 (55% of who were Kuwaitis) to approximately 2.2 million 
in 1990,27% of who were Kuwaitis (Al-Saadoun, 1993, p. 34). Accordingly, 
Kuwaiti nationals became a minority group in their own country (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 - Kuwait's Population During the Census Years (1965-1995) 
Non- 
Year Kuwaitis 
Kuwaitis Non- 
Kuwaitis Total 
percentage Kuwaitis 
percentage 
1965 168793 36% 298546 64% 467339 
1975 307755 31% 687082 69% 994837 
1985 470473 28% 
- 
1226828 72% 1697301 
1995* -T 665820 42% 920163 58% 1575983 rreuminary Keswts Source : Ministry of Planning, 1995, p. 25. 
The Iraqi invasion caused the population to decrease substantially in Kuwait. 
After the liberation of Kuwait, the government intended to balance the population 
so it set a target population of 1.2 million. The population was close to the 
government target in 1992 when it reached 1,398,059, with Kuwaitis accounting 
for 43% (the highest proportion of Kuwaiti nationals since 1957). This target has 
now been exceeded significantly with the population reaching 1.8 million in 1997 
(Kuwaitis representing 41 %). The non-Kuwaitis have been mainly been 
dominated by Arabs from different nationalities and Asians. 
The Kuwaiti nationals are distinct from other nationals in terms of the 
economical and social rights they enjoy. In economic terms, only the Kuwaiti 
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nationals have the right to buy and sell real estate, buy stocks of shareholding 
companies. Non-Kuwaitis can only establish a business if they have a Kuwaiti 
partner. In social terms, Kuwaitis enjoy a generous welfare system of free health, 
education and cheap housing. Kuwaitis have long been guaranteed employment 
in the public sector. In the aftermath of the Gulf-War, non-Kuwaitis no longer 
have access to free education and recently are required to buy health insurance. 
However, all residents in Kuwait enjoy subsided services (e. g. electricity, water, 
telephone, fuel prices) and do not pay any kind of direct taxes. 
Although Kuwaiti nationals present a united group that is distinct from other 
nationals in terms of the privileges and rights they enjoy, they are divided in 
terms of their influence and the rights they exercise. Crystal (1992) identified 
several factors that create division in Kuwait society (family, class, tribal, 
sectarian, gender) and felt that the class and sectarian divisions are the most 
significant ones. The class division has its roots in Kuwait's pre-oil society 
where three main groups existed. The ruling class represented the ruling Al- 
Sabah family who was responsible for running the country, collecting tax and 
upholding regulations. The Merchants were the owners of ships, employers of 
sailors and lenders for the small ship owners and to the Al-Sabah family to some 
extent. They represented the main source for employing people and for paying 
taxes to the ruling family. The wealth of merchants and their importance as a 
source of income has tightened the relations between merchants families and the 
Al-Sabah family. The third class consisted of sailors, pearl divers and other 
workers who were heavily dependent on employment with the merchants for their 
livelihood, as the role of the government in the economy was limited. 
The discovery of oil changed Kuwait's class structure. Crystal (1992) argued that 
oil created a rentier economy that changed "class structure by making access to 
the state rather than access to private property the determinant of wealth" (p. 73). 
The huge oil revenues that started to flow directly to the government secured the 
independence of the ruling family from the merchants and made the family a 
stronger class. The growth in oil revenues led to the government establishing 
more ministries and departments to assist in Kuwait's development process. 
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Consequently, Kuwaiti citizens who worked for the merchants sought 
employment with the government, shedding their previous class identities for 
new ones as bureaucrats and technocrats (Crystal, 1992). The merchant class, 
while weakened in the post-oil Kuwait, drew on its previous power and wealth to 
secure the most senior governmental positions and jobs. Merchants subsequently 
started to act as agents for foreign companies that were trying to sell their 
products in Kuwait (Al-Saadoun, 1984). Their control on import activities in 
Kuwait, where the dependence on foreign goods was substantial, led to enormous 
increase in their wealth. Moreover, the assumption of high posts in the 
government enabled them to gain insider knowledge of the forth coming laws and 
spending plans of the government -a knowledge which they used to their benefit 
(Al-Saadoun, 1984). Such a position has benefited them in terms of the 
government's strategy known as the Land Purchasing Programme. The enriched 
government sought to distribute the oil wealth among Kuwaiti citizens and to 
stimulate private investment. To achieve this goal it adopted, in the 1960s, the 
Land Purchasing Programme, where the government bought the houses and land 
of its citizens at much higher prices than their market value, even though there 
was no shortage of land. It is widely believed that a substantial number of the 
merchant class who were holding high positions in the government were able to 
establish better negotiation positions for their properties and for those of their 
kinship. Benefiting from insider information, these officials acquired properties 
that the government was planning to purchase and then sold them to the 
government at profit. 
Crystal's (1992) other divisions in the Kuwaiti society include: family - ruling 
family vs. the others; sectarian - Sunni vs. Shia Muslims; tribal - long settled in 
Kuwait vs. settled in last several decades and gender - male vs. female. The 
divisions on these lines have some effect on issues such as employment, `Wasta' 
and other political rights (e. g. women do not have suffrage yet). Kuwait's religion 
is Islam and the constitution promulgates Islam as a major source for legislation 
in Kuwait. Virtually all Kuwaiti nationals are Muslims, with the majority being 
Sunni Muslims while Shia Muslims represent around 30%. Lately there have 
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been two unsuccessful attempts by the assembly to restrict the source of 
legislation to Islam only (one in 1986 and the other in 1994). The teachings of 
the Quran and Sunnah6 are not strictly adhered to in Kuwait's business life. 
Quran strictly emphasised and prohibited the use of usury (interest) in everyday 
transactions. Despite this the government and the business community in Kuwait 
are dealing in interest7. Although Islamic banks and investment companies are 
slowly being accepted by the West8, there is only one Islamic bank and a limited 
number of Islamic investment companies in Kuwait. 
4.2.2 Kuwait's Magical Vitamin W 
Wasta, also known as "Vitamin W', refers to the act of knowing someone in any 
governmental or private organisation who will be willing to furnish your 
demands from these organisations either legally or illegally. It is not clear when 
this kind of practice surfaced in Kuwait for the first time but it is widely used in 
the everyday life of Kuwaitis. All of Kuwait's social classes have access to 
Wasta, although the rich and elite families have access to more powerful Wasta. 
Wasta in Kuwait has the effect of magic in all activities that take place in Kuwait. 
Securing good business contracts with the government requires Wasta. 
Employment in highly paid prestigious organisations such as Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation and Kuwait Investment Authority requires strong Wasta regardless 
of the applicant's qualifications. Traffic violations, some of which carrying short 
term jail sentences, can be waved or downgraded to lenient sentences if the 
violator was backed with a strong Wasta. The application of Wasta is also felt in 
everyday transactions such as government ministries helping to speed up the 
processing of applications for passports. Usually it would take more than one 
day to issue a new Kuwaiti passport but with Wasta this could be done in a matter 
of hours. Under the heading of "Healthy doses of vitamin W are vital", the 
6 Quran is the holy book of the Muslim religion. Sunnah the actions of the prophet Mohammed 
and his sayings which followed as a supplements to the Quran. 
The Kuwaiti government claimed that soon it will start collecting Zakah (a type of taxation that 
the Quran imposes on all Muslims) from public companies. 
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Financial Times wrote its guide for doing business in Kuwait (FT, Survey of 
Kuwait, 8/7/1991, p. XIX), advising readers that it: 
".... is vital to establish lasting relationships with Kuwaitis who have the 
right business contacts: the local word for this is Wasta or "Vitamin W" to 
some expatriates..... " 
Although senior government officials always publicly deny the existence of 
Wasta, it is widely spread. It undermines law and regulations, putting influential 
people almost "above the law". Reliance on Wasta as a criteria for employment 
in some organisations does not provide these organisations with the best qualified 
people. Government corruption and inefficiency can also be attributed to the 
spread of Wasta. Neither the government nor the parliament has shown any 
significant will to fight and eradicate Wasta. Also it is unlikely that Kuwaiti 
citizens will abandon Wasta as they feel socially obliged to adopt it for the 
benefit of their own family and friends. 
4.2.3 Employment in Kuwait 
The Kuwaiti labour market is predominately compromised of non-Kuwaitis for 
the last two decades. The total work-force estimates before the Iraqi invasion in 
1990 was put at 874,022 with Kuwaitis at 121,647 and non-Kuwaitis at 752,373 - 
14% and 86% respectively. The limited contribution of the Kuwaiti nationals to 
the labour market (about 35% for the census period of 1970-1985) can be linked 
to factors such as the small size of the Kuwaiti population, the high rate of the 
young age group, and the small participation of women (the average for the 
period between 1970-1985 census was 8%). The absence of an employment 
strategy has been seen as contributing to unlimited and unrestricted immigration 
of foreign workers (Al-Quisi, 1993). The majority of the Kuwaiti nationals in the 
labour force are employed in governmental ministries and organisations (see 
Table 4.2). 
8 Citibank one of the biggest American banks is to finalise their plan to establish an Islamic bank 
in Bahrain by the end of this year. 
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TahlP 4.2 - Kiiwaiti and Non-Kuwaiti Labour Force (1994) 
Kuwaitis Rate Non-Kuwaitis Rate Total 
Total 
681526 37% 1148595 63% 1830121 
Population 
Male 337934 30% 690782 70% 1128716 
Female 343592 49% 357813 51% 701405 
Total Work- 
163320 17% 820557 83% 983877 
force 
Government 153432 62% 94837 38% 248269 
Private 
9888 1% 725720 99% 735608 
Sector 
Source- Financial "Times, 23/-)/1995. 
The popularity of government employment is credited to the social presumption 
that manual jobs are demeaning and clerical work for the government is more 
prestigious and offers higher pay than that of the private sector. All Kuwaiti 
nationals are guaranteed employment regardless of their qualifications and the 
need for their services. 
"Kuwait faces a shortage of educated managerial personnel. Although 
professional recruitments are becoming more common, traditional 
employment still tends to be based on family affiliation, friendship, or 
right of birth. Thus, objective employment criteria tend to be rare. " 
(Pomeranz and Haqiq, 1985, p. 154). 
Researchers have argued that the government's strategy of guaranteed 
employment has adverse consequences. Al-Sabah (1984) argued that such policy 
"has resulted in the distortion of the price of labour, made industrial employment 
less attractive and discouraged industrial investment" (p. 8). Employees of the 
government have a secure job, as they will not be fired even if they are inefficient 
or redundant. Ironically, occasionally unproductive and problem employees are 
promoted as a way of disposing of them - as revealed from Tetreault's (1995) 
study of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, one of Kuwait's most prestigious 
organisations. She noted that 
"A number of managers lamented the fact that problem workers are often 
promoted because this may be the only way for a supervisor to get rid of 
them. At the same time, able and dedicated workers lose their enthusiasm 
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because their supervisors seek to keep them and yet have no way other 
than promotion to reward them for their efforts. " (Tetreault, 1995, p. 175). 
Al-Quisi (1993) has argued that the lack of balance between reward (salaries and 
wages) and effort has made employees less productive and less likely to seek 
employment in the private sector. It has also led to foreign employees taking 
control of vital sources of production. The dependence on government as the 
major employer in Kuwait has played a major burden on public expenditure and 
income especially, in recent years when Kuwait has run a budget deficit. 
4.3 Kuwait's Political Scene 
Kuwait is a hereditary monarchy with executive power, legislative power, and 
Judicial power. The Amir acts as the head of the executive power and 
participates with the parliament as head of the legislative power. Legal 
judgements in different legal cases are issued in the name of the Amir. 
4.3.1 The Executive Powers 
The Amir exercises his executive powers indirectly through his Prime Minister 
and ministers (see figure 4.1). He elect the Prime Minister, whom always has 
been the crown prince of Kuwait, and then the Prime Minister on his part elects 
the ministers who are later approved by the Amir. The constitution propagates 
that the Amir is immune and inviolable as the Prime Minister and the ministers 
are accountable for their actions to parliament and the Amir (Assiri, 1994). 
Figure 4.1 Executive power in Kuwait 
The Amir 
Prime Minster 
Crown Prince 
First Deputy Prime Minister I Second Deputy Prime Minister 
Cabinet Assembley 
Source: Assiri, 1994. 
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unofficial parties or groups9. Kuwait's constitution provided the parliament with 
huge powers. One of the most important privileges is that no law will 
be enacted 
unless approved by both the parliament and the Amir. The parliament also 
has a 
controlling influence say on the financial affairs of the country. This role 
is 
exercised largely through the Kuwait Audit Bureau, who reports directly to the 
assembly. The Kuwaiti government lacks the authority to acquire a loan, or give 
a loan, or guarantee a loan unless it is authorised by the parliament. The 
proposed general budget must also be approved by the parliament. Furthermore, 
the parliament can raise questions, discuss public issues, form an investigation 
committee, question public officials up to the ranks of Prime Minister, and 
exercise motions of no confidence in ministers, though they cannot do the same 
for the Prime Minister. 
Kuwait has always been the most democratic state in the Gulf region. Kuwait 
had its first general assembly in 1961 while the other gulf countries to the present 
day either do not have such an assembly or have dissolved it or have a 
consultative one, whose members are chosen purely by the government. 
Substantial powers were provided to the Kuwaiti assembly as they have the 
power to approve laws, act as a protector of Kuwait's public capital, and have the 
power to investigate important matters and exercise motions of no confidence in 
the ministers. The print media in Kuwait is the most independent in the region, 
with newspapers able to criticise openly the government -a privilege that rarely 
can be found in other countries in the region. On the other hand, Kuwait might 
not be considered a fully democratic state by western standards. The right to vote 
is restricted to Kuwaiti men over 21 years old and descendants from ancestors 
that lived in Kuwait before 1920. Women and Kuwait men from the "second 
class" (where ancestors migrated to Kuwait after 1920) are prohibited from 
voting. Several countries in Europe (such as France and Switzerland) were 
9 The seven groups that provide members of the parliament are as follows: Members of the 
Parliament Dissolved in 1986, the Democratic Forum (Left-leaning and Arab nationalist), the 
Constitutional Alliance (Merchants), the Popular Islamic Congress (Sunni Moslem), the Islamic 
Constitutional Movement (Sunni Moslem), the National Islamic Coalition (Shia Moslems) and a 
group of independents (FT, 8/7/1991, p. V). 
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considered democratic even though women did not have the right to vote until 
after the Second World War (Birch, 1995). Nevertheless, in Kuwait about 25% 
of the population is eligible to vote and Kuwait's assembly has been dissolved 
twice in an unconstitutional fashion before the Gulf-War. The constitution 
indicates that if the parliament is dissolved by the Amir, a new election must be 
held within two months, otherwise the dissolved assembly can reconvene. 
However, in both cases, the assembly was dissolved for more than 5 years in 
clear disregard for the constitution. 
4.3.3 Judicial Power 
Court verdicts are announced in the name of the Amir. The main sources for the 
law in Kuwait are Islamic and foreign laws. The constitution established judicial 
power in Kuwait as independent of both executive and legislative power. 
However, the judicial system is criticised for being not independent, as the Courts 
all under the control of the Justice Ministry - which appoints the judges and 
assigns legal budgets. The system has also been criticised for being dominated 
either by non-Kuwaitis, whose future depended on their compliance with the 
wishes of the regime, or young Kuwaitis, who don't have sufficient experience 
(Tetreault, 1995). Attempts have been undertaken to guarantee the independence 
of the judicial system, never been implemented as a law. 
4.4 The Economy of Kuwait 
4.4.1 The Role of the Kuwaiti Private and Public Sector 
4.4.1.1 Pre-Oil Role 
The economic development of pre-oil Kuwait relied on the contribution of the 
private sector. The private sector, which was heavily controlled by merchants, 
was responsible for creating employment opportunities for Kuwaitis mainly 
through pearling, trading, and fishing. Taxes levied on the private sector 
represented the main source for governmental spending. Furthermore, it also 
played a role in the management of the country through participating in 
consultations required by the government (Al-Saadoun, 1993). The role of the 
public sector was limited, basically performing the role of absent as it only took 
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The cabinet ministers consist of nineteen ministries with some of the ministers 
heading more than one ministry at some point in time. The vital ministries of 
foreign affairs, defence, interior, and communication usually are headed by 
members of the ruling family. The heads of other ministries have usually been 
drawn from members of Kuwait's elite or rich families in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti 
constitution allows the appointment of elected members of parliament as 
ministers (but the highest number of members of parliament to become ministers 
was six in 1992). Government ministers participate in parliamentary discussions 
and vote on proposed laws and regulations. However, the constitution requires 
that the number of ministers does not exceed two-thirds of the number of 
Members of Parliament. 
The cabinet ministers carry out the duties of the government on behalf of the 
Amir. The cabinet meetings are confidential and the decisions made by means of 
unanimous voting by the attending ministers. Duties of the cabinet include 
planning the general strategy for the country, signing treaties, enacting 
regulations, approving the employment of higher officials and carrying out the 
executive affairs of the country. Presentation of the Amir's proposals to the 
parliament and the ratified proposals by the parliament to the Amir are also duties 
of the cabinet (Assiri, 1994). 
4.3.2 Legislative power 
Before its independence in 1961, Kuwait's legislative powers were restricted to 
the ruling family, with some input from the consultative assemblies established in 
1921,1938, and 1939. In December 1961, a Constituent assembly was elected to 
draft Kuwait's constitution. In 1963 Kuwait's first election for parliament took 
place. Since then, there has been eight parliaments, with the parliament being 
unconstitutionally dissolved in 1976 (for five years) and then in 1986 (for eight 
years). Each parliament has a duration of four years, with 50 freely elected 
members. Official political parties are prohibited, although there are about seven 
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over the role of protecting Kuwait. The relation between the government and the 
merchants was described as follows: 
"The rulers were expected to organise the defence of society against 
attacks from the bedouin or pirates, while the merchants, who owned most 
of the communities' wealth, in the form of trading and pearling dhows, 
were expected to finance the sheikhs through taxes and loans. In return, 
the merchants would be consulted by the rulers on all important affairs of 
state. " (Field, 1981, p. 85). 
The major source of income was diving for pearls which were then a precious 
merchandise. Kuwait's annual revenue from pearling was estimated at 
£1,688,888 (Al-Fara, 1974, p. 69). A ten month season of trade trips was the 
main source of living for Kuwaitis. Kuwaitis sailed from Kuwait to India and 
Africa, trading in things such as pearls, dates and gold. They imported to Kuwait 
timber and mangrove poles for building. 
4.4.1.2 Post-Oil Role 
The discovery of oil in Kuwait in 1938 and the shipment of oil in 1946 changed 
the roles of the private sector and public sector. The government, through its 
rulers, was no longer in need of tax income and loans from the merchants. The 
private sector role was starting to weaken as the trade trips and Kuwait's function 
as a transit port lost their values as result of the establishment of the Suez canal. 
Another factor was that the discovery of cultured pearls rendered uneconomical 
diving for pearls. However, the major vehicle behind the fading of the role of the 
private sector was the discovery of oil. The Kuwaiti people started to seek 
employment with a government that offered higher wages and jobs requiring less 
effort. 
The government started to acquire all the important national assets. It started 
with the oil sector, which in the beginning was both a private and public sector, 
then a transportation sector, and finally stakes in public companies and the real- 
estate sector. Accordingly, Kuwait appeared to be a capitalist country while in 
fact it was more government controlled. Kuwait in effect possessed the 
disadvantages of both systems - on the one hand a freedom to adopt laws and 
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regulations and on the other a monopoly by government and a spread of 
mismanagement (Al-Saadoun, 1993). 
The government fully owned Kuwait's oil corporations, all utilities institutions, 
held large stakes in almost all share holding companies, owned some 
governmental companies such as Kuwait Airways and undertook 
foreign 
investment through the Kuwait Investment Authority and other Kuwaiti 
organisations. The government's monopoly position made it the main contributor 
to the economy. Furthermore, the government made the private sector more 
dependent on its functions through contracts set up by the government. In 
addition, the government has institutionalised the notion that it will step in and 
help the private sector whenever they encounter problems - encouraging the 
private sector to indulge in activities without properly assessing the risks 
involved. This notion has left the government problems and the liabilities of 
particular sectors of the economy. 
The government policy of providing jobs for all Kuwaitis as a means of 
distributing the oil wealth made Kuwaiti employees totally dependent on the 
government for their jobs. Recently, the government ministries and their 
organisations employed 94% of the Kuwaiti work-force. This staggering number 
has inflicted a huge financial burden on the budget, with wages and salaries 
figures estimated at 29% of total government expenditures. For example, it was 
estimated that 75% of the Housing Authority Budget was being spent on wages 
and salaries (Al-Seyassah, 26/5/95). 
Tahlo A 'I - Calariac and waaiac cnpndinr nut of 
the anvernment budget 
Financial Year Value in KD Percentage of Total Expenditures 
1978-1979 329 million 19% 
1986-1987 757 million 44% 
1989-1990 883 million 29% 
1995-1996 1180 million 29% 
Source: Al-Ebraheem, 1993; Al-Qabas, 2-5-1995. 
Kuwaiti's economy to a large extent is dependent on oil production, its 
contribution to the GDP in the last decades is estimated at 67% while it 
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represents 69% of Kuwait's total revenues. There are some unfavourable effects 
of such dependence not least the scenario of oil being depleted in the future 
(although it estimated to last for more than 100 years). In addition, it's difficult 
for the government to control fluctuations in oil prices, oil demand, and foreign 
exchange rates. Accordingly, the government has been trying to encourage the 
development of other sectors in the economy, include manufacturing, real estate, 
and community and social services. 
The government has also pursued a strategy of foreign investments as an 
alternative source of income, investing in Europe, USA and Eastern Asia through 
KIA and KIO. The foreign investments' revenues have proven to be very 
rewarding in the 1980's, exceeding the oil revenues for the first time in 
1985/1986. The $100bn of Kuwait's foreign investments were reduced by 60% 
as a result of the cost of exiled governments spending during the Kuwait's 
occupation. Further, a big scandal broke in 1992 over Kuwait's investments in 
Spain, (known as the KIO/GT scandal. This will be thoroughly examined later in 
the study. 
4.4.2 Kuwait's Oil Sector 
During the period from the discovery of oil in 1946 until 1960, Kuwait's income 
from oil came through royalties and taxes on oil revenues. The 1960's 
represented Kuwait's first attempt to establish national oil companies such as 
Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) and Kuwait Oil Tankers Company 
(KOTC) in 1960. Both were listed in the stock market and jointly owned by the 
government and the private sector. During the 1960s, Kuwait was one of the co- 
founders of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an 
organisation that played a vital role in the global oil market. The oil producing 
countries need for a collective policy against the monopolistic oil companies, 
who were then controlling the oil market, was the main reason for the emergence 
of OPEC. It failed to realise its objectives or exercise power until the early 
1970's, when it increased oil prices. 
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In 1968, another organisation that Kuwait co-founded with Libya and Saudi 
Arabia was called the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC). The goals and aims of OAPEC were somewhat different as OAPEC 
was established with the aim of using oil revenues to achieve the political and 
economic aims of the Arab countries. Kuwait started to nationalise oil fields in 
the 1970's when it nationalised KOC, the jointly owned British and American 
company. It also nati9nalised the stock market listed, Kuwait National Petroleum 
Corporation (KNPC) and Kuwait Oil Tankers Corporation (KOTC). It also 
terminated the concession of the American Company (Aminoil). 
In 1980 as the Kuwaiti government became the sole owner of oil, the Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation (KPC) was established. KPC and its subsidiaries in 
Kuwait and abroad handle all of Kuwait's upstream and downstream activities. 
Kuwait's upstream activities of oil exploration and the production of crude oil 
were undertaken in the 1960's. However, its downstream activities of refining, 
delivery, and marketing of petroleum products to final consumers were only 
pursued from 1983 when Kuwait acquired refineries and sales outlets in 
consuming countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark and UK (see Mergers and 
Monopolies Commission, 1988). The annual revenue of KPC's budget, which is 
not included in the government budget, has been larger than that of the whole 
government budget every year since 1985/86 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1994). 
"There is no doubt that since mid-1987 at least, Kuwait had apparently 
favoured low oil prices as the policy which would serve best the long- 
term economic interest of OPEC members and other exporting nations. 
There is a plethora of statements made by Kuwaiti officials which 
supports this proposition. The argument is simple. Low prices would 
increase demand and raise, or at least stabilise, the share of oil in world 
energy consumption. They would discourage investments in other 
sources of energy, particularly gas and nuclear, they would relax the will 
to introduce and implement energy conservation measures, and more 
importantly, they might sustain the expansion of the world economy, 
bearing in mind that economic growth is the most powerful determinant 
of increases in the demand for oil. " (Mabro, 1994, p. 242). 
The above quotation represents Kuwait's strategy before the invasion of Kuwait. 
The Iraqi invasion had terrible consequences on the oil industry in Kuwait, with 
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613 oil wells set on fire, and most oil refineries destroyed. Kuwait put out the oil 
fires in record time and oil production reached pre-war production in 1994. 
Kuwait, which holds 9.4% of the world's oil reserve, now more than ever is 
looking at oil as a source of income to finance the budget deficit and to rebuild 
Kuwait's foreign investments. Currently Kuwait is looking into developing 
virgin oil fields in the north, near Iraq, as a joint venture with foreign companies 
utilising the latest technology in developing these fields and seeking to enhance 
to enhance Kuwait's security. Kuwait is also looking into navigating new 
markets in Asia, such as the recent establishment of oil refineries in India and 
Pakistan. Kuwait's reliance on oil as a source of income is still substantial. 
63.1 % of Kuwait's GDP in 1965/66 contributed to oil but this dependence still 
persists, with 43.3% of GDP being contributed by oil in 1993. 
4.4.3 Financial Policy and the Budget Deficit 
The General Budget Department in the Ministry of Finance assumes the task of 
preparing the annual budget. Since 1938 the government outlines its annual 
economic programme in the proposed budget. The budget covers the financial 
year commencing on the 1st of July and ending on 30th of June of the next year. 
The cash basis is the accounting method used in preparing the budget, with the 
general budget being divided into three sub-budgets: (Al-Ebraheem, 1993). 
1. The ministries and governmental departments budget 
This budget is concerned with the financial activities of the government's 
ministries and departments. A law is issued for this budget showing the 
magnitude of the public revenues and expenditures and allowances. 
2. Attached Budgets 
Attached entities are those organisations that are attached to and not 
independent of the concerned ministry. However they enjoy managerial 
freedom and a special regulation as a result of their distinctive practices. For 
every entity a law must be enacted for its budget that shows its revenues and 
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expenditures. Some of these entities are the Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA) and the Kuwait Housing Authority. 
3. Independent Budgets 
Independent budgets represent those of organisations and entities that act in a 
business fashion. These organisations enjoy independent status from 
ministries and have a separate financial budget. A law must be enacted for 
the budget of every entity, showing its revenues and expenditures. The 
government has established such organisations either due to the disinterest of 
the private sector (as a result of their low financial reward) in the activities of 
such organisations or because of the business needs huge investment in that 
capital that is not available to the private sector. Moreover, the strategic role 
of such organisations has enticed the government to control them. Kuwait 
Airways Corporation and Kuwait News Agency are examples of entities that 
have independent budgets. 
The Kuwaiti budget does not take account of the investment revenues made by 
the government in Kuwait and abroad. In addition, the extent of government 
spending on defence facilities was not disclosed in the budget until the parliament 
passed a law in 1993 forcing the government to include such allocations in the 
budget. The budget doesn't show the income from the sale of refined products or 
petrochemicals as these are shown in KPC's budget. 
The governmental accounts consist of three accounts: 
1) General Account 
Oil revenues and non-oil revenues represent the main income for the general 
account. Funding for the budget is financed through this account. The RFFG is 
credited with 10% of this account annually and the account's surplus is 
transferred to the General Reserve fund, which is expected to finances any 
deficits on the general account. 
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2) General Reserve Fund (GRF) 
This account was established to invest the increasing surpluses of the budget. 
The revenues of this account compromise of the budget surplus, interest on 
invested surpluses, and profits of independent organisations. Expenditures 
include financing the budget deficit, financing the independent organisations, 
meeting emergency expenditures etc. 
3) Reserve Fund for Future Generations (RFFG) 
This fund was established in 1976 as a mean of pursing a long-term strategy of 
establishing an alternative source of income for Kuwait's future generations. The 
fund is mostly invested abroad by institutions such as KIA and KIO. 
The growth in oil prices in the seventies led to a parallel growth in oil revenues 
and governmental spending by a rate of 1900% and 850% respectively. The 
economy relies heavily on government spending, which has evolved from 27% of 
GDP in 1969/1970 to 74% of GDP in 1989/1990. In the 1980's, oil revenues 
started to diminish in the light of the global recession and the deterioration of the 
demand for the crude oil. This decline in revenues failed to alarm the Kuwaiti 
government as government spending increased by 18% in the 1980s while oil 
revenues decreased by 48% during the same period. This situation of decreased 
revenues and increased spending led to the appearance of the first budget deficit 
at KD660m. Since then the budget deficit persistently1° arisen and is currently 
estimated at KD1,503m. More recently, the destruction of Kuwait's infrastructure 
by the Iraqi invasion served to widen the deficit. 
Even though the budget deficit has been financed from the liquidation of 
financial reserves and from local and international borrowings, alternative 
approaches are encouraged. The Ministry of Finance claims it is drafting a new 
financial policy to improve non-oil revenues and contribute to a greater extent to 
the budget. This means improving sources of revenue that seem simple to collect 
and economically feasible (e. g. luxury taxes, real estate taxes, increasing customs 
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on imports). The government also introduced privatisation and offset programme 
as a new tool for tackling the budget deficit. Raising oil revenues through 
improving marketing techniques, seeking new regions abroad are also considered 
to decrease to deficit. In addition, `belt-tightening' is an option that is strongly 
called for by the parliament and economists in Kuwait. One Kuwaiti economist 
made a strong and unpopular call for the government to abandon its expensive 
military program, which was assigned KD 3.5 billion for the next 12 years. He 
argued that advanced military equipment is not sufficient for a small military, 
(estimated at 20,000 men) to defend Kuwait. He also claimed that the cost of 
military job will reach KD100,000 annually while the cost of civil jobs cost only 
KD15,000 (Al-Saadoun, 1993, p. 43). 
In May 1995, The parliament rejected the government proposed budget for the 
financial year 95/96 that to be commences in July 1995. The rejection of the 
budget is due to parliament believe that the government's budget lacks any plan 
to cut the deficit. The government decreased the budget spending by only 1% 
and increased the non-oil revenues by only KD 18 m instead of the proposed KD 
50m. Another blow for the government came from the parliament when it also 
rejected a proposal for a law that would have enabled the government to 
withdraw from RFFG to finance the budget. 
4.4.4 Privatisation 
Recently privatisation has become a trend all around the world, from the 
capitalist countries like the USA and Britain to the formerly Communist countries 
like Russia. The Gulf states have been no exception, seeing privatisation as a 
way out of their budget deficits. Kuwait's adoption of privatisation has been 
based on the recommendations of the IMF and World Bank as a means of 
increasing the role of the private sector in the economy. 
10 The financial year 1989/90 was exceptional as the budget had Surplus of KD 174.9. 
95 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 4 
However, to date, progress has been slow in Kuwait due to the fact that the 
Kuwaiti economy is limited and cannot afford a rapid introduction of private 
capital. The low salaries offered by the private sector in comparison to those of 
the public sector might create labour problems for the private sector. The notion 
that privatisation will substantially raise the prices of the services has been a 
worry while concerns have been expressed over foreign organisations holding 
stakes in key Kuwaiti organisations. The concern that foreign organisations 
might hold stakes in the privatised companies and control them has raised 
opposition to the privatisation of strategic organisations such as oil companies. 
4.4.5 The Collapse of the Souk AI-Manakh and the Difficult Debts 
The Kuwaiti stock market was established in 1970 and 32 Kuwaiti companies 
traded there. The reasons for the emergence of the A1-Manakh crisis in 1982 
might be traced to a period as far back as 1974. Accusations of illegal acts by the 
founders of stock holding companies surfaced in 1974 a mid a heated debate 
between the parliament and the government. The debate resulted in the 
government launching an investigation of the accusations, which unravelled a 
wide range of illegal share dealings (for more details, see Al-Saadoun, 1984). 
The findings of the investigations did not result in any prosecutions - giving the 
impression that rich and powerful figures will not be prosecuted or fined in 
Kuwait. The enforcement of law was undermined as the people who broke the 
law were not punished. 
The boom in oil prices since 1973 led to a huge surplus and savings in Kuwait. 
The limited absorptive capacity of the Kuwaiti economy led to a huge increase in 
the price of land and real estate in the period 1974-1975. In mid 1976 when the 
demand for, and prices of, land and real estate started to decrease a new breed of 
investors looking for quick returns started to speculate in the stock market. The 
growth of such speculation led to a leap in share prices by as much as 11 times 
their average nominal value. Share prices reached their highest levels in early 
1977 when shares were largely believed to be un-marketable. Most of the share 
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transactions were conducted through forward deals, a unique system that surfaced 
in the Kuwaiti stock market. Beblawi gave an explanation of such deals: 
"Kuwait forward deals differ from the usual forward transactions known 
in other markets. Rather than an agreement to sell and buy at a 
prearranged price on a designated date in the future, Kuwait forward sales 
are spot sales with credit. The seller delivers the buyer the shares on the 
spot and the buyer will hold them immediately; only payment is deferred 
to a future date (usually a post-dated cheque). For all practical purposes, 
forward deals in Kuwait are spot deals on credit without collateral. The 
forward price is not independent of the spot price; it is invariably the spot 
price with a premium (an interest rate or rather a usury rate) which varies 
between 50-150% for one-year delivery. Forward deals are used in fact as 
a means of finance at usury rates" 
Hundred of millions of Kuwaiti Dinar's were represented by post-dated cheques 
and some of the post dated cheques were very short term owing to the fact the 
stock market become very dull (Al-Jumah, 1986, p. 36). The government 
intervened to solve the crisis through KFTAC, spending KD 155 million on 
purchasing shares offered by the private sector at the lowest price. The 
government, also enacted resolutions to restrict forward transactions", suspended 
the establishment of new public-subscriptions for share-holding companies, and 
prohibited increases in capital of existing companies. The government established 
the idea that if investors were taking risks, it has the duty to, and will, intervene to 
protect them (Beblawi, 1984). 
The suspension of public offerings of new stock holding companies and the rigid 
requirements for listing on the Kuwait Stock Exchange led to the emergence of 
Al-Manakh'2 in 1976 as an unofficial secondary stock market. In Al-Manakh, 
" The government introduced four conditions without no undertakings of forward transactions 
would take place: 
1- The period of settlement should not exceed 12 months 
2- The buyer should immediately settle part of the total value of the transaction 
3- The shares continue in the possession of the seller until the forward date and the settlement of 
the price in full. 
4- The contract be registered upon completion at he department of securities at the Ministry of 
Commerce (Al-Jumah, 1986, p. 40). 
12 Al-Manakh is the name of the building where the shares of the Kuwaiti closed companies and 
gulf companies were traded. 
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shares of Kuwaiti closed companies and gulf companies13 were changing hands 
through forward transactions (post-dated cheques) at staggering rates in mid 
1981. Al-Manakh was a classical example of chaos and disarray as no governing 
body was regulating the transactions and the laws of the Kuwaiti Stock Market 
were not being implemented. The shares of the gulf companies were traded 
illegally before their incorporation. The huge profits out of the gambling-like 
speculation appealed not only to the average Kuwaiti citizen but also to high 
officials and members of the ruling family (the Minister of Justice who was also a 
member of the Al-Sabah family was forced to resign to avoid a motion of no 
confidence from the parliament over the accusations of his son's involvement in 
Al-Manakh). No list of Al-Manakh debtors has ever been published - although a 
substantial number of Kuwaiti companies and government owned companies 
(KIC) were involved in Al-Manakh dealings. In 1983, financial statements of the 
Kuwaiti and gulf share-holding companies showed that these companies had 
invested in forward cheques and stocks about 104% and 85% of their respective 
capitals (Al-Saadoun, 1984, p. 77). The Summer of 1982 represented the end of 
Souk Al-Manakh when two investors failed to meet their obligations, causing the 
system of forward transactions to collapse - creating what are known as Al- 
Manakh Crisis. 
One Kuwaiti economist asserted that the real crisis would have been if the Al- 
Manakh market had not collapsed. The collapse of A1-Manakh has revealed that 
6000 persons and companies were involved in forward transactions. The number 
of investors registered in the clearing company was 5,509, while the total number 
of post-dated cheques reached 28,878 with one investor holding alone 5,000 
cheques (see Purdy, 1982, p. 7). The value of the post-dated cheques was 
estimated at 26.7 billion K. D. 
Since the collapse of Al-Manakh the government established more than one 
organisation to solve the crisis and it also introduced more than one scheme to 
13 Kuwaitis registered most of these companies in the gulf countries to avoid the government 
prohibition on the establishment of new public share holding companies. 
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settle the crisis. A handful of debtors settled their debts in 1986, which led the 
government to initiate the Difficult Debts Settlement Programme No. 1 after the 
dissolution of parliament in 1986. This programme offered 15-year pay off 
period but failed to resolve the matter. The government issued law 32 in July 
1992 which enabled it to purchase KD 5.9bn ($19.7bn) of personal and corporate 
debts from the private sector. In return for debt the bonds issued to commercial 
bank. This move was seen as a way of preventing the 6-year dissolved 
parliament, which was going to be elected again in three months, from repealing 
the law. Accordingly the government bought the debts and issued bonds to the 
banks so that the parliament could not do anything about it. Since this time the 
parliament has launched different programmes to get debtors to repay amounts 
owed to the government. These schemes have offered a range of discounts and 
benefits for debtors to settle early but there continues to be a large amount of 
debts unpaid and questions are repeatedly asked as to the legitimacy and equity of 
continually revising laws regarding such repayments. There has been long 
standing worry that the government is soft on financial law breaking and will 
always try to bail out unwise investors especially when investments are carried 
out on a large scale. 
4.4.6 The effect of the Iraqi Invasion on Kuwait 
The Iraqi regime is still holding 600 Kuwaiti citizens hostage in their jails and 
denies their existence. The families of these people are suffering tremendously as 
they are not aware of their whereabouts. The government tried through the 
United Nations and the Red Cross to free them but their efforts were not fruitful. 
The destruction of Kuwait's infrastructure was enormous. The oil fields the 
major source of income for Kuwait was set on fire and refiners were bombed. 
Power stations and water desalination plans were destroyed. Other sectors were 
devastated by the Iraqi invasion with the total estimates of the invasion costing 
about $59,983 million. 
Kuwait was forced to liquidate up to $60bn of its foreign investments that were 
held by KIA and KIO to finance the government in exile and the military effort to 
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liberate Kuwait. Kuwait made its first foreign borrowings in December 1991 
when it acquired $5.5 billion from a consortium of 81 International banks. The 
first repayment was due on June 12th, 1995 with an instalment of $800 million. 
In addition, Kuwait acquired credit lines of $10 billion from USA, Japan, Canada 
and other European countries in 1992. 
Table 4.4 - The Main Expenses of the General Budget Resulting 
from the Iraqi 
T.,.. Qc! iri, rillrincr +hc r, orinfl 1 /R/1 QQl -. 
`-1 /1 9/1 QQ1 
Type of Expense (Million Dollar) 
1- Cost of financing military operations 24000 
2- Cost of putting out oil fires 1500 
3- Cost of removing mines 704 
4- Emergency plan 1000 
5- Support for the financial co-ordination of the gulf crisis 3700 
6- Cost of living for Kuwaitis abroad 1000 
7- Amiri grant 383 
8- Write off the real estate loans 3497 
9- Write off the social loans 40 
10- Accruals for Public Housing Authority 2333 
11- Retrospective salaries payments for Kuwaitis 1823 
12- Write off of consumer loans 1293 
13- Accruals for Ministry of Electricity and for the Ministry of Communication 277 
14- Accruals for government properties 27 
15- Exchange for pensioners' salaries 1713 
16- Cost of salaries raise 1333 
17- Cost of social care 60 
Sub total 44683 
Lost revenues from asset sales 3200 
Lost revenues from oil production 12100 
Total 59983 
Source: A1-. braheem, 199i, p. 2Jb. 
Kuwait's feeble, defenceless status, especially after the Iraqi invasion and the 
continued threat of Iraq, made it more dependent on powerful countries like 
USA, UK, France. This dependence made it difficult for Kuwait to undertake 
decisions that might be unpopular with these allies. The oil price is one of the 
situations where Kuwait will be sensitive to the interests of these countries. 
A positive outcome from the Iraqi invasion is the return of the Kuwaiti 
democratic experience after a5 year period of absence. Kuwait gained its 
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rightful boarders, which were looking to settle with Iraq since its independence. 
Kuwait's alliance with the USA as a protector of its solidarity made Kuwait less 
intimidated by Iraq. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The future of Kuwait will be shaped by the ability of the government and the 
parliament to undertake essential reforms in the economic life of the country. 
The budget deficit is a challenging and serious problem that requires a clearly 
defined strategy to curb it. Although, the government claims that it plans to 
balance the budget by the year 2000, its inability to cut the huge spending levels 
raise some concerns. Further, the government's attempt to boost the budget's 
non-oil revenue has not materialised yet. 
The Kuwaiti parliament can play a major role in balancing the budget. However, 
it has failed so far to take the unpopular decisions to approve imposing taxes and 
other fees. The parliament's disapproval can be attributed to the unpopularity of 
such a measure with the Kuwaiti citizens. In addition, some parliament members 
believe that the government should reform its corrupted management style and 
cut spending levels before they approve the introduction of new fees. Acting as a 
watchdog over the government's actions, the parliament may control government 
spending and push for a balanced budget. 
The development in the international oil market will also play a major role in 
Kuwait's future. Kuwait's ability to market its oil in new regions will play a 
major role in its economy. Securing stable and high revenues from oil will 
contribute to rebuilding Kuwait's portfolio of foreign investments. 
Promoting the development of other sectors in the economy is fundamental. 
Success of the privatisation programme will be very significant to Kuwait as it 
will balance the role of the private and public sector in the economy. Expanding 
the role of the private sector will also increase the absorptive capacity of 
Kuwait's economy and repatriate Kuwaiti capital from abroad. 
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The Development of Accounting and Auditing in Kuwait 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 5 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the historical development of accounting and auditing in 
Kuwait. Appreciation of such a process of development is an important element 
to understanding contemporary perceptions of auditing and its role in processes 
of management and accountability in KIO/KIA. This chapter starts by discussing 
the development of accounting over four distinct periods. The first period covers 
the development prior to the discovery of oil until 1959 when accounting was in 
its simplest form and there wasn't any kind of regulation of accounting practice. 
The second period spans two decades from 1960 to 1979, a period during which 
many of Kuwait's institutions and organisations were established, and which saw 
the first attempt to regulate the Kuwaiti accounting and auditing profession. The 
third period stretches from 1980 to 1989, when Kuwait experienced its biggest 
financial problems. This period also witnessed the introduction of a special 
examination for accountants who wanted to practice in Kuwait and the limiting of 
practising rights to Kuwaiti accountants. The final period, from 1990, considers 
some of the issues related to the development of auditing in Kuwait after the war, 
however the main discussion about this period are examined in chapter 8 as a part 
of the reflection of the KIO scandal on auditing in Kuwait. The chapter closes by 
considering the nature of accounting education in Kuwait and discussing the 
various social factors affecting the accounting profession. 
In constructing this historical review it was necessary to supplement reviews of 
the existing literature with information obtained from interviews with 
representatives of large, medium, and small sized auditing firms, officials from 
the Ministry of Commerce, and the auditor of Kuwait's Audit Bureau. This was 
done to overcome the scarcity of available literature on*the subject. Additionally, 
some information had to be specially commissioned from the Ministry of 
Commerce. The ministry, even though it was the regulator of the accounting 
profession, does not keep any systematic form of statistics on auditing firms and 
auditors in Kuwait, and only provided the information as a response to my special 
request. 
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5.2 The Development of Accounting in Kuwait 
5.2.1 The Undeveloped Period (Before The Discovery Of The Oil -1960) 
This period in Kuwait was characterised by its simplicity, the small scale of 
business activity and the dependence on foreign sources, such as India and 
Britain, for trade, protection and education. Accounting was in its simplest form 
in this period. The single entry method was used for registering quantities sold 
and purchased by merchants (Shuaib, 1974). The foundations of accounting in 
Kuwait can be traced to the Indian Commercial Law (Hasan, 1984, p. 22, Al- 
Mousawi, 1986, p. 83). Accounting was called Blanguo in Kuwait, the Indian 
word for accounting, with most of the early accounting practices being based on 
Indian methods of accounting. Also the accounting principles of neighbouring 
countries were adopted (Bazie). There was no statutory requirement for auditing 
at that time and accountants were not required to register with any professional 
body. 
Prior to the 1950's ownership of enterprises in Kuwait was characterised by 
single (or family) ownership. These kinds of establishments were not seen to 
require the services of an auditor, as the owner (or one of his trusted relatives) 
was also managing the company and handling its accounts. Historical reports of 
accounting before the discovery of oil are scarce but it has been argued that 
British companies introduced the first auditors in to Kuwait, as they did in Iraq 
and Egypt (Jones, 1981). The British Bank for the Middle East was established 
in the early 1940's in Kuwait. The bank utilised the services of the international 
accounting firms (Al-Hajeri, 1992). Bazie suggested that the bank might have 
used the service of Whinney Murray in Iraq. 
Kuwait's economic development in the early 1950's led to the establishment of 
the first shareholding company in Kuwait. These kinds of corporations distanced 
1 Mr Bader Al-Baize was the first Kuwaiti accountant to be registered in Kuwait. He is a senior 
partner in Arthur Anderson. 
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the owners from the management of the organisation. Owners voluntary chose to 
hire auditors to attest to the credibility of the manager's financial statements. The 
National Bank of Kuwait (NBK) made history in 1952 as Kuwait's first stock 
holding company. The British managers of NBK sought a sophisticated 
accounting system for the bank, hence they hired Russell & Co., a London based 
accounting firm, to design the accounting system of the Kuwaiti bank. Having 
accomplished their task, Russell & Co. returned to London, turning down NBK's 
solicitations for establishment of a permanent office in Kuwait to audit the bank 
and any other related corporations that might be set up in the near future. At that 
time, the founders and managers of the bank had felt that it was crucial for NBK 
to be audited by an international accounting firm if it was going to set up 
relations with foreign banks, as such banks usually liked to see the financial 
statements of their counterparts audited by such firms. The problem for NBK 
was that no qualified auditing firm was present in Kuwait at that time. 
NBK duly approached a branch of the British accounting firm Whinney Murray 
& Co. (WM) in Basra-Iraq and WM opened their office in Kuwait in 1952 with 
clients such as NBK, the British Bank for the Middle East, and Crane Makanzie. 
The latter were established in Kuwait long before 1952 but they were audited by 
WM's branch in Basra. Oil companies working in Kuwait at that time were also a 
client of WM. The partners of WM were British and gradually businessmen and 
enterprises started to use the accounting and consulting services of WM in 
Kuwait. The absence of Kuwaiti accounting regulation and principles led to WM 
adopting British accounting regulation and principles in their work in Kuwait. 
The Lebanese accounting firm, Saba & Co., became the second international firm 
to be founded in Kuwait during the 1950's. This firm had a number of offices in 
several Arabian countries as a result of its association with the Arabic Bank. This 
connection had enabled Saba & Co. to become one of the biggest audit firms in 
the region at that time. After enacting the Tax Law of 1955, the government of 
Kuwait engaged Peat Marwick Mitchell to audit the tax accounts levied on the 
Kuwait Oil Company. Peat Marwick utilised some of the services of WM in 
Kuwait as they had not yet established their own office in Kuwait. During this 
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period there was no formal accounting education of any kind in Kuwait. Except 
for some of the Kuwaitis who learned accounting methods from India and 
Bahrain, most accounting education experience was gained through personal 
experience. 
5.2.2 The Maturity Period (1960 - 1979) 
The increase in the number of share-holding companies and limited companies 
led to the enactment of a few laws that regulated the commercial activities and 
auditing activities in Kuwait. The first statutory requirement of auditing was 
established by the Law of Commercial Companies in 1960. This law required 
share-holding companies to appoint one auditor or more to attest their financial 
statements. The Law prohibited the auditor from holding a position in, or doing 
business with, the audited company. The auditor was also given the right to 
examine all the accounting records of these companies whenever he desired and 
to attend the annual meeting and assert his opinion in that meeting with reference 
to his work. 
The government started to regulate the accounting profession in 1962, enacting 
Law No. 6, the Practice of Audit of Accounts. Shuaib argued that the Kuwaiti 
government's move to regulate the profession was aimed at permitting only 
competent accountants to practice (Shuaib, 1974, p. 73). Accountants were 
required by this law to be registered with the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry's register of auditors. Enrolment in that register was subject to 
satisfying the following requirements: 
1. A bachelor's degree in business or its equivalent, with some study 
having been in accounting. 
2. Membership in one of the institutes or societies approved by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industr '; or having practical accounting 
experience of three successive years . 
2 The law defined experience as that gained through either one of the following. a) working in 
auditing firm, b) working in public or private companies, c) working in government departments, 
d) teaching accounting or auditing, e) practising in his own auditing firm before the enactment of 
the law. 
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3. Kuwaiti citizenship (although the Minister of Commerce had the 
authority to licence a non-Kuwaiti to practice accounting and auditing 
for the period of five years, renewable it for another period of five 
years). 
4. A good moral character with no criminal or civil history. 
5. Over 25 years of age. 
Therefore, under this law accountants were required to present a bachelor degree 
and a proof of their practical experience only. There wasn't any requirement to 
pass any examination - any person possessing the above qualifications was 
eligible to practice. The 1962 law prohibited the accountant from involvement in 
any job that was in conflict with the accounting profession. The auditor was also 
discouraged from acquiring audit work through solicitation or means that would 
be damaging (such as paying commission for acquiring clients or soliciting other 
firms clients by offering a lower fee) to the prestige of accounting profession. 
Shuaib (1978) suggested that the laws of 1960 and 1962 improved the practice of 
accounting in Kuwait as they highlighted the importance of accounting by 
imposing certain requirements for entry into the accounting profession. 
However, such claims have some limitations for when these regulations were 
enacted there wasn't any Kuwaiti accountant practising in Kuwait. The first 
Kuwaiti accountant to be licensed to practice was in 1967 (see Table 5.1). 
Tnhle 5.1- Kiiwaiti Reaisterec3 Aremintnnts 1 WA-1q99 
Year 
Number of 
Accountants 
Year 
Number of 
Accountants Year 
Number of 
Accountants 
1966 0 1974 11 1982 36 
1967 1 1975 14 1983 39 
1968 3 1976 16 1984 40 
1969 3 1977 19 1985 40 
1970 4 1978 21 1986 40 
1971 7 1979 23 1987 42 
1972 8 1980 26 1988 48 
1973 10 1981 36 
source: Ai-mousawi (iyay) 
The 1960's and 1970's was the establishment of important organisations in 
Kuwait. These included Kuwait Audit Bureau, Kuwaiti Accountants and 
Auditors Association, and the Central Bank of Kuwait. The Audit Bureau was 
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set up in 1964 as an independent commission for financial control and was 
attached to the national assembly. The plan to establish the Bureau first emerged 
in 1954 when the government realised the need for more sophisticated methods to 
handle its rapidly expanding budget. An Egyptian accounting expert was hired to 
design and organise the Audit Bureau. The main objective of the Audit Bureau 
was specified as being to maintain an effective control over public funds: to 
safeguard them, prevent any misuse and verify their proper utilisation for the 
purposes they have been allocated for (Audit Bureau, 1985, p. 17). Nowadays, 
the Bureau audits all government ministries, departments and public agencies. 
Moreover, institutions and organisations controlled by the government (such as 
the Kuwait Investment Authority and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation) also fall 
under its jurisdictions, together with any companies in which the government 
holds a 50% or more ownership stake. 
In 1968 Law No. 32 was issued to establish the Central Bank of Kuwait and 
organise the work of the bank and Kuwait's monetary sector. The law gave the 
Bank with wide powers to supervise the banking and financing sectors. Their 
importance saw one article of the law being concerned solely with the work of 
the auditor in these vital sectors. The law obliged the auditor to disclose the 
methods and procedures he adopted in attesting and evaluating assets and 
liabilities. It also required auditors to furnish a copy of their report to the 
Governor of the Central Bank, disclosing any transactions which are not in 
compliance with the Law of the Central Bank or other relevant regulations. The 
auditor is required to verify and sign any accounts and records of the auditee 
whenever the Central Bank requests it do so. Furthermore, the law forbids the 
auditor from accepting loans from banks being audited. 
The Kuwaiti Association of Accountants and Auditors (KAAA) in 1973 was 
established by government accountants to represent local accountants in all 
matters affecting their profession. The absence of any prior professional 
accounting organisation before was attributed by Fakhra (1996b) to inadequate 
education, the domination of accounting practice by non-Kuwaitis, limited and 
unorganised local markets, ineffective legislation and the political instability of 
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the 1960's (for details see Fakhra, 1996b). He also sighted the growth in the 
number of accounting firms and lack of strict accounting regulations behind the 
establishment of KAAA. On the other hand, Malallah argued that the general 
dissatisfaction of accountants with the government had led to the establishment of 
the KAAA (Malallah, 1983). The constitution of KAAA listed the following 
objectives: 
1. Raise the professional and educational level of its members. 
2. Protect the rights of members and guarantee their future when they 
retire or became disabled or sick. 
3. Keep members informed about the recent developments in accounting. 
4. Propagate the development of accounting and sponsor accounting 
research. 
5. Participate in the development of accounting standards and 
regulations and try to maintain a high level of qualifications for 
registered accountants. 
6. Cooperate with other societies either locally or internationally. 
KAAA has been criticised for its poor contribution to the Kuwaiti accounting 
profession. El-Azma and Al-Bassam attributed this to 
"... the lack of a general framework as to how accounting standards 
should be set in Kuwait, and of any form of co-ordination among 
governmental agencies and other parties concerned with financial 
reporting... " (El-Azma and Al-Bassam, 1987, p. 348). 
The lack of action on the part of KAAA in the 1970's has been attributed to 
internal deficiencies and to environmental circumstances prevailing during that 
era. Fakhra (1996a) claimed that administrative factors within KAAA, namely 
the part time employment of its staff, the fact the board members were not 
remunerated, and the lack of experienced people in the appropriate fields. He 
also indicated that the KAAA prepared three draft laws between the period of 
1973-1980 to replace the existing law on the practice of auditing but the 
economic and political conditions of the time stopped them from taking place. 
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The KAAA's inability to address the improvement of accounting standards might 
be justified in that it didn't want to provoke the government who could have cut 
its financial assistance. KAAA's lack of legal authority to impose and issue 
regulations or standards led to criticisms that it had failed to guide the profession 
(Malallah, 1983). The persistent situation in Kuwait where accountants opt to 
work in the governmental sector rather in accounting firms coupled, with non- 
Kuwaiti accountants registering with foreign accounting societies has also been 
held to have hindered the development of the KAAA. Malallah (1983) claimed 
that governmental accountants are unaware and disinterested in the problems 
facing professional accountants, while the absence of qualified personnel and 
resources have led members to adopt a negative attitude towards the association 
and its activities. 
The first official accounting education system was introduced by the Kuwaiti 
government in 1963 through the establishment of a Secondary School of 
Commerce. This was basically a system geared towards satisfying the needs of 
the public and the private sector for bookkeepers, administrators, secretaries and 
clerks (Shuaib, 1974, p. 76). In 1967, Kuwait University established the Faculty 
of Commerce, Economic and Political Science. This faculty offered Kuwaitis, 
for the first time, the chance to acquire a bachelor degree in accounting in 
Kuwait. Another opportunity to study accounting in Kuwait emerged in 1975 
when the Business Institute3 was established. The Business Institute is a two-year 
polytechnic that offers diplomas in different business fields including accounting. 
The graduates of this institute are not allowed to practice auditing in Kuwait, as 
they do not satisfy the legal requirement of having a bachelor study. 
The 1960s saw further development of accounting firms in Kuwait, when 
Egyptian accounting firms initially became established in Kuwait. Even though 
these firms were highly regarded and successful, they did not spread in the area 
because they usually had one partner and would cease to exist when the partner 
became old or dies. Bader Bazie constituted the first Kuwaiti accounting firm in 
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1963. The economy of Kuwait grew substantially in the seventies as oil prices 
reached their highest level. The growth in the economy led to the establishment 
of numerous private corporations. Consequently, the number of accounting firms 
increased as result of the demand for their services. Also, the number of 
Kuwaitis starting to enter the audit profession increased substantially. Mr Bazie 
was in partnership with Arthur Young since 1967. In the late Seventies Price 
Waterhouse was established in Kuwait with Talal Abu-Ghazaleh (Deloitte, 1984, 
p. 42). Peat Marwick Mitchell opened an office in Kuwait in 1975. Touche Ross 
built a partnership with Jasem Al-Fahad in Kuwait in 1978. 
5.2.3 The 'Kuwaitization' Period (1980 -1990) 
This period witnessed three important developments. First, a new auditing law 
was passed and a committee was set up to draft accounting standards. The two 
developments can be seen as contributing to the 'Kuwaitization' of the accounting 
profession, with non-Kuwaitis not being allowed to practice after 1986 and 
accounting guidelines being drafted to meet the needs of the Kuwaiti 
environment. This period also saw the collapse of Souk Al-Manakh, creating one 
of the country's biggest financial problems. 
The most important development in Kuwait's auditing history was the enactment 
of Law No. 5 (Practice of Auditing) in January 1981 which superseded Law No. 
6 of 1962. The need for this law stemmed from the concern that the auditing 
firms were deviating from their original practice - being involved in managerial 
consulting services and underwriting of corporations. Fakhra (1996a) identified 
other influential factors including the lobbying of KAAA4 for such a law (since 
KAAA's inception in 1973) and the growth in shareholding companies and the 
stock market. The law consisted of three sections. The first section discussed the 
general requirement for registering and practising in Kuwait. The second section 
3 The name of the Business Institute has been changed to the College of Business Studies in 1986. 
° The KAAA wrote to the Minister of Commerce in 1973 highlighting preservation of public 
interest as a top priority and their plans for drafting an amendment to Law 6/1962. The letter 
indicated that Law 6/1962 only provided the minimum in comparison to the laws of other 
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listed the duties and responsibilities of auditors and the third section focused on 
the disciplinary actions that can be imposed on auditors in cases where they were 
negligent or not in compliance with the laws. 
The new law increased the required experiences period for Type "A"6 auditors 
from 5 years to 7 years. The experience period for type "B" auditors was also 
increased from 3 years to 5 years. A requirement was also introduced for 'would 
be' auditors to pass a specific test prepared by the Ministry of Commerce. The 
first test was undertaken in 1984. However, the low success rate prompted 
KAAA to ask the Ministry if it could prepare the exam. However, there was no 
response from the Ministry until the end of the 1980's (Fakhra, 1996a). The law 
also prohibited non-Kuwaitis from practising in Kuwait from 1986. It also 
approved the establishment of partnerships of more than one accountant to audit 
the financial reports of companies, with the stipulation that the person responsible 
for the audit is known and personally signs the audit report. Moreover, the 
legislator made it clear that the auditor is prohibited from doing the following: 
1. Provide management advisory services. 
2. Underwriting services for new companies. 
3. Handling bookkeeping and the preparation of financial statements for 
their audit clients. 
4. Advertising for his office or acquire any work through any improper 
methods. 
5. Not accept a job in a stock-holding company. 
Fakhra (1996a) concluded that the new law restricted access of the new 
accountants to the auditing profession, which was to the benefit of the 
practitioners of that time. His analysis of the new law and the law draft prepared 
countries. The KAAA also recommended suspending the registration of Non-Kuwaitis (for more 
details see Fakhra, 1996b). 
S The required experience involved one of the following: a) work as an auditor in an auditing 
firm; b) work as an accountant or auditor in companies or organisations or public authorities or 
private authorities; c) work as an accountant or auditor in a governmental agency. 
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by KAAA revealed that if the KAAA draft had been adopted more qualified 
accountants would have been able to practice in Kuwait (see Fakhra, 1996a). He 
indicated that this showed the political dimension of the auditing function in 
Kuwait as the legislator was in favour of limiting the number of people who 
could pursue the audit function. Others have echoed these claims, emphasising 
the timing of the enactment of this law - which came a less than one month 
before the return of the parliament after having been dissolved for four years and 
a half (Al-Muhasiboon, December 1997, p. 5). While the experience of 
professionalisation in the UK and USA demonstrate the self-interested role of 
profession in limiting access to accounting practice (Lee, 1995), the experience in 
Kuwait contradicts this situation as the government in this case was the one 
limiting access to the audit market. 
Malallah believed that the shortcomings in Law No. 5 of 1981 was the result of 
lack of any direct input from the accounting firms. One of the criticisms of the 
law has been that it is more concerned with the length of auditing experience 
rather than the quality of the experience received. The failure to establish some 
kind of continuing education for auditors is another noted defect in the law 
(Malallah, 1983). 
The second major development in this period was the Ministry of Commerce's 
establishment of the Permanent Technical Committee for Setting Accounting 
Rules (PTCSAR) in 1981 in order to improve the structure of accounting practice. 
The PTCSAR Charter outlined the objectives of the committee. They were as 
follows: 
1. Establishing rules of conduct to which auditors should adhere. 
2. Promulgating accounting standards and rules to be adopted in 
preparing financial statements. 
3. Determining the minimum required financial information to be 
included in financial statements. 
6 Type "A" auditors are licensed to audit all firms in Kuwait, while Type "B" are restricted from 
auditing Banks and Insurance companies. 
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4. Periodic Assessment of accounting standards and rules. 
5. Conducting research to improve the auditing profession. 
Every three-year term a new committee has to be chosen. While the committee 
does not have the authority to issue standards or rules, which are the sole right of 
the Ministry of Commerce, it communicates its findings to the Ministry in the 
form of recommendations. The first committee consisted of five members, three 
from the Ministry of Commerce, one from KAAA, and one from Kuwait 
University. The committee did not establish or promulgate any accounting 
standard during its first three years of sessions. One reason for this failure might 
be that members of the committee were directing most of their attention during 
that time to Al-Manakh crisis. Other reasons include governmental bureaucracy 
and the fact that none of the members were working full time in the committee 
(Al-Hajeri, 1992). In 1986 the Second PTCSAR was established with a slight 
difference in the arrangement of its members. The number of members increased 
from five to seven, which meant increasing the number of members from Kuwait 
University by two. Another change was the replacement of the KAAA member 
by one from the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange. The efforts of this PTCSAR resulted in 
the presentation of three recommendations for accounting guides. The Ministry 
of Commerce in its part enacted these guides, making them the basis for 
preparing financial statements in Kuwait. These guides consisted of the 
following: 1-Financial statements' guidelines; 2-The investment accounting 
guide; 3-The property accounting guide. 
One of the main reasons cited for PTCSAR's inadequate role in the development 
of the accounting profession in Kuwait is the lack of a clear strategy for research 
and development which rendered PTCSAR's work to be limited and not up to- 
date. PTCSAR was accused of working in isolation of the interested parties or 
concerned parties. Even though the committee claimed its work is conducted on 
the basis of professional task forces which issues exposure drafts to be examined 
and commented on by interested parties.. Some researchers questioned the 
committee claim's emphasising, that there had been neither draft stages nor trail 
periods (Al-Hajeri, 1992; Al-Rashed, 1994b). A handful of accounting firms 
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were consulted with relevance to the guides, but they and the other users and 
preparers of financial statements had only one month to express their opinions 
with relevance to the guides before they were enacted by the Ministry. 
Even though the government offered its full financial support for the PTCSAR, 
its guides were not enforced by the Ministry - the level of compliance with these 
laws was very low with a large number of companies and their auditors not 
adopting them. The impartiality of the committee was questioned as 
approximately 50% or more of members were government officials. Likewise, 
PTCSAR's concern with the impartiality of its functions led to it surrounding 
itself with excessive secrecy. The minutes of the meetings and its final reports 
were confidential and only few people could access them (Al-Rashed, 1994b), 
again illustrating the political dimensions of accounting and auditing regulation 
in Kuwait (Fakhra, 1996a). 
This period also witnessed one of the most important problems in the history of 
Kuwait's financial history, namely the collapse of Souk Al-Manakh (the 
unofficial Kuwaiti Stock Market), at a cost of $92bn. The Al-Manakh problem 
started in early 1980s with the enormous growth in number of Gulf (offshore) 
companies and closed companies, whose shares were traded on the Al-Manakh. 
This saw rising demand for accounting services and growth in the number of 
accounting firms. These firms devoted much of their time to the registration of 
new stocks with the authorities. (Malallah, 1983). Some of these firms even 
went as far as entering as underwriters of the companies they audited, which 
resulted in some of the auditors losing their independence. 
In the summer of 1982, the A1-Manakh market collapsed as result of the failure of 
some of the biggest investors to fulfil their obligations. The aftermath of the 
collapse revealed the negligence of the accounting profession, both through the 
work of big firms and small firms. Darwiche (1986) identified some of the 
abuses committed by audit firms in Kuwait before the collapse of Souk Al- 
Manakh. 
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"Accountancy firms colluded with the boards of Kuwaiti and Gulf 
companies to submit inaccurate reports on their standing. Some auditors 
presented false statements and balance sheets that showed profits where 
there weren't any. The boards paid dividends of 15 or 20 per cent by 
drawing from capital. " (Darwiche, 1986, p. 98). 
Another criticism of the audit firms was that they kept quiet with regards to the 
private and public companies speculative use of resources in speculation in the 
Al-Manakh market, which often violated their corporate charter (Malallah, 1983, 
Abdul Raheem and Al-Jumah, 1989). Al-Hajeri (1992) examined the causes of 
the Al-Manakh crises through a questionnaire survey in Kuwait. The majority of 
the respondents, (who were accountants and people concerned with the 
profession) agreed that the lack of adequate accounting information had been one 
of the causes of the crises (Al-Hajeri, 1992). While it has been argued that the 
foreign audit firms were less culpable in the Al-Manakh crisis (see Al-Hajeri, 
1992), others (e. g. Al-Mudhaf, 1990; Darwiche, 1986) have argued that they were 
clearly implicated in the crises. 
Although the Kuwaiti commercial law did not discuss either implicitly or 
explicitly the right of shareholders to pursue audit firms in the courts for their 
negligence (Al-Bassam, 1983, p. 28), these failures were pursed in Kuwait's legal 
courts for the first time in the country's history. As Shuaib noted: 
"Until 1980, there had been no negative public concerns or lawsuits 
against practitioners. As a result of the stock market crash in 1982, some 
cases were brought against the auditors. This fact raises the question as 
to how to determine the liability of the auditor in the absence of generally 
accepted accounting and auditing standards" (Shuaib, 1987, p. 383). 
However, there are no available reports about the outcome of these claims or if 
they indeed were heard in court. On the other hand, a governmental committee 
from the Fatwa and Legislation Department was set up after the collapse of Al- 
Manakh to investigate the actions of the closed share-holding companies. The 
committee concluded that the founders of 39 companies had committed serious 
offences. The committee also recommended disciplinary actions for nine 
auditors for breaching the Audit Law No. 5 of 1981 (Al-Qabas, 29/6/94). The 
committee's recommendations, however, were not implemented. The head of the 
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committee was contacted to acquire a copy of the report. He indicated that a 
copy of the report can only be provided from the Council of Ministers, but the 
council subsequently refused to release the report claiming that the council does 
not have a direct contact with members of the public. 
The collapse of the Al-Manakh market in 1982 prompted the Committee of the 
Stock Exchange to develop its own set of rules and regulations. It also issued 
Law 1/1985 stipulating the presentation of semi-annual reports of companies 
listed on the Kuwaiti stock exchange. The Kuwaiti stock exchange also issued an 
Auditing Guideline for attesting semi-annual information. This was designed to 
offer some guidance to auditors, requiring them to follow a specific prescribed 
procedure in examining the semi- annual financial statements 
At that time, a Kuwaiti accounting firms associated with the Big Eight 
international firms controlled the audit market. For instance, Shuaib (1986) 
showed that 44 out of the 48 companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange in 
1982 were audited by firms associated with the Big Eight, that is 92% of listed 
companies were audited by these firms (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2- Number of Listed Companies in the Kuwaiti Stock Market Audited by Selected 
Audit Firms in 1 999 
Audit Firms 
No. Of Companies audited by 
each firm 
Association with the "Big Eight" 
Al-Massed 8 Ernst & Whinny 
Bader Bazie 17 Arthur Young & Co. 
Saba & Co. 2 Touche Ross & Co. 
Talal Abu-Ghazaleh 17 Price Waterhouse 
Total 44 
source: k3nuaio, i ioo, p. 101) 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry established (in early 1980s) a 
department to deal with the organisation of the accounting profession in Kuwait. 
Starting from 1986, Law No. 5/1981 prohibited non-Kuwaitis from practising 
accounting and auditing. The foreign accounting firms had either to find a 
Kuwaiti partner or to leave the country. Some of the firms did leave the country 
while the others enforced their presence with Kuwaiti partners. For instance, 
Ernst & Whinney re-established their firm with Kuwaiti partners in 1982. 
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This 1980s witnessed fluctuations in the partnerships between Kuwaiti firms and 
the international firms. Price Waterhouse partnership with Talal Abu- Ghazaleh 
did not last for long and Price Waterhouse's became associated with the 
International Audit Bureau in 1984 (Deloitte, 1984). A manager with Talal Abu- 
Ghazaleh claimed that his firm dissociated with Price Waterhouse because they 
felt that they had no need for the international auditing firms as they were the one 
who getting clients and not Price Waterhouse. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells was 
associated with Saif Al-Saadoon in 1984 but it seems that it left Kuwait after the 
law forbid the practice of non-Kuwaitis. Peat Marwick Mitchell closed its office 
in Kuwait in 1981 only to re-establish a partnership with Masaud Serkhoh in 
1986. Arthur Anderson entered into a partnership in Kuwait in 1986 with a 
Kuwait partner, Mr Ali Al-Hasawi, but again things did not work out and it 
terminated the partnership. In 1989 the merger of Ernst & Whinney with Arthur 
Young formed Ernst & Young in the UK and Kuwait. Mr Bader Bazie, a Senior 
Partner in AY, declined the offer of a merger. He asserted that E&W and Arthur 
Young were the biggest firms in Kuwait and if the merger went through they 
would control 60% of Kuwait's audit market. Controlling this huge share of the 
audit market was socially not acceptable. On the other hand, Mr Al-Osami, a 
Kuwaiti partner in EY, claimed that the merger issue was a confidential matter 
for the firm and he would only say that the merger didn't go through because the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry was reluctant to approve the merger. He 
indicated that the Ministry made this decision to avoid a monopoly in the Kuwaiti 
audit market. 
5.2.4 The Post Gulf War Period 
The post gulf-war period has witnessed a greater role for accounting and auditing 
in Kuwait. In 1990 the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued a resolution to 
make all share-holding companies and limited liability corporations in Kuwait 
adopt the International Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board. Based on the recommendations of the permanent 
Technical Committee, the Ministry of Commerce can prevent these companies 
from adopting principles that are not relevant to Kuwait. Also PTCSAR can 
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suggest the accounting principles that are relevant to Kuwait and not covered 
by 
the international standards. This decision superseded another one imposed in 
1987 to adopt a prescribed principle for preparing the financial statements. This 
decision was scheduled to be effective from January 1991 but it was postponed as 
a result of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. Shuaib and Douglas (1996) concluded 
from their analysis of reporting practices in the banking industry in 1982 and 
1995 that they had improved as a result of the adoption of IAS. For example he 
showed that the widespread practice where banks created secret inner reserves 
was abandoned after the adoption of IAS. In their study of accounting evaluation 
of fixed assets in shareholding companies, Abdul Rahim et al (1996) have shown 
that IAS are suitable for implementation in such companies. They also found 
widespread support for adoption of IAS by these companies. 
The impact of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait not only saw the postponement of the 
adoption of International accounting standards, but also created other problems 
for accountants and auditors in Kuwait. Shortly after the liberation of Kuwait 
accountants and auditors were faced with the problem of missing or destroyed 
accounting data and records. A ministerial resolution No. /110 was issued in 1991 
as a basis for reporting losses and unusual transactions resulted from the Gulf 
War. As for the problem of preparing the financial statements for the financial 
year during the invasion, this was resolved before Kuwait was liberated when the 
exiled government issued law No. 4/A 1990 which propagated that the financial 
year of 1990 would be extended to include 1991. The UN resolution No. 687 for 
1991 propagated that those companies and individuals which had suffered 
emotional and material losses from the Iraqi invasion would be compensated 
through a special account set up from Iraq's sale of oil. The Big Six firms, 
including Price Waterhouse, took a major role in preparing applications for war 
compensation for companies, institutions and organisations in Kuwait. Price 
Waterhouse and the international law firm Bryan Cave were hired by the Kuwaiti 
government to prepare the compensation forms for institutions and organisations 
controlled by the government. 
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The destruction Kuwait suffered during the war put significant pressure on the 
government's budget deficit. Hence, the government thought seriously of 
privatising its highly subsidised utility services. The Big Six acted as consultants 
for the government's proposed privatisation plans in Kuwait. For instance, 
Coopers & Lybrand studied the plans for privatising the government owned 
telephone services. Another proposal for tackling the budget deficit was 
parliamentary proposal for the introduction of taxes in Kuwait as a source of 
revenue to finance the budget deficit in the short run and to constitute a long-term 
revenue for the government budget. If such a proposal came to fruition this 
would have translated into a larger role for the accounting firms in general and 
for the Big Six in particular, given their international taxation knowledge. The 
post-war reconstruction of Kuwait also aided the Big Six in Kuwait, in that they 
served as financial advisors for many international companies involved in 
building and construction projects. 
The Big Six monopoly on the audit market in Kuwait was challenged in an 
interview by a partner at E&Y, claiming that Kuwait is adopting an open market 
policy and that there is no monopoly. He attributed their firms domination of the 
market as an outcome of their long history in Kuwait. For example, Ernst Young 
and its predecessor firms have audited the National Bank of Kuwait since 1952. 
However, his arguments does not explain how Coopers & Lybrand (who were 
only established in Kuwait in 1991) had increased their listed clients from 2 to 13 
in two years. In addition, the E&Y partner indicated that currently competition is 
hard and requires enormous efforts on the part of the firms to maintain market 
share. Another partner at a small audit firm claimed that the monopoly is 
justified as the Big Six firms have the required means (large staff, extensive 
training, supervision through international partners) for auditing large companies. 
The small firms do not have the required means for auditing big companies in 
Kuwait. 
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Medium and small size audit firms also have a role in Kuwait's audit market. 
The medium size firms can be characterised by their association to smaller 
international7 auditing firms, and by being larger in size in comparison to the 
small firms, and by the full time participation of their partners. The majority of 
the medium size firms' clients include limited companies, individual companies 
and a small number of public and closed share-holding companies. The number 
of firms in this category is also small. The small audit firms, which represent the 
highest number of firms in Kuwait, are characterised by their small staff, and 
their part time partners' participation. The average number of auditors in these 
firms is less than five auditors, while the partners in these firms work in the 
government or companies in the morning and work in their firms in the afternoon 
Recently the accounting program at Kuwait University had a face-lift. Changes 
being contemplated include an American based courses system, featuring an 
accounting curriculum partially taught in English. The changes are seeking to 
eradicate the problems of the previous accounting education system at Kuwait 
University. One of the major disadvantages of the current accounting education 
program is that little change in the program has taken place since 1967 and the 
recent developments in accounting have not been accommodated well. The 
program neglects auditing and fails to promote it as an important service 
(Malallah, 1983, p. 116). In addition, the program lacks the practical orientation 
of accounting as it emphasises on the theory side of accounting. Furthermore, 
there is a lack of both the emphasis on the local environment and few textbooks 
with a local orientation. The shortage of accounting educators and the 
subsequent lack of research with relevance to accounting in Kuwait are a major 
problem for the profession (Al-Hajeri, 1992, p. 203). 
In 1990 Mr Bader Bazie and a fellow became the partners representing Arthur 
Andersen's worldwide partnership in Kuwait. Coopers & Lybrand entered 
Kuwait's audit market after the liberation of Kuwait. Mr Bader Al-Wazan, the 
International Audit Bureau is a Member of Horwath International. Al-Fouz International Audit 
Bureau is a member of Urbach Hacker Young Worldwide. Bouresli Auditing Office is member 
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sole Kuwaiti partner, was in partnership with a firm called Spicer & Pegler since 
1980. But he opted for a partnership with Coopers & Lybrand 1991. Since the 
Gulf War, Price Waterhouse tried and still trying to build up a new partnership in 
Kuwait. As it been discussed earlier Price Waterhouse through their office in 
Bahrain was hired by the Kuwaiti government to prepare the war compensation 
forms. 
5.3 The Changing Nature of Social Attitudes to Accountants and 
Auditors 
The problem for the accounting profession in Kuwait and KAAA is that their role 
and regulations will not be taken seriously unless backed up by government 
support, as an average citizen regards government support as constituting 
credibility. Although Shuaib (1995) supports standard setting by the profession 
he thinks that it is more appropriate for the government to undertake such a role 
given the limited resources of the profession. The accounting profession in 
Kuwait suffers from a shortage of Kuwaitis. This shortage can be attributed to 
factors such as the low wages of these firms, the long training period (5 to 7 
years) and the prestige/benefits associated with working in the government or 
elsewhere in the private sector. A major factor for this shortage is that the 
accounting profession is not highly regarded in Kuwaiti society. This phenomena 
was asserted by Al-Hajeri 
"Some of the problems of accounting in Kuwait can be put down to the 
fact that accountancy is not socially widely accepted as a profession nor 
regarded as important. It is regarded by a large sector of the society as a 
bookkeeping or money collecting (cashier) function. This view 
negatively affects the advancement of the accounting profession in 
Kuwait, and most Kuwaiti families prefer to educate their sons for more 
socially acceptable professions such as medicine and engineering. Even 
those who study accountancy prefer to join a government department in 
order to maximise their status. "(AI-Hajeri, 1992, Vol. II, p. 175) 
It has been argued by some researchers (see Malallah, 1983, Al-Hajeri, 1992) 
that one of the major social influences on the development of the accounting 
of Pannell Kerr Forster. 
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profession is the desire of the wealthy families of Kuwait for loose regulations to 
protect their interest. The situation was best explained by Malallah (1983, 
pp. 169-170) 
"The Kuwaiti business environment........ is characterised by the existence 
of large, privately held companies, which are controlled by a small 
number of big wealthy families. To protect the interest of their owners, 
these companies have resorted to secrecy and the protection of 
information from outsiders. Accordingly, accounting firms have been 
forced to submit to the pressure of these big clients, which led to financial 
reporting practices being characterised by undervaluation, hidden reserves 
and minimum disclosure. " 
There is a tendency in Kuwait to believe that accounting information is just a 
formality. For example a manager of Coopers & Lybrand in Kuwait in response 
to an inquiry about the disinterest of clients in computerised audit claimed that 
the majority of clients do not care about the quality of the audit, they think its 
only a formality to be presented to the shareholders and the Ministry of 
Commerce. (Al-Haj j i, 1993, p. 121) 
Family and social relations and friendship play a major role in the way auditors 
are hired by the management of companies. The importance of relations and 
connections has been confirmed by auditors from small and medium size firms, 
by KAAA and by members of parliament (Al-Qabas, 1994). These relations are 
what some auditors are claiming to be the motive behind some Big Six firms 
having more clients than others. KAAA claimed that it wouldn't be able to 
eradicate this practice yet it can contribute in cutting it down if better co- 
ordination could be set up between the Ministry of Commerce and KAAA to put 
a cap on audit fees and place a limit on the number of years over which an audit 
firm can act as an auditor of a specific client. KAAA believed that the 
requirement for two auditors would diminish the disadvantages of having audit 
firms with relationships or friendships with the members of the board of some 
share-holding companies. (Al-Anaba, 2/6/94, p. 22) 
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Family relations and friendships are also claimed be an important factor in 
getting in getting access to information about the financial status of companies 
and corporations. Al-Mosawi indicated that 
" 
... the 
influence of family and friendship are considered very important 
among people in the country. This has led to users in general having 
access to companies' financial information. This together with the fast 
spread of news due to the small size of the country and widespread of 
Diwanias, gathering centres, lead the release of financial information in 
spite of the lack of financial information disclosure by companies"(1986, 
p. 93) 
The establishment of the international firms in Kuwait can be attributed to the 
perception that local firms are considered to be more efficient when associated 
with these firms. Al-Mudhaf highlighted this idea: 
"... As a part of the process of gaining credibility, a number of auditing 
firms in Kuwait have affiliated themselves with international auditing 
firms in order to be perceived as competent and hence gain the credibility 
of their clients and the users of financial statements"(Al-Mudhaf, 1990, 
p. 218) 
The trend of association with international accounting firms seems to be on the 
increase in Kuwait. Several medium and small size audit firms in Kuwait have 
established some kind of relationship with international audit firms (See Table 
5.3 for a list of the audit firms with their international associations). This trend 
might have resulted from the belief that international firms will be exerting 
pressure on their local partners to act more professionally to keep up the reputed 
image of the international firm. Another factor is that the desire of local 
accounting firms to provide better accounting services for private business might 
have led them to closer professional ties with international accounting firms. The 
international firm's knowledge and professional experience are claimed to be 
valuable tools for a better service and a way to improve the local profession (Al- 
Mudhaf, 1990, p. 220). In today's global market various kinds of corporations are 
seeking business opportunities in any potential part of the world. To be able to 
grow in this era bank, investment organisations, insurance corporations, and 
industrial companies have sought to establish relations with overseas 
counterparts. To strengthen these relations, such organisations usually would like 
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to see the financial statements of their business partners audited by accounting 
firms familiar to them and in whom they trust. The association with reputed 
international firms means increasing the market share and revenue for both the 
local and international partners. As most of the large public share holding 
companies and the government owned organisations potentially could be 
expected to seek audits by these firms in order to build up business opportunities 
to these organisations in the world. Furthermore, the consulting services of these 
firms might be very rewarding as usually public companies and the government 
would require the advice and the consultation of professionals who are only 
available through the international practices of these firms. 
Tnh1a FR- Aiirlit Firm, - 
in Kiiwnit. and Chair Tntarnatinnnl Accnrint. inn 
Name of Firm 
No. of 
Partners 
No. of 
Employees International Association 
Abdul%vahad Aman Public Accountants 
Office 
1 7 
Al-Murtaja for Auditing and Accounting 1 9 
Al-Ahli Bureau Certified Accountants 2 11 
Al-Aiban, Osaimi & Partners 2 95 Member of Ernst & Young 
Al-Asry Office For Auditing 1 8 
Al-Ateeqi Certified Accountants 1 18 Member of PKR International 
AI-Baian For Accounting & Auditing 3 IS 
Al-Bassam & Company 1 
Al-Dallal Audit Office 1 10 
Al-Dar Audit Bureau 3 17 Member of Abu-Ghazaleh Group 
Al-Fahad Al-Marzook Deloitte & Touche 2 Member of Deloitte & Touche 
Al-Faraj Auditing Office 1 10 
Al-Fouz Audit Bureau 1 8 Member of Urbak Hacker Young Worldwide 
All Salem Taqi Auditors And Accountants 1 11 
Al-loot Audit Centre 1 10 
Allied Accountants 3 13 Member of RSM International 
Al-Waha Auditing Office 2 7 Member of International Accounting Group 
Al-Wehda Auditing Office 2 13 
Bader & Company Coopers & Lybrand 4 35 
Full Member Firm of Coopers & Lybrand 
International 
Bader Al-Bazie & Co / Arthur Andersen 3 80 Member of Anderson International 
Burqan Auditing Office 3 20 Member in BDO International 
Experience Auditing House 2 10 Member of Kingston International 
Fakhra Auditing Office 1 
Grant Thornton / Anwar Yousef Al- 
Qatami & Co 
1 65 Grant Thornton International 
International Auditing Bureau 1 35 Member of Horwath International 
International Auditing Centre 1 15 
Jazira Auditing Office 1 17 
Legal Auditing Centre 3 10 
Masoud & Partners 4 35 Member Firm of KPMG 
Middle East Auditing Bureau 1 7 
Member of International Association of 
Practising Accountants (IAPA) 
Nazar & Partners 2 15 Member of Nexia International 
Tareq Bouresli & Co. 1 12 Member of Pannell Keff Forster International 
Technical Auditing Office 1 16 
Source: KAAA, 199 
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The practical impact and the role of the international firms on the accounting 
profession in Kuwait, however, are not known. Al-Mudhaf (1990) conducted a 
very limited study aimed at finding out whether investors and lenders 
differentiate between financial reports verified by international firms or local 
firms. The result of the al-Mudhaf study suggested that there is a perception of 
the international auditing firms as being more credible to investors and lenders 
than the small local firms. 
According to Mr Bazie it was the Kuwaiti accountants in most cases who sought 
partnerships with the Big Six in Kuwait. The advantage of association with 
international firms is that the firm is acknowledged to be familiar with the latest 
developments in accounting though the training conducted by the international 
firms, the methods and software used by these firms. They also offer more 
opportunities for the audit firms' staff - giving them the opportunity to work in 
many countries around the world. 
In his study of the factors that mostly affect auditor independence in Kuwait, Al- 
Rashed (1994a) found that auditors in Kuwait believed that small firms are more 
likely not to be independent while association with international firms will 
usually strengthen the independence of the auditor. Consulting services offered 
by audit firms and competition between these firms were also seen to some 
degree to compromise auditor independence. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The development of accounting and auditing in Kuwait has shown that the 
government has been the major force behind the regulation of the profession. It 
set the law of accounting practice in 1962 and then amended it in 1981 without 
much input from the accounting firms or the profession's representative, the 
KAAA. Another influential role for the government was in trying to set 
accounting standards. Throughout the history of accounting in Kuwait there have 
not been any Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) adopted. The 
management and auditors have had the freedom to adopt any accounting 
principles they see fit (El-Azma, 1987, p. 353). The international accounting 
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firms usually adopted their home country standards. The same can be assumed of 
both the multinational corporations working in Kuwait and the foreign 
accountants practising in Kuwait. Even though companies were required to 
prepare their financial reports based on the guides of PTCSAR since their 
enactment in 1987, there was compelling evidence that these guides were not 
adhered to (Al-Rashed, 1994b, p. 54). The PTCSAR guides were abandoned in 
1991, as companies were required to adopt the International Accounting 
Standards. The Accounting profession in Kuwait still lacks Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS). No professional requirements have been adopted 
by the local profession, as there are only statutory laws in Kuwait. The 
international firms are adopting their home countries' auditing standards. The 
absence of such standards could be problematic for the accounting profession in 
Kuwait. Shuaib argued that: 
"The absence of defined audit standards has made it more difficult for the 
auditor to prove that he has done what a prudent and diligent auditor would 
do under the given circumstances in accordance with recognised auditing 
standards" (Shuaib, 1987, p. 383) 
However, practitioners and academics in Kuwait perceive the problem in 
accounting and auditing to be related to inadequate efforts in education and other 
measures to transcribe the Anglo-American accounting model. For example they 
pin the problems of the accounting profession in Kuwait on the lack of qualified 
accountants, lack of continuing accounting education and training and they 
expect that the profession will improve greatly if these measures are undertaken. 
This limited focus fails to recognise the limitations of the audit function and the 
myth surrounding it. Another aspect of which that a strong emphasis has been 
placed in Kuwait is the requirement for conceptual framework of accounting. 
Researchers are still promoting such a concept for advancing the audit function in 
Kuwait. However, these arguments fail to recognise the belief that the profession 
in Anglo-American contexts have engaged in such framework to maintain the 
status quo and fend off governmental regulation (Hines, 1991). 
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Another conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis of the history of the 
accounting profession in Kuwait's that concern and efforts are primarily geared 
towards entrance into the audit market rather than the quality of the audit 
function. Debates are focusing on the examination requirement, continuing 
education and required experience but not on the more practice related issues like 
the role of friendships and family in securing audit engagements, and the lack of 
disciplinary measures against disgruntled auditors. 
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The Development ofAccounting and Auditing in Spain 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 6 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the development of accounting and 
auditing in Spain. In order to understand the role of accounting and auditing, it is 
crucial to examine the political, business and social environment in Spain. This 
development is also beneficial to understand the environment in which KIO 
started to invest its money from the mid-1980's. Accordingly this chapter will 
start with a brief history of Spain's political, economical and social dimensions. 
Then the chapter will discuss the development of accounting and auditing both 
before and after Spain became a member of the European Union. This division 
of the chapter is useful as most of the development in Spain's accounting 
profession emerged after joining the European Union. 
6.2 The Spanish Environment 
6.2.1 Political Background 
Spain was under the rule of the Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco since 
the end of civil war in 1939 until his death in 1975. Franco ran the country under 
an authoritarian and centralised dictatorship (Bruton, 1995). There was only one 
political party and it is argued that Franco maintained power by balancing the 
opposition of elite groups against other groups and tolerating widespread 
corruption. Franco's regime sympathised with the fascist powers in Germany and 
Italy despite Spain's apparent neutrality in the Second World War. His regime 
was also engaged in violent oppression of the Spanish people even after the civil 
war. These factors led to Spain's isolation from the rest of Western Europe in 
most of the 1950s and 1960s. Franco chose Juan Carlos, the grandson of King 
Alfonso IV (Spain's previous monarch) as the heir apparent to succeed him after 
his death feeling that he would maintain his legacy. However, Juan Carlos' 
accession to the Spanish throne as King of Spain after the death of Franco in 1975 
led to Spain's return to democracy. The new king was totally committed to 
democracy in Spain and started a transitional period from dictatorship to 
democracy in 1977 with the draft of the constitution in 1978. During that period, 
political parties were legalised and the constitution was drafted. The constitution 
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established Spain as a monarchy with parliamentary democracy. The pursuit of 
democracy also led to the devolution of political powers to other regions such as 
Catalonia and the Basque county having their own independent government. The 
Spanish parliament (Cortes Generales) is divided into two bodies the Congress 
(Congreso de los Diputados), the Lower house, and the Senate (Senado), the 
Upper house. There is no clear separation of powers in Spain. Instead, there 
exists a deliberate integration of executive and legislature via the government 
(Heywood, p. 89). The leftist - Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero 
Espanol - PSOE) governed Spain under the leadership of the Prime Minster, 
Felipe Gonzalez from 1982 to 1996. Under a socialist government, Spain joined 
the EEC, joined Nato and prospered economically. However, scandals came to 
dog the socialist party in the early 1990s and nearly caused them to lose the 
election in 1993 to the centre right - Popular Party (Partido Popular - PP). 
However, PP was duly successful in the 1996 general election and took over the 
government of Spain under the leadership of, Jose Maria Aznar. They continued 
to govern since recently winning the year 2000 general election. Spain has 
emerged from fragile democracy in 1970's to a strong democracy. The new 
Spanish prime minister saw the process of democracy as `absolutely consolidated' 
through the achievement of three elements -a peaceful transition to democracy, 
the devolution of government and the pursuit of an open economy (Time, 
17/11/97, p. 40). 
6.2.2 Economic Background 
The closeness of Franco's regime to the fascism during the Second World War 
and the regime's oppression of the Spanish people saw Spain being isolated from 
the rest of the world for many years after the war. The exclusion of Spain from 
the Marshal Aid Plan for Europe and the trade sanctions imposed by the United 
Nations on Spain (1946-1950) were clear examples of its isolation. This situation 
forced the Spanish regime to adopt policies of economic self-sufficiency and 
protectionism. Hooper (1995) even argued that this policy also coincided with the 
fascist doctrine of "emphasis on national economic independence and on 
agriculture rather than industrial development" (p. 14). Accordingly, Franco's 
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regime imposed heavy restrictions on the movement of goods and people from 
and into Spain. This policy made agriculture the dominant sector in the Spanish 
economy and had a detrimental effect on the Spanish economy, almost leading to 
the bankruptcy of the Spanish state in the mid 1950s (Ross, 1997). Consequently, 
Franco drafted technocrats to address this problem - their work and 
recommendations of IMF culminated in the stabilisation plan of 1959 (Plan de 
Estabilizaciön) that was based on the French model of inductive planning. It was 
responsible for creating the boom that was identified in Spain as the `economic 
miracle' of the 1960s (Heywood, 1995). The plan proposed a package of actions 
that were implemented in the late 1950s to achieve short and long-term goals. 
The plan embarked on reducing public spending and credit. These actions 
instituted some form of liberalisation of the Spanish economy, allowing the 
import and export of goods, foreign trade, foreign investment in Spain and the 
migration of Spanish workforce. The Spanish laws were amended to enable 
foreign investors wholly to own Spanish corporations. Encouraging tourism was 
also part of the stabilisation plan. 
These developments overall enabled Spain to move from an agrarian economy to 
an industrial one. Since the adoption of this plan, the map of occupational labour 
in Spain has changed dramatically from one where workforce was heavily 
dominated by agriculture to one with a much higher industrial base. The 
government established several industrial corporations and by the 1970s, the 
government was dominating the economy through the Instituto Nacional de 
Industria (INI) (National Institute for Industry) with INI holding a large portfolio 
of industrial companies in Spain. Spanish banks also control many of the 
companies in the economy, taking a more prominent role in providing capital than 
the stock market. The Spanish stock market was not as active and as important as 
those in other parts of Europe and the USA. This was attributed to the backward 
structure that followed the `economic miracle' of the 1960s. However, the 
introduction of several reforms to the stock market and the establishment of the 
CNMV in 1989 have led to a growth in its activities. By the early 1980's, the 
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World Bank, United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
considered Spain to be a developing country. 
Around the time of death of General Franco, Spain was starting to experience the 
effect of the oil crisis of the 1970's. Inflation shot up to 20% and unemployment 
reached 7.1 %, starting a trend of high unemployment that still present today. This 
period also saw more focus starting to be placed on establishing democracy -a 
concern with political process rather than on the economy. The real political 
developments started in 1982, with the socialist government coming to power. In 
1984, it embarked on an industrial retransformation policy that involved cutting 
redundant labour, undertaking financial restructuring and adopting technical 
modernisation. The government secured Spain's admission to the European 
Commission (EC) in 1986. While the economy started to achieve real GDP 
growth, above the EC average (Bruton, 1995). Inflation substantially fell from 
24.5% in 1977 to 4.9 (5.3% in 1987) in 1993 (Bruton, 1995, p. 39), although 
unemployment in Spain became the largest among the OECD countries, moving 
from 5.2% in 1977 to 22.7% in 1993 (Bruton, 1995, p. 64). Foreign investments in 
Spain were boosted after Spain joined the EC, growing almost ten fold between 
1982 in 1990 (Bruton, 1995). This growth was attributed to lower labour costs, 
growing domestic markets, political stability and financial incentives. However in 
the early 1990's, there was a concern that aggressive foreign investments were 
becoming detrimental to Spain's interest. Although, the government was keen to 
sell some of its public companies to foreigners, the law restricted acquisitions in 
the Spanish banking sector (reflecting the importance of the banking sector to the 
local economy). Spanish banks still hold significant holding in a large number of 
strategically important industries such as petrochemical, construction etc. 
Spain was required as a member of the EC to modify its laws and regulations to 
those of the EC. Accordingly, several laws in Spain were introduced in the late 
1980's to achieve this goal. These included the Audit Law of 19/1988, the Law 
19/1989 - Partial Reform and Adaptation of Commercial Legislation to EC 
Company Directives and the stock market law (the Ley de Reforma del Mercado 
de Valores). 
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6.2.3 The Spanish Society 
Tax evasion has traditionally been significant on both personal and business 
levels - interestingly it was only since 1977 that tax evasion was 
deemed as an 
offence in Spain. The history of the Spanish tax systems has been one of general 
inadequacy. There has been more reliance on indirect taxes which were easier to 
collect than direct taxes. Also, the tax administration has been cumbersome and 
there has been widespread evasion. One by-product of this unsatisfactory state of 
affairs has been the keeping of more than one set of accounting books which 
hindered progress towards providing reliable financial information (Donaghy and 
Laidler, 1982). 
"Tax evasion, by those who have the opportunity to practice it, is still rife. 
According to a study carried out for the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, half 
the income earned in Spain in undeclared. It is still common for 
companies to keep several sets of accounts, and in 1990 the president of 
Spanish employer's federation described evasion as an `entrepreneurial 
necessity'. As for taxes on the buying and selling of property, it is 
reckoned that on average the parties to a transaction declare about one- 
third of the real price when the house or flat is new, and only a fifth or so 
if it is not. " (Hooper, 1995, p. 241). 
Tax evasion was so prevalent in Spain that the government sought to attach what 
is commonly known and called in Spain as Dinero Negro (Black Money - or the 
undeclared assets held by individuals). The Spanish government's actions led to 
the divulgence of Pts 3.4bn in 1989 and Pts 1.7bn in 1990 of Dinero Negro (for 
more details, see Hooper, 1995). 
The nature and the importance of family and friends in Spanish society has a 
significant influence on the business environment. Family relations and 
friendships seem to have a great impact on employment in Spain - generally 
referred to as the phenomenon of amiguismo in Spain (jobs for the boys). 
Corruption in Spain is seen as one of the country's `perverse norms', considered 
acceptable at all levels of society (The Independent, 28/10/94, p. 12). Spanish 
entrepreneurs have also traditionally lived in hope of the Pelotazo (the `long ball' 
or `big kick') - that single stroke of luck or genius which will bring them a 
fortune overnight (Hooper, p. 188). This `get rich quick' mentality overtook 
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Spain in the eighties, and not surprisingly had considerable impact in a society 
where operating at the margins were very much accepted. In Spain, the 
development of a good business relationship is very much tied up with the 
development of a good personal relationship. Mutual trust and understanding are 
regarded as very important and social situations facilitate their development 
(Bruton, 1994, p. 107). 
Since the late eighties Spain has witnessed some quite major political and 
financial scandals, starting with the Filesa scandal, where big companies were 
paying huge sums of money for consulting studies by Filesa -a company acting 
as a front for fund raising by POSE, the socialist party. Scandals have often 
involved high figures in the government, including government ministers, the 
governor of the Bank of Spain and, even to some degree, the Prime Minister. 
The range of scandals include using secret funds to finance the dirty war against 
ETA, the Basque terrorist group, tax evasion and share price manipulation, fraud 
and bribery, phone tapping and party financing (for more details see FT, 7-2-96, 
p. 3). The increase in recent scandals is seen as making Spain a contender for 
supplanting Italy's reputation as the European corruption capital:. 
"It has been [corruption] fruit of a stage that's now past. There is a 
graphic journalistic view that two or three years ago Spaniards awoke 
each morning, we put on the radio and we asked ourselves: What's the 
scandal of the day? That's finished. I believe today Spain is morally solid 
country. The recipe is simple: those governing have to be honest, and 
appear to be honest. Transparency is fundamental, and public spending 
has to be increasingly scrutinised. Law can help, but the critical factor is 
personal honesty. " (Jose Maria Aznar, Time, 17/11/1997, p. 41). 
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6.3 Development of Accounting and Auditing in Spain 
6.3.1 Accounting and Auditing Pre-EC 
The history of accounting in Spain can be traced back to the 14th century where 
research has shown that double entry bookkeeping was used in Mallorca 
(Gonzalo and Gallizo, 1992). Spain has enacted several commercial codes (in 
1829,1885,1973 and 1989). The code of 1829 was concerned with providing 
merchants and traders with instructions on bookkeeping (Gonzalo and Gallizo, 
1992). Historically accounting in Spain was identified with taxation rather than 
with financial accounting. In 1973, the Plan General de Contabilidad (PGC) 
(General Accounting Plan) prescribed the statutory accounting requirements for 
Spanish companies. Further legislation in 1970's and 1980's has amended this 
plan for some sectors. 
The Law of 1848 on Share-Issuing Companies required the first form of auditing 
in Spain. The law required the civil governors of the provinces to check that the 
annual balance sheet was matching the company accounts. However, this 
requirement was short lived when that law was abolished by the 1868 decree of 
abolition of the 1848 law and regulations (Giner Inchausti, 1993a). Still in the 
early twentieth century, there was no statutory requirement for audited financial 
statements in Spain and consequently there were no professional accountants in 
Spain. Even in the limited situations where audited financial statements were 
required, the board of directors appointed a person they trusted (who did not 
necessarily have a professional qualification) to audit the accounts (Brown, 
1905). The first attempt to form the auditing profession in Spain was represented 
with the establishment of the Institute of Public Accountants of Spain in 1912 
only to disappear shortly after (Giner Inchausti, 1998). 
Accounting associations in Bilbao, Madrid, Barcelona and Vigo were bundled 
into the body Instituto de Censores Jurados de Cuentas de Espana (ICJCE) (the 
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Spanish Institute of Chartered Accountants) between 1942-1945', with a 
membership of 44 individuals (Donaghy and Laidler, 1982). Despite the 
emergence of ICJCE, the auditing profession failed to establish itself, given the 
lack of statutory requirement for auditing. Donaghy and Laidler (1982) also 
attributed the lack of growth in auditing to the limited number of individual 
shareholders, the existence of two forms of accounting books (official and other) 
and the widespread nature/scale of tax evasion. They believed that these factors 
did not create a suitable environment for auditing to thrive. However, the 
government's introduction of legislation in 1959, which made it possible for 
foreign investors to own unlimited amounts of a company's capital, is seen as a 
most important factor for the development of auditing. Donaghy and Laidler 
(1982) claimed that the flow of foreign investors into Spain was accompanied by 
an increase in the number of international audit firms to satisfy the lack of 
expertise in auditing in Spain. They saw these firms as having been a major force 
behind exposing Spain to modern auditing. 
A new regulation was enacted in 1967 where companies listed on the stock 
exchange were required to appoint an independent auditor who was a member of 
ICJCE. However, this type of audit was later restricted to certifying that the 
financial statements were in agreement with the accounting records (AICPA, 
1973). Companies not listed on the stock exchange were not required to appoint 
an external auditor but were required to prepare financial statements and present 
them to two shareholder-auditors. Another development in Spain's audit history 
started to emerge when voluntary audits was pursued as result of major financial 
scandals in the banking sector and the subsequent recommendations of the Bank 
of Spain for undertaking audit in that sector. Public companies' desire to 
improve their tarnished image due to mismanagement and lack of control led to 
the adoption of voluntary audits (Garcia Benau and Ruiz Barbadillo, 1996). The 
monopoly of ICJCE on the audit profession was challenged when the Consejo 
' There seems to be inconsistency over the exact date for the establishment of ICJCE, spanning 
from 1942-1945. Donaghy and Laidler (1982) reported the date of the establishment as 1942 
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General de Colegios de Economistas de Espana (the General Council of Spanish 
Economists' Associations) established in 1977 in their statute that auditing as one 
of the functions of economists, given their educational background (Cea Garcia, 
1992). Accordingly, the General Council established, in 1982, a Registro de 
Economistas Auditores (REA) (Register of Economist Auditors) to register 
economists who were providing auditing services. The international accounting 
firms supported the creation of REA given the disagreement among ICJCE 
members as to whether it was appropriate to accept these firms as members. The 
incompatibility of the views between these firms and ICJCE on how to tackle the 
problems of the profession was seen as another reason for the international firms' 
support for REA (Cea Garcia, 1992). 
In similar circumstances/process to those surrounding the establishment of REA, 
a third professional body was set up. It started with the 1977 professional statute 
of Consejo Superior de Colegios Oficiales de Titulados Mercantiles y 
Empresariales de Espana (the Supreme Council of Spanish Commercial 
Graduates' Associations) granting the commercial graduates the right to perform 
auditing. Shortly after the establishment of REA in the early 1980's, the council 
of commercial graduates set up the Registro de Titulares Mercantiles (RTM) 
(Register of Commercial Graduate Auditors) to register its members wanting to 
practice auditing. Cea Garcia (1992) attributed the establishment of RTM to 
ICJCE's suspension of its links with the council of commercial graduates in 
attempt to restrict the practice of auditing to ICJCE's members. He also claimed 
that the establishment of REA also encouraged the establishment of RTM. 
However, the establishment of the three accounting professional bodies did not 
change the status of limited company auditing and voluntary audits until the 
enactment of the Audit Law of 1988. However, the three bodies did draft their 
own auditing standards and obliged their members to adopt them in conducting 
their work (Lopez Combarros, 1992). 
while Cea Garcia (1992) thought it was in 1943 and others reported it to be in 1945 (Gonzalo and 
Gallizo 1992; Giner Inchausti, 1998). 
138 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 6 
Despite the limited statutory requirement for auditing in Spain, all of the Big Six 
audit firms established themselves during period. The international audit firms 
first surfaced in Spain in the early 1960's (Arthur Andersen) while the other firms 
established in the 1960's and 1970's (Gonzalo and Gallizo, 1992). However, the 
growth of the number of auditing firms did not significantly enhance the image of 
the profession. 
"It seems likely that there will continue to be a growth in auditing work. 
However, it is not always easy for a Spanish businessman to accept the 
concept of auditing as it is practised in the UK. Until very recently it has 
not rated very highly either as an academic discipline nor as a task to be 
undertaken by professionals. Attempts are being made by the 
international accounting firms and by the Spanish institute to redress the 
balance. " (Donaghy and Laidler, 1982, p. 57). 
6.3.2 Accounting and Auditing Post EC 
Spain's admission to the EC in 1986 led to the enactment and modification of 
key laws to mould Spanish laws along the lines of the European Community's 
Directives. Two major laws had a major impact on auditing and accounting in 
Spain, namely the Law 19/1988 - Audit Law and Law 19/1989 - Partial Reform 
and Adaptation of Commercial Legislation to EC Company Directives2. The 
Audit Law was moulded on the European's Community Eighth Directive, while 
Law 19/1989 was concerned with implementing the Fourth and Seventh 
directives. The Audit Law made it a statutory requirement for companies 
(excluding small companies) to have an audit - the intention serving to bring 
auditing to the same level as that in other member countries. The law required 
the setting up a special register, the Registro Oficial de Auditores de Cuentas 
(ROAC), for auditors seeking to practice in Spain. The law also established the 
Ins! ituto de Contabilidad y Auditoria de Cuentas (ICAC) (The Accounting and 
Audit Institute) as an independent agency under the control of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance to maintain that register and to regulate the profession. 
2 The law amends the Commercial Code, the Companies Act and other laws that regulate the 
work of companies. 
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ICAC was also given the right to investigate auditor's work, including 
examinations of working papers and issuing disciplinary and sanctioning 
measures. The law also recognised the three professional bodies (ICJCE, REA, 
RTM), providing them with several powers that are subject to the final approval 
of ICAC. These powers include drafting auditing standards, maintaining quality 
control procedures and mechanisms to control the entrance to the audit market 
(continuing professional training, administering the entrance examination and 
control of practical experience). While the law entrusted these bodies with the 
drafting of auditing standards, it ultimately placed the ratification and publication 
of these standards in the hands of ICAC. The Audit Law also instituted the 
concept of auditor rotation in Spain, propagating that auditors must be appointed 
for a minimum of three years and maximum of nine years with reappointment 
only possible after the completion of three further years. This rotation concept 
was clearly incompatible with the stances of the Big Six, especially in Anglo- 
American countries. 
Garcia Benau and Barbadillo (1996) saw the development of the Audit Law, 
19/1988 as an outcome of the inability of the profession to secure recognition 
and to close the market for non-competent professionals. The division and 
competition among the three Spanish professional bodies was a major motive 
behind the government's regulation of the profession via ICAC (Cea Garcia, 
1992). The ruling socialist party preference for state intervention and its 
domination of parliament resulted in governmental regulation of the profession. 
The socialist government made it clear that it would reduce its level of 
intervention depending on the future behaviour of the profession (Bougen 
(1997). The audit profession saw this type of regulation as interventionist and 
thought that ICAC gave the government too much power over accountants. On 
the other hand, Cea Garcia (1992) argued that the model of the regulation of the 
profession is a mixed one as the law granted the three professional bodies 
important functions for organising the profession. ICAC's Consultative 
Committee has six representatives from the three professional bodies serving on 
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it, ensuring the involvement of the profession in tackling the main issues that 
face the profession in Spain. 
The Law 19/1989 - Partial Reform and Adaptation of Commercial Legislation to 
EC Company Directives also had a major impact on the auditing profession in 
Spain. It required all companies that comply with specific criteria to perform an 
independent audit. The law also required all capital companies to publish their 
financial statements and submit them to the Mercantile Registry. Corporations 
were also required to present consolidated financial statements and the law 
spelled out the methods to be followed for conducting the consolidation. The law 
also highlighted the accounting principles that should be complied with to 
provide a True and Fair View (Imagen Fiel). The General Accounting Plan was 
also revised in 1990 and came into force in 1991. This new plan made a clear 
distinction between accounting rules and taxation rules - with the former is more 
concerned with providing a True and Fair View while the latter is geared towards 
the calculation of taxes due to the government (Giner Inchausti, 1993b). 
6.4 Optimism and Growth of Auditin 
"A revolution is taking place in the hitherto arcane world of Spanish 
financial reporting. For many Iberian finance directors, the effect will be 
akin to marching out under arc-lamps after a very long spell in a very 
dark dungeon. " (David Owen, FT, 23/5/1991). 
"... it is thought that the quality of accounts is greatly enhanced if 
independent auditors verify the annual accounts... " (Giner Inchausti, 
1993b, p. 385) 
The enactment of the Audit Law 19/1988 and other laws brought with it growth 
and optimism in a function that was previously better known for its awkwardness 
and for its lack of transparency. The number of statutory audits increased from 
2,212 in 1991 to 20,324 in 1993 (Corona Romero et al, 1995). The international 
audit firms dominated the audit market in 1990 receiving fees of Pts l Ibn in 
comparison with the other local firms receiving a total of Pts4bn (Gabas Trigo, 
1992). Garcia Benau and Humphrey (1992) highlighted the positive status of 
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auditing in the late 1980s/early 1990s. This increased transparency in financial 
reporting and improved processes of corporate governance. Such beliefs seemed 
naive and little informed by international debates. That said, Bougen and 
Vazquez (1997) have claimed that their analysis of the debates in Spain's 
Congress of Deputies has shown politicians to be aware of the questionable 
potentialities of the audit function. Nevertheless, the survey is not that strong in 
terms of revealing the significant of the Audit Expectations Gap, and certainly 
not one as widespread as in the USA and Britain (Garcia Benau et al, 1993). 
Having reviewed recent developments in Spain it is apparent that expectations of 
auditors were set at a high level, with the legislative moves to bring Spain into 
line with EU regulations being seen as laying the foundation for a more 
transparent and reliable accounting or reporting function. Such expectations of 
an accounting and auditing system, however, have been based on a limited 
analysis or appreciation of the practical impact and effectiveness of such a 
system. Further, such changes have not seen a significant improvement in the 
public image of the auditing profession, to the extent that the Spanish 
government have been reluctant to grant the profession a considerable amount of 
autonomy. A good way of judging the significance and force of recent changes 
in the Spanish Legislation, is to explore the impact that major corporate scandal 
has had on the perception of auditing and image of audit firms. The following 
chapters (7 and 8) analyse the impact of the GT/KIO case, particularly exploring 
the capacity of auditors to deal with complex practical scenarios, the ability of 
auditors to deal with situations where management dominates, the ability of 
auditors to report in a manner which is both timely and clear. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has briefly discussed the political development of Spain from 
dictatorship under Franco to a total democracy. It also described the economic 
development under the two different systems. Spain, under the socialist 
government, joined the EC in 1986, a step that had a great influence on the 
development of auditing in Spain. Prior to joining the EC, accounting was used 
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for taxation purposes rather than for financial accounting purposes. That period 
was also marked by the failure of auditing to take a prominent position in Spain, 
as auditing was either mostly voluntary or statutory required for a limited number 
of companies. However, this period has marked the establishment of Spain's 
main accounting bodies (ICJCE, REA, RTM). Generally in this period the 
accounting profession was not perceived as a prestigious profession. Spain's 
joining the EC has led it to adapt its laws to those of the European Directives. 
The audit law made auditing statutory requirement for a larger number of 
companies. It also appointed ICAC as the regulator of the profession something 
that the profession in Spain was not pleased about. The new General Accounting 
Plan made a distinction between the taxation rules from those of financial 
accounting. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Kuwait Investment Office's investments in Spain were met with euphoria and 
enthusiasm. It almost seemed that everything that KIO touched turned into gold. 
The mammoth investments massed by KIO between 1986-1992 culminated in 
Grupo Torras (GT), KIO's Spanish holding company, becoming the largest (non- 
governmental nor bank owned) industrial group in Spain. The group created 
Spain's biggest chemical company (Ercros), its biggest food company (Ebro), 
largest paper company (Torraspapel), and Spain's second largest property 
developer (Prima Inmobiliaria). However, in May 1992, there were concerns 
behind the scene about the group that led to a change of management in KIO and 
GT. The new managers were overwhelmed with financial problems and fraud at 
the group which subsequently led to some of the group subsidiaries being placed 
under `suspension of payments' (suspension de pagos - receivership) and 
ultimately saw GT, the parent company, filing for receivership at the end of 1992. 
This was seen as the bursting of what many regarded as "Spain's biggest bubble", 
leaving KIO with its first experience of a collapse in any of its investments, 
following its establishment in London in the early 1950's. The huge scandal 
involving KIO's investments in Spain made headlines for months in Kuwait, 
Spain and around the world. Initial estimates placed financial losses at $5bn and 
job losses at 100,000 in Spain. The collapse represented Spain's biggest corporate 
failure since the re-establishment of democracy in 1975. 
The collapse of GT is one of a series of major corporate collapses to hit Spain in 
recent years (others including PSV and Banesto Bank). It has often contained all 
the colourful elements of a suspense thriller film, with claims of fraud and 
misappropriations of funds ($500m apparently disappearing into thin air), 
allegations of political payments from GT's funds, wire-tapping of GT's offices 
and GT's data diskettes being stolen from the Ministry of Economy. Allegations 
were also made of a conspiracy to blackmail the Spanish king in order to get the 
charges dropped against De la Rosa and Mario Conde (the disgraced former 
chairman of Banesto Bank). The case allows for a detailed reflection on the state 
145 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 7 
of auditing in Spain, a country in which a number of positive declarations were 
made in the late 1980's and early 1990's with regard to auditing expectations. It 
is also useful in enabling an examination of the case's implications for auditing in 
Kuwait and can inform current debates about the international auditing 
environment and the global role and practice of the Big Six accounting firms. 
This chapter focuses on the history of KIO and the context that prevailed during 
KIO's investments in Spain to prepare the ground for analysing the accounting 
and auditing implications of the KIO case in chapter 8. The chapter is organised 
into three main parts. It starts with a brief historical account of the establishment 
of KIO and its younger parent KIA. It seeks to understand the environment that 
shaped the development of these organisations and their dual role in influencing 
Kuwait's investment strategy. The historical review is also helpful in 
understanding the nature of the relationship between KIO and KIA, as (in theory) 
KIA was supposed to act as the parent of KIO, while in practice the opposite often 
seemed to be true. 
The second part of the chapter begins with a brief description of the rise and fall 
of Grupo Torras. It then documents the subsequent events and court cases that 
have arisen since the collapse of the group. The political fallout from the scandal 
in Spain and Kuwait is also discussed. The third section focuses on the main 
issues evident in the KIO case. These include a discussion of the secrecy doctrine 
adopted by both organisations, KIO's chosen investment strategy and the lack of 
control and accountability processes revealed by the case. Other issues that are 
discussed in this section include a brief overview of the failure of the Spanish and 
Kuwaiti governments in terms of supervising KIO's investments in Spain. 
Comprehending these issues is essential to the understanding of the elements that 
led to the collapse of KIO's investments in Spain and is also helpful in 
understanding the role played by accounting and auditing in the KIO case. 
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7.2 The Emergence of KIO and KIA 
"Attracting these revenues represents a high priority for us and for the 
Sterling area. As these revenues will lead directly to a high demand on 
imported goods, which leads to the disruption of the Sterling area as result 
of the high demand on it. Our interest compels us to get these revenues 
invested, with the stipulation of endowing these investments in good hands 
- as misappropriations and mishandling of these 
funds will lead to the 
disruption of the London Financial Market. In addition, leaving this huge 
capital in the hands of the Sheikh will make him exposed to individuals 
and organisations who are seeking to take advantage of this capital and 
certainly not all of them deserve these advantages. "(A letter sent by the 
Foreign Office to the British Political Representative in Kuwait, Quoted in 
Al-Watan, 29/6/1985, p. 22). 
"It is now not only a question of Kuwait but of Qatar; and if something is 
not done on the lines of our investment proposals in both cases very soon, 
the consequences for sterling can be most serious. " (A letter dated 
14/10/1952 and sent by David Serpell from the British Treasury to Clive 
Rose of the Foreign Office, FO 371/98399, pp. 118-120) 
"It is highly important to try to get the proposals accepted well before the 
next large payment of oil revenues (nearly £50 million) in March 1953. " 
(A telegram dated 17/10/1952 sent from the Foreign Office to the Political 
Resident in Bahrain, FO 371/98399, p. 125). 
The beginning of production of oil in 1946 in Kuwait saw the country's oil 
revenues boosted from $760,000 in 1946 to $57m in 1952, providing Kuwait with 
enormous surplus funds (see Figure 1). This surplus attracted the interest of its 
protector, Britain, who saw Kuwait and Qatar as very promising and helpful to the 
British economy. Official British documents revealed that the British government 
started to persuade the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem, to invest 
Kuwait's oil revenues in Britain -a process which began when Sir Roger Makins, 
head of the economic division at the Foreign Office, visited the Gulf States on a 
mission in February 1952. The Foreign Office saw the objective of Makins' 
mission as being to examine the economic and political problems facing the Gulf 
States as a result of the increasing importance of their oil production and to 
consider Britain's special responsibilities in the area (F0371/98340). The British 
Foreign Office's objectives in Kuwait were to maintain its influence in Kuwait, 
introduce financial control to avoid upsetting the sterling area and guarantee that 
Kuwait's wealth would be fairly shared among the public (FO 370/104272). The 
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Amir was reluctant in the beginning to accept the British proposal as he did not 
understand it and suspected that Britain wanted to direct Kuwait's revenue to 
channels that would place as little strain as possible on sterling (FO 371/98399). 
However, by October 1952, the British were more eager to get the approval of the 
Amir, with the British Treasury claiming that if the investment proposal was not 
approved then it would have serious consequences on sterling'. On 21 October, 
1952, the Amir expressed to Britain his willingness to accept the investment 
proposals and ultimately signed an agreement in February, 1953, which 
established an investment board in London to invest Kuwait's sterling surpluses 
(Smith, 1999). British officials saw the Amir's decision as an act of faith in their 
government - noting that he "did not really understand what was 
involved and his 
decision represented a considerable act of faith in Her Majesty's Government. " 
(FO 371/104272). The agreement initially provided the Kuwait Investment Board 
(KIB) with £27m to invest and saw the appointment of four British nationals to its 
board (the representative of the Amir in London, a member of the Bank of 
England, director from the British Bank for the Middle East, and a partner from 
the law firm in London representing the Amir) (see Smith, 1999). The agreement 
also stipulated that the funds would be exempted from all taxes levied in Britain, 
especially income tax and death duty tax (F0371/98399, p. 17). KIB was also 
forbidden from pursuing any investment strategy that would upset the London 
stock market. The agreement mandated hiring professional accountants to attest 
the reliability of KIB's accounts and to present an audit report each year to the 
Amir. H. Kemp, the political representative of the ruler of Kuwait in London 
recommended that Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. act as the auditor of KIB (Al- 
Najar, Al-Watan, 22/7/1985, p. 24). 
1 According to a document of the British Foreign Office, Kuwait started to emerge in the early 
1953 "as the Principle creditor country of the Sterling area" (for details see FO 371/104272). 
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Figure 7.1 - Government Oil Revenues 
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Source: Khouja and Sadler (1979, p. 26). 
In 1960, the British Foreign Office proposed the appointment of a Kuwait 
member as a way of making the KIB more accountable, given the exclusivity of 
British managers at the board. The chairman of KIB opposed such a proposal 
claiming that the Amir and the Kuwait finance department had control over the 
policy of the board. Ultimately, the ambassador of Kuwait was appointed as a 
Kuwaiti member of KIB's board in May 1962 (for more details see Simon, 1999). 
A year later the Kuwaiti ambassador in London, Khalid Jaffar, changed KIB's 
name to the Kuwait Investment Office2 (KIO) (Whittington, 1993). In 1963, an 
international advisory committee was entrusted with the job of advising Kuwait 
on its investment strategy (Smith, 1999). The International Advisory Committee 
started to changed Kuwait's investment strategy and broadened its investment 
area from merely depositing funds with the Bank of England to setting up two 
investment portfolios (equities and other property) in the USA and purchasing 
properties overseas (for further details, see Field, 1975). In 1967, two years after 
joining KIO, Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah, a cousin of the present Amir of Kuwait, was 
appointed as the general manager of KIO. In that same year, Fouad Jaffar 
Z There was a lack of consensus with relevance to the date of the establishment of KlO. These 
dates spanned from 1963 to 1966. 
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(Jaffar's father was KIO's first chairman) was appointed at KIO to become the 
deputy general manager of KIO in 1969. 
Figure 7.2 - Government Oil Revenues 1954-1977 
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Source: Khouja and Sadler (1979, p. 26). 
In the early 1970s the increase in oil prices boosted Kuwait's revenues 
substantially - these rising over four fold to $7095m between 1973-74 
(see figure 
2). This led the Kuwaiti government in 1976 to set up the Reserve Fund for 
Future Generations (RFFG), a pension fund designed to establish an alternative 
source of income for Kuwait's future generations once oil revenues started to 
decline. The growth in revenues made more money available for KIO to invest 
beyond the UK-USA market to include Asia, Australia and Germany. 
Acquisitions in real estate were also targeted - KIO, for example, acquired St. 
Martins Property Corporation (a large real estate company that holds properties in 
the UK and Australia) in 1974 and established Foster Lane in the USA as a real 
estate holding company. KIO's investment portfolio included many blue chips 
companies around the world (e. g., a 14% share in Daimler Benz). In the early 
1980's it was reported that KIO had minority (less than 5%) shareholdings in 
many Fortune 500 companies in America. KIO's power in the international 
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markets was such that, in 1976, investigators from the American Federal Bank 
expressed concern about KIO's holdings at Citibank where it had become the 
biggest depositor. The investigators feared that KIO's $1.7bn deposits would 
create a liquidation problem if the funds were withdrawn at short notice (Al- 
Qabas, 17/1/1976, p. 5). 
In 1982 the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) was established. It took over the 
duties of the Finance Ministry's Investment Department, a move which also meant 
that KIA assumed control of KIO3. KIA, which officially started its operations in 
July 1984 and had its own management structures and operational powers, had a 
constrained degree of independence from the Finance Ministry. The head of KIA 
was also the head of the Finance Ministry and KIA was still required to report to 
the Finance Ministry on a regular basis. The establishment of KIA came as a 
result of calls for such an organisation from the Kuwait parliament. Abdel-Latif 
Al-Hamad, the then finance minister and a major advocate behind the creation of 
KIA, indicated that the Kuwaiti government's motives for establishing KIA rested 
in their belief that traditional bureaucratic governmental administration was not 
"the best institution for managing a portfolio" (Euromoney, June 1982, p. 85). 
There were also arguments suggesting that KIA was set up with the purpose of 
controlling KIO and making it more accountable (Institutional Investor, August 
1988). KIA's establishment, however, did not change the way KIO was 
operating. It maintained most of its power and was seen as more experienced and 
successful than its parent. Both organisations held international investment 
portfolios estimated at approximately $94-100bn4 before the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 and were generating income greater than Kuwait's annual oil 
revenues. It is estimated that between 1986-1989 Kuwait's investment revenues 
exceeded those of oil. The importance of KIO/KIA's investment portfolio was 
clearly evident during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The exiled Kuwaiti 
3 KIO fell under the responsibility of the investment department at the finance ministry before the 
establishment of KIA 
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government used the portfolio to support exiled citizens, to contribute to the war 
effort, to support the liquidity problem of the Kuwaiti banks abroad, and 
subsequently to finance the reconstruction projects following the liberation of 
Kuwait. These activities cost Kuwait approximately $50bn uptil the end of 1992, 
decreasing KIO/KIA's portfolio to about $44bn. KIO, however, still maintained a 
powerful role in the international markets. In 1996, KIO was ranked as the sixth 
largest UK fund management institution (Quant ir, 1996). KIO still had the 
ability to influence the financial markets as evidenced by its sale of a 3% stake at 
BP for $2bn in 1997, representing the biggest ever block trade of shares 
(Institutional Investor, January 1998). The secrecy that surrounded the real scale 
of KIO/KIA's investment portfolio was broken for the first time in 1998 when the 
Al-Watan, the Kuwaiti newspaper owned by Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa of the Al- 
Sabah family (and the former Oil and Finance minister) disclosed that the funds 
invested by KIO/KIA were about KD 12bn ($40bn), with revenues of $4bn in 
1997. These figures were discussed in the closed session of the Kuwaiti 
parliament in May 1998 and were not meant to be made public (see Al-Watan, 
3/5/1998, p. 1). 
7.3 The Rise and Fall and Re-emergence of Grupo Torras 
7.3.1 The Rise: From Torras Hostench to Grupo Torras 
The planned entry of Spain into the European community in 1986 made the 
prospects for growth in the Spanish economy very promising in the early 1980s. 
Arab investors saw their investments grow from Pts 1,101 m in 1979 to 
Ptsl4,567m by 1984, with Kuwait being the most prominent Arab investor in 
Spain (Arab Banking Corporation, 1985). KIO was at the forefront of Kuwait's 
investment. Its initial Spanish investments were no. different from any other 
investment made by the Kuwaiti institution, including the acquisition of farmland 
and a 30% stake in a hotels group called Hoteles Agrupados, S. A. (Hotsa) in 1984 
° For a list of some of KIO/KIA's previous investments see for example Dixon, 1989; The 
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for Pts8m (later sold by KIO for Pts70m). KIO's general manager, Fouad Jaffar, 
however, concluded that KIO's normal strategy of making portfolio investments, 
but staying off the boards of the companies, wouldn't work in Spain. He said "the 
stockmarket in Spain is minute. We could have invested at most $200m or 
$300m and that would be it. I thought we should make a big commitment" 
(Forbes, 5/3/90, p102). KIO's `big' stake in Spain started in 1984 with the 
acquisition of a bankrupt packaging company called Industrias del Papel y de la 
Celulosa S. A. (Inpacsa) for $30m. While undertaking this acquisition, the head of 
Inpacsa's creditor bank, Javier de la Rosa, was introduced to one of KIO's senior 
managers who convinced KIO to keep de la Rosa on the board of Inpacsa (FT, 
30/11/92, p. 19). Moreover, de la Rosa (JR) was introduced by the bank of 
America to KIA's Managing Director, Dr Fahad Al-Rashad, and in 1986 Al- 
Rashad signed a contract with JR to act as a stockbroker on behalf of KIA in 
Spain. In interview with a member of KIA's staff at the time, it was claimed that 
KIA's operations with JR were successful and profitable. It was also indicated 
that KIA's operations with JR were straightforward transactions which involved 
the direct purchase and sale of shares and, in consequence, all transactions were 
profitable and legal. However, KIA cancelled its contract with JR eight months 
after signing it. It justified the cancellation on the basis of information it had 
received regarding the integrity of JR. Whittington, (1993), however, provides a 
different account for KIA's break up with JR. He claims that when JR offered 
KIO the chance to buy Banco Central, KIA was slow to respond and became upset 
with de la Rosa as they considered him to be in KIO's camp which had a rivalry 
with KIA and accordingly suspended its contract with JR (p. 81). Regardless of 
which of these stories represents the true account, what is clear is that while KIA 
did not want to do business with JR it was not able to stop KIO from dealing with 
him. This might be explained by the fact that KIA since its establishment was 
never able to exert control over KIO due to several factors that will be explained 
later in the chapter. 
Guardian, 10/9/1988, p. 13; FT 10/8/1990, p. 4. 
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KIO's Spanish investments continued to evolve in 1986 when it acquired Torras 
Hostench (TH), a Catalonian paper company which had just emerged from three 
years under receivership. The acquisition of 40% of the paper company, with 
cash reserves of $204m, was made on the recommendations of JR5. In early 1987, 
KIO took over the board of TH with KIO's chairman (Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah) 
becoming TH's chairman and Fouad Jaffar, Bruce Dawson (a senior manager of 
KIO) and JR all acting as deputy managers. KIA did not have any role in the 
composition of that board. A few months later Spain witnessed the biggest rights 
issue in its history, when TH made a fully subscribed rights issue to the tune of 
$513m. 
The Torras Hostench group was used as KIO's holding company for launching 
other acquisitions in Spain. This was clearly evident when KIO (through TH) tried 
to takeover Explosivos Rio Tinto (ERT), the Spanish chemical group, in 1987 -a 
bid which triggered a fierce challenge from Escondrillas, the chairman of ERT, 
who hired external advisors, Lazard Freres, to defend against the bid. 
Escondrillas tried to persuade the Industry Ministry to approve his plans to unify 
the private Fertiliser sector and to recommend Torras' plans for take-over. The 
Industry Ministry informed Escondrillas that he supported KIO's plans, claiming 
that KIO's plans was backed up by capital (Chemical Week, 4/11/1987, p. 60). 
Ultimately, KIO was successful in launching and winning Spain's first hostile 
take-over as it acquired ERT. However, KIO's acquisitions of ERT raised 
concerns for the USA, (a member of NATO) as ERT was the largest private 
supplier for explosives in Spain and was heavily involved in defence contracting. 
Accordingly, the USA felt that if KIO took a position on the board of ERT it 
would be privy to NATO secrets - thus, it lobbied the Spanish government to 
block such a move (Business Week, 7/3/88, p. 20). KIO's investments in Spain 
also raised concerns in the Spanish press, with some hostile coverage depicting 
s Javier De la Rosa left Banco Carriga Nogues in 1985, which collapsed a year later with bad 
debts of $800m, to form his own investment company, Quail Espana. 
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KIO as "behaving as a shark in Spain", something denied by Fouad Jaffar (FT, 
10/5/1988, p. 2). The Spanish government was initially also concerned about 
KIO's motives in Spain as there was a feeling that KIO might be just a short term 
investor aiming at stripping the country's assets and then fleeing the country. 
Such concerns were alleviated to a degree when Jaffar met several Spanish 
officials and explained to them that KIO intended to be a long-term investor in 
Spain (Whittington, 1993). Other acquisitions duly followed in the remainder of 
1987, with KIO/TH securing stakes in Spain's then largest bank, Banco Central, 
another chemical group (CROS), Banco de Vizcaya and Ence. In 1988, KIO 
merged ERT with CROS to form Ercros (Spain's largest chemical group) and 
acquired stakes in other companies such as Coma Cros (Bures), Beta and Amaya. 
Controversy surfaced again in 1988 when TH took over Ebro, Spain's largest food 
group. Ebro's management tried to resist Torras's take-over bid, hiring the firm 
Lazard Freres. In a desperate attempt, Ebro management also wrote to the Amir 
of Kuwait to advise him that KIO was embarking on acquiring a company that 
was involved in the distillation business - something outlawed by Islam 
(Whittington, 1993). KIO's stakes in Spain's banking sector also raised great 
concern amongst the Spanish government and the Spanish banking community. 
Protests by the chairman of Banco de Vizcaya and Mariano Rubio, the governor 
of the Bank of Spain, forced KIO to sell its stake in Banco de Vizcaya but it held 
on to its stake in Banco Central, which led Rubio to question the Chairman of 
Banco Central about KIO's stake in the bank. Rubio suggested that KIO should 
find a Spanish partner for its stake in Banco Central. Accordingly, KIO formed a 
partnership with "Los Albertos" (two Spanish businessmen and cousins) called 
Cartera Central to manage the 12.5% stake at Banco Central - Los Albertos held 
the majority stake of 51.2%. KIO's interest in the banking sector lay in the banks' 
industrial investments portfolio. The chairman of Banco Central wanted to fight 
Los Albertos so he accepted a merger proposal offered by Mario Conde (the 
Chairman of Banesto - another top five bank) which forced Carters Central to 
acquire stakes in Banesto. The Los Albertos' subsequent criticism of the 
management of Banesto eventually led to the collapse of the merger. Breakdowns 
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in communications with Los Albertos and a sexual scandal involving one of the 
cousins, eventually led KIO to sell its stake in Cartera Central to Los Albertos. 
In 1988, KIO was also planning to use TH to launch investments in Europe in 
anticipation of the forthcoming European single market in 1992. It acquired 
50.1% in the Belgium paper company, Cellulose des Ardennes. KIO's injection 
of a significant amount of capital into JM Sassoon, the Singapore broker 49% 
owned by KIO, was seen as a possible indication that KIO might use Sassoon's 
European office to launch its European acquisitions - especially given that a 
prominent Economist had been recently appointed at European Sassoon 
(Euromoney, August, 1988, p. 7). Jaffar also indicated that KIO could use TH to 
break into Europe and markets such as France and Italy, where Arab investment 
might not be as warmly welcomed as in Spain and UK (Forbes, 5/3/1990, p. 104) 
In that same year Salomon Brothers, the American Bank, underwrote a £100m 
convertible Eurobond issue for Phoenix International Finance, a holding company 
owned by KIO, which offered Eurobond investors the opportunity to buy 
convertibles in TH. The Eurobond attracted influential investors such as Bank of 
America, Chase Manhattan, Credit Suise, Banco Santander, Banco Central 
Hispano Americano, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Barclays Bank (Al-Qabas, 11/7/92). 
Two months later Salomon Brothers helped TH to go public by underwriting one 
third of a $450m stock offering by the group. The flotation of TH resulted in a 
change in the name of the group (from Torras Hostench to Grupo Torras) and the 
paper business was placed under the new name of Torraspapel. Torras Hostench, 
the previous name of KIO's holding company, was given to a new financial 
company in London called Torras Hostench London. 
7.3.2 The Fall: From Public to Private Status, to War and Collapse 
In late 1989, it had become increasingly evident to KIO's executive committee 
that, contrary to positive reports presented by KIO's operational managers, Grupo 
Torras (GT) was facing serious problems. Just a few months after presenting a 
favourable report, Torras' creditor banks suspended their lines of credit to the 
group and KIO had to inject $450m -a loan which KIO's Chairman did not have 
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the authority to grant (FEAC, 1993b, p 29). On discovering the granting of this 
loan, KIO's executive committee made the decision, in late 1989, to gradually 
liquidate GT - the first step being to take GT private in 19906, with KIO 
purchasing all the shares held by the public. KIO's bid for the remaining stake of 
37.5% cost $630m, representing the most expensive bid in Spain's history (FT, 
5/1/90, p. 20). Two months after de-listing GT from Madrid's stock market, 
Fouad Jaffar (the general manager of KIO for the last 20 years) and two of KIO's 
junior staff were recalled to Kuwait. Jaffar's recall to Kuwait would see him 
assume an undisclosed position at KIA, an action designed to nullify any 
influential role for Jaffar in the operations of KIO and KIA (The Independent on 
Sunday, 25/2/1990, p. 3). The recall of Jaffar seems to be consistent with the 
Kuwaiti tradition of moving unwanted people to different positions rather than 
dismissing them (e. g., see Tetreault, 1995). Jaffar elected to resign from his post 
at KIO. Although it was not made public why he was recalled or resigned, it was 
seen as the consequence of him increasingly making sensitive decisions without 
reference to his parent organisation (i. e., KIA) in Kuwait and the desire of the 
Finance minister to reassert control over KIO (see Wall Street Journal, 21/2/1990; 
FT, 21/2/1990). During the same time, KIA appointed three executives at KIO 
(Salah Al-Moushargi, Abdul Aziz Al-Tayar and Abdul Wahab Al-Haroun) - the 
appointments, however, were resented by Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah, who duly 
restricted their involvement in the operations of KIO. 
6 The committee decision shows that De la Rosa justification for the actions of taking Torras 
privately was a smokescreen. JR explained the KIO's move saying "what we need to now is the 
ability to proceed calmly with our industrial strategy in Europe. Small investors cannot keep up 
in the long-term. We want to re-invest all our profits" (Financial Times, 5/1/1990, P. 20). He also 
listed two reasons for removing GT from the stock market: 
1- The belief that shares in holding companies that own controlling stakes in subsidiaries 
tended to trade at discount. 
2- The stock market were probably going to be flat for most of the year as result of the 
slow recovery of the 1987 crash. 
He claimed that KIO's decision to take full control would guarantee the holding company a 
powerful and interested in long term partner without having to change industrial strategy 
(Financial Times, 18/6/90, p. 25). 
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On the 2 August, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Kuwaiti government fled the 
country to Saudi Arabia. One day later, the Finance Minister and the chairman of 
KIA, Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa, sent a fax to KIO giving plenipotentiary powers over 
Kuwait's assets to just three people - himself, the chairman and the 
deputy 
chairman of KIO. This action by-passed the Managing Director of KIA, who 
arrived in London shortly after the Iraqi invasion. He was very concerned with 
the state of KIO and wrote a protest letter to the State Minister for Cabinet Affairs 
in September 1990. This letter and a resignation notice by a member of KIO's 
Executive Committee (subsequently retracted) resulted in no action by the exiled 
Kuwaiti government towards KIO. During the same month GT was badly in need 
of cash to pay its creditors and employees. KIO transferred $1.44bn between 10 
and 15 September, 1990 to enable GT to satisfy its financial obligations in Spain. 
Subsequently, in December 1990, three members of KIA's board, including the 
Managing Director, who were also members of the Executive Committee of 
KIO/KIA, resigned. They cited, as reasons, a whole list of irregularities and non- 
compliance with the rules and regulations of KIO and KIA (for details see 
Appendix 1). Their resignation letter was sent to the Crown Prince/Prime 
Minister of Kuwait, clearly illustrating that the exiled government were fully 
aware of the problems of KIO. 
In December 1991, the newly appointed Executive committee of KIO instructed 
KIO's auditor (KPMG) to examine Kuwait's Spanish investments. KPMG's 
report placed the value of GT at between $2.9bn and $4.4bn. It also indicated that 
the management was weak and recommended changing the board of GT. In April 
1992, Ali Al-Bader succeeded Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah as the chairman of KIO. 
Fahad Al-Sabah had been forced to resign as a result of seven months of lobbying 
by the newly appointed Kuwaiti Finance minister - he had replaced Al-Khalifa, 
who had been a strong supporter of KIO's independence from KIA (FT, 30/11/92, 
p. 19). The GT board was changed in May (with the appointment of several 
Kuwaiti officials) and immediately had to respond to warnings from the Spanish 
government regarding the group's debts of $1.2bn. KIO's new managers asked 
Aresbank (Banco Arabe Espanol) to investigate GT's financial position - they 
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duly concluded in June 1992 that bad management and financial irregularities 
were clearly evident. The resignation of Javier De la Rosa followed in July, with 
him claiming that he wanted to concentrate on the business group he had created 
while working for GT. 
The new managers of KIO presented a report to the board of KIA in June 1992, 
stating that KIA's guidelines had possibly been breached over the Spanish 
investments. Consequently, the board advised KIO to investigate the matter 
thoroughly, employing any organisation it needed to facilitate the investigation. 
The concerns of KIO's managers became a reality when it was revealed that 
Ercros was unable to repay $990m worth of debts to its creditor banks. KIO 
refused to make more funds available to Ercros unless the Spanish government 
offered some financial aid to the chemical group. Negotiations with Ercros' 
creditors to reschedule the debts failed and this ultimately led to Ercros filing for 
suspension of payments in Spain. The collapse of Ercros marked Spain's biggest 
corporate collapse since the re-birth of democracy in 1975. It was also KIO's first 
association with a bankrupt investment. 
GT's problems with Ercros caused a `domino effect' on its other group 
companies. Share prices of GT's listed companies considerably declined? in 
value, leading to both Prima (a property developer) and Industries Bures (a textile 
company) filing for receivership. KIO's new managers ordered GT's auditor 
(Coopers & Lybrand) to prepare the group's accounts for 1991, removing all 
extraordinary profits and re-valuing its investment portfolio at current stock 
market prices rather than at book value. They also commissioned KPMG to 
examine the group accounts and also asked Soloman Brothers to investigate the 
group's financial position. The results of these investigations were devastating. 
Coopers & Lybrand reworking of GT's accounts changed its $3m profit into a 
loss of £300m (a change rejected by GT's board of directors - basically KIO's 
Ebro share prices fell from Pts3200 to Pts 1000 while Prima share price fell from Pts7600 to 
Pts600 (FT, 7/11/1992, p. 14). 
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managers - who subsequently also refused to sign the company's accounts). The 
investigations of both KPMG and Soloman Brothers were also unfavourable to 
the group. Their investigations revealed that KIO had injected a total of $4.88bn - 
spending $2.8bn on acquisitions of shares, $700m on loan interest, $700m on 
share price support operations, $510m on unidentified transfers and $170m on GT 
expenses (FEAC, 1993b, p. 26). This ultimately led to GT being placed in 
receivership with debts of $2bn to KIO and $145m to other creditors in December 
1992 (see Figure 7.3). 
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7.3.3 The Aftermath of Collapse: Re-emergence of GT and the Search for 
Explanations/Compensation/Punishments 
The collapse of GT resulted in heated public debate in Kuwait and led to several 
official investigations of KIO's investments in Spain. In Kuwait, both the 
parliament and the Audit Bureau carried out investigations of the collapse of 
KIO's Spanish investments. The reaction in Spain was similar with additional 
investigations taking place. The securities commission (CNMV) carried out an 
investigation of the ownership of shares in GT, while the regulator of the 
accounting profession (ICAO) examined the role of Coopers & Lybrand in 
auditing GT. The Spanish authorities were concerned that further collapses in the 
group would severely harm Spain's economy. Consequently, Pedro Perez, 
Spain's Economic minister, flew to Kuwait and signed a memorandum of 
understanding with KIA. The aim of this memorandum inter alia was to establish 
a liaison committee to make sure that the disposal of the different companies in 
the group were carried out in an "orderly manner", avoiding a "fire-sale" (for the 
full text of the memorandum see Al-Qabas, 5/12/98, p. 32). GT subsequently sold 
most of its smaller companies - with its chemical group, Ercros, emerging from 
receivership in November 1993 after disposing of its oil refining, pharmaceutical, 
defence industry, mining and fertiliser units. Kuwait and Spain signed an 
agreement in 1995 aimed at guaranteeing Kuwait's presence in Spain and creating 
the conditions to carry out new investments. Kuwait agreed to invest $148m in 
Torraspapel, Ebro and Ercros, while the Spanish government provided an official 
credit of $123m to Torraspapel. At the end of March 1997, GT ended the longest 
suspension of payments in Spain's history after agreeing with its creditors to pay 
Pts25.1 bn of its Pts2l7bn debts (Pts 184bn owed to KIO was written off together 
with Pts7.5bn owed to other creditors). Prima, which was on the brink of 
bankruptcy, also emerged from receivership in 1997. KIO sold off large stake at 
Ebro in 1998 and also sold 95% of Torraspapel in 1999 for Pts52bn, in addition to 
transferring debts of Pts44bn to the buyer (El-Pais, 9/11/1999). The sale of 
Torraspapel represented the biggest divestment by KIO in Spain since the collapse 
of the group in 1992. It reflected KIO's desire to return to a position in Spain of 
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Spain of being a passive investor (holder of small stakes with no responsibility for 
the management position). This is evident from the size of the stakes it currently 
holds in Spain - 12.1% at Ebro, 9.1% at Ercros, 4.5% at Prima and in a small 
group of plastic manufacturers - with a total capitalisation value of Pts27bn (El- 
Pais, 9/11/1999). 
KIO attempted to file a criminal suit in Spain against seven former managers of 
GT (alleging misappropriation of $1 bn), but this was rejected four times by 
Madrid's senior financial judge. Judge Miguel Moreiras claimed that there was 
no single indication that fiscal crimes had been committed. However, an appeal to 
Madrid's high court approved KIO's request for a criminal investigation in early 
1994. Little progress was made since the filing was approved and KIO 
complained to the Spanish General Council of Judicial Power about Moreiras 
attitudes and called for his removal from overseeing the motion. KIO claimed 
that Moreiras had breached official regulations by revealing secrets to the media 
about the instruction under his consideration (El-Pais, 27/10/1995, p. 57). 
Ultimately, Moreiras was replaced by Judge Teresa Palacios, who is currently 
overseeing the criminal case that was originally scheduled to start in October 1999 
(but has been postponed to March 2000 because of de la Rosa's mental health). 
GT's Spanish case is demanding a sum of approximately $1 bn from the 
defendants, while the public prosecutor in the case has requested a 38 year jail 
sentence for de la Rosa for his role in the collapse (El-Mundo, 19/11/99). 
In 1993, KIO also filed a civil case in London against several defendants 
(ultimately totalling 56 defendants) including former managers of KIO and GT, 
accountants and offshore companies - seeking around $500m in damages. Some 
of the defendants tried to stop the case from being heard in London, claiming that 
the English courts did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Their attempts were 
dismissed by the High Court in Grupo Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah [1994]. Similarly, 
their appeal to the House of Lords in Grupo Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah [1995] was 
also dismissed and the trial for the civil case started in October 1998. The civil 
case focused on five transactions (Croesus, Oakthorn 1, Oakthorn 2, Pincinco, and 
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Wardbase) that took place between 1988 and 1992, through which approximately 
$500m was embezzled from GT via its subsidiary, THL. In the first four 
transactions, the embezzled funds were either transferred directly from KIO to 
GT/THL or through the transfer of some of KIO's financial instruments (such as 
promissory notes or treasury bills) to GT (who, in turn, used them as collateral for 
acquiring bank loans). These funds were then diverted, via a web of offshore 
shell companies, to unidentified Swiss accounts. For most of the transactions, 
documentation was prepared at a very late stage to cover up the reality of the 
transactions. In the fifth transaction, known as Wardbase, the money was 
transferred directly from GT via THL to an offshore company (Wardbase) as a 
payment for a fictitious job. This transaction was the least ingenious, probably 
because of the lack of time available - given that it was carried out on the same 
day that de la Rosa resigned from GT. During the course of the trial, the findings 
of the investigations by a Swiss judge revealed the identity of the people who had 
received the embezzled funds. They included, among others, the former managers 
of KIO and GT (Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah, Fouad Jaffar and Sheikh Khalid Al- 
Sabah), the former managers of GT (Javier de la Rosa and Juan Jose Folchi) and 
two prominent Spanish individuals (Manuel de Prado y Colon de Carvajal and 
Enrique Sarasola Lerchundi). Manuel de Prado, a close financial advisor to the 
Spanish king', was not named in the civil action but has now been added to the 
list of defendants in the Spanish criminal action. He claimed that the money he 
received was payment for business transactions between JR and himself and that 
he wasn't aware that the funds came from GT. Sarasola, a close friend of the 
former Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, was also not named in the civil case in 
London. Both of the Spaniards did not have any business dealings with GT, so 
1 It was alleged in 1996 that De la Rosa (in alliance with Mario Conde the former chairman of 
Banesto who was ousted from the bank in 1994 and found guilty of misappropriating funds and 
was handed a jail sentence of 50 months) tried to blackmail the Spanish king, using Prado's 
closeness to the king, in order to pressurise the Spanish courts to drop the investigations against 
them. This tactic did not work as it was leaked to the press and there was no credible evidence of 
any wrong doing on the part of the king. 
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the reasons behind their receipt of the funds remain a mystery according to Judge 
Mance. 
In June 1999, a judgement was announced on what is seen as having been the 
biggest fraud and corruption trial in English legal history (The Observer, 27/6/99, 
p. 3). The judge ruled in re Grupo Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah [1999] that Sheikh 
Fahad Al-Sabah, Fouad Jaffar (in the first four transactions) and Javier de la Rosa 
conspired to defraud GT, while Sheikh Khalid al-Sabah was only found to be a 
co-conspirator in the Pincinco transaction. Similarly the judge found the four 
managers (on the same transactions) liable for breach of duties as directors of GT 
and guilty of dishonest assistance. Juan Folchi was also judged to be liable for 
breach of duties as a director of GT (in one transaction) and dishonest assistance 
(in four transactions). However despite the involvement of the other defendants in 
schemes and documentation to conceal THL's and GT's operations, the judge did 
not find them party to any conspiracies or liable for dishonesty. The judge felt 
that their involvement stemmed from their belief that what they did was for the 
interests of GT/THL/KIO and was not a part of any conspiracy. The judge 
ordered the five defendants to repay the siphoned funds of $500m, plus seven 
years interest of $240m and $70m of legal fees. The judge refused Sheikh 
Fahad's and Sheikh Khalid's appeal against the decision but Sheikh Fahad is still 
planning to launch an appeal. The judgement also revealed other relevant findings 
and facts in the case that will be discussed further in subsequent parts of this 
thesis. 
The KIO scandal led to several changes in the organisation of KIO and its 
relations with KIA. The parliamentary committee which investigated KIO's 
Spanish investments proposed establishing a separate entity from KIO to oversee 
KIO's Spanish investments - so as not to inflict further reputational damage 
(FEAC, 1993b). Indeed, a unit was set up in Kuwait (called `Spain's Desk') to 
deal with the Spanish investments and to report directly to the managing director 
of KIA. The control of Fosterlane, KIO's holding company for its real-estate 
portfolio in the USA, was transferred from KIO to KIA in Kuwait (Al-Hajiri, 
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1993b). In March 1994, KIO came under the total control of its parent KIA. The 
power of KIO's manager was transferred to the managing director of KIA in 
Kuwait. The two executive committees of KIA/KIO were combined into one 
committee. KIA now determines all strategic decisions while KIO, as a 
department of KIA, implements its approved investments strategies and plans in 
Europe (KIA, 1996a). The internal audit procedures of KIA and KIO have also 
been unified/combined (KIA, 1996b). Recently, the chairman of KIO (the 
Kuwaiti Finance minister) made a decision to restrict the years of employment at 
KIO to 6 years (although this can be extended to 10 years with the minister's 
approval) - see Al-Qabas, 15/7/99. The parliamentary committee suggested that 
the composition of KIA's board was susceptible to political pressures. The 
positions of the central bank governor and the under-secretary of Finance were 
not seen to be independent from the Finance minister and might be politically 
affected (FEAC, 1993b). However, no change was made to the composition of 
KIA's board. 
7.3.4 Political Fallout from the Scandal 
The very close relation between politics and business in Spain can be easily 
demonstrated in the KIO case. The Spanish government had taken an initially 
sceptical attitude towards KIO's intentions of pursuing investments in Spain 
especially when they were carried out by de la Rosa - the government had 
particular concerns about him following his role in the collapse of Banco Carriga 
Nogues. The government's negative attitude towards KIO suddenly changed 
when Fouad Jaffar met and explained KIO's position to the prime minister Felipe 
Gonzalez, Carlos Solchaga, and Mariano Rubio. Jaffar also met Gonzalez, after 
being summoned by Rubio over the actions of the `Los Albertos' towards the 
proposed merger between Banco Central and Banesto. Jaffar requested that Rubio 
should not interfere in KIO's operations and the Prime Minister apparently told 
Jaffar "anything you need I will make sure it gets done" (Whittington, 1993, 
p. 88). 
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Eventually, the friendly relationship between KIO and the Spanish government 
changed once the newly appointed management team at GT decided to stop 
injecting more funds into the Torras group. In response to KIO's actions, the 
government started publicly criticising KIO and threatened to pursue KIO all over 
the world with legal actions. The Spanish authorities feared that a swift 
withdrawal by KIO from Spain would destroy a number of Torras' companies and 
would increase the already high unemployment rate in Spain. Tens of employees 
of Fesa Enfresa went on hunger strike for 12 days in a protest over Ercros' plans 
to shut down 5 plants and make 1900 employees redundant (Al-Qabas, 27/1/1993) 
There were also regular negative comments about KIO and Kuwait in the Spanish 
press when GT was taken into receivership. 
"The Spanish government has been snubbed and made a laughing stock of 
and now the question remains: why not expropriate now, as was the case 
with Rumasa? " (Tribuna, 22/3/1993). 
"The Kuwaiti's cannot just walk away leaving these floundering 
companies to go under. Nor can they turn their backs on a country which 
had a direct hand in restoring its independence, spending some $500 
million on dispatching a fleet to the Gulf, risking the lives of young 
recruits and allowing squadrons of B-52's to take off from Spanish 
airfields on their way to bomb Iraq. At the same time, however, our 
foreign policy should be used to take whatever diplomatic measures or 
trade sanctions are deemed necessary to make Kuwait's feudal lords 
realise that they won't get off lightly for abusing the friendship of one of 
their allies. " (El-Mundo, 5/12/1992). 
The daunting economic prospects of the collapse of GT and the huge public 
outcry made the Spanish government intervene. Accordingly, Pedro Perez, the 
Economic secretary, visited Kuwait and signed a memorandum of understanding 
between the two countries to ensure that GT's problems could be resolved in an 
orderly manner (for details see Al-Qabas, 5/12/98, p. 32). This agreement changed 
the GT affair from a business issue to a political one. For instance, the Spanish 
ambassador in Kuwait saw the collapse of Kuwait's investments in Spain as "the 
black point" in the relations between the two countries (Al-Qabas, 18/2/1995). 
However, securing agreement from Kuwait to support GT meant that the Spanish 
government was no longer attacking KIO in Spain but was supporting its actions 
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and later made funds available to some of the companies in the group. Strikingly, 
it seems that political negotiations were needed to facilitate KIO's entrance into 
Spain and were also needed to persuade KIO to stay in Spain. Moreover, the 
relationship in the former was between the Spanish government and KIO while, in 
the latter, the relationship was between the Spanish government and the Kuwaiti 
government. 
The problems with KIO's Spanish investments were a major issue in the Kuwaiti 
parliamentary elections in Kuwait in October 1992. The affair provided a 
legitimate reason for the opposition members to demand more control and 
accountability over the country's public funds. The return of democracy in 
Kuwait represented a major force behind the publicity attached to the KIO 
scandal. The parliament, who called the scandal "the theft of the century", played 
a significant role in demanding investigations of the GT affair. The KAB was 
asked by parliament to investigate GT's accounts in 1993. In addition, the 
financial committee of the parliament investigated the scandal in the same year. 
The government endorsed the parliamentary investigation and claimed that it 
wouldn't intervene for the sake of former managers. Similarly, the KIO scandal 
was emphasised by the right wing opposition party in Spain, the "Partido Popular 
(PP)" (Popular Party), during the general elections in June 1993. PP highlighted 
the government's failure to scrutinise KIO's investments in Spain, even though 
Spanish regulations required cabinet approval for foreign investments made using 
public money. At one stage, PP were contemplating suing the prime minister 
over the collapse of KIO's investments. However, the socialist party won the 
general elections and PP appeared to drop its interest in investigating the GT 
affair. 
7.4 Key Elements of the Collapse of GT: Analysing the 
Business/ReLyulatorv Environment/Culture in the KIO Case 
In order to consider the role of auditing in the KIO case and the case's 
implications for auditing (and its future promotion) in Kuwait, it is vital to 
understand the investment, business culture and regulatory environment in which 
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KIO (and its auditors) was operating. This section identifies a number of key 
elements in business practices that have a direct bearing/influence on the work of 
auditors. The subsequent chapter then considers the detailed role of auditing in 
the case. Many of the issues raise questions for the efficacy of audit practice that 
go well beyond the confines of the KIO case. These issues are crucial to 
understanding the way in which auditing operated in KIO and the problems it 
encountered. 
7.4.1 A Culture of Secrecy 
Information about the Kuwaiti investments managed by KIO/KIA has long been 
regarded as Kuwait's most protected secret. The tradition of secrecy was mainly 
adopted in the 1970s as a way of overcoming anti-Arab feelings that were present 
at the West as a result of the Arab-Israeli war and oil-sanctions imposed by the 
Arabic, oil producing nations. Being secretive also meant escaping the media 
publicity in the countries in which KIO was investing, enabling it to buy and sell 
without causing market prices to move against its interests. Another force behind 
the secrecy might be attributed to the Kuwaiti government's attempt to reduce the 
demand for loans and aid from other countries. One Kuwaiti official explained to 
a newspaper that "if we disclose, you have no idea of the planeloads who come to 
us" (International Herald Tribune, 25/4/1983, p. I1 S). Moreover, the magnitude of 
Kuwait's revenues and its small size made it vulnerable to aggression by some of 
its neighbours. Therefore, Kuwait thought secrecy about its investments might 
save it from such potential aggression. 
Regardless of the motivations and merits of KIO's secrecy, it was successfully 
achieved through several means. The main strategy for KIO and KIA to achieve 
this secrecy rested in the fact that information about their total investments and 
revenues had never been disclosed nor been incorporated in the government's 
budget. Severe punishment was propagated to maintain this secrecy. Even 
though the secrecy of KIO's investments was secured long before the 
establishment of KIA, Law 47/1982 (which established KIA) further emphasised 
secrecy by stating that any one disclosing secrets relating to the operations of KIA 
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or information about it would be punished by a maximum jail sentence of 3 years. 
Institutions and organisations working with KIO/KIA have also been required to 
honour their client's secrecy doctrine. This attitude was clearly captured in the 
comments of some of the brokers dealing with KIO, with one reported as saying 
"I don't want to go to prison" and another noting that "No one talks about them, 
they don't like it and they are too important to lose" (Euromoney, 1988, p. 52). 
Consultants and the advisory committee working for KIO were also not fully 
informed of all KIO's operations. This claim is evident in the case of KIO's 
acquisitions of stake at British Petroleum (BP) in 1987. The Advisory Committee 
for KIO, which included members of the House of Lords2, was not aware of 
KIO's acquisition of BP until it became a controversial issue in the British press 
(FEAC, 1993b). KIO's use of offshore and external accounts played an 
instrumental role in maintaining the secrecy of its operations. 
The veil of secrecy that surrounded KIO's operations was also maintained through 
the limited number of people undertaking KIO's strategic decisions and privy to 
all of its secrets. These people mainly consisted of Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah, Fouad 
Jaffar, Sheikh Khalid Al-Sabah and a handful of British managers. This small 
group did not even provide complete information to KIA. Dr Fahad Al-Rashed, 
told the judge in the civil case filed by GT in London that KIO responded to 
KIA's inquiries with general, inaccurate statements about its investments 
portfolios and its assets (Al-Qabas, 5/12/98, p. 33). The secrecy of KIO's Spanish 
investments was greater than normal in the sense that so few people at KIO were 
aware of the financial operations of the group. Executives outside the above 
circle in both KIO and GT had no knowledge of the group's operations, including 
the general manager of direct investments at KIO who was supposedly responsible 
for GT operations (GT represented 72% of all direct operations held by KIO) 
2 For instance Lord Thomson of Monifieth is currently a member of the advisory committee of 
KIO (House of Lords-Register of Lords' intrests, http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- 
office. co. uk/pa/ld/ldreg/regl6. htm, 2/11/1999). 
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(FEAC, 1993b). KIA was also in the dark when it came to KIO's operations in 
Spain, receiving only limited information from KIO executives. As one source 
close to KIA indicated to me in interview, during routine meetings at KIA about 
the status of KIO's investments a question mark was often placed in front of 
KIO's Spanish investment revealing KIA's lack of knowledge about the status of 
such investments. Even when KIO presented information about its Spanish 
investments it sometimes gave untruthful information, as in the case of the report 
presented to the executive committee in 1989 (FEAC, 1993b). 
The secrecy doctrine seems have made it difficult for regulators, supervisory 
bodies and, to some degree, the government to know what was going on with 
KIO's investments. The parliamentary committee concluded that "senior officials 
responsible for the investment of the RFFG funds did not have a full and broad 
picture about these investments" and attributed this to the doctrine of secrecy 
(FEAC, 1993b, p. 9). Ironically, the secrecy that surrounded KIO/KIA's 
investments, meant that people in Kuwait only obtained information about these 
investments from what was published in the newspapers - which usually 
amounted to translations of articles already published in the international press. 
The obsessive secrecy, unfortunately, offered the platform for mismanagement, 
illegal acts and fraud. In addition, it led to an exaggeration of Kuwait's assets and 
revenues, enticing other countries to ask for loans and aid which rather nullified 
the argument of being secretive to stem the tide of requests for financial aid. 
Moreover, the argument that secrecy might save Kuwait from a greedy neighbour 
proved false as it failed to prevent Iraq from invading Kuwait in August 1990. 
The issue of secrecy in the light of the GT scandal has been criticised in Kuwait as 
being both unreasonable and unnecessary. For instance, even simple information 
debating whether KIO had bought certain property or not was considered to be 
secret and not to be disclosed to the public. 
"The government is obsessed with secrecy. One member of the parliament 
who asked the Finance minister for simple questions such as `what is the 
magnitude of the funds invested in Spain? ' and `what are the companies in 
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which these funds are invested? ' and `are these companies listed in the 
stock exchange? '... The Finance minister prepared written answers for the 
parliament requesting that these answers be kept a secret. The public has 
the right to know the answers to these simple questions. As with reference 
to the inquiry about whether it was true that KIO purchased a Golf Club in 
the UK that is believed to have cost KIO more than $100m, the required 
answer is a simple "yes or no" and if it was yes, how much did it cost 
KIO" (Editorial, Al-Qabas, 7/12/92). 
Such secrecy was eased to some degree after the return of democracy in 1992 and 
the huge publicity that emerged following the collapse of GT. For instance, the 
parliament published the report of its investigation of KIO's Spanish operations 
and the Audit Bureau published two reports about KIO/KIA's investments. 
However, many aspects still remain secret, including the extent of KIA/KIO's 
holdings around the world and estimates of KIO's international portfolio. The 
belief in secrecy can also be seen in the form of information provided on KIA's 
internet site - where there is scarcely any information about KIO/KIA's 
foreign 
investments and details are mainly geared towards KIA's stakes in shareholding 
companies in Kuwait. 
7.4.2 Investment Strategy 
"An examination of Kuwait's current domestic and international 
investments and discussions with those involved in investment decision 
making in Kuwait indicate an absence of clearly defined objectives and/or 
an overall strategy for the utilisation of Kuwait's surplus funds. Ad hoc 
investment decisions, bilateral transfers and investment management are 
indications of the lack of well defined investment objectives, strategies 
and policies. ... 
" (Al-Rashed, 1976, p. 3) 
There was no clear strategy for KIO's investments, especially before the 1980's, 
as investments were made on an ad hoc basis or by accident. The above findings 
by Al-Rashed (1976) were shared by other researchers (see Al-Awadi, 1975, Al- 
Temeemy, 1993). KIO's investment in Japan was a clear example of this claim. 
KIO's entrance into the Japanese market was initiated accidentally by Fouad 
Jaffar in late 1971. He saw a surplus $200m worth of yen in an unused KIO 
account and suggested that KIO invested in Japan. This investment grew 
subsequently to a value of $12bn in 1990 (Whittington, 1993, p. 50). 
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There was also a lack of co-ordination between the investments of KIO and KIA, 
with the two bodies unknowingly investing in the same companies (and, 
in the 
process, often breaking an investment rule that they hold in total no more than 
10% of the equity capital of specific companies). Consequently, KIA drew up 
investment plans in the late 1980s, aiming to co-ordinate the investment efforts of 
both organisations. For instance, it required that neither KIO's nor KIA's stake 
in a specific company would exceed 5% of the equity capital at any time. Despite 
KIA's effort to map out a specific investment strategy for both organisations, 
there remained a clear conflict in opinion between the. two bodies. This was most 
vividly evident in the issue of investments in oil companies or those related to the 
oil business. KIO's acquisition of 22% of British Petroleum (BP) in the period 
between 1987-1988 was a move that did not go down well with Jasem Al-Kharafi, 
the then Finance minister and chairman of KIA. Al-Kharafi believed that the BP 
investment ran counter to Kuwait's desire to use its investment as an alternative to 
dependence on oil. However, Ali Al-Khalifa, the Oil minister and a strong 
supporter of KIO's independence, argued that it was inevitable that investments 
will be affected by the oil market (Institutional Investor, August 1988). 
Although KIO/KIA do not publish any figures or data about their investments, the 
parliamentary committee was able to show the distribution of RFFG funds 
between the two organisations as they stood in June 1992 (see Table 7.1). This 
distribution revealed that the investments of the two organisations were almost 
equally divided into two categories. The first category represented investments in 
cash, bonds and stocks. KIO was believed to have more than three-quarter of its 
staff assigned to these transactions in the dealing room. KIO's investments in this 
category can be characterised as that of a "passive investor", with small stakes in 
blue chip companies - neither assuming any board representation nor sometimes 
being identified as an investor in these companies. For example, KIO usually 
held stakes of less than 5% in the USA and UK - with companies required to 
declare any holdings of over 5%. 
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fP-Ul- 17 1 All., +;.,,, ., f PT'PC fnrlc to KTA nnrd 1(10 nc of. TiinP 1992 
Assets Category KIA KIO Both 
Cash 19.86% 9.68% 15.42% 
Bonds 3.87% 15.65% 9% 
Stocks 30.53% 23.03% 27.26% 
Direct Investments and Real Estate 45.75% 51.64% 48.32% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
source: (rtAL, IVVJo, p. Y4) 
The second category represented direct investments and real estate, with the 
investments not usually being listed on the stock market and KIO usually 
assuming a direct management role. Less than a quarter of KIO's employees were 
believed to be responsible for this type of investment. Some of KIO's 
investments in this category include St. Martins Property and St. Martins 
Hospitals in the UK, Foster Lane in the USA and Grupo Torras in Spain. 
Accordingly, KIO's Spanish investments fell into the second category and 
therefore it shows that KIO taking over the role of management of Torras was not 
something unique. However, what made KIO's investments Spain clearly 
different from other investments was that KIO constructed a large conglomerate 
with a highly diversified number of operations (the main companies being in the 
areas of chemical, food, paper, real estate, textiles, engineering, security, 
insurance and investment). This huge conglomerate, with its major industrial 
companies, was something that KIO did not have the expertise nor the skill to 
manage. The former president of KIO, Ali Al-Bader, implied that this new role 
for KIO might have been one of the reasons for the losses. He explained: 
"... In Spain we took big positions in companies but we don't have the 
capabilities to do these things; we are financial investors not managers of 
industrial corporations. We have limited resources and our strategy is to 
take small stakes in well-defined companies; it is not our objective to act 
as a manager. " (The Banker, February 1993, p. 32) 
7.4.2.1 A Complicated and Vague Investment Style 
"Acquiring and purchasing companies was conducted through a number 
of brokers, individuals and companies, who traded in big volumes with 
inflated prices which made it difficult to identify the real owner of these 
shares" (FEAC, 1993b, p. 46) 
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".... Torras wasn't so much a stock market problem. For me, the key was 
what happened in the relations between the management and shareholders 
of the company and its subsidiaries. On that issue I feel we have pretty 
much drawn a blank. " (Pedro Cases, CNMV's spokesman - quoted in 
Corporate Finance, 1/94, p. 15) 
"The ingredients are all there: an in-house bank; a string of obscure firms 
(including the appropriately named Croesus International) based in 
loosely-regulated offshore financial centres; and blocks of money winging 
electronically around the world. " (The Economist's description of the GT 
scandal, Economist, 15/5/93, p. 96) 
The construction of GT was so complex that, seven years after the collapse of the 
group, investigators are still unable to solve some of the mysteries surrounding the 
group structure. KIO invested in Spain using a combination of offshore/shell 
companies and the so-called `External Accounts'. KIO used the former to enter 
Spain, following a practice it had previously used to acquire investments in other 
parts of the world (see Euromoney, March 1988, pp. 52-60). KIO's acquisition of 
Torras Hostench was made through a route from KIO to Clachard Holdings N. V. 
(a Netherlands Antilles' company), then through Kokmeeuw Holdings B. V. (a 
Dutch subsidiary), who duly acquired Torras Hostench. Other Spanish 
investments of KIO took place through Hainingend Holdings N. V. (a Netherlands 
Antilles' company) and then through Koolmees Holdings B. V. (a Dutch 
subsidiary) (see Figure 7.4). The indirect acquisition of the companies can be 
attributed to the fact that KIO liked to keep its identity unknown. Furthermore, 
investing from the Dutch Antilles cut KIO's tax rate from 30% to 15.5% as the 
Dutch Antilles was a tax haven (Expansion, 15/2/1993). 
A major part of KIO's Spanish investments also took place via the External 
Accounts, known as `under management accounts'. These were opened in the 
1970s with Swiss banks, such as Lombard Odier and Volksbank, to manage 
funds on KIO's behalf, although the banks were required to consult with KIO 
before embarking on any investments (Whittington, 1993). Very limited 
information is available about the functioning and purpose of these accounts. On 
the one hand, Whittington (1993) claimed that these accounts were created to 
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bypass restrictions imposed by the Bank of England in the 1970s. He highlighted 
the legal and operational reasons for the creation of such accounts as: 
a) The agreements between KIO and the UK government in order to 
compensate for the devaluation of the sterling. 
b) The secrecy of some investment transactions, in particular those 
regarding a large holding in equities, gilts, and gold, due to 
restrictions by the UK government. " (Whittington, 1993, p. 215). 
On the other hand, the former managing director of KIA, Dr Fahad Al-Rashed, 
(whose organisation was also not aware of these accounts for many years) was 
informed by KIO that the establishment of these accounts was used to disguise 
the identity of KIO when making investments. The aim here was to protect KIO 
from potential detrimental effects on the prices of investments it acquired or sold 
(Al-Qabas, 21/11/1998, p. 24). These accounts were shrouded with secrecy to 
the extent that a former manager of KIO described KIO's attitude towards them 
as "paranoid" (Grupo Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah, 1999, p. 7). Only the president, 
vice president and the chief investment officer at KIO were privy to the details of 
these accounts. The executive Committee of KIO expressed concerns about the 
external accounts, indicating that most of the reasons necessitating them had 
disappeared by 1989 (a decision was subsequently taken in May 1989 to 
gradually close these accounts - Whittington, 1993). These accounts were also 
highlighted as a cause of concern for KIA's managing director and two members 
of the executive committee in their resignation letter (for more details, see 
Appendix 1). 
The external accounts played a prominent role in acquiring the Spanish shares, 
albeit in a complicated manner. Rather than acquiring shares directly from the 
stock market, KIO acquired these shares initially through external accounts held 
in offshore companies in Switzerland and other parts of the world such as the 
Antilles and Jersey (Financial Times, 30/11/92, p. 19). Then, based on rumours 
that KIO was interested in acquiring stakes in the companies (which it already 
owned through external accounts), the price of these shares would be boosted. 
The increase in prices would make KIO sell the stakes held in the external 
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accounts at a profit to TH, who financed the purchases through public offerings 
and loans (Figure 7.4). In its investigation of GT, KPMG revealed that, in late- 
1987, an external account of a Swiss company acquired a stake in Ebro, the food 
group, for $9.8m and sold it a few weeks later to Torras for $19m. Moreover, the 
Financial Times reported that a KIO internal memo revealed that the external 
accounts used by KIO made $231m in profits, while the RFFG (KIO's main 
source of funding) made only $23m profits for the same period. The London 
newspaper also believed that these accounts belonged to government officials or 
influential figures in the country (Financial Times 30/11/92, p. 19) rather than to 
KIO (as has been claimed by the former managers of KIO). The confusion and 
the near impossibility in asserting the true benefactor of these accounts is no 
doubt a clear consequence of the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding 
KIO's operations. 
However, regardless of the true identity of the benefactor of these accounts, the 
fact remains that the acquisition of shares through these accounts had a 
detrimental effect on Grupo Torras. Acquisitions through the external accounts 
were designed to shift the profit from selling shares to Torras abroad, tax free 
(either for KIO or other parties) while increasing Torras' debts and, hence, 
decreasing the group tax liability. However, such a scheme contributed to the 
collapse of the group, as the group ended up holding numerous shares at inflated 
prices paid for by bank loans. The huge debts owed by the group made it 
particularly vulnerable when the economic recession hit Spain in the early 1990s 
- but the use of the external accounts shows that the collapse of the group was 
not purely a direct result of the economic downturn (as has been claimed by the 
former managers of the group). It also undermines the accounting profession's 
usual claim that corporate collapses are the inevitable consequence of the 
economic cycle and have no bearing on the standard of audit services being 
provided. On the contrary, the case shows that the collapse was clearly related to 
indulgence in a complicated investment scheme - and the inability of the auditing 
function to cope with such complexity. 
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Walid AlHusaini Chapter 7 
An additional factor that increased the complexity of GT's structure were the way 
KIO acquired stocks or assets by combining share transactions and cash. The de- 
listing of GT from the Madrid stock market in early 1990 was done by offering 
cash of $76 and one share in Prima, the property developer, for nine shares in GT. 
Another example was the complicated transaction that took place in February 
1991, when GT swapped a combination of shares in Ebro, Prima, Torraspapel and 
a cash payment of $109m for the paper business of the Spanish company Sarrio 
(Figure 7.5). 
Figure 7.5 - GT acquisition of Sarrio's paper business 
4% of Ebro 
Grupo Torras 
1 6% of Prima 
9.9% of Torraspapel 
Cash Payment S 109M 
Sarrio Paper Business 
Saffa 
(Big Italian 
Cardboard 
Producer) 
Owns 54% of Sarrio 
Sarrio 
The strategy of combining shares with cash made KIO embark on share price 
support operations to maintain share values before making offers (such as the 
above, which cost KIO $700m). This support operation created a problem of 
control and provided a platform for irregularities at GT. The former managers of 
KIO claimed that they had participated in concealing some of KIO's stakes. They 
indicated that KIO parked these shares with them to support the share price and to 
avoid making bids for GT affiliates'. KIO's new managers claimed that stakes 
held by de la Rosa and Jaffar, estimated at 32.5% of Prima, were personal stakes 
held by the former managers. Hammarstone, a company established in the 
1 Spain's law propagated that companies holding more than 25% of a subsidiary must make a bid 
for that subsidiary if it acquires stakes bigger than 6% in one year 
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Antilles (and headed by Jaffar) acquired 12.5% of Prima shares in February 1990. 
Although, Jaffar claimed that he was only acting as a proxy for the company, the 
new managers of KIO dismissed his claim that this company was owned by him. 
De la Rosa claimed in court that Mesa Redonda (a company 60% owned by him) 
had acquired 18.8% of Ercros on behalf of GT, who denied the claim. One of the 
new managers indicated in interview that the former managers were accustomed 
to making investments on the Spanish stock market and if their investments were 
successful they kept them for themselves while transferring such investments to 
GT if they failed. The complexity associated with Torras also included 
undisclosed acquisitions of stakes in the group. A one-year investigation by 
Spain's stock market commission, the Commission Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores (CNMV), revealed that KIO disguised some stakes in the group through a 
network of offshore companies. Accordingly, the CNMV fined GT and 
Kokmeeuw Holding, a Dutch subsidiary of KIO, $13m for concealing from the 
stock market regulator the acquisition and disposition of shares in listed 
companies. The stock market regulator also imposed a maximum fine of $36,000 
on Javier de la Rosa for concealing stock market transactions relating to GT. 
The use of offshore/shell companies and external accounts might be legitimate in 
reference to KIO's objectives of reducing its tax liabilities and protecting itself 
against speculation against its interests. However, regardless of these merits, the 
fact remained that the widespread adoption of such mechanisms enabled the 
former managers of KIO and GT to embezzle approximately $500m from the 
group over a considerable period of time (1988-1992). The findings of the 
London court in re Grupo Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah [1999] showed the reliance of 
the former managers on a network of offshore/shell companies and external 
accounts in different financial centres (e. g. Switzerland, Jersey, Bahamas) around 
the world to channel the embezzled funds. It can also be argued that KIO's and 
GT's frequent reliance on these mechanisms might have made auditors less 
inclined to suspect (have doubts) about the real purpose and destination of these 
funds. Auditors in other organisations and other countries (where such 
mechanisms were less frequently used and accepted) might have been more 
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inquisitive and sceptical about the transactions and funds exercised through such 
mechanisms. It is ironic that the auditors' job was clearly made more difficult by 
the prominent role played by accountants and lawyers in designing these 
mechanisms. The mechanisms made it undoubtedly difficult for auditors and 
other parties to understand the complex networks that were used to embezzle 
funds and hide their stakes in some of the Spanish companies. The role of 
accountants in designing these mechanisms and the related impact of the 
offshore/shell companies and external accounts on the auditing process will be 
further discussed in the next chapter. 
7.4.2.2 Questionable Partners 
The former managers of KIO made some of their investments with questionable 
partners. One of their partnerships was with Lincoln Savings & Loans, with 
Charles Keating (the mastermind behind the Savings & Loans scandal in 
California) selling to KIO a resort in Phoenix-Arizona at a highly inflated price. 
Keating told American investigators into the debacle of the S&L scandal that he 
paid $17m in commissions and brokerage fees to unidentified Swiss accounts 
related to this sale (Audit Bureau, 1993). Partnerships with questionable 
individuals was also evident in Spain. The controversial partnership established 
with Los Albertos in 1988 to manage the acquisition of Banco Central initially 
ended in a sexual scandal. However, the Albertos are also now facing criminal 
charges over the allegations that they committed fraud and falsified documents in 
the sale of a plot of land in Madrid to Prima (this being where the famous towers 
known as "Torres de KIO" were built). 
Nothing was more costly than KIO's partnership with de la Rosa who had a 
questionable past given that Banco Garriga Nogues collapsed after he left it and 
that his father had fled Spain after embezzling money from the Spanish 
government. The Spanish authorities claim that they warned KIO about JR's 
history and that KIO did not take their advice, taking the view that the Spanish 
government was targeting him because of his Catalonian descent. KIO appointed 
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him as deputy president of GT, while allowing his own company, Quail Espana, 
to commission all of GT's transactions through a contract that was clearly 
unfavourable to GT. The contract forbade GT from using the services of any 
company other than Quail for a five year period. It also stated that if GT cancelled 
the contract, or made specific changes2, a $50m compensation fee would be paid 
to Quail. De la Rosa's company was in no way legally obliged for any bad 
investment decisions it made on behalf of GT. The contract also stipulated an 
annual fee of Pts30m regardless of other fees that would be payable on 
transactions. This contract virtually gave JR the full control of KIO's investments 
and made him known as KIO's man in Spain. Accordingly, Spanish officials 
seemed to overcome their reservations of de la Rosa when they realised the huge 
investments made by KIO. This fact was echoed by Jordi Pujol, the head of 
Catalan government, in noting "I said something that I will say again. At a 
specific moment in time, it was Javier de la Rosa who helped the Spanish and 
Catalan economies out of every difficult patch" (El-Pais, 26/1/1993). 
Quail's contract and JR's prominent position at GT allegedly enabled him to 
undertake a catalogue of actions that were detrimental to GT. JR used the contract 
to buy and sell shares for GT at inflated prices among related parties. KIO 
estimate the fees earned by Quail were around $110m3. KPMG concluded in its 
1992 investigation of GT that many of these acquisitions resulted from closed 
negotiations, without any justification for the prices paid. Many of the operations 
de la Rosa was involved in revealed a pattern of irregularities, including the 
acquisition of the paper business of Sarrio and the acquisition and merger of 
Coma Cros and Bures (which represents part of the legal action in Spain). It 
2 The contract stipulated that Quail has the right to terminate the contract and be paid $50m if any 
of the following cases (Audit Bureau, 1993): 
I. Change in the ownership of GT's capital that leads to change in management. 
2. Change in the board of GT or change in the majority power of the board. 
3. Injection of funds into the group stops as a result of factors related to the Spanish laws. 
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seems that de la Rosa was carrying out some of the acquisitions on behalf of GT 
just to acquire the commission. GT's acquisition of Sarrio's paper business is a 
good example of this tactic - it is alleged by Stampa Braun, GT's lawyer in Spain, 
that GT's purchase of Sarrio "lacked economic or industrial justification and it 
was set up by JR in order to obtain hefty commission" (Cambio 16,22/3/1993). 
Misappropriations of funds occurred in many transactions usually involving 
companies owned by de la Rosa or his friends. For example, in 1988, de la Rosa 
recommended that GT buy an aeroplane at the price of $3.56m from the son of 
Bruce Dawson, one of KIO's senior managers (the cost of the aeroplane was 
$0.5m). Then the aeroplane was refurbished for an extra $2.5m and sold for 
$1.5m to one of the companies headed up by de la Rosa (FEAC, 1993b). 
The widespread corruption phenomena identified by the Spanish social 
psychologist, Jose Miguel Fernandez-Dols, as `amiguismo' (`jobs for the boys') 
(The Independent, 28/10/1994, p. 12) was clearly evident in this case. De la Rosa 
appointed many of his friends to senior posts in GT with lucrative contracts. He 
also acquired from his friends, companies and shares for GT at unfavourable 
conditions and prices (e. g. Cros and Bures). De la Rosa played a major role in the 
five transactions discussed earlier in the chapter and has been in prison more than 
once as a measure of preventive custody. He is currently under house arrest 
waiting for the start of the Spanish criminal case4. 
3 In interview with El-Mundo, JR admitted receiving the $110m but said he had to pay out $60m 
of it as fees (El-Mundo, 22/1/1993). 
'' On 18 October 1994, Javier De la Rosa was sent to prison pending charges of falsifying public 
documents and misappropriation of funds brought against him by the minority shareholders of the 
bankrupt Grand Tibidabo, a holding company acquired by De la Rosa in 1991. De la Rosa is 
accused of re-routing at least £15m from Grand Tibidabo towards his own private business. On 13 
February 1995, De la Rosa left prison on bail of $7.6m after one hundred and seventeen days in 
prison. However, he was sent again to prison as a measure of preventive custody for 15 months 
for his in the KIO case. He was released from jail in January 2000 under house arrest until the 
start of criminal case in Madrid (El-Mundo, 14/1/2000). 
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7.4.3 Lack of Control & Accountability 
"In the first four years, I was the entire Japanese Department of KIO and 
made all the decisions myself' (Fouad Jaffar, quoted in Whittington, 
1993) 
"The first rule is that there are no rules" (Fouad Jaffar quoted in 
Euromoney, 1988) 
The KIO case can serve as a classic example for Lord Acton's famous motto that 
"Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely". KIO's formula 
of few people managing huge funds in secrecy, independently with little, if any, 
accountability, was a recipe for disaster. KIO was also not under the direct 
supervision and audit of the Kuwait Audit Bureau. Furthermore, the external 
auditor of KIO, KPMG Peat Marwick, was relieved of its position in 1979 as the 
auditor of KIO and the office remained without an external auditor 
5. One well- 
known economist in Kuwait, Jasem Al-Souddan, was at the forefront of the 
people who were concerned and sought to investigate the operations of KIO in the 
1970's. However, his attempts were blocked by claims of secrecy. His concerns 
appeared to gain some validity in 1981 when KIO acquired Santa Fe, an American 
oil company, on behalf of Kuwait Oil Corporation (KPC). The acquisition of 
Santa Fe was surrounded with claims of insider trading before the acquisition took 
place at inflated prices6. American authorities subsequently investigated the 
matter and found no evidence of insider trading emerging from Kuwaiti sources. 
The opportunity to control the activities of KIO started to evaporate when the 
Finance minister, Abdel-Latif AiHamad (who advocated the establishment of 
KIA) resigned and his post was filled by Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa - who supported 
the independence of KIO. Sheikh Ali made these belief clear in an interview to 
the Institutional Investor in 1988 
s There is no documented reason for the removal of auditor except one former official close to 
KIA indicated to me that KPMG was removed to maintain the secrecy of KIO's operations. 
6 KPC decided to sell Santa Fe after years of attempts to support the company has failed and 
proved costly to the KPC. 
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"Yes, the KIO does have a lot of autonomy. But it is absolutely essential 
for them to operate the way they do and as well that they do. We do not 
want to be making all their decisions for them. " 
Consequently, KIO operated with little consideration to the wishes of KIA. 
Everything appeared to be going KIO's way until the issue arose of the investment 
in the liquor company, Arthur Bell. This investment generated huge criticism in 
Kuwait because Islam outlaws the consumption of, and trade in, liquor. KIO was 
ordered by the Finance minister to sell the investment and was warned to refrain 
from such investments in the future. Kuwait sold its stake in Arthur Bell at a huge 
loss to Guinness, who was bidding to take-over Arthur Bell (Kochan and Pym, 
1987). The Kuwaiti parliament was irritated with KIO's investments and tried to 
assert some control over KIO, but the parliament was dissolved a year later. In 
1986, KIO's executive committee visited KIO in London to try to enforce some 
kind of control. The reaction of KIO's managers was to prevent access to their 
offices and computers. One of KIO's employees described the attitude of KIO's 
managers to the executive committee as "how dare they come in and look at our 
books" (Asian Wall Street Journal, 25/11/92, p. 8). 
After the 1987 stock market crash KIO started to acquire big chunks of the British 
government's floated shares in British Petroleum (BP). BP and the British 
government were concerned about KIO's acquisitions and made this known to 
KIO. Ignoring such concerns, KIO continued its aggressive acquisitions until its 
stake reached 21.6%, making it the largest investor in BP. These acquisitions 
were examined by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1988) who 
concluded that a merger situation existed and stated that KIO should reduce its 
stake to 9.9% within one year (later amended to three years). Eventually, BP 
bought back the shares from KIO at a favourable price (giving KIO a profit of 
$750m). 
Even though the Oil minister and the most senior managers at KIO were strongly 
opposed to the new regulations which KIA was trying to implement, the new 
board of KIA reinstated the post of external auditor for KIO in 1987 and 
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introduced a set of internal control guidelines in 1988 to govern the type, value 
and the region of investments. Subsequently, in the late 1980's, three members of 
KIO's executive committee met with the Amir to ask him to intervene to ensure 
that the internal guidelines were implemented (KIO had ignored them). The new 
guidelines advocated the establishment of two executive committees, one for KIA 
and one for KIO. These committees were set up to deal with urgent issues that 
did 
not need the approval of KIA's board. The Amir agreed to this but before they 
were implemented, Iraq invaded Kuwait (FEAC, 1993a). This ended up leaving 
KIO's operations and fund management basically in the hands of three people (the 
chairman, deputy-chairman and the Finance minister) - while the managing 
director of KIA had his powers largely taken away by the Finance Minister. The 
executive committee made a decision in March 1990 to appoint Abdul Whab Al- 
haroon, the new head of the direct investment department, as a member of the 
board of GT and a replacement for Fouad Jaffar. KIO's chairman chose to ignore 
the appointment of Al-haroon, although Jaffar was still appointed to the board. 
The above indicates that there was a problem of control over the activities of KIO, 
which have contributed to the problems in Spain that culminated in the scandal of 
Grupo Torras. This catalogue of controversies should have, at least, served to 
change the way KIO was controlled and brought to account. However, this was 
not the case, with KIO embarking on riskier and unaccountable actions in Spain - 
making investments without reference to KIA and without informing KIA about 
the full status of KIO's investments in Spain. Lack of control is evident in the 
way KIO relied on one man in Spain to manage its huge industrial investments. 
Moreover, the creation of a web of offshore and shell companies made it very 
difficult to control the funds invested in Spain. Furthermore, the management of 
KIO committed the organisation to a different investment style, assuming 
management control of industrial groups without having the required skills and 
expertise. The large loans granted by the chairman of KIO without the approval of 
the Kuwaiti authorities was another vivid example of the overall lack of control. 
In 1989, the chairman made a loan for $450m to GT for which he did not have the 
authority (loans in excess of $30m required what is called a `loan by law'). KIO's 
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executive committee's protests about this loan did not deter the chairman from 
granting further loans to GT - totalling $1044m during the first three months of 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Audit Bureau, 1993). What is more striking is the 
passive attitude of the government over such loans - it was aware of their 
existence in 1989 but did not swiftly intervene to put an end to such violations. 
The government was seen as taking the side of the managers of KIO (FEAC, 
1993, p 32). This can be vividly demonstrated by the way the government failed 
to react to several warnings and protests from the members of the board of KIA - 
leading them to resign in December 1990. The KIO management team, in 
contrast, stayed in position until they were forced to resign in May 1992. 
The lack of control and accountability can also be attributed to the unstable 
history of the Kuwaiti parliament. The absence of the parliament from 1976 to 
1981 and then from 1986 to 1992 enabled Kuwaiti organisations such as KIO to 
make controversial investment decisions without any reference to matters of 
parliamentary accountability. In addition, the absence of the parliament made the 
role of supervisory bodies such as KAB more limited as the Bureau was reporting 
directly to the government rather than to the parliament. Lack of accountability 
was also documented by the way one of KIO's British managers was involved in 
insider dealing activates regarding KIO's share purchases. KIO allowed the 
manager, who made Elm from his illegal dealings, to resign when it discovered 
the matter but did not report him to the authorities. The lack of action by KIO can 
be attributed to the fact that it wanted to maintain its low profile and avoid 
publicity. 
7.4.4 Failure of the Supervisory Bodies 
"Neither has the Spanish government shown any desire to block foreign 
take-overs, even when it comes to companies like Explosivos Rio Tinto, 
which is a major supplier of explosives to the armed forces, and which has 
been trying to fend off the attentions of the Kuwait Investment Office. 
Since the 1986 Foreign Investments Law specifically empowers the 
government to intervene in cases involving any aspect of national defence 
(along with gambling, television, radio, and air transport), it would have 
been easy to do so, but Kuwaiti capital has been of considerable value in 
revitalising some once sickly companies - like quality paper manufacturers 
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Torras Hostench - and risk alienating them might have been thought 
unwise. Besides, the government has good reasons for keeping Spanish 
companies worried about the possibility of being taken over: it is common 
knowledge that most of them have been concealing profits and 
undervaluing assets at the expense not only of the long-suffering investor, 
but of the Spanish treasury as well. " (Euromoney, June 1988, p. 27) 
"Eventually, politics helped carry the day for KIO. While Defence 
minister Narcis Serra sided with Escondrillas, KIO's Jaffar was able to 
convince Economics minister Carlos Solchaga that KIO would make ERT 
the centrepiece of what could be Europe's biggest chemical company. 
Proposals to shore up Spanish industry go down well with Solchaga, with 
whom Jaffar is careful to maintain good relations. " (Patterson, 1988, p. 60). 
"The Government had been helpful to the KIO but had not compromised 
Spanish interests. " (Fouad Jaffar speaking about the Spanish government 
at FT organised conference on Business with Spain, FT, 10/5/1988, p. 2). 
The failure of the supervisory bodies in Spain is clearly evident in the case of 
KIO's investment. Spanish rules on direct investment by foreign institutional 
investors state that approval of the Spanish cabinet is required for investments of 
more than 50% of the company's share capital. However, this law was ignored in 
the case of KIO. Carlos Solchaga, the former Finance minister, defended the 
government, claiming that it was not aware that the investments made in Torras 
represented KIO as they were carried out by companies from the Netherlands 
(Expansion, 23/2/1993). Nevertheless, this claim does not seem to hold water 
when considering an internal memo dated June 27,1988 written by Manuel 
Conthe, Director of General Foreign Transactions at that time, pointing out that 
KIO's investments in Spain should have been presented to the Spanish cabinet for 
approval. Conthe suggested two alternatives to comply with the Spanish 
regulation - either to authorise the investments after they had already taken place 
or to change the existing regulations. None of Conthe's proposals were acted 
upon (Parry, 1994). Solchaga's claim also seems inconceivable when one looks at 
commentaries in the business and financial press in the late 1980s such as those 
sighted above. Moreover, it was reported that Banco Central had written to the 
government in 1988 asking for Cartera Central's constitution to be annulled, 
claiming that KIO as a foreign government agency had not acquired the necessary 
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approval required under the Spanish law. However, Solchaga intervened and 
resolved the matter, demanding an agreement between Cartera Central and Banco 
Central in order to maintain KIO's holdings at the bank (El-Mundo, 22/2/1993). 
These facts show that the Spanish government was not only adopting a laissez 
faire attitude towards KIO's investments but also was giving its support to KIO. 
The government's attempts to legitimise its claims by reports from the legal 
services department (El-Mundo, 11/3/1993) were not taken seriously by some of 
the Spanish daily newspapers, such as El-Mundo, whose editorial noted: 
"And the government continues to confuse the issue by making incoherent 
statements... Only this very week, in response to questions raised by the 
opposition, the government claimed to have no records of KIO's 
investments in Spain. The ruling party still maintains that it was the Dutch 
companies, Koolmes and Kokmeeuw that invested in Grupo Torras on 
behalf of KIO. What an insult to intelligence! Not only is there no doubt in 
anyone's mind that KIO had been investing in this country without the 
authorisation of the government (as denounced by Banco Central in 1988), 
but why did the government go to the extremes of discussing the matter at 
the highest level, with its Kuwaiti counterparts? If it is true that these 
investments did not require the authorisation of the Council of Ministers 
due to their condition of being Community-based, then why on earth did 
Pedro Perez go all the way to the Emirate to sign an agreement with the 
Kuwaiti finance minister, ensuring KIO's continued presence in Spain. 
Why didn't he scuttle off to Amsterdam - far more in keeping with the 
government's logic. " (Casimiro Garcia-Abadillo, El-Mundo, 14/3/93). 
Similarly, the Kuwaiti government's supervisory position was ineffective. It did 
not take firm action regarding the concerns of KIA's managing director and two 
executive committee members who had resigned in December 1990. Similarly, 
twelve Kuwaiti executives at KIO resigned in the same month, citing the failure of 
KIO's management to comply with office regulations and the executive 
committee's decisions (see Al-Qabas, 3/12/98, p. 9). - The twelve executives 
retracted their resignations after the intervention of the governor of the Kuwaiti 
Central Bank and assurances from the Finance minister that these complaints will 
be resolved. However, nothing seems to have happened which ultimately led 
them write to the Prime Minister and Finance minister in June 1991, raising 
similar concerns (for more details see Al-Hajiri, 1993b). Despite all of these 
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complaints and the fact that he overstepped his authority more than once to grant 
loans to GT for huge amounts7, the chairman of KIO was only forced to resign in 
April 1992. Had the government acted earlier and forced him to resign when the 
complaints first surfaced, most certainly the magnitude of KIO's losses, and the 
fraud committed against it would have been much less. The actions of the 
Kuwaiti government came at a very late stage of KIO's investments in Spain. 
Overall, the position of the two governments shows that they failed to act before 
the breakout of the scandal - although this is something they have not readily 
accepted. The Spanish government denies that it did not enforce the law and 
argued that it thought the law was not valid concerning KIO's investments. The 
Kuwaiti government's response has been more muted - placing blame ultimately 
on the former managers of KIO. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to document the collapse of the KIO's investments in 
Spain and the context in which it operated. It began with a brief history of KIO, 
highlighting the role of the British government in persuading Kuwait to establish 
the office in London as a base to invest its oil surplus funds. The office's 
investments have grown throughout the years, especially during the growth in oil 
prices in the 1970's, making KIO an influential institutional investor in many 
parts of the world. In the mid-1980s, KIA was created as a parent for KIO with 
the aim of making Kuwait's investment strategy less bureaucratic and to gain 
more control over KIO's operations. However, the long history of KIO and the 
success it had achieved gave it unequivocal support from the Kuwaiti 
In 1989, he granted a loan of $450m to GT (he only had authority to grant loans with value of 
less than $30m). The executive committee of KIO objected to this action and wanted the issue 
addressed. The finance minister, Ali Al-Khalifa promised to look into the issue after the summer 
vacation. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came before that end of summer. He again 
overstepped his authority and made several loans (approx. worth $1072m to GT during the period 
from 1990-1991) 
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government, but turned it into a weakly controlled organisation - with a handful 
of people managing billions of dollars in utmost secrecy with very limited, if any, 
accountability for their actions. The prestige and the large autonomy enjoyed by 
KIO made it difficult for its new parent KIA to control KIO. Given this context, 
a crisis of some sort was almost bound to happen and, indeed, it did happen with 
KIO's Spanish investments. 
KIO embarked on investments in Spain from the mid-1980s, making it Spain's 
largest foreign investor. The group was faced with huge losses and debts in 1992 
and eventually put some of its subsidiaries into receivership. The aftermath of 
the collapse revealed fraud, misappropriation of funds and mismanagement. 
These led the group to file legal proceedings against the former mangers of KIO 
and GT in Madrid and London. The judge in the civil case in London found 
some of the former managers guilty, among other things, of fraud and ordered 
them to pay $700m of damages to GT. 
The chapter has discussed the context in which KIO and GT operated, as this is 
vital to understand the factors that most probably had some bearing on the 
functioning of auditing in the KIO case. Several major issues stand out from the 
examination of the KIO case. The issue of excessive secrecy surrounding KIO's 
operations in general (and to a greater extent in its Spanish investments) made it 
extremely difficult not only for outsiders, but also for KIA, to access reliable and 
transparent information about KIO's Spanish investments. It was difficult to 
identify the beneficiaries (i. e. KIO/KIA or personal stakes of the former 
managers or other parties) of some of the transactions carried out in Spain, as a 
result of the secrecy and lack of transparency. The way KIO invested in Spain 
and constructed its group using offshore and external accounts played a crucial 
role in complicating the group's structure and transaction flows. It was a feature 
that was successfully tailored to embezzle millions of dollars from the group - 
and something that, after almost seven years of investigations, means that it is 
still difficult to trace particular business activities. The case showed that the 
fraudulent transactions were conducted with the knowledge and benefit of senior 
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managers at KIO and GT. The chapter also shows how in several cases KIO 
chose to do business with questionable partners rather than with respectable 
institutions. De la Rosa's partnership with KIO also shed light on the widespread 
practice of `amiguismo', with de la Rosa appointing many of his friends at GT 
and its subsidiaries. Lack of control was vividly evident in the way KIO 
operated, working largely with no reference to its parent KIA and paying little, if 
any, attention to investment regulations set by KIA. The fact that the chairman of 
KIO was a member of the ruling family (and also one of the Amir's cousins) and 
was supported by Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa (the one-time Finance minister, who 
wanted to KIO to remain independent) played a major role in enabling KIO to 
by-pass KIA and indulge in unauthorised actions (such as granting loans with the 
value of more than $30m). Concerns about KIO's actions were communicated on 
more than one occasion to the Kuwaiti government but the government did not 
act at the right time - even though the managing director of KIA and other 
executives resigned in protest over KIO's actions and the lack of government 
action. The Spanish government was also accused of turning a blind eye to the 
legal requirement of approving foreign institutional investors, presumably not 
wanting to discourage investors like Kuwait. The facts and the major factors 
highlighted from the KIO case in this chapter will be used in the next chapter to 
assess their impact on the role and functioning of audit work in the case and for 
auditing in general. 
192 
Chapter 8 
The Role of Accounting and Auditing in the KIO Case 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 8 
8.1 Introduction 
The KIO case, with its polemical elements, its international scope and the 
involvement of a number of different sets of auditors is a valuable vehicle for 
studying the contemporary role and nature of international audit practice. 
Auditors involved in the case included KPMG Peat Marwick (auditors of KIO in 
London and KIA in Kuwait), Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse (auditors 
of Grupo Torras and its subsidiaries/affiliates). In addition, Kuwait's Audit 
Bureau, the parliamentary-backed auditing organisation, audited both KIA and 
KIO. In this chapter, the role of these auditors is examined, along with that of 
other professional service providers used by GT. 
The involvement of more than one auditor in auditing KIO and GT did not reveal 
any clear benefits over other forms of arrangement. The high reputation of KIO 
and its international wealth shows how auditors and consultants were proud to be 
associated with KIO but then ended up distancing themselves to some degree 
from KIO after the outbreak of the controversy over KIO's investments. The 
case also highlights the issue of creative accounting, where group accounts 
prepared using alternative accounting methods translated small profits into huge 
losses. The case also questions the independence of KIO's auditors, namely 
KPMG and the Audit Bureau, with KPMG being depicted more as an internal 
auditor than an external auditor. The politics of auditing is clearly highlighted in 
the case through the way auditors were hired and fired and the way they were 
hired to re-examine what they (or other auditors) had failed to uncover. The 
opaque way auditors collected their evidence is also discussed, emphasising the 
extensive degree of reliance that auditors place on management assurances or 
management created evidence. 
KIO stands in some contrast to major financial collapses in Anglo-American 
countries in that such scandals usually generate several books and academic 
papers. For instance, the recent collapse of Barings Bank was the subject of at 
least five books, while the Savings & Loans crises in the USA produced various 
Books and academic papers (for example see Adams, 1992; Gapper and Nicholas 
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Denton, 1997; Hunt and Heninrich, 1996; Jonathan Beaty and Gwynne, 1993; 
Pizzo et al, 1989; Rawnsley, 1996; Truell and Gurwin, 1992; White, 1992; 
Hogan, 1997). Despite the fact that the KIO scandal was a bigger collapse than 
for instance that of Barings in terms of losses and its effects on the Spanish 
economy, it has not produced much in the way of academic research. One reason 
for this might lie in the historical tendency of auditing research in both Spain and 
Kuwait to concentrate on normative research. Lee (1993) criticised the use of 
scandals in auditing research believing that it was wrong and potentially 
misleading to rely on corporate failures to examine standards of auditing, 
especially given the limited number of completed cases in the courts. Other 
researchers (Stamp, 1980, Kaplan, 1987, Clarke et al, 1997) have a different 
view, seeing corporate failures as a valuable source of information to study the 
audit function. Indeed, audit scandals are used by some academics (Frecknall 
Hughes et al, 1998) in their teaching of auditing and they consider them to be 
useful tools for developing auditing knowledge. 
This chapter starts by highlighting the role of different auditors and other 
professional service providers. Then it explores a number of key implications for 
the auditing function, include the subjectivity of accounting valuations, auditor 
independence, fraud detection, evidence collection, disciplinary proceedings and 
auditors' apparent immunity to scandals. The chapter then moves to consider the 
impact and the response of the accounting profession to the scandal in Kuwait 
and Spain, closing with a number of final reflections on the significance of the 
KIO case. 
8.2 Assessing the Role of Auditors and Other Professionals in 
the KIO Case 
This section discusses the role performed by KIO's different sets of auditors in 
Kuwait, UK and Spain, examining each one in turn before seeking to identify a 
number of key analytical themes in the case. This part also considers the 
involvement of other professional service providers in the case. 
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8.2.1 The Role of the Audit Bureau 
Although the Audit Bureau was established eleven years after the establishment 
of KIB/KIO, it was indirectly auditing the information that the London office was 
presenting to the Investment Department at the Ministry of Finance. The Bureau 
started to audit KIA as soon as it commenced its operations in 1984 and duly 
assumed responsibility for the audit of KIO once it was came under the control of 
KIA. However, Law 47/1982 governing the establishment of KIA exempted it 
from the Bureau's ex-ante examination and stipulated that the Bureau's 
examination should not interfere in KIA's management and operational policies. 
The Bureau's statutory role also seemed to be restricted, with a Kuwaiti Member 
of Parliament claiming that KIA's accounts were not under the supervision of the 
Audit Bureau (Al-Qabas, 21/6/86, p. 3) - apparently, the Audit Bureau's report on 
KIA's accounts for the year 1983/1984 did not contain any comments about 
KIA's investments activities relating to the General Reserve Fund (GRF) and 
Reserve Fund for Future Generations (RFFG). The Bureau's report only showed 
figures for KIA's total investments and revenues. Accordingly, the above 
mentioned MP proposed that the Audit Bureau carry out an investigation and 
audit of the accounts of KIA from 1983 to 1986, especially examining whether 
the GRF and the RFFG were in compliance with KIA's regulations and 
guidelines. The proposal, however, did not come to fruition as the Kuwaiti 
parliament was dissolved 12 days after the proposal's formal submission (the 
parliament not being re-formulated until late-1992). 
The Audit Bureau lost much of its independence during the period when the 
Kuwaiti parliament was dissolved (1986 to 1992). This represented the period 
when KIO constructed the Torras group and during it the Bureau was reporting 
directly to the Kuwaiti government rather than to the (dissolved) parliament. 
Accordingly, the role of the Audit Bureau in auditing KIO and GT before the 
outbreak of the scandal continued to be rather insignificant. The Bureau's 
examination was restricted to the accounts prepared by KIO and sent to KIA. As 
KIO did not report all the required details to KIA, it is likely that most of the 
important transactions relating to the Spanish investments were never audited by 
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the Bureau. Despite the inability of the Audit Bureau to directly examine KIO's 
accounts and its Spanish investments, it seems that it was informed of KIO's 
mismanagement and illegal acts in Spain and elsewhere. A senior official 
(formerly close to KIA) indicated in interview that he informed the president of 
the Audit Bureau about irregularities and mismanagement at KIO in late 1990 but 
the president was reluctant to intervene (and apologised that he did not have the 
necessary manpower to investigate KIO). It was only after the collapse of GT 
and the return of the parliament that the Bureau's auditors visited KIO to conduct 
their audit of the London based office. Therefore, it would appear that the Audit 
Bureau had a very limited role in investigating KIO's operations and accessing its 
accounts but, even when it was informed about the possibility of 
misappropriations of funds and illegal transactions, chose not to intervene. The 
Bureau's failure to take action might be attributed to the fact that members of the 
ruling family controlled KIO and it was difficult for the Bureau (being under the 
control of the government rather than the (dissolved) Kuwaiti Parliament) to 
investigate their actions. 
8.2.2 The Role of KPMG 
`We audit their two big funds, but we are not actually auditors to the 
organisation and we never have been', insists a spokesman. A letter to 
KIO from now-retired partner John White, in 1990, says: `My firm, in its 
capacity as auditor of Kuwait Investment Office and Kuwait Investment 
Authority 
... 
' White was the most senior partner working on the Kuwaiti 
business - so how could he be wrong? `Oh, it's an understandable mistake 
because we audit the two big funds', blusters a spokesman. `They have 
their own auditors in Kuwait -I forget the name - and we have no links 
with them. ' (The Daily Telegraph questioning the role of KPMG Peat 
Marwick with relevance to KIO - Daily Telegraph, 6/12/93) 
Information about the auditors of KIO is confusing. The previous chapter has 
documented that KPMG Peat Marwick was chosen by the British political 
representative of Kuwait in London as the auditor of Kuwait's first investment 
body in 1953. A prominent person (formerly close to KIA) revealed in interview 
that in 1979 KIO decided that it no longer needed an external audit of its accounts 
and Peat Marwick was discharged. He believed that the reason behind the 
dismissal of the audit firm was to maintain a veil of secrecy over KIO's 
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investments and operations. Accordingly, it is suspected that Peat Marwick was 
indeed the auditor of KIO, during the period 1953-1979, although no public audit 
reports or documents are available to support that belief. Law 47/1982 covering 
the establishment of KIA led to the re-introduction of external auditors at KIO, as 
the law required that one (or more) auditor be appointed by the board of KIA, 
based on the recommendation of the Finance Minister (the chairman of KIA). An 
auditor was only appointed one year after KIA started its operations, with KPMG 
Peat Marwick-London being selected as the auditor of both KIA and KIO -a 
point disputed by KPMG. KPMG have claimed to be the auditor of KIO before 
the breakout of the scandal of GT but subsequently have maintained that they 
were only auditing two of KIO's accounts (the GRF and the RFFG). The 
significance of KPMG differentiating between being the full auditor and the 
auditor of two accounts might be explained by the fact that in the former role 
KPMG would be auditing all of KIO's funds (and all other funds KIO's invests 
on the behalf of other organisations, such as KPC), while, in the latter, KPMG 
would only be responsible for KIO's funds. KPMG's claim that they only 
audited the two accounts enabled it to claim that it was unaware of the allegations 
that KIO (a tax exempt body) made the controversial investments in BP on behalf 
of KPC (a tax paying corporation) avoiding payment of £600m in taxes to the 
Inland Revenue in Britain. 
In seeking to clarify issues relating to KPMG's audit of KIA/KIO, I contacted 
KPMG in London. On 12 April 1996 a letter was mailed to its head of audit 
making inquiries about the possibility of arranging an appointment to discuss the 
firm's involvement in the audit of KIO. KPMG's head of audit responded that 
"... it is extremely unlikely that we would be prepared to comment on matters 
concerning a specific client... " and he passed my request to the partner 
responsible for KIA's audit. A follow up letter was sent to the concerned partner 
explaining that I was seeking clarification of certain factual matters which could 
be answered without any breach of client confidentiality - e. g. "From what date 
and until when were KPMG the external auditors of KIO? " (For a complete list 
of the presented questions, see Appendix 2). The audit partner concerned 
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responded that "as a matter of principle we do not disclose the affairs of our 
clients in any form". He communicated my requests to KIA and suggested that I 
should contact KIA directly to obtain such information. Consequently a letter 
was mailed to Mr Ali Al-Bader (the Managing Director of KIA) requesting an 
interview to discuss the questions put to KPMG. The director of his office, Mr 
Ahmed Bastaki, responded to my letter suggesting that an interview could be 
arranged in Kuwait. I met Mr Al-Bader on 29/1/1997 and after explaining my 
research project he told me that KIA's rules and regulations forbid him from 
talking about KPMG's work at KIA and KIO - and that the only organisations 
who could get access to information about KIO/KIA's auditors were the Audit 
Bureau and the National Assembly (the Kuwaiti Parliament). 
However, he did state that according to his knowledge, KPMG only started to 
carry out audits in real terms in 1992 and that its first audit report was in 1992 - 
prior to this it was merely checking investment procedures. He added that there 
was "no beef in it", meaning that there was no story in the claims that KPMG- 
London had been negligent or did not act professionally. He carried on saying 
that, "in fairness to KPMG, I will tell you that in December 1991 KPMG staff 
had come to KIA in Kuwait warning them to save their money, recommending 
that KIA changed the management team at GT". According to Mr Al-Bader, 
KIA had originally appointed KPMG (London) in 1987 and that KIA had no 
relations with KPMG (Kuwait). In the interview, it was very apparent that Mr 
Al-Bader was reluctant to provide information on the role of KPMG. The 
difficulty in obtaining basic factual evidence from either KPMG or Mr Al-Bader 
emphasises the sensitivity of the KIO/GT case and the degree to which it has 
been clouded in secrecy. 
Regardless of whether KPMG was a full auditor of KIO or not does not change 
the fact that it was restricted in its investigations of some of KIO's investments, 
such as those in Grupo Torras. That KPMG did not appear to have had access to 
all of KIO's documents and papers is backed up by the resignation letter of three 
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KIO's executive committee, dated 30 December 1990. These three members of 
the executive committee wrote to Kuwait's Prime Minister in exile', sighting a 
list of irregularities at KIO. They indicated that one of KIO's accounts, estimated 
at $1.9bn (and managed by KIO's chairman, vice chairman and overseen by one 
person) was not audited by the external auditor (KPMG) or the internal auditor of 
KIA. In addition, KIO did not present its monthly and quarterly reports to the 
executive committee, while the latter's call for the external auditor (KPMG) to 
carry out a full inquiry into GT operations was ignored. All of this suggests that 
KPMG's access to information was severely restricted by KIO's management 
team. KPMG was assigned to assess the value of KIO's Spanish investments, 
which they estimated to be between $2.7bn and $4.4bn in late 1991. A year later 
KPMG was asked to undertake another examination of GT, duly giving it a 
negative value of $4.4bn. 
The parliamentary committee investigating the collapse of GT claimed that many 
of the people it met during its investigation did not think that hiring KPMG in 
1993 (after GT's collapse) was a good decision, given KIO's previous 
experiences with KPMG and its expensive fees2. The committee felt that KPMG 
had been aware of KIO's difficulties in Spain, claiming that when a draft 
financial report of Torraspapel (prepared by Coopers & Lybrand in Spain) was 
presented to KPMG, it failed to pass its concerns to KIA. Accordingly, members 
of the committee thought that KPMG had not properly performed its job: 
"It became clear to the committee that KPMG was the external auditor of 
KIO during the time when the Spanish investment was carried out. One 
of KPMG's tasks was to attest to the financial position of these 
investments and to express an opinion on them. But it did not present any 
reports, or notes, or reservations concerning the financial reports prepared 
by the auditors of GT companies in Spain... " (Kuwaiti Parliamentary 
Financial Committee Report, 1993, p. 62). 
During the period of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait between 2/8/90 and 26/2/91, the Kuwaiti 
government assumed its responsibilities from Saudi Arabia. 
It was estimated that the fees of KPMG for the period from early 1992 to early 1993 were £ 18m 
for the audit of KIO and investigations of GT (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 20/3/93, p. 13). 
200 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 8 
However, it can be argued that even if KIA had found KPMG negligent to some 
degree (as the committee thought) it wasn't prepared to change auditors because 
of its historical desire to maintain the secrecy that surrounds its operations. 
Indeed, the Kuwaiti Finance minister's justification for hiring KPMG to 
investigate GT was that KPMG was already familiar with KIO and, more 
importantly, it would preserve the secrecy around KIO (Al-Watan, 4/7/1993, 
p. 10). 
In summary, it would appear that the involvement of KPMG and the Audit 
Bureau played a major role in creating a facade that KIO was being properly 
audited and controlled - while in reality both were restricted in terms of their 
access and scope of work. Further, both became aware of GT's difficulties but 
did little, if anything - raising questions regarding their independence. However, 
in failing to prevent mismanagement they stand in company with the managing 
director of KIA, two members of the executive committee of KIO and the Prime 
Minister of Kuwait. The involvement of members of the Kuwaiti ruling family in 
the management of KIO made any such corrective/preventive actions difficult for 
all concerned. 
8.2.3 The Role of Grupo Torras Auditors 
Grupo Torras, its subsidiaries and affiliates were audited by a number of the Big 
Six audit firms in Spain (see Figure 8.1). Surveying the audit reports of Torras 
and selected subsidiaries between the period of 1988-1993 reveals an extensive 
pattern of qualified audit reports (see Tables 8.1 - 8.3). KPMG (Spain), the 
auditor of ERT before the merger with CROS in 1989 and later the auditor of the 
merged group Ercros, issued qualified audit reports from as early as 1988. 
KPMG's qualification of ERT in 1988 and Ercros' accounts in subsequent years 
led Touche Ross and Coopers & Lybrand to qualify GT's accounts over the 
uncertainty of Ercros' future. 
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Figure 8.1 - Soino of the Auditors of 
GT, its subsidiaries 
and affiliates 
Grupo Torras 
'Touchc Ross (1988-1989) 
Coopers 8c Lybrand (1 990- 1 992) 
Torraspapel 
Coopers 8c. Lybrand 
Torras I-Iostench London 
"Tuche Ross (London) 
Coopers 8c Lybrand (London) 
Ebro 
Price Waterhouse 
Prima Inmobiliarla 
Coopers &t Lybrand 
Eppic 
Coopers 8c. Lybrand 
PrKI 
The financial statements for 1988, when Torras Hostench was floated at the stock 
market and its name changed to Grupo Torras (GT), represented the group's only 
unqualified report. In March 1990, the board of Torras made a decision to 
replace Touche Ross with Coopers & Lybrand (Barcelona) as the auditors for GT 
starting from the financial year of 1990. In June 1990, Ricardo Gomez the 
Touche Ross partner responsible for GT's audit also moved to Coopers & 
Lybrand and became the partner responsible for the GT audit. In August 1990, 
GT's 1989 accounts were filed with the CNMV, with a qualified audit report by 
Touche Ross sighting the uncertainty over the future of Ercros (as highlighted in 
KPMG's audit report of Ercros). However, these accounts did not show or 
highlight the concerns expressed by Touche Ross (London), the auditor of THL, 
regarding two of the fraudulent transactions (Croesus and Oakthorn 1). 
According to the KIO legal judgement in London, the concern about these two 
transactions was raised in June 1990, at the time that THL's auditor was 
preparing to complete their work on THL's 1989 accounts. Shortly before that 
time, de la Rosa had given GT's guarantee for the Croesus ($25m) and Oakthorn 
1 ($55m) loans made be THL. De la Rosa's action led Touche Ross (London) to 
inquire about the rationale of these two transactions. Touche Ross' inquiry 
resulted in the production of a letter from Miguel Soler, the general manager of 
administration and finance of GT and a director of THL, justifying the two 
transactions as a part of a strategy for reorganisation of the group. The inquiry 
also secured letters from Croesus and Oakthorn confirming their liability towards 
THL and Nunez from GT also guaranteed GT's responsibility for these loans 
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towards THL. Touche Ross (London) also communicated their concern about the 
status and rationale of the transactions in a letter to Coopers & Lybrand, as the 
new GT group auditor for year 1990, and to Nigel Black at KIO, whom they met 
along with his superior manager shortly after. The KIO officials weren't able to 
provide answers to their inquiries. Touche Ross wrote again to Coopers & 
Lybrand wondering if they had received similar information. Eventually these 
inquiries and the guarantee letter received from GT were sufficient for Touche 
Ross to sign the 1989 accounts of THL (for more details see the official 
judgement in Grupo Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah, 1999). 
Neither of Torras' auditors in Spain, Touche Ross (Barcelona) and Coopers & 
Lybrand (Barcelona), seemed to share the concerns of Touche Ross (London) as 
they both did not make reference to the issues in their audit reports of 1989 and 
1990, nor raised concerns about the two transactions with KIO or GT. 
Interestingly, it appears that the 1989 group accounts for GT were not signed off 
by Gomez (Touche Ross) until late June/early July (although the published date 
that the audit report was signed was given as April 1990 - and May 1990 for the 
second paragraph in the opinion). The KIO legal judgement stated that officially 
the audit report was signed off before the THL audit had been completed, giving 
the impression that the real desire of Touche Ross was for supporting evidence to 
justify the existing opinion rather than to -resolve the questions coming from 
Touche Ross (London). 
Coopers & Lybrand audited GT's accounts for 1990 and issued a qualified audit 
report. Coopers & Lybrand attributed their qualification to two transactions. The 
first concerned Ebro's merger (creating a bigger food group) which saw Grupo 
Torras' overall stake at Ebro change from 51% to 40%, but its investment value 
increase to Pts33.73bn according to an independent expert. C&L disagreed with 
such a valuation and indicated that the book value should not have been changed. 
The second transaction related to concerns about Ercros, which was in the 
process of restructuring. Coopers & Lybrand was concerned with the audit report 
of Ercros which stated that it was not possible to determine if the provisions 
registered in Ercros' accounts were sufficient to cover the relative costs of 
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restructuring. However, uncertainties also existed with respect to subsidies 
received in relation to this process, while C&L were also subsequently criticised 
for their failure to qualify GT's accounts for the capitalisation of the two 
fraudulent loans (Croesus and Oakthorn 1) which were subsequently transferred 
to the reserves of THL. This, and other transactions, was investigated by ICAC 
who fined C&L (see below for further discussion). This transaction was also the 
focus of the civil case filed in London, where the judge concluded that Grupo 
Torras has suffered losses. 
KPMG gave a qualified audit report in 1992 for Ercros' 1991 accounts, just a 
month before the chemical group filed for receivership, citing uncertainties about 
the future as motivations behind their opinion. Interestingly a year later, KPMG, 
in its audit report on Ercros' 1992 accounts, not only refused to give opinion but 
also retracted its qualified opinion for the 1991 accounts - replacing it with a 
disclaimer of opinion. This change of opinion (from qualified to disclaimer) is 
unusual, as it implies that there was something wrong with the previous audit 
opinion. The draft financial statements of GT for the financial year 1991 showed 
a profit of Pts3.9bn but the new management in KIO and GT ordered C&L to 
rework the accounts using market prices and removing extraordinary gains. The 
new accounts saw GT's results change from Pts3.9bn profit to a Pts44.4bn loss, 
leading GT's managers to refuse to sign the audit report. Accordingly, the formal 
accounts of GT were only presented to the CNMV in 1993 (a year overdue), with 
C&L disclaiming their opinion (citing uncertainties with GT's suspension of 
payments). A disclaimer of opinion was also common to the financial statements 
of companies in the GT group, due to the uncertainties about the future of the 
holding company and other uncertainties, such as the CNMV investigation 
discussed in the previous chapter. The accounts of THL in 1991 also raised 
concerns for its auditor Coopers & Lybrand (London). Their concern was related 
to a sum of $300m used in the Pincinco transaction as a Fiduciary Deposit from 
October 1990 to October 1991 at Bankers Trust (Switzerland). In July 1991, the 
auditor of THL sent an audit confirmation form to the bank to complete, not 
knowing that the deposit was no longer held at that bank. A Co-operative Bank 
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loyee implemented the request of GT's managers to provide confirmation 
the $300m deposit was at the bank when no such deposit was in existence. 
ordingly, an auditor told the civil court in London that his firm had signed the 
unts on the belief that the confirmation was genuine. 
U Ice other cases, where corporate collapses shortly follow a clean audit report 
.d raise 
the infamous question as to "Where were the auditors? ", the GT case, as 
i strated above, had a significant number of audit qualifications some years 
r to the collapse. However, C&L's qualification of the 1990 accounts and 
sisal to give opinion on the 1991 accounts were not seen as sufficient by ICAC, 
tom. Spanish audit regulatory body. ICAC investigated the audit reports for these 
two years and fined C&L for the 1990 audit after completing a ten month 
iestigation (see Appendix 3). This was the first instance of a Big Six 
accounting firm being fined in Spain. ICAC initial investigations identified six 
arges. It claimed that the facts relating to charges 1 to 5 could be constitutive 
of. a serious breach of article 16,2. c of the Audit Law 19/1988, for supposing non- 
compliance with audit procedures that can cause economic prejudice to third 
parties or to the company or entity audited. The facts reported in the sixth charge 
could be constitutive of a serious breach of article 16,2 relating to differences 
between what is reported and what was obtained by the auditor during his work. 
ICAC also showed that C&L did not comply with ICAC's Technical Procedures 
and the Reformulated Text on Company Law (see Table 8.4 for a summary and 
Appendix 4 for further details). ICAC prepared a proposed resolution for all but 
the fifth charge and communicated its findings to C&L, giving it the opportunity 
to defend itself against the charges. C&L's response to ICAC's findings and its 
proposed resolution was twofold. On the one hand, C&L made a series of 
general statements questioning the legality of the principles specified by ICAC 
and ICAC's interpretations of what constituted a breach of such principles. It 
also discussed each one of the charges in detail. ICAC refuted the claims of 
legality sighting various legal judgements and emphasising specific points in the 
audit law. ICAC also used the working papers of C&L to discredit their response 
to the charges. C&L also presented to ICAC two reports of professional opinion 
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from the major Spanish professional accounting associations, Registro de 
Economistas Auditores (REA) and Instituto de Censores Jurados de Cuentas de 
Espana (ICJCE), as a defence against ICAC's charges'. ICAC's report did not 
disclose the full text/details of the opinion of these institutes but responded 
directly to their arguments in defence of C&L work. ICAC assigned a 
considerable part of its report to refute REA's opinion. ICAC's report indicated 
that some of REA's justification for C&L work was difficult to understand, had 
limited or no basis for its conclusion, and implied non-compliance with GAAP. 
ICAC felt that some of REA's justifications might have been acceptable if 
additional measures had been adopted but they were neither adopted by C&L nor 
discussed by REA (for further details see Appendix 4). The ICJCE report was 
only briefly addressed in ICAC's report. According to ICAC, ICJCE had 
referred to alternative accounting treatments that could have been adopted by GT 
but did not address the one adopted by GT. ICJCE avoided commenting on one 
transaction, claiming that it was purely a legal issue, while referring to evidence 
that only emerged after the financial statements had been issued when discussing 
another transaction. ICAC indicated that the rest of the arguments in the ICJCE 
report were similar to those advanced by C&L and therefore did not weaken 
ICAC's findings. Ultimately, ICAC decided to fine Coopers & Lybrand 
Pts38.50m, amounting to 1.25% of their total audit fees for the previous year. 
ICAC's investigation and fines were not limited to GT but also included Ebro, 
the most successful company in the GT group. ICAC investigated Price 
Waterhouse's audit of Ebro for the year ended 30 September 1992. This 
investigation was instigated by CNMV who contacted ICAC requesting technical 
opinion on the individual and consolidated audit reports of Ebro for that year. 
ICAC concluded that Price Waterhouse had failed to qualify its audit report in 
relation to three transactions, which if they had been charged against income, 
3 It is unclear from the ICAC report of whether C&L asked REA and ICJCE to prepare these 
reports or these professional bodies voluntarily prepared these reports. It is also unclear whether 
either of these bodies prepared similar reports in defense of other firms sanctioned by ICAC. In 
order to resolve these uncertainties, a contact was made with ICAC, REA and ICJCE whom all 
declined to comment on these matters. Contacts were also made with Spanish academic 
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would have turned Ebro's profit of Pts3.59bn into a loss of Pts2.2bn. On the first 
two transactions, Ebro wrote-off the restructuring charge and the loss on sale of 
its own shares against reserves rather than against profits. With the third 
transaction, Ebro wrote down revalued assets to their historical cost in order to 
show a profit on their sale. Accordingly, ICAC fined Price Waterhouse 
Pts53.6m, 1% of PW's total audit fee income for 1992. ICAC also fined the 
partner in charge of Ebro's audit, Pts550,000. 
An examination of selected financial statements of key companies in the group 
thus reveals a number of interesting findings. The auditors of Ercros and Grupo 
Torras qualified their audit reports from as early as 1988, mainly as a result of 
uncertainties over the future of Ercros. This might indicate that Torras' auditors 
had no choice but to qualify their audit reports given that all of Ercros' audit 
reports were qualified over the uncertainty about its future. Indeed, the collapse 
of the group in 1992 was triggered by the huge losses of Ercros and its 
subsequent filing for receivership. Therefore, it seems that the auditors of Ercros 
and GT had successfully identified a going concern issue that became reality 
when the group filed for receivership in mid 1992. The case also showed that the 
British auditors of THL were more inquisitive about the fraudulent transactions 
(Croesus, Oakthorn 1, Pincinco) than their Spanish counterparts, especially those 
auditing GT. This was clearly seen in the above three transactions where the 
auditors tried to inquire about their rational and wanted to obtain proper 
confirmatory evidence (even though such evidence was usually fabricated). The 
role of auditors in Spain revealed some peculiar practices, such as in the case of 
Ercros where KPMG modified its previous audit opinion from qualified to 
disclaimer in the subsequent financial year. Additionally, it is worth emphasising 
that the charges laid against the Spanish auditors do not relate to controversial 
issues such as a failure to detect fraud. The charges against C&L, for example, 
relate to basic issues of breaches in accounting concepts, auditing procedures and 
compliance with laws. The fact that the scandal came after a number of qualified 
colleagues who were also unable to resolve these uncertainties. 
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reports can give the impression that auditors are damned if they report and 
damned if they don't. However, in spite of such qualifications the charges 
relating to C&L and PW revealed several instances where the auditors had failed 
to disclose important facts to the public. 
8.2.4 Accounting Records 
Analysis of the role of KIO's auditors and GT's auditors has revealed that while 
many auditors were involved in the case the quality of their work was not that 
evident. The problems faced by KIO's auditors concerned the restrictions on 
their access to information and sometimes also finding records or documentation 
not available as a result of poor bookkeeping. GT's auditors seemed to encounter 
similar problems, with investigations revealing that loans between group 
companies were registered in GT's books but not in those of the subsidiaries. 
The second problem that affected all the auditors (both public and private) related 
to the management and the power of KIO. The managers of KIO felt accountable 
to nobody, while de la Rosa's total control of GT also seems to have 
compromised auditors' objectivity. The lack of action on the part of KIO's 
auditors looks all the more surprising given that subsequent official investigations 
highlighted KIO's poor standards of bookkeeping and accounting record 
maintenance. KIO's accounting problems also included deficiencies in its 
internal audit staff, whom were not professionally qualified. Neither the director 
nor his assistant held a degree in accounting (even though regulations required 
that the head of the department should be a certified accountant). Consequently 
the Bureau felt that the shortcomings in the staffs' qualifications meant that the 
department was unable to fulfil its task. However, this was a harsh conclusion 
given that managers controlled everything in KIO and were not accountable to 
anyone. External parties to KIO failed to control the organisation or stop the 
mismanagement and there is no evidence to believe that the internal audit 
department would have been able to achieve what other people (e. g. KIA's 
managing director) had failed to achieve. 
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Charge Transaction Problem Conclusion 
In July 1988 Phoenix Finance International - Non-compliance with the prudence ICAC saýý C&L's 
failure to qualify the report 
Ltd. Issued a £100m convertible bond into principle as the financial capacity of given the different problems with the 
Torras Hostench that was due in 1998. In Phoenix was based on the value of its provision as constituting a non-compliance 
1990, GT anticipated losses on the bond and shares in Prima Inmobiliaria at the date of with Technical procedures on reports issued 
thus prepared a provision to meet these redemption of bonds in 1998. by ICAC in 1991, especially points 
potential losses. ICAC claimed that the Pts3bn - The companies offering the Pts6bn " 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 relating to 
provision prepared by GT to meet the potential guarantee, used in decreasing the provision, opinions with qualifications 
looses was underestimated. did not have the capacity to meet this " 3.7.5 and 3.7.6 that regulate non- 
guarantee. compliance mistakes or non-compliance 
- ICAC concluded that the guarantees did with GAAP 
not exist because these companies were in 
contract with GT to buy and sell its shares. 
- C&L claimed to rely on KlO's support 
letter sent in 3/3/1992 eight months after 
issuing the financial statements 
2 GT had revealed in the notes of its financial ICAC claimed that this treatment was right ICAC saw the auditor's failure to make an 
statements that KIO was going to seek the when priority was given to substance over exception in their report despite the fact the 
approval of GT's . 
board to capitalise form. However, rectifying the credit to the report showed a future increase of capital of 
Pts162,912,190,000 of the loans it granted to reserve account through the profit and loss Pts 162,912,190,000 as non-compliance with 
the group. Accordingly, GT capitalised the account might not been the right treatment Technical procedures on reports issued by 
loans that expired in December, 1990 given that the company at all times acted as ICAC in 1991, especially points 
(Ptsl 15,413,549,589), then transferring them an intermediary. " 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 relating to 
to the account of THL with a charge to the opinions with qualifications 
reserves of Ptsl4,472.629,000 to settle " 3.7.5 and 3.7.6 that regulate 
obligations towards third parties. mistakes or non-compliance with 
GAAP 
3 GT made an adjustment in the annual accounts ICAC indicated that GT did not issue new ICAC concluded that the adjustment did not 
of 1990 that showed a 35% reduction of its financial statements for 1989 to introduce comply with GAAP and it would have 
own funds as of 31 December 1989 in the adjustments. As such, there would not affected the 1990 accounts. It also concluded 
comparison to what was reported in the annual be another understanding aside from that that the failure of C&L to make an exception 
accounts of 1989. Consequently, the balance the adjustment affected the 1990 accounts. for this issue Evas a non-compliance with 
sheet and profit and loss account of 1989 Technical procedures on reports issued by 
which were re-produced in the 1990 accounts ICAC in 1991, especially points 
for comparison purposes differed from the " 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 related to opinions 
ones in the issued annual accounts of 1990. with qualifications 
" 3.7.5 and 3.7.6 that regulate 
mistakes or non-compliance with 
GAAP 
4 Four companies (Philiby, CAOS, Mira and - ICAC concluded that GT lent financial - C&L's failure to highlight GT's attempt to 
Folma) owned by de la Rosa signed contracts support for the purchase of its own shares avoid the limit on a company's own share 
with GT to buy and sell GT shares. via these companies. acquisition did not comply with section 4, 
- ICAC attributed this contract to GT's chapter 4 of the Reformulated 
Text on 
desire to avoid the limit (set by the Company Law. 
Reformulated Text on Company Lau) on -ICAC indicated that C&L should have made 
the number of a company's own shares that an exception in their report given that C&L 
it can acquire. did have evidence to justify the inflated 
- ICAC saw that the price of the acquisition prices for the buy back shares that would 
shares from the four companies was higher explain the loss of shareholders' equity at 
than their net accounting net value. GT. Therefore, C&L did not comply with 
Technical procedures on reports issued by 
ICAC in 1991, especially points 
" 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 related to opinions 
with qualifications 
" 3.7.5 and 3.7.6 that regulate 
mistakes or non-compliance with 
GAAP 
6 ICAC claimed that working papers of C&L C&L made no reference to this regard in C&L failure to make an exception to this 
revealed that they detected an undervaluation their audit report. matter in their report constituted a non- 
of Pts4.5bn of the portfolio provisions in the compliance with Technical procedures on 
annual accounts of Grupo Torras of the year reports issued by ICAC in 1991, especially 
1990. points 
" 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 related to opinions 
with qualifications 
" 3.7.5 and 3.7.6 that regulate 
mistakes or non-compliance with 
GAAP 
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8.2.5 Non-auditing Professional Service Providers 
"Grupo Torras is a complicated animal. Salomon says `it can be likened to 
the conglomerates popular in the 1960s, when it was believed that 
financial and management acumen could bring additional benefits to this 
type of organisation (an industrial holding) - however, this was rarely 
proven to be the case'. But it was also Salomon Brothers who, in 
November 1988, designed the flotation of Grupo Torras, praising it as `a 
strongly profitable holding company with pan-European ambitions'. 
Torras, the investment bank said then, had carried out a diversification 
programme `with timely acquisitions in some of the fastest-growing 
sectors of the Spanish economy' (Peter Bruce commenting on the role of 
Salomon Brothers, FT, 26-10-1992, p. 14). 
In 1988, Salomon Brothers' involvement with GT, in underwriting £100m of 
convertible bonds in Torras, attracted international banks such as Bank of 
America, Chase Manhattan, Credit Suisse, Barclays Bank. The bond was 
promoted as an opportunity to buy into an excellent investment constructed by 
KIO, who was then highly regarded. In that same year, the investment bank also 
helped KIO to float Grupo Torras on the Madrid stock market. In June 1992, 
KIO's new managers hired Salomon to examine the financial position of GT. 
Salomon presented KIO with two options, either to find a partner for GT or 
liquidate the group. Excerpts from Salomon's investigation of GT, published in 
the Financial Times (26/10/1992, p. 14), shows how Salomon changed its opinion 
of GT. While Salomon was claiming that conglomerates like GT had failed since 
the 1960's, they did not express such an opinion in 1988 and 1989 when they 
participated in underwriting the convertible bond and helped in floating GT. 
Instead in the late 1980's, they promoted the group as a very promising 
investment for the future. In response to criticisms of its role in the flotation of 
GT, Salomon asserted that it did not work for GT in the period of early 1990 to 
June 1992, when it was believed that the group was starting to face problems. 
However, the bank's claim contradicts the fact that GT was facing problems as 
early as 1989, when its own credit lines were suspended. It would appear that 
Salomon wanted to dissociate itself from the GT group and downplay any 
responsibility for having sought to convince people to invest in GT and its 
convertible bond. 
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While the speed with which Salomon's views of GT changed may give cause for 
concern as to the reliability of its earlier declarations on the status and financial 
strength of GT, by far the most detrimental role played by professional advisors 
relates to the work of accountants (accounting firms) in devising offshore 
schemes designed to minimise taxes. These ultimately led to the siphoning of 
huge funds from KIO and GT and clearly presented considerable problems for 
auditors seeking to work their way through a maze of major transactions. 
Whittington (1993) claimed that Touche Ross was the architect of KIO's mode of 
entry to Spain, via the two sets of companies in Dutch Antilles and the 
Netherlands. This mode of entry created problems for the Spanish government as 
it claimed that it did not know that KIO was investing in Spain and therefore was 
unable to prevent the bypassing of legislative requirements for parliament to 
approve foreign investments in Spain. In addition, the former managers of KIO 
used the Antilles and Dutch connections to misappropriate funds. This complex 
use of offshore centres made it difficult for other auditors in the group to carry 
out their audit work. The civil case filed by GT originally included among the 
list of defendants a number of accountants and their Jersey accounting firm - 
however, they opted for an out-of-court settlement before the start of trail. These 
accountants acted as directors for some of the shell companies used by the former 
managers to siphon the funds from KIO/GT. Judge Mance in his judgement in re 
Grupo Torras S. A. v. AI-Sabah [1999] saw these accountants and their shell 
companies as having been involved in sham agreements. The case also 
highlighted the prominent role of Plinio Coll, a former auditor at Touche Ross 
Spain, who ultimately became a consultant for GT and its subsidiaries. Coll was 
named in the London legal case. While the judge did not find him guilty of 
conspiracy to defraud GT, he found him responsible for producing false 
documentation and participating in other conduct which he believed was 
dishonestly structured for exchange control and tax reasons and to deceive 
auditors. The involvement of accounting firms and accountants in the case 
supports previous findings by Mitchell ei al (1998) regarding accountants' 
involvement in money laundering. Currently, the Treasury in the UK is 
examining the possibility of introducing new legislation to combat money 
laundering - and this will require accountants to report money 
laundered 
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unsactions. The Treasury's decision is attributed to the accusations that 
ountants and other professionals are turning a blind eye to, or sometimes even 
: eng a role in, money laundering (Accountancy Age, 12/2/1998). 
KIO case has also revealed a practice witnessed in other scandals where 
. arxitors can be hired, fired and rehired either as auditors or investigators (even of 
mir own failed audit work). Coopers & Lybrand the auditor of GT and other 
isidiaries was appointed in 1990, only to be replaced in 1994 by Ernst & 
Young after GT and Torraspapel called for an extraordinary general meeting 
Mowing apparent dissatisfaction with C&L's work. KPMG was the auditor of 
Gros since 1989 but was replaced by Audiberia in 1994. KPMG-London was, 
ertheless, hired by KIO in 1993 to act as administrator, only then to be 
moved after its fees were deemed to be too high for the services being 
oovided. KPMG was also used by KIO in 1991 to place a value on the GT group 
; mod was used again in 1992 for such a valuation purpose, even though it was 
>pected that the group was in trouble and had been hit by major fraud. KPMG 
wes. also used by KIO to carry out a forensic audit of GT in conjunction with the 
lawn firm of Stephenson Harwood. Price Waterhouse was hired to investigate 
F. rcros and found 300 breaches of laws in the company - which again questioned 
the past work of auditors. 
8.3 General implications 
8.3.1 The Subjectivity of Accounting Valuations 
"One set of annual accounts for Grupo Torras carried out in 1989 doesn't 
tell the reader anything. " (Ricardo Bolufer, President of the Spanish 
Institute of Accountants and Auditors (ICAO), quoted in The European, 
17 February, 1995). 
"There weren't any losses when we left the group, you can check 
KPMG's report, which was prepared six months before the change of 
management. It estimated the value of the group at between $2.9bn and 
$4.4bn. However, the new management relies on a new report of KPMG 
that estimates the group's losses at $4bn. Why don't they ask KPMG 
about the previous report? Is it possible to believe these advisors who 
prepare contradictory reports. " (Javier De La Rosa, Quoted in Al-Hayat, 
January 28,1993, p. 12). 
Recent corporate collapses in Spain have raised concerns about the reliability of 
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accounting valuations. These concerns can be demonstrated in two incidents 
related to the collapse of Grupo Torras. In 31 July 1992, the new managers of 
KIO and GT ordered C&L to re-evaluate the group accounts based on market 
values rather than on book values and to remove extraordinary items. The 
revaluation reversed GT's reported profit of Pta3.9bn to a loss of Pta44.4bn. The 
result of Coopers & Lybrand revaluation of GT accounts was rejected by GT's 
management, who claimed that their lawyers had advised them against signing 
off these accounts to avoid giving the impression that they accepted them as 
representing a true and fair view of the company's behaviour (Financial Times, 
28/10/92, p. 26). Consequently, GT submitted the unsigned financial statements 
to the CNMV in late October 1992. Eight months later C&L presented their audit 
report on the 1991 accounts to the CNMV, in which they refused to give an 
opinion on the financial statements. C&L listed several factors for this refusal. 
The first factor related to GT's adoption of a substantial change in accounting 
criteria in preparing its accounts, which under Spanish law should have been 
charged to the profit and loss account. However, the managers of GT chose to 
charge the adjustments directly against reserves, claiming that it gave a more true 
and fair view. C&L also indicated that it had not been possible for them to 
evaluate the outcome and financial effect of a number of different transactions, 
especially in terms of the contingencies mentioned in the financial statements. 
They also had not been able to obtain a written confirmation of GT's group 
liabilities. Other uncertainties included Ercros' filing for suspension of payments 
and its effect on GT and CNMV's investigation of GT and another subsidiary. 
De la Rosa's above cited point concerning the massive disparity in KPMG's 
valuations of GT (from between $2.9 - 4.4bn (see Table 8.5) in 1991 to a 
negative value of $4bn in late 1992) also raises serious questions about 
accounting valuation. KPMG defended its actions on the grounds that the 
December 1991 valuation was based on figures presented by Torras' former 
managers. KPMG stated that it had been concerned that these figures might be 
over-optimistic but felt that it was not obliged to report such concerns to CNMV 
as GT had been transformed into a private company by KIO. The two different 
evaluations were also carried out under two different management teams at KIO. 
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In the 1991 evaluations, KIO was under the control of the former managers of 
KIO/GT - with a close source to KIO claiming in interview that KPMG 
during 
that year had been granted a very huge computing consulting assignment and 
might not have been that willing to upset KIO's former managers or had been 
heavily restricted by the former managers'. 
Table 8.5 - KPMG's evaluations of GT in Late 1991 
Possible Values Basis I Basis 2 
Torraspapel 1.7 1 
Ebro 1.2 1 
Ercros 0.5 0 
Prima 0.4 0.4 
Services 0.3 0.3 
Bonds & Loans 0.6 0.6 
Other 0.3 0.2 
5 3.5 
Liabilities : Bonds and Loans 0.6 0.6 
4.4 2.9 
Cost 
Liabilities - Bank Loans I 1 
KIO Debt 0.7 0.7 
KIO Equity 2.7 2.7 
4.4 4.4 
Such dramatic changes in valuation were not just limited to GT but rather seems 
to have been something of a malaise in Spanish accounting at the time, with 
examples being found in other notable corporate scandals. The near collapse of 
Banesto in December 1993 questioned the nature of accounting valuation, with a 
reported difference in valuation of about £650m between that of the Bank of 
Spain and that of Banesto's biggest investor J. P. Morgan, the American 
investment bank (for more details see Garcia Benau et al, 1999). Similarly in late 
1994, Grand Tibidabo, the company that was chaired by de la Rosa, revised its 
accounts transforming a Ptal 6m profit to a Ptal l bn loss. Juan Luis Marchini, 
Chairman of the Confederaciön Espanola de Auditores later claimed that the 
controversy created by these scandals had made Spanish companies "more 
rigorous" in preparing their financial statements (The European, 8/5/1997). 
1 This claim couldn't be pursued as both KPMG and KIA refused to discuss any issue relating to 
217 
(Valid AlHusaini Chapter 8 
However, Marchini's claims are undermined by the latest controversy over the 
accounts of Dragados y Construcciones, Spain's second largest contractor, where 
Arthur Anderson publicly opposed the company management over its treatment 
of redundancy provision as reserves rather than as a profit and loss item. The 
dispute between the auditors and the management was put to the shareholders for 
a decision (the management's method was legally acceptable but did not comply 
with Spanish accounting standards) - the management's method giving 
Pts8.7bn 
higher profits (for details see The European, 8/5/1997). 
The revision of accounts with accounting methods showing dramatically different 
results seriously undermines confidence in accounting. In a Spanish context, the 
above problems strengthen previous empirical research claims by Blake and 
Amat (1996) that creative accounting in Spain was generating problems for 
auditors, as it had been in the UK. Blake and Amat argued that their research 
undermined the widespread claim that the inflexible Continental Europe form of 
accounting regulation (adopted by Spain) was less susceptible to abuse than the 
Anglo-American context. 
8.3.2 Auditor Independence 
"a climate of euphoria reigned (in Spain during the 1980s), foreign money 
was pouring into the country. Groups such as Torras or Banesto wielded 
great power and prestige, and auditors were very anxious to have them as 
their clients. " (Spanish senior auditor quoted in Corporate Accounting 
International, May 1995). 
The role of KPMG in auditing KIO, which does not publish any financial 
information, resembled that of an internal auditor reporting to corporate 
management. Access to KPMG's audit report was limited to just a few people at 
KIA/KIO, the board and executive committee of KIA, and the Audit Bureau. 
This type of environment raise some doubts about the role of KPMG as an 
external auditor, especially given the secrecy of its audit reports and its inability 
to access all the information about KIO's operations. The scepticism about the 
independence of KPMG was highlighted in the resignation letter of KIO's 
executive committee. The fact that KPMG was not allowed either to audit the 
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$1.9bn account or investigate GT accounts in 1990 did not lead to KPMG's 
resignation. The concern about the role of KPMG can be seen in the way they 
changed their evaluation of GT within one year under two different management 
teams at GT. They prepared their reports based on information given to them by 
GT managers without making their concerns known publicly, giving the 
impression that GT was in a sound position. The attitude of KPMG towards the 
report prepared by Coopers & Lybrand indicates that it was indifferent to the 
creative accounting being pursued by KIO. The position of KPMG might have 
been different if KIO was publishing financial statements but it seems KIO's 
secrecy doctrine made the accountancy firm confident that even if something 
went wrong, KIO/KIA would avoid publicity. 
The Audit Bureau seemed to lose its independence when the Kuwaiti Parliament 
was dissolved between 1986-1992. During that period, the Bureau was under the 
control of government rather the parliament, which clearly limited its capacity to 
highlight or criticise mismanagement. KIO restricted the Bureau's access to 
information about its operations and, indeed, when the Bureau was informed of 
problems it was not able to act as KIO was under the control of a member of the 
Kuwaiti ruling family, who in turn had the backing of the Finance minister 
(another member of the ruling family). 
The huge scale of KIO's investment portfolio and its reputation made prestigious 
organisations proud to be associated and work for KIO. This was evident in 
KPMG's relationship with KIO before the collapse of GT. The motivation behind 
KPMG's change of heart seems to have had less to do with the collapse of GT and 
more to do with the allegations that KIO unlawfully avoided paying £600m in 
taxes. This issue was related to KIO's controversial acquisition of 22% of BP, 
then Britain's biggest corporation. The British government decision's for KIO to 
divest half of its stake led to BP buying back its shares from KIO, in turn enabling 
KIO to give a tax credit of £458m to the Kuwaiti office because of its tax 
exemption status. During an investigation into the affair by the Kuwaiti 
parliament's Financial and Economical Affairs Committee, Fouad Jaffar in 
London and Javier de la Rosa in Madrid were asked to clarify some of the 
mysteries that surrounded KIO's Spanish investments. Both men threatened the 
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committee that if KIO chose to go ahead with the court cases against them, new 
revelations of illegal transactions would surface and cost KIO a great deal of 
problems. They apparently referred directly to the issue of BP claiming that these 
stakes were bought for Kuwait Petroleum Corporations (KPC), the country's oil 
holding company, to avoid paying taxes on the investments as KPC was not 
exempted from taxes like KIO. In September 1993, these claims appeared on the 
front page of the Financial Times, where it was alleged that KPC had saved 
£600m through the investment strategy of KIO. The issue raised uproar in Britain 
claiming that the Inland Revenue had lost £600m in tax revenues. American 
authorities also investigated these allegations as BP was listed in the New York 
Stock Exchange and if KPC was the real holder of BP, it had broken the 
regulations of the exchange concerning the identity of ownership. It was reported 
that KPMG was negotiating, on behalf of KIO, with the Inland Revenue for a 
settlement of £402m to resolve the issue (The Independent on Sunday, 23/1/94, 
p. 2). However, no public action concerning the BP question has been revealed by 
either the Kuwaiti or British authorities and KIO sold 3% of its 9.3% stake at BP 
for $2bn in May 1997. 
In the BP affair, KPMG appeared to depict itself as not the full auditor of KIO, 
possibly so that it could claim that it did not know if KIO had bought the stake for 
KPC or not. This may also explain why KPMG argued that it was not the full 
auditor of KIO but rather auditor of the two main accounts, namely the General 
Reserve Account and Reserve Fund for Future Generations Account. While these 
two funds represented the main sources for funds for KIO, they did not include 
funds that KIO would occasionally invest on behalf of other organisations (e. g. 
KPC). The statement by KPMG's spokesman sought to restrict its involvement 
with KIO to these two funds to emphasise that it was not auditing transactions 
such as those of KPC and therefore avoid any possible legal action related to the 
BP affair. That said, KPMG's claim still stands in contrast to statements by KIA 
and other government officials that KPMG was (and still is) the external auditor 
ofKIO. 
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8.3.3 Fraud Detection 
".... the probability appears to me to be that most, if not all, of the 
forgeries were the work of Mr de la Rosa, undertaken with a view to 
reassuring or, after the event, persuading accountants, auditors and others 
that all was in order in relation to the Croesus, Oakthorn and Pincinco 
operations. "( Grupo Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah, 1999, p. 109). 
".... Mr Coll believed that the transactions as a whole, and the 
improprieties in which he involved himself in relation to them, related to 
movements of money being made in the commercial best interests of his 
clients. The cultural context in which he was operating tolerated evasion 
of exchange control and tax and the preparation of false accounting 
documentation for such purposes. Mr Coll devoted his considerable 
abilities to the enthusiastic gulling of professionals to whose ranks and 
standards he was supposed to adhere. He did not realise that he too was 
being gulled. " ( Grupo Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah, 1999, p. 202). 
The funds (approx. $500m) that were illegally channelled from KIO/GT to 
unknown destinations raise fundamental questions about the role of auditing. 
The initial belief is that it was not surprising for these funds to disappear given 
the chaos that accompanied the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, this belief is 
far from the truth as these funds were first transferred in 1988 (two years before 
the occupation) and continued to be transferred until mid-1992 (more than one 
year after the liberation of Kuwait). Some of the transactions used to siphon 
funds from KIO drew the attention of Touche Ross, THL's auditor in 1990, who 
raised the issue with KIO, GT's auditor in Spain. However, forged 
documentation was presented to Touche Ross. The chairman of KIO blocked 
crucial information and the chief financial officer was reluctant to act apparently 
fearing that confirmation with the chairman would jeopardise his job (Grupo 
Torras S. A. v. Al-Sabah, 1999, p. 36). Such power and collusion illustrates a real 
difficulty for auditors seeking to detect senior management fraud. Likewise, the 
use of shell companies and external accounts also played a major role in 
complicating the fraud and making it more difficult to detect (especially when 
these schemes were designed and implemented by professional accountants). 
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8.3.4 Evidence Collection Process 
The case raises serious questions about audit evidence collection processes and 
methodologies. ICAC found that GT's auditors (Coopers & Lybrand) had been 
wrong to accept GT's provisions as sufficient. C&L claimed in defence that GT 
was being supported by KIO, but ICAC did not find any evidence of such support 
in C&L's working papers. C&L referred to a letter dated March 3 1992, but this 
was eight months after issuing the financial statements. More seriously C&L 
found information that contradicted what was reported in GT's accounts but 
neither asked GT to amend its accounts nor referred to it in its audit report. 
KPMG's reliance on information and reports prepared by the management of GT 
failed to take into account the questionable history of Javier de la Rosa, a major 
player in the KIO scandal. Such a failure is not unique to the KIO case, with 
several scandals around the world revealing the problems that dominant chief 
executives (with questionable personal histories) can cause for auditors (e. g. 
Robert Maxwell in the Mirror Group scandal and Mario Conde in the Banesto 
case). Such questionable histories of managers should make auditors more 
concerned and more questioning of what managers provide as evidence. The 
issue of amiguismo discussed in the previous chapter, likewise, should also make 
auditors more stringent in terms of relying on evidence - given the likelihood that 
`friends' managing corporate operations might co-operate to provide fake 
documentation and evidence. 
8.3.5 Disciplinary Proceedings 
The disciplinary actions against audit firms involved in the KIO case (and others 
in Spain) gives some assurance to the investing public - and possibly more than 
has been evident in recent years in Anglo-American countries. ICAC swiftly 
investigated claims of misconduct by audit firms - the investigation of C&L's 
audit of GT coming only three months after GT had filed for receivership. In 
contrast, the UK disciplinary investigations have taken much longer. A recent 
example is the Mirror Group case, where C&L (unsuccessfully) sought in 1995 to 
get the courts to stop the Joint Disciplinary Scheme's (JDS) inquiry into the firm 
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- claiming it would be prejudicial to civil or criminal actions against the 
firm in 
relation to their audit of Maxwell Group's pension funds. The JDS eventually 
arrived at a decision in November, 1998, over 7 years after the outbreak of the 
scandal. This long period for disciplinary process has been held to undermine 
public confidence in the profession and the effectiveness of disciplinary 
proceedings (for details see FT, 20/8/1998). Another recent example can be seen 
in the controversy over C&L's role as joint administrator of the bankrupt group 
Polly Peck in the UK. The controversy stemmed from that fact that C&L had 
failed to declare its extensive links with Polly Peck and its chairman Asil Nadir. 
Accordingly, Mitchell et al (1993) wrote extensively (a total of 12 letters between 
March 1991 and April 1992) to the Minister of Corporate Affairs and the ICAEW 
requesting an investigation of C&L. The ICAEW's disciplinary hearings 
eventually found two of C&L auditors guilty of breaching ethical guidelines and 
they were each fined £1000. Findings of the disciplinary hearings, however, 
were kept secret (for more details see Mitchell et al, 1993). The experience of 
Mitchell et al (1993) has questioned the appropriateness of a self-regulatory 
system in disciplining its members, especially those belonging to the Big Six 
firms (whose members often reside over the disciplinary process). Rollins and 
Bremser's (1997) study of SEC enforcement against auditors added to such 
questioning, suggesting that the auditor's reputation did influence actions against 
auditors. They found that the SEC generally took less severe actions against Big 
Six auditors compared to other auditors. 
In their analysis of disciplinary proceedings of public accounting firms in three 
different contexts (USA, UK, Germany), Baker and Hayes (1998) argued that 
disciplinary practices had been set in era of smaller practice and were ineffective 
in the face of the growing multinational practices of accounting firms. Rollins 
and Bremser (1997) have also revealed that the SEC's targets for investigations 
were higher than it could actually pursue given the high cost and publicity 
surrounding its investigations. Such thoughts have given rise to talk of the need 
for an international regulator of the multinational firms, especially when the firms 
are able to restrict national regulatory investigations by arguing that their 
international offices/partnerships fall outside the scope of such investigations (as 
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in the case of BCCI). 
8.3.6 Auditors' Immunity to Scandals 
The Spanish accounting profession has claimed that ICAC's sanctions were 
damaging the reputation of audit firms. Yet these claims are questionable when 
considering the empirical findings of Garcia Benau et al's (1998) study of the 
images that Spanish financial directors held of their audit firms. This study 
revealed that directors differentiated between the image of Big Six and Non-Big 
Six firms based on the firm's geographical or client base rather than on technical 
aspects relating to the conduct of audit. Moreover, the constant growth of Big 
Six audit firms in Spain has not been hindered in recent years (see IAB, 8/11/93, 
27/11/95,31/10/96,31/10/97). This suggests no significant influence of the 
recent corporate collapses and subsequent sanctions on the reputation of the Big 
Six firms. A clear example of such immunity can be demonstrated with C&L, the 
main auditor in the KIO case, where a string of corporate collapses around the 
world led to C&L being entangled in a web of litigation over allegations of 
substandard work (for example see Table 8.6). However, such scandals did not 
prevent C&L from maintaining its position as the fourth largest firm in the world, 
with annual growth rate of revenues of 12.7% in 1995 and of 9.7% in 1996 (IAB, 
21/12/95, p. 7,13/12/96, p. 8). C&L in Spain also maintained this fourth position 
with a constant growth rate during the period 1993-1997. Furthermore, Moizer's 
(1998) study illustrated that many of the recent controversial corporate scandals 
in the UK did not affect corporation satisfaction with auditors, from the evidence 
of ratings given in 1987 and 1996 (also see, Corporate Accountant, 20/8/97). All 
these findings re-emphasise the argument that auditors are relatively immune to 
scandals and questions auditors' claims that these scandals are negatively 
affecting the reputation of audit firms. 
"It is important to have an internationally recognised accounting firm to 
control the investments. Although I greatly respect the role of the Audit 
Bureau, investments need an advanced technical expert to attest" (Jasem 
AlSaquar, Kuwait MP speaking to the parliament on protecting Kuwait's 
investments, Al-Qabas, 2/12/92, p10). 
"It not his (the auditor) duty to detect fraud and improprieties. His main 
task is restricted to the financial statements and that is a known 
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convention and has generally accepted principles and guidelines" 
(Waleed Al-Oasami, senior partner of Ernest & Young, quoted in Al- 
Qabas, 3/2/93). 
In December 1992, the role of international firms in auditing and controlling 
Kuwait's foreign investments was raised in Kuwait's parliament as a solution to 
safeguarding Kuwait's foreign investments. Members felt that these firms could 
provide the required protection against fraud for Kuwait's public capital. 
Nevertheless, such calls were in contradiction with the claims of the accounting 
firms in Kuwait, especially, the Big Six firms, that their job was not to detect a 
fraud. Seven months after advocating the use of Big Six firms to help control 
Kuwait's foreign investments, a report by a parliamentary committee was 
criticising one of these firms. In June 1993, the parliamentary committee's 
report on KIO's Spanish investments suggested that KPMG had failed to carry 
out the job it was hired to do (FEAC, 1993b). The committee also recommended 
investigation of the role of auditing firms in the collapse of GT but no such 
investigation was undertaken. Further, despite ICAC's investigation of C&L and 
the imposition of sanctions on the firm, there were no parliamentary debates 
about the role of international auditors in controlling KIO's investments. 
Apparently there was no change in the status of the big six firms regarding their 
suitability for auditing KIA or KIO, other than KIA's managing director claims 
that KPMG only started to undertake full audits in 1992. Similarly, the 
revelations of fraud and misappropriations of funds in the Kuwait Oil Tankers 
Corporation (KOTC), a subsidiary of KPC, did not lead to any debates or 
investigations about the role of auditors. Arthur Anderson-Kuwait had a 
monopoly over the audit work of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) and 
its subsidiaries including KOTC. The KOTC scandal did make KPC transfer the 
audit of some of its subsidiaries away from Arthur Andersen - but these were 
simply passed to other Big Six firms in Kuwait. 
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8.4 Implications for Spain and Kuwait 
The previous section discussed some of the general implications of the KIO 
scandal with regard to reputational effects for audit firms. This section examines 
the aftermath of the case (and the responses to it) in more detail in both Spain and 
Kuwait. 
8.4.1 Development of Auditing in Spain in the Aftermath of GT collapse 
There was a jubilant feeling in Spain following the enactment of the Audit Law 
in 1988 -a belief that financial reporting will be more transparent and a 
hope that 
auditing will bring accounting and reporting standards to a higher level. In the 
early 1990's, the audit expectations gap, a widespread notion in Anglo-American 
countries, was largely unheard of in Spain. A few years later it is very widely 
promoted by the Spanish profession as the culprit behind the ills and negative 
publicity attached to the profession. It seems that much of the change in opinion 
is attributed to the polemical financial scandals that have dominated the Spanish 
business environment in recent years. However, it has to be said that these 
financial scandals (despite the sanctioning by ICAO) did not generate the same 
level of publicity and media attention on auditing as is usually the case in Anglo- 
American countries. Most of the press coverage focused on the role of managers 
in the collapse of these corporations. 
Spanish supervisory organisations acted to address some of the practices that 
seemed to be abundant in the financial scandals. ICAC's fining of C&L 
represented the beginning of such sanctions for Big Six audit firms involved in the 
audit of the recently collapsed organisations (See Table 8.7) - indeed, prior to 
these sanctions, ICAC had only sanctioned small audit firms. 
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Table 8.7 - Major Sanctions imposed by ICAC on the Big Six Accounting 
Firms 
Auditing Firm Client ICAC Decision 
Coopers & Lybrand Grupo Torras Fined Pts37m 
Price Waterhouse Ebro Agricolas Fined Pts53m 
Ernst & Young IGS-PSV Fined Pts71 m 
Price Waterhouse Banesto Fined Pts96m 
Arthur Anderson La Corporacidn Banesto Fined Pts 112m 
Arthur Anderson BEF Issued warning 
Ernst & Young Safei-Sanedi Issued warning 
Ernst & Young AVA Fined Pts40rn 
Source: BOICAC, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, El-Pais, 3/8/95, p. 27, IAB, 23/4/96, p. 2, El-Mundo, 
15/5/99). 
The scandals also had an effect on the other supervisory bodies in Spain. The 
CNMV, Spain's securities market commission, tightened its investigation of 
allegations of irregularities, de-listing 123 out of 763 companies listed in 1993. 
The CNMV's fines rose from Ptsl. 79bn in 1993 to Pts4.36bn in 1994. While 
1994 was seen as a record year for initiating actions by the commission, it 
managed to triple its actions to over 348 in 1995 (for details see FT, 31/3/95, 
p. 28). The CNMV's actions emphasise the widespread failure to declare 
significant share acquisitions, something very evident in the GT case. 
In a move that emulated other countries in the European Union, the CNMV has 
sought to develop a code of best practice in corporate governance, led by the calls 
of its chairman, Juan Fernandez Armesto. Unlike previous regulations in Spain, 
the code that has been issued is voluntary, although the CNMV will require listed 
companies to disclose the extent of their compliance with these 
recommendations. The new conservative government's belief in less state 
intervention might be the reason behind the voluntary nature of the code as it 
trusts that the market will provide an efficient control mechanism. Some auditors 
disagree with the voluntary nature of the code, claiming that deficiencies should 
be corrected through legislative change while others see it as public relations 
exercise by the government to keep foreign investors interested in its privatisation 
programme (European Accounting Bulletin, 18/3/97). The committee's 
recommendations, based on the UK's Cadbury report, call for smaller company 
boards, comprising a larger degree of independent non-executive directors who 
would also be responsible for monitoring the work of internal auditors (FT, 
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12/3/98, p. 2). 
The above actions were geared towards matters of the public interest and the 
protection of shareholders. However, the same cannot really be concluded from 
the actions of the Spanish accounting profession. The Spanish profession's 
response in the aftermath of a string of financial scandals has seemed to be 
primarily concerned with professional self interest rather that of public interest. 
The profession's response has been pointed in two main directions. First, it has 
used the familiar tactic of `blaming the victim', namely promoting the notion of 
an education gap on the part of users of audited financial statements as the major 
reason behind the problems haunting the profession. Secondly, it has lobbied for 
changes in regulation that seem of more direct benefit to the profession than the 
public. These actions include rejecting ICAC's sanctioning powers and calling 
for self- regulation, the abolition of compulsory auditor rotation and launching a 
campaign to limit auditors' liability. Each of these issues is now explored in 
turn. 
8.4.1.1 An Expectations Gap 
"The auditors have been subjected to extraordinarily severe judgements 
in large part owing to the fact that their role is not well understood" (J. 
Alvarez, Coopers and Lybrand). 
The aftermath of corporate failures in Anglo-American countries often sees 
debates about the failure of audit firms in detecting and reporting problems in 
these collapsed corporations. The familiar response of the audit profession is to 
argue that that the function of auditing is misunderstood. Not surprisingly, the 
Spanish accounting profession played the audit expectation card in response to 
criticism of the audit function arising from the collapse of GT and other 
corporations in Spain. Members of the profession were making statements such 
that "the auditor is not a god". Audit failures have been portrayed as "one offs" 
and calls made for appropriate blame to be placed on the role of corporate 
managers. 
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Ironically, the notion of an education gap can be dismissed when one considers 
the findings of ICAC's sanctioning report in the GT case. Its criticisms of 
auditors related to non-compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) prescribed by the Audit Law and ICAC's Technical 
Procedures and regulations set by the Reformulated Text on Company Law - and 
not to failures in the detection of fraud. A clear example can be seen in the GT 
case where the group did not comply with the prudence concept in setting loss 
provisions for Phoenix Bonds. Despite the fact that the prudence convention has 
priority over other conventions in the Spanish Plan General de Contabilidad 
(moulded on the European Fourth Directive - Blake and Amat, 1993), C&L 
did 
not qualify its reports on GT's non-compliance with such a convention. In short, 
there were no unreasonable expectations of auditors in ICAC's actions but rather 
it was addressing issues very much at core of the audit function. This observation 
strengthens the. argument that auditors use the expectations gap as a way of 
screening off their failure and promising improvement and seeking means to 
close the gap (for more discussion, see Power, 1994). 
8.4.1.2 Rejecting ICAC and Calling for Self Regulation 
In mid-1992, prior to the outbreak of the GT and other scandals in Spain, ICAC 
started to impose fines on small audit firms for substandard work. The big audit 
firms did not object to ICAC's sanctions as they saw them as essential to protect 
the profession's image. ICAC's subsequent sanctions against the Big Six firms, 
however, was not seen by them as helping to improve the image of the profession. 
The former head of ICAC, Ricardo Bolufer - who imposed fines on 30 different 
accounting firms - clearly disagreed with their views. He said "the challenge we 
faced in 1990 was to switch this market from total opacity to absolute 
transparency. We have a big hill still to climb" (quoted in European, 17/2/95). 
Some of the Spanish press, when it commented on ICAC's role, saw the sanctions 
as a much needed action to counter negative images resulting from the financial 
scandals (e. g. E1-Pais, 9/2/94, p. 19). 
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The Big Six accounting firms in their heavy criticism of ICAC's disciplinary 
process argued that it is not the job of administrative employees to investigate the 
matters of professionals. They denounced the technical credibility of ICAC and 
its right to impose sanctions. Consequently, they called for restrictions in 
ICAC's powers or its outright abolition. REA and ICJCE threatened that if ICAC 
fines audit firms and publishes the findings, which an appeal court subsequently 
overturned, then the audit firms would sue ICAC. They claimed that publicising 
the fines while they were under appeal was damaging to the firms' reputations 
(Expansion, 21/2/95, p. 35). The president of REA wrote to the Justice Ministry 
requesting that ICAC should no longer be able to impose sanctions - claiming 
that "only the courts should impose sanctions. He also requested that the 
government make it compulsory for managers of companies to acquire civil 
responsibility insurance (Expansion, 6/10/95, p. 35). The professional bodies also 
called for restricting ICAC's role to setting accounting standards while they take 
over the disciplinary powers (Expansion, 17-19/10/96). This argument would 
give the auditors control over the sanction process, while keeping the standard 
setting with ICAC - potentially establishing a situation where the profession 
would not be investigated vigorously in cases of possible failure and allowing 
ICAC to be blamed for setting inappropriate work standards. Ricardo Bolufer 
disagreed with the claims of the profession: 
"They want everything without having to answer for it, it could take up to 
ten years for a case to work its way through the courts, which is just what 
the firms would like. But ICAC is obliged to announce the sanctions as 
soon as they have been confirmed by the Finance Ministry. The law does 
not allow us to wait because it holds that the injured parties should be able 
to take rapid action against all the parties responsible for their losses" 
(Quoted in European Accountant, February 1996, p. 10). 
The profession ended up accusing Bolufer of having a vendetta against auditors. 
When the conservative Partido Popular replaced the socialist party as the 
government in 1996, Bolufer was replaced by Antonio Gomez Ciria. The new 
president of ICAC soon made a decision to stop publishing the detailed reasons 
for sanctions and agreed to publish only the name of the audit firm and the amount 
of the sanction (Expansion, 17/1/97, p. 44). 
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Garcia Benau and Barbadillo (1996) saw the profession's ability to gain self- 
regulatory status as resting on its capacity to respond to the expectations gap. 
However, the change in the governing party in Spain in 1996 made the audit 
profession's dream for self regulation become much closer to reality - with the 
Partido Popular indicating that it would be willing to revise the law if the three 
accounting professional bodies (ICJCE, REA, RTM) in Spain were united. In a 
survey conducted by ICJCE, 87% of accountants saw a need for reforming the 
audit law while over 87% and 85% wanted the profession to regulate technical 
aspects of audit work and to be in charge of professional discipline ethics (for 
more details see European Accounting Bulletin, 14/4/1997, p. ll). The profession 
wanted less restriction on incompatibility rules, a clearer definition of both 
auditor's duties and liabilities and greater respect for professional secrecy (The 
Accountant, December 1996, p. 10). However, the inability of the Spanish 
professional bodies to agree on even the simplest decision (i. e. unified day for 
holding professional examination) made PP declare that they were no longer 
considering the amendment of the law as a priority (Corporate Accountant, June 
1997, p. V). 
Such calls for self-regulation seem strange given the rise of financial scandals in 
Spain in recent years. With the increasing saturation of the audit market in Spain, 
the subsequent competition for the consulting market to secure further growth 
and international concerns with the pressures to `low-ball' audit fees, it seems 
that such calls are not a suitable way of ensuring audit quality. Furthermore, calls 
for self regulation in Spain stand in contrast to calls in the UK for its abolition 
and the increasing attention given to the contradictions in the role of professional 
bodies as a promoter of members' interests and a protector of the public interest 
(Mitchell et al, 1993). 
The profession's lobbying has also managed to secure an amendment of the 
Spanish company law in relation to mandatory auditor rotation. Now auditors do 
not need to rotate automatically after a tenure of nine years - but can continue to 
be appointed annually. This was a somewhat surprising concession for the 
profession and what it will achieve in terms of improved audit quality has to be 
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doubted. After all, in the KIO case, many auditors had served fairly short periods 
of tenure and yet they had struggled to find fraud and error. 
8.4.1.3 Auditor Liability 
The scandals in Spain and the sanctioning exercises of ICAC eventually led to 
calls for change in the current audit liability environment. The Spanish auditors 
were not concerned about their unlimited liability and their civil liabilities to third 
parties when the audit law of 1988 was drafted - the debate prevailing at that time 
did not pay much attention to this issue (see Garcia Benau et al 1993). Legal 
cases against auditors were unheard of in Spain before the recent financial 
scandals. However, corporate collapses like GT, Banesto and PSV have led to 
the filing of lawsuits against the auditors but no formal judgements have been 
issued against them in favour of shareholders or third parties. The audit 
profession is vigorously calling for change in the current legal environment 
against auditors. The auditors' arguments for limiting liability makes reference 
to the claim that auditors are being targeted in cases of corporate collapse because 
they are seen as having deep pockets. They have also cited the famous Caparo 
case in the UK in seeking to advance the arguments for restricting liability to 
third parties. In its 1997 white paper, ICJCE outlined the profession's demands 
in relation to audit liability. These included defining auditor's responsibilities to 
third parties, substituting unlimited auditor responsibility for a proportional based 
system on the damage caused by any negligent audit work and setting a 
maximum period outside of which it would not be possible to file a claim against 
the auditor (ICJCE, 1997). 
This situation is unique in comparison to that of other countries (i. e. UK, USA, 
Canada, Australia) where legal liability is highly controversial (given the number 
of legal cases filed against auditors) and many high claims have been paid out. 
The Spanish profession seems to be preparing for a situation that does not exist at 
the time being - they want to limit liability before the courts require auditors to 
compensate other parties. As such, the Spanish profession's attitude might be 
233 
Walid AiHusaini Chapter 8 
seen as a preventive measure. It could also be seen as keeping up with the 
international fashion for limiting auditor's liability in many countries around the 
globe. 
8.4.1.4 The Influence of the International Accounting Firms/Big Six on the Spanish 
Audit Environment 
All the strategies pursued by the profession serve to support the main theme in 
this thesis' literature review (see chapter 2) that the profession in times of crisis 
tends to disclaim responsibility, protecting its self-interest rather than explicitly 
serving the public interest. Further, the apparent constant state of crisis in 
auditing has not prevented it from growing, both in the provision of auditing 
services (in developing nations) and through the provision of other services to 
audit clients, i. e. management consulting and lately legal services. The same 
phenomenon is evident in the case of Spanish accounting profession. Despite the 
failure of the major accounting firms to highlight the major problems in their 
audit clients accounts before they collapsed and being sanctioned by the national 
regulator, the profession (especially its large firm members) flourished during the 
first half of the 1990s. It adopted various strategies to deflect attention and 
discussion on cases of audit failure, notably attacking ICAC for its sanctioning 
regime and the damage being caused to the profession's image. Interestingly, the 
profession has not viewed the sanctioning powers of ICAC as having a 
potentially beneficial effect for the profession as whole in terms of depicting an 
image of efficient and effective professional regulation. 
In the latter part of the 1990's, the Spanish audit market has become more 
competitive. Revenue growth declined not because of a downgrading in 
professional image, but more because of a saturation point being reached in the 
audit market (with the number of new firms requiring audits declining). The 
enactment of new change in Spain's audit legislation (Real Decreto 572/1997) 
restricted the number of companies that statutorily audited to those with 
minimum turnover and net asset levels increasing by over 70. Such 
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developments have encouraged audit firms to expand their consulting work. 
Another recent trend in Spain has seen the Big Six firms develop in terms of the 
provision of legal services. In early 1997, Arthur Anderson merged it legal 
division with Spain's second largest law firm, J. & A. Garrigues. In 1997, legal 
consultancy was the fastest growing activity for the top 30 Spanish professional 
services firms. Revenue from auditing increased by 1.2%. The Big Six's revenue 
from legal services rose by 17.37% and consultancy by 12.1% (see Table 8.8). 
Now legal consultancy is Price Waterhouse's business focal point in Spain, 
accounting for 45% of total revenue (Expansion, 6/2/98). 
Tah1 99-T, aarlinv nrnvirlarc of T. Pcral RPrvirPC in gnain in 1 996 
Name of Firm Revenues 
J&A Garrigues Andersen y Cia, Pts 9.836 billion 
Cuatrecasas Abogados Pts 4.6 billion 
Uria & Menendez Pts 3.436 billion 
Gomez Acebo & Pombo Pts 2.76 
Ernst & Young Pts 2.328 billion 
Price Waterhouse Pts 2.325 billion 
Clifford Chance Pts 1.75 billion 
Lusfinder Pts 1.75 billion 
Coopers & Lybrand FL Pts 1.71 billion 
KPMG JT Pts 1.36 billion 
Baker & Mc Kenzie Pts 1.3 billion 
Source: Expansion, 6/2/98 
In terms of leading public representatives, the Spanish accounting profession 
increasingly appears to be dominated by the large international firms. Presidents 
of the two main institutes are routinely partners in Big Six firms, as are 
spokespeople on a range of issues in the financial press. Not surprisingly, the 
strategic responses of the Spanish accounting profession in the aftermath of 
recent corporate collapses has increasingly assumed an international 
flavour/spirit. The attribution of audit failure to unreasonable expectations by the 
public, the preference for self-regulation, the rejection of auditor rotation and the 
campaign to limit liability are all indications of such a pattern of development. 
Increasingly, it can be argued that debates and changes in the audit environment 
in Spain reflect rather more closely the changing global strategies and campaigns 
of the Big Six firms than they do changes in the Spanish auditing environment. 
The situation in Kuwait, however, appears somewhat different. 
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8.4.2 Development of Auditing in Kuwait in the Aftermath of GT's 
Collapse 
In Kuwait, unusually, the collapse of KIO's Spanish investments and other major 
scandals and failures of Kuwaiti corporations did not advance much, if any, 
debate about the role of external auditors. Instead, the recent scandals focused 
attention more on the role of management and its failure to adhere to laws and 
regulations. The government played a very limited role in this period with 
respect to auditing, proposing only an amendment to the Audit Law that would 
have scrapped the requirement for auditors to pass an examination before gaining 
the right to practise auditing in Kuwait. The profession in Kuwait did not embark 
on any major defensive campaign since there was not much criticism of the role 
of auditors in the recent scandals. Ironically, a proposal advanced by the KAAA, 
which called for expanding auditors' joint liability to third parties seemed to be a 
case of the profession prioritising matters of public interest rather than self 
interest. Accordingly, this section will discuss the development of external 
auditing in Kuwait after the KIO collapse, considering in particular the expanding 
role of the Audit Bureau. 
8.4.2.1 Expanding the Role of the Audit Bureau under the Auspices of the 
Parliament 
"Performance and accountability are only the beginning of a new 
discipline we are going to have to inject into our school system.... " (Hasan 
Al-Ebraheem, quoted in Time, 24/12/90, p. 32) 
During the occupation of Kuwait and after the liberation, claims (such as the 
above) sought to shape a new accountability process. However, promises for 
more accountability had gradually faded by the time GT's problems surfaced in 
mid-1992. This crisis triggered much more detailed discussion about the absence 
of control and accountability in Kuwait's organisations and corporations. 
Accordingly, the issue of KIO's Spanish investments became a hot topic in the 
parliamentary election campaigns that took place in October 1992 (and saw 
Kuwait's return to democracy after a six-year suspension). 
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"The opposition, of course, had a totally different prospective, which, 
over the last four decades, put it in constant conflict with the Sabahs. It 
sought to embarrass the ruling family at every opportunity and wanted 
total Sabah adherence to the constitution as well as accountability to the 
parliament. To achieve this, the opposition sought at every turn to 
undermine the Sabah's legitimacy and expose them to criticism among 
the wider population. In this zero-sum game, anything that enhanced the 
government's position was bad for the opposition". (Ghabra, 1994, p. 
104) 
"... KIO representatives told the El Pais newspaper that Torras companies 
were in serious trouble and required $3bn to put them on a sound financial 
footing. 
... 
for KIO to appear in the Spanish press yesterday running down 
the quality of its investments and stating that some, such as Prima, are on 
the verge of collapse is an unusual way of generating confidence.... Grupo 
Torras probably does not need the $3bn to survive but the blacker the 
empire created by the old pro-Sabah management is painted and the 
bigger the crises in Spain appears, the more effective a political weapon 
Torras may become in the run up to the elections (in Kuwait). " 
(Comments by Peter Bruce of the Financial Times, 31/7/92) 
Arguments such as the above emphasise the exploitation of the collapse of KIO's 
Spanish investments and other scandals to secure the adherence of the 
government and members of the ruling family to some kind of accountability 
process. However, the magnitude of the scandals and funds involved made it 
more than a legitimate goal for the new parliament to assert more control over 
governmental organisations and to make members of elite families in Kuwait 
(including members of the ruling family) accountable for their actions. The 
parliament's order for the Audit Bureau to examine KIO's investments was the 
parliament's first step towards making institutions like KIA and KIO 
accountable. It was the first time that the Audit Bureau was allowed to visit KIO, 
examine its books and allowed to publish its audit report in the press. Six months 
later, the parliament also instructed the Bureau to examine KIA's investments. 
The parliament expanded the role of the Audit Bureau in the process of auditing 
and accountability in Kuwait's public organisations and corporations. The 
enactment of the Protection of Public Capital Law required all institutions and 
companies which are at least 25% owned by the government to report changes in 
their investments to the Audit Bureau within 10 days of the transaction. In 
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addition, the status of every investment made by a governmentally owned 
institution which exceeds KD100,000 ($330,000) must be reported semi-annually 
to the Bureau, who, in turn, has to pass the reports (along with its comments) to 
the parliament. 
The extension in the role of the Audit Bureau saw a number of new measures 
being adopted. The parliament approved a 100% increase in the Bureau's wages 
to attract new accountants to work in what had been an unpopular organisation. 
A new department, called the Investment Department, was established in the 
Bureau to carry out the audit of Kuwait's foreign investments. Moreover, the 
Bureau opened an office in London to audit Kuwait's investments in Europe. 
The parliament also proposed a law that would enable the Audit Bureau to refer 
any detected illegal acts to the general attorney. 
The Protection of Public Capital Law also propagated the establishment of a 
permanent parliamentary committee, called the protection of public capital 
committee. The main task of this committee is to study the reports presented by 
the Audit Bureau about the investments discussed above. The law has imposed 
severe criminal charges, ranging from life sentence to a minimum, five-year jail 
sentence for people who misuse public funds. The short period it took to enact 
the Protection of Public Capital Law (about one month) was a reason behind it 
being criticised in Kuwait. One argument was that the law would make matters 
unduly complicated and bureaucratic for governmental organisations and for the 
Audit Bureau. In early 1996, the concerns with the law were raised again by the 
government in a proposal to amend it so that it only related to 
institutions/companies where the government owned at least 50% of the share 
capital - citing privatisation of government investments and the difficulties in 
forcing companies to provide the required reports. The parliament did not 
approve the proposed amendment. Interestingly, the Audit Bureau also proposed 
an amendment of the law, but this was also not approved. 
The practicality of the law, however, was questionable. It had changed the 
control mechanism in organisations like KIO from one where regulations were 
238 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 8 
very lax (enabling one person, the chairman of KIO, to grant a $450m loan 
without any reference to anyone else) to a situation were all investments in excess 
of $330,000 would have to be reported to the Bureau within six months. This 
clearly would create a mass of documentation for the Bureau, especially given the 
limited number of staff working there. It also is worth noting that the real 
problem in Kuwait is the lack of implementation of laws not the dearth of laws. 
This is clearly supported by the findings of the KIO's case in the way that the 
former managers ignored guidelines and regulations of both KIA and KIO. 
8.4.2.2 Regulation of the Profession in Kuwait 
All the financial scandals and collapses that surfaced after the liberation of 
Kuwait related to public corporations and not companies listed on the Kuwaiti 
stock exchange. However, the parliament enacted in 1994 an amendment to 
Kuwait's Commercial Companies Law to require companies listed on Kuwait's 
stock exchange to appoint two auditors from different auditing firms to attest 
their financial statements. Members of the parliament who backed such a change 
claimed that this law would protect the interests of shareholders from the actions 
of company management. They based their arguments on the roles of managers 
and auditors of companies involved in illegal matters in the Al-Manakh dealings 
in the early 1980's. The parliament's motivation for the amendment of the 
Companies Commercial Law was geared towards assuring the public that the 
parliament is vigilant in attacking corruption and concerned with the protection of 
the public interest. 
Opponents of the modification claimed that a few questionable auditing firms in 
Kuwait are creating the impression that all the auditing firms in Kuwait are 
dubious while in fact there are many firms with a high degree of professionalism. 
Consequently they thought that such amendments would only contribute to a 
bureaucratic expansion of the audit market in Kuwait without meeting the desired 
objective of protecting the shareholders' interests. The opponent's position 
seems compatible with the claims of small and medium size audit firms that the 
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new requirement has led to an expansion in the big audit firms' portfolio of 
clients. These small and medium size firms claim that the position of the big 
firms (as the incumbent auditors of the companies listed on the stock exchange) 
led to a situation where they merely recommended to their current clients another 
big firm to act as their second auditor - while the second firms returned the favour 
by recommending the first firm to the companies they were auditing. In other 
words, the big firms exchanged clients among themselves. All the Big Six firms 
gained new audit clients as a result of the change of law (see Table 8.9). The 
notion that the law benefited the big firms was confirmed by one of the partners 
of Ernst & Young, claiming in interview that "from a selfish point of view, we 
benefited a lot". However, the partner claimed that such financial benefit had 
created problems on their audits. He indicated that prior to the enactment of this 
law one auditor would carry out the whole audit work while now two auditors are 
dividing the work between themselves - which allows each auditor to see only a 
part of the picture rather than the whole picture (as in the past). It has also been 
difficult to set up meetings between the two auditors and the company, which he 
thought had created communication problems. 
KAAA issued a statement after the enactment of the law stating that neither the 
parliament nor the Ministry of Commerce consulted it before approving the law. 
However, KAAA thought that this law was going to advance the profession. The 
general secretary of KAAA, Abdul Latif Al-Majed, claimed that the enactment of 
the law came as a response to the recent economic position of Kuwait. It was also 
an attempt to curtail the problems faced in the annual meetings of shareholding 
companies and, finally, to protect the interests of shareholders (Al-Anaba, 2/6/94, 
p. 22). The audit market in Kuwait is currently dominated by a small group of big 
firms associated with international auditing firms. The five Big Six firms' 
represented in Kuwait audited 71% and 70% of companies listed in Kuwait's 
stock exchange in 1993 and 1994 respectively (See Table 8.9). Their share of the 
audit market for listed companies after the change of law rose to them being 
1 Price Waterhouse is the only Big Six firm that was not represented in Kuwait. 
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involved in auditing 90% of the listed companies in 1995 and 1996. 
Furthermore, governmentally controlled institutions and organisations, such as 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC)Z, 
closed share-holding companies, and limited companies are also audited by these 
firms. The services of these big auditing firms goes beyond auditing to include 
consulting services, privatisation studies, war compensation estimation, and 
training programs. 
Tahla 9Q- Number of Share-hnlrlino f: mmnanv f hientc by Audit Firm. 1993-1996 
Auditing Firm 
Number of 
Companies 1993 
Number of 
Companies 1994 
Number of 
Companies 1995 
Number of 
Companies 1996 
Ernst & Young 12 12 19 20 
Arthur Anderson 11 12 15 19 
KPMG Peat Marwick 1 I 6 7 
Coopers & Lybrand 2 2 10 13 
Deloitte & Touche 3 3 14 17 
Anwar Al-Qatami (Memebr of Grant 
Thornton) 
11 12 11 13 
Abdual Aziz Al-Muatawa 1 1 I 1 
Allied Accountants 4 6 
Al-Fouz International Audit Bureau 1 3 
Al-Faraj Auditing Office 4 3 
Al-Ateeqi 1 1 
Burgan Auditing Office 1 2 
AI-Ahli Auditing Office 3 4 
Abdul Rahman Al-Qaoud & Co 2 
Al-Bayan Accountant & Auditing 
Office 
3 
Number of Audit Clients 41 43 90 114 
Number of Companies not Audited 
by the Big Six 
12 13 5 6 
No. of Listed companies 48* 50* 57* 67* 
Big Six's Share in the Audit Market 71% 70% 71% 67% 
Big Six's & Anwar Al-Qatami's 
Share in the Audit Market for 
Shareholding Companies 
98% 98% 83% 78% 
Big Three share's in the Audit 
Market for Shareholding Companies 
83% 84% 50% 46% 
seven companies out or tnese are non-Kuwaiti and not audited in Kuwait 
Source: Kuwait Stock Exchange, Investor Guides, 1993-96. 
The above developments expanding the role of audit are, however, contradicted 
by one of the government's latest proposals, namely, to remove the requirement 
of the qualification exam for the right to obtain an auditing practising certificate. 
Officials from the Ministry of Commerce claimed that the desired amendment to 
the law would be to exempt university graduates with ten years of experience, 
2 KPC and eight of its subsidiaries in Kuwait were all audited by Arthur Anderson in Kuwait 
before the fraud scandal in Kuwait Oil Tankers Corporation. While Currently Arthur Anderson is 
auditing KPC its subsidiaries are audited by different Big Six firms in Kuwait. 
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holders of masters' degrees with six years of experience and holders of doctorates 
with four years of experience. However, a higher official at the Ministry 
amended the proposal, claiming that the experience requirement was enough and 
that there was no need for the exam at all (Al-Qabas, 2/5/95, p. 17). This 
amendment was presented to the cabinet ministers who approved it and 
transferred it to the Kuwaiti parliament in May 1995. The proposed amendment 
met with opposition from auditing firms (big and medium size firms), the 
Kuwaiti Association of Accountants and Auditors (KAAA) and the auditors' 
department in the Ministry of Commerce. The auditing firms argued' that 
abolition of the examination requirement was a backwards step as all developed 
countries call for such an examination to gain the right to practice. The absence 
of such a requirement was said to effectively shift the accounting practice from a 
profession to that of a business. It was also stressed that the licensing emphasis 
should be placed on the quality of practitioners and not their number. While 
some argued that the examination was not impossible to pass, others suggested 
that the low success rate in the past (See Table 8.10) can be attributed to the way 
the exam was designed by academics distant from practice. Therefore, a 
suggestion was made to switch the design of the exam from academics in the 
Ministry of Commerce to the professionals at the KAAA. An exemption from 
such an examination would be granted if accountants held a CPA or CA 
qualification. It was also suggested that a number of refresher courses be taken 
by licensed accountants each year to enable them to retain their license to 
practice. KAAA's comments included extending the experience period to 10 
years to be able to practice, with the examination being required for accountants 
with less than 10 years of experience (10 hours of refresher courses provided by 
KAAA currently must be attended annually by practitioners to be able to retain 
their licence). The KAAA also suggested the retention of the current system 
where auditors are categorised as either "A" or "B" practitioners. 
3 The Kuwaiti parliament asked the auditing firms and KAAA for their opinions in the proposed 
amendments. The above opinions and recommendations are based on the responses received by 
the parliament from the auditing firms and KAAA. 
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Table 8.10- Success Rate in Kuwait's accounting practice exam and auditing and 
ý»riifnr 
infnrmrfinra 
Description Years 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
Exam 3 7 13 4 12 11 23 15 11 28 26 15 13 
attendants 
Passed 4 2 2 4 4 10 3 6 
Exam 
Success 57% 0% 0% 17% 18% 17% 0% 0% 14% 38% 20% 46% 
Rate 
Audit Firms 25 26 28 28 30 34 37 43 44 43 44 44 46 46 51 
Auditors 41 43 46 46 46 48 50 56 57 57 59 60 63 62 68 
Suspended 1 1 3 
auditors 
Jourc.: 1v1, n, suy u, l. uuuuc, Gc 
The parliament ended up refusing the government's proposal and is now 
considering amendments put forward by KAAA. The parliament seemed to 
agree with KAAA and the audit firms as it did not approve the government's 
proposed amendment. The government's desire to make it easier for accountants 
to be licensed to conduct auditing seemed strange, especially given that there are 
claims of unprofessional conduct against some of the existing (limited) number of 
auditors. Some audit firms are suspected of indulging in unprofessional practices 
whereby the auditor agrees a fixed fee to sign an audit report and financial 
statements prepared by the client without attesting to the accuracy of their records 
and stated financial position. These financial statements are prepared by the audit 
clients to present to banks in order to secure loans and/or to the Ministry of 
Commerce to satisfy legal requirements. During interviews, auditors from audit 
firms and the Audit Bureau, together with bank loan managers claimed to be 
aware of such practice by small audit firms. The Ministry of Commerce, which 
regulates the profession and has the power to discipline auditors, was also well 
aware of the unprofessional practice. The director of the Shareholding 
Companies and Auditors' Department at the Ministry of Commerce claimed that 
they had called for a meeting of the disciplinary committee to discipline auditors 
who indulge in this practice - but were still awaiting a response to this request. 
He claimed that the committee seems basically to accept such practices as it has 
not even met once since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 
Of considerable interest is the fact that KAAA, the professional body in Kuwait, 
has proposed several changes to the auditing law in Kuwait - all being changes 
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which the Big Six audit firms have strongly campaigned against on the global 
stage. At one time the secretary general of KAAA called for auditors to rotate 
every five years in every company (Al-Anaba, 2/6/94, p. 22) - although, such 
calls were not presented in KAAA's draft amendment of the Audit Law to the 
parliament. The draft law, however, has proposed a more controversial issue 
relating to auditor liability. This proposes that auditors should be liable to third 
parties and to make partners jointly responsible for such liability. It stated that 
"The auditor has a legal responsibility towards the client and others for 
professional mistakes he commits, and he is obliged to compensate the 
client and the others on the losses they encountered. The partners have a 
joint responsibility among themselves" 
The recent developments in auditing have shown that audit firms did not have 
very much impact on the regulation of the profession. The recent amendment of 
company law for two auditors to audit shareholding companies was introduced 
and approved by the parliament without consultation with the audit firms or 
KAAA. The government's proposal to remove the requirement for a practising 
examination was also proposed by the government without consultation with 
audit firms and KAAA. Even the amendment proposed by KAAA to establish 
auditors' liability towards third parties does not seem to be in agreement with the 
international campaigns of the Big Six. Overall, such developments clearly show 
that the representative of the Big Six firms in Kuwait do not have that much 
influence on the regulation of auditing in Kuwait. It stands in some contrast to 
the situation in Spain where the Big Six is becoming an increasingly significant 
force behind (the pressure for) auditing reforms. 
8.4.2.3 Kuwaiti Society for the Protection of Public Funds 
People's frustration in Kuwait with the overwhelming feeling of corruption and 
mismanagement and the perceived failure of all organisations to protect public 
funds and stop them being mismanaged, led to attempts to establish a Kuwaiti 
society for the protection of funds in 1997. This non-profit society has attracted 
different people from different background including the speaker and members of 
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the parliament and a member of the Al-Sabah family. Four members of the 
parliament, including the speaker, proposed a law for exempting this society from 
the usual requirements for establishing societies in Kuwait (Al-Taleea, 16/6/98, 
p. 6). The application for this society is still under-consideration by the 
government and has generated mixed reactions. There are some who are 
enthusiastic about the establishment of the society and who see it as a civilised 
step to aid the government and parliament in the protection of public funds (see 
Al-Qabas, 24/3/97, p. 32,31/3/97, p. 40). Others see it as interfering in the duties 
of the government and the parliament - and the constitution gave them the task of 
protecting public funds (see Al-Sayiash, 17-3-1997, p. 32). The proposed society 
identified the following as the goals for its establishment: (for more details see 
A1-Taleea, 26/3/97, p. 6). 
1. Raising public awareness among citizens of the importance of protecting 
public funds 
2. Examining and commenting on all reports and news conducted with 
relevance to public funds and highlighting the problems and the mediums 
to rectify them 
3. Undertaking studies and drafting laws that would help to protect against 
the misappropriation of public funds 
4. Investigating all received information about the misappropriation of 
public funds, including individuals for whom guarantees of anonymity 
have had to be given. 
The serious attempt to establish a society of this kind and the backing it has 
received from concerned people from different backgrounds, serves to show the 
level of public concern about the level of corruption and mismanagement in 
recent years in Kuwait. Concern with corruption is not a solely Kuwaiti 
phenomena and is clearly becoming an international issue (see Time, 22/6/98). 
However, people in Kuwait do not seem to be that confident with the ability of 
the auditing function (represented through the Audit Bureau and audit firms) to 
control corruption and mismanagement. The government and the parliament are 
seen to have failed to have put an end to corruption. These feelings might be 
reflected in the recent attempt on the life of an outspoken member of parliament, 
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who is well known for his strong views about corruption. The failure of the 
government to bring people responsible for embezzling funds and committing 
fraud in the KOTC scandal might also be attributed to the public's worries about 
the government's ability to fight corruption. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed the role of KIO's auditors and the role of GT auditors 
in the collapse of KIO's Spanish investments. It has argued that the role of 
KPMG and the Audit Bureau effectively acted as a facade to show that KIO was 
properly audited and controlled. In reality, both organisations were restricted in 
their access to much of the data about GT's investments and, indeed, when they 
did have some crucial information about GT, they failed to act correctly. In some 
contrast, the external auditors of GT (unlike those in other corporate collapses) 
did issue (several) qualified audit reports. However, ICAC's investigations still 
identified several technical deficiencies in the audit reporting of GT's group 
auditor, Coopers & Lybrand and imposed significant fines. It also imposed fines 
on Price Waterhouse for its audit of Ebro, GT's most successful associate 
company. 
Financial scandals usually raise debates about the role of auditors and the 
function of auditing. This chapter has considered the implications of the KIO 
scandal for accounting and auditing in Spanish, Kuwaiti and international 
environments. The Spanish implications from the case showed a pattern that has 
prevailed in mainly Anglo-American contexts. This involves criticism of the 
profession, an audit expectations gap, relative immunity of the Big Six firms to 
scandals and competing debates on the need for reform of auditor liability and 
(self) regulatory regimes. The implications in Kuwait were rather different. 
There was no criticism of the auditing profession or the auditing function and 
there was a limited change in the audit law that was related indirectly to the KIO 
scandal - giving a bigger role to the Audit Bureau in auditing KIO/KIA. 
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In order to explore further the apparently different views held of auditing in 
Kuwait, a questionnaire study was undertaken. The aftermath of big scandals 
usually sees people questioning the role of auditors, revealing evidence of an 
audit expectations gap. The questionnaire will examine the situation in Kuwait to 
see if people have a reasonable expectation of auditors. It will also examine 
people's perception of the role of the Audit Bureau given the fact it has been 
given a bigger role after the KIO scandal. Comparing people's perceptions of 
the respective role and reputation of the Audit Bureau and the audit firms will be 
of particular interest given that the former claim to conduct 100% audit testing in 
contrast to the audit firms who base their audits on sampling techniques. Calls 
for joint audit in Spain as a way to boost auditor's independence were dismissed 
by the large firms (see European Accountant, February 1996). However, joint 
auditing was introduced in Kuwait as indirect impact of GT and other scandals to 
protect shareholders' interests. The questionnaire offers an opportunity to see 
how such a development has been greeted in Kuwait. Finally, the relative lack of 
debate in Kuwait about the role of auditors in the collapse of GT/KIO will be 
addressed in the questionnaire. This will involve questions about the 
respondents' knowledge of the work of KIO's auditors, the objectives of KIO's 
external audit and the type of information that should be published by KIO. 
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9.1 Introduction 
Generally, financial scandals and corporate collapses lead to debates about the 
audit function and the role of auditors. Criticisms of the profession in the 
aftermath of such scandals usually see emphasis being placed on the notion of an 
audit expectations gap. The breakout of major corporate collapses of Kuwaiti 
owned organisations (e. g. KIO's Spanish investments and KOTC) in the 
aftermath of the Gulf-War provides a useful opportunity to see if such an 
expectations gap emerged in Kuwait. The questionnaire survey presented here, in 
fact, is the first major study of auditing expectations in the Gulf region. It 
examines people's view of auditing and a number of general issues related to the 
role of audit firms and their success in performing different tasks. It also 
explores views concerning the introduction of the requirement for two audit firms 
to audit the accounts of listed shareholding companies in Kuwait (discussed in 
the previous chapter). Similarly, it examines perceptions of the role of the Audit 
Bureau in auditing government owned organisations and listed shareholding 
companies in Kuwait. Examining the role of public sector auditors in this respect 
will contribute to the few studies (e. g. Chowdhury and Innes, 1998) that have 
examined the audit expectations gap in the public sector. It will also give a very 
rare, direct comparison of the perceived standing of private sector and public 
sector auditors and allow for some valuable reflections on the future role of 
auditing in processes of corporate governance in Kuwait. 
The main studies of the audit expectation gap (e. g. Gloeck and Jager, 1993; 
Humphrey et al, 1993; Porter, 1993; Monroe and Woodliff, 1994; Yoshimi, 1994; 
McInnes and Stevenson, 1996) tend to focus primarily on whether an audit 
expectations gap exists or not. Some studies (e. g., Garcia Benau et al, 1993), 
however, have sought more directly to explore individual dimensions of the 
results in more detail and to relate these to issues in the wider auditing 
environment, both domestically and internationally. This study seeks to apply a 
similar approach in relation to audit expectations in Kuwait. 
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This chapter outlines the questionnaire survey and analyses its results in three 
main sections. The first section reviews the construction of the questionnaire 
survey, issues of sample selection, distribution of the questionnaire and the 
problems encountered in carrying out the survey. The second section presents the 
analysis of each section of the questionnaire highlighting the prominent fact in 
each section. The final section of the chapter maps out the key themes to emerge 
from the survey. 
9.2 Construction and Distribution of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire had five main sections, addressing issues relating to: the work 
of Audit Firms and the Audit Bureau, the KIO case, the future of corporate 
governance in Kuwait and demographic matters. The audit firms' section 
(Section A) was partially (Questions 1,2,3,5,6) based, after appropriate 
adjustments, on Humphrey et al's (1993) audit expectations gap study in the UK. 
It tackles issues such as the role of external auditors, the nature of the auditing 
process, the legal responsibility of auditors to shareholders, the regulation of 
audit firms and the success of audit firms at particular activities. The Audit 
Bureau section (Section B) also derived from Humphrey et al's (1993) work but 
with considerable amendment to accommodate the function of the Bureau. The 
KIO section (Section C) addressed issues relating to the collapse of KIO's 
investments in Spain, including: the respondents' familiarity with the KIO case 
and the degree of information made public about KIO's activities, and the relative 
status and independence of KIO's auditors. A number of more general questions 
were also asked about the KIO scandal, including whether respondents blamed 
particular parties for the collapse of Grupo Torras and whether common causes 
were behind the number of financial scandals to have hit Kuwait since its 
liberation in 1991. The fourth main section (Section D) dealt with a range of 
proposals for improving the future of corporate governance in Kuwait. The final 
section of the questionnaire (Section E) focused on the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents, to facilitate attempts to explain the difference 
(if any) in their answers. 
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Questionnaires were circulated to four main groups: auditors from the Audit 
Bureau, auditors from audit firms, users of financial statements and financial 
directors. Questionnaires only differed in terms of the demographic section. The 
involvement of auditors from the private and public sector in the audit of 
organisations such as KIO/KIA made it necessary to circulate questionnaires to 
auditors from both sectors. Likewise, users and financial directors were selected 
from both sectors. The questionnaire was piloted with ten individuals and duly 
adjusted following comments and suggestions reviewed. Respondents 
participating in the survey were offered the choice of completing the 
questionnaire in Arabic or English version (copies enclosed in the Appendix 5). 
Two tutors at Kuwait University examined the questionnaire to check that there 
were no problems in the way the questionnaire had been translated and 
adjustments were made accordingly. 
9.2.1 Selecting the Sample and Distributing the Questionnaire 
The difficulty of obtaining a good response rate from mail questionnaires in 
Kuwait led to the questionnaires being distributed personally by myself through 
individual contacts made with people in the selected organisations. Only 
financial directors from stockholding companies, due to their larger number, were 
sent questionnaires by mail. Questionnaires were distributed to all of Kuwait's 
32 audit firms, with the number of questionnaires given to these firms depending 
on how many questionnaires each firm was willing to accept. In the case of the 
Audit Bureau an agreement was struck to circulate questionnaires to all auditors 
(approximately 100 auditors) attesting the financial statements of companies 
listed on the Kuwaiti stock exchange or those of government owned companies 
and organisations. Auditors responsible for auditing government ministries were 
not included in the sample because their work did not involve contact with the 
work of external auditors of corporations like KPC or Kuwait Airways. 
Questionnaires were also circulated to the financial directors of all 292 
shareholding companies (41 public and 251 closed companies) listed in the 
1996/1997 Directory of Shareholding Companies published by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry in Kuwait. Financial directors of government owned 
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organisations and companies were also sent questionnaires. The most 
diversified 
group was users of financial statements, which included loan managers, financial 
analysts, brokers, governmental supervisory bodies, regulators, governmental 
agencies and academics. 
The questionnaires were circulated in early February 1997 and their collection 
spanned until June 1997. There was difficulty in getting people to participate in 
the study given the secrecy and sensitiveness of KIO's operations. For instance, 
questionnaires were circulated at KIA but respondents there left all the KIO 
questions unanswered. KIA's managing director had suggested that no 
questionnaires should be returned to me. He also, falsely, accused my supervisor 
of working for the former managers of KIO and of using me to carry out this 
research on their behalf. Non-Kuwaitis were generally hesitant to participate and 
if they did participate they tended to leave KIO's questions unanswered. Their 
reluctance to respond to the questionnaire was clearly demonstrated in the case of 
my research sponsor (Kuwait University's Accounting Department) where only 
two out of the thirteen Non-Kuwaiti accounting staff at the department chose to 
participate. Another problem related to the accuracy of some participant's 
responses. In preparing the questionnaires for analysis, it became clear that some 
of the respondents had copied each others' answers (e. g. in the cases of a limited 
number of responses from a Big Six Audit Firm, the Audit Bureau and the 
Ministry of Commerce & Industry). One auditor in a local Kuwaiti firm 
indicated that the responses of all auditors in his firm were the same and that I 
could fill the rest of the questionnaires I circulated to his firm on the basis of this 
single response! A related problem concerned the existence of large amount of 
missing data in the sections on the Audit Bureau and KIO (see Table 9.1). 16% of 
respondents failed to answer the Audit Bureau questions, citing their poor 
knowledge of its work as the reason. 
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T,. 1.1.. n1 TT...... -... r. «^a n.. ýnfiýr. o iv% 
Qon+inn of . 
11P Q»PCtinnnnirP 
Full (B) (C) (D) (E) (B) & (C) (B) & (D) Total 
Audit Bureau 27 5 32 
Audit Firms 37 7 1 27 1 73 
Users of Financial Statements 120 2 2 1 1 126 
Financial Directors 80 4 3 1 8 1 97 
Total 264 13 11 1 1 36 2 328 
Rate 80% 4% 3% 0.3% 0.3% 11% 0.6% 45% 
Eighty-six percent of the people who failed to answer this section (Section B) 
were also non-Kuwaitis. Analysis of the responses to the KIO section (Section 
C) revealed three types of respondents: those who answered all KIO's questions, 
those who probably knew about the KIO case but avoided providing answers; and 
those who did not know enough information about KIO and did not answer. The 
number of respondents (14%) who failed to answer the KIO questions were 
mainly from the audit firms (60% of audit firms respondents left the KIO section 
unanswered - see Table 9.1). Several Audit Bureau respondents wrote "I don 't 
know" across the whole section. This was difficult to understand given that their 
demographic data showed that they had: worked in the Bureau for a period 
spanning from 10 to 25 years; held senior auditor posts; and were responsible for 
auditing government owned organisations like KIO (which is also audited by the 
Audit Firms). Some of the respondents might have been reluctant to answer KIO 
questions as they were non-Kuwaiti (Egyptians) and wanted to stay loyal to the 
government and not get involved in sensitive issues. Some respondents seemed 
to perceive the KIO section as dealing with political issues and preferred not to 
answer it -a sentiment expressed clearly by a financial director of a partly 
government-owned insurance company who wrote that the "KIO section was full 
of political questions". An auditor from one of the Big Six firms refused to 
answer the KIO section, citing a potential conflict of interest (even though his 
firm was not an auditor of KIO). Alternatively, there were other respondents who 
may not have answered because their knowledge of the KIO case was limited by 
the fact that (from their demographic information) they were non-Kuwaitis living 
outside Kuwait when the scandal broke out. 
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9.3 Analysis of the Main Findings of the Questionnaire 
A response rate of 45% was achieved after eliminating unusable responses as 
detailed in Table 9.2. The highest response rate was 70% (from users of financial 
statements) while the lowest response rate was 29% (from financial directors). 
The overwhelming majority of respondents were males (94%) - attributed to the 
very low rate of women working in the four groups (especially in audit firms 
where women very rarely act as external auditor). The nationality of respondents 
was strongly dominated by Kuwaitis (47%) and Egyptians (28%), while the rest 
stood at Indian (6%), Jordanian (4%) and other nationalities at less than 3% each. 
The nationality of the Bureau's auditors were exclusively of Kuwaiti or Egyptian 
origin. The largest age group was between 30-39 years old (42% of respondents), 
with the second largest age group being between 40-49 years (33% of 
respondents). The other respondents were either under 30 years or older than 50 
(12% for each group). Consequently, it can be concluded that the sample was 
dominated by Kuwaiti and Egyptian male respondents of between 30-49 years of 
age. The majority of respondents were university graduates (74%), with 17% and 
3% respectively holding a post-graduate qualification in the form of a masters or 
doctoral degree. 
TnblP A9- QiiPCtinnnaira Rasnnnce Rate 
Group Distributed Response Usable Response 
Usable Response 
Rate 
Audit Bureau 100 34 32 32% 
Audit Firms 221 80 73 33% 
Users of Financial Statements 179 129 126 70% 
Financial Directors 332 102 97 29% 
Total 832 345 328 39% 
Tal-%1A Q 
.q -SAY of 
Rn; znnn(1Pntc Arrncc flip lrniinc 
tage Perce 
Sex The Audit Audit Users of Financial Financial Total of Bureau Firms Statements Directors Respondents 
Male 28 73 111 94 306 93.3% 
Female 4 - 14 3 21 6.4% 
Unknown - - 1 - 1 0.3% 
Total 32 73 126 97 328 100% 
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T, hlo Cl A- ATotin - 1i"1v of Rnennnr1antc Acrncc the Crnuns 
The Audit 
Bureau 
Audit 
Firms 
Users of Financial 
Statements 
Financial 
Directors 
Total 
Percentage 
of 
Respondents 
Kuwaiti 19 12 88 36 155 47% 
Indian 7 7 7 21 6% 
Lebanese 3 3 2 8 2% 
Jordanian 5 1 7 13 4% 
American 1 2 3 1% 
Egyptian 13 29 19 31 92 28% 
Pakistani 3 3 6 2% 
Syrian 3 1 4 8 2% 
British 7 2 9 3% 
Palestinian 3 1 4 1% 
other 3 3 2 8 2% 
Unknown 1 1 0% 
Total 32 73 126 97 328 100% 
Tah1c AR- Ac nfRaennnrlantc Arrnec the (Trnii 
Age 
Audit 
Bureau 
Audit 
Firms 
Users of Financial 
Statements 
Financial 
Directors 
Total 
Percentage 
Respondents 
21-24 2 1 5 - 8 2% 
25-29 3 10 15 2 30 9% 
30-34 4 11 23 14 52 16% 
35-39 7 18 44 17 86 26% 
40-45 4 10 20 34 68 21% 
46-50 4 12 11 13 40 12% 
51-60 4 9 7 14 34 10% 
61-70 2 - 1 1 4 1% 
Unknown 2 2 - 2 6 2% 
Total 32 73 126 97 328 100% 
Tahla QR of Pacnnnrlantc Arrncc the CTrrnins 
Education 
Level 
The Audit 
Bureau 
Audit 
Firms 
Users of Financial 
Statements 
Financial 
Directors 
Total 
Percentage 
of 
Respondents 
High School - 1 1 1 3 1% 
Diploma - - 7 2 9 3% 
Bachelor 26 59 89 70 244 74% 
Master 5 7 21 22 55 17% 
Doctoral - 2 7 - 9 3% 
Other 1 3 - - 4 1% 
Unknown - 1 1 .2 4 1% 
Total 32 73 126 97 328 100% 
Given the non-parametric nature of the data, it was analysed initially using the 
Kruskal Wallis one way analysis of variance test - known for its usefulness in 
determining whether a number of independent samples have been drawn from 
the same population (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p. 206). Accordingly, the 
Kruskal Wallis test was used to compare the responses of the four groups. 
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A striking overall finding is that there were no significant differences ('an 
expectations gap') for a large percentage of the questions across the four groups 
(see Table 9.7) - 54 of the 131 questions did not produce a significant 
difference. 
Further, when significant differences did arise, they tended to relate to differences 
in emphasis rather than basic differences in opinion. In total, only 13 of the 77 
questions which showed significant across groups differences at either the I% or 
5% levels of statistical significance revealed basic differences in opinion across 
the groups (i. e. some groups disagreeing and others agreeing with a particular 
statement). 64 of the differences, therefore were due to differences in emphasis 
(with some groups more strongly agreeing than others - but all groups agreeing 
with a particular statement). This is an important point, as often expectations gap 
studies can claim a major expectation gap, when basic differences in opinion are 
not so common. 
In analysing the data, there was an initial concern that the Audit Bureau or the 
Audit firms might be driving the differences among the groups - through a self- 
rating bias, given that they were having to rate their own performance. 
Therefore, the Kruskal Wallis test was re-run, first without Audit Bureau 
respondents and secondly without Audit firm respondents. This decreased the 
number of significant differences across groups quite substantially on both 
occasions, although not in uniform ways (see Table 9.7). Accordingly, the results 
for each section of the questionnaire are shown in the Tables in way which details 
the mean responses of the four different groups (directors, users, Audit Bureau 
and audit firms), together with the significance of the Kruskal Wallis statistic for 
the three combinations (i. e., 1. - all four groups; 2. - directors, users and audit 
firms; 3. - directors, users and Audit Bureau). The benefit of this presentation is 
that it shows the questions where the views of the two sets of auditors were 
clearly different. It also reveals that a large proportion of the significant 
differences across all groups relate to questions concerning how successful 
particular sets of auditors are at certain performance attributes (see Tables 9.16 
and 9.17). Thus, when respondents are asked to judge the success of the Audit 
Bureau, the responses of the four groups are significantly different at the 1% 
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level on all 19 attributes. However, when the Audit Bureau respondents are 
excluded, significant differences in the views of directors, users and audit firms 
only arise on three of the attributes. In what follows, the results of the re-run of 
the Kruskal Wallis test without the Audit Bureau are shown throughout the 
chapter highlighted in bold italics fonts whenever a different result is obtained 
from that for the four-group comparison. When the results of the re-run of the 
Kruskal Wallis without the Audit Firms produce different results these are 
highlighted in bold italics fonts. 
Til 1Q7- Proniianrv of Tlifforannoc and R'imilnrit. iac Aerncc Grniinc 
Not Significant Significant at 5% Significant at 1% Total 
Frequency Rate Frequency Rate Frequency Rate 
The four groups 54 41% 15 11% 62 47% 131 
The three groups 
without the Audit 73 56% 18 14% 40 31% 131 
Bureau 
The three groups 
without the Audit 79 60% 18 14% 34 26% 131 
Firms 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of sample means was subsequently used to 
test whether two independent groups were drawn from the same population 
(Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p. 128). This test was carried out comparing each of 
the four groups in turn with the other three groups (e. g. audit firms with the Audit 
Bureau, then audit firms with directors and audit firms with users) - resulting in 
six different tests. Analysis of the Mann Whitney test shows that the most 
frequent differences were observed between audit firms and users, with a total of 
53 significant differences from 131 questions. Interestingly, the second highest 
number of differences were observed in the Audit Bureau-audit firms comparison 
(with 51 significant differences), while the least differences were observed 
between directors and users (for further details, see Table 9.8). This does suggest 
that any differences in auditing expectations cannot simply be attributed to 
`uneducated' or ill-informed user groups. 
Table 9_9 - Results of Six Mann Whitney Tests for the Four Groups 
Frequency of Significant AB-AF AB-D AB-U AF-D AF-U D-U 
Differences 51 48 41 37 53 31 
AB = Audit Bureau, AF = Audit Firms, D= Directors, U= Users of Financial Statements 
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9.3.1 Views on the Nature of Company Audit Practice 
The questionnaire initially sought respondents' views on 12 statements regarding 
the role of external audit firms and the audit process in Kuwait. Most of the 
responses to the statements showed no difference in opinions across the four 
groups. Even in the four of the twelve statements that showed significant 
differences (at the 1% level) as in Table 9.9, such difference was mainly related 
to a difference in emphasis rather than in opinion. A good example of this can be 
seen in the statement that "auditors do not understand the problems of business", 
with the majority of each group disagreeing with the statement - external auditors 
having the strongest level of disagreement (73%), followed by directors (57%), 
Audit Bureau (53%) and users (50%). Similar patterns can also be seen in the 
statements that "auditors provide a significant protection against fraud" 
(supported by 55% of respondents from audit firms, 84% from the Audit Bureau, 
83% of users and 70% of directors) and that "auditors should report to 
shareholders on management efficiency" (supported by 64% of audit firms, 84% 
of the Audit Bureau, 85% of users and 73% of directors). 
The major differences of opinion were exhibited in just two statements. The first 
one concerns whether company auditors are adequately accountable for their 
work. Financial directors (51 %) generally did not agree with the statement while 
the majority of respondents from the other groups agreed with the statement (see 
Table 9.9). 61% of financial directors and 56% of users felt that "auditors are too 
concerned with keeping company management happy", while both auditors from 
the Audit Bureau and audit firms were divided in their agreement with the 
statement. 
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Tn1.1ý a0 nr, +kn MQ+1irn of (". mmnnnv Audit Practice 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
AB AF 
1. The quality of company audits has 
increased since the Manakh crises of 1982 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.3 NS NS NS 
2. Too much is expected of auditors by the 
investing community 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.5 NS NS NS 
3. Auditors are too concerned with keeping 
company management happy 4.6 4.6 4.1 3.8 S5% S5% NS 
4. The auditing process is seriously 
weakened by imprecise accounting 4 9 5 2 5.4 4.6 NS NS NS 
standards . . 
5. An audit is of very little benefit to a 
company 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.7 NS NS S5% 
6. Audits generally take too long to 
complete 3.6 3.9 4.4 3.8 NS NS Sj% 
7. Auditors do not understand the problems 
of business 3.4 3.4 3.7 2.5 S1% Sj% NS 
8. Audits provide significant protection 
against fraud 5.0 5.7 5.5 4.6 S1 % S1^; Ss.,; 
9. Auditors should be identifying ways to 
improve management efficiency 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.1 NS NS NS 
10. Auditors should report to shareholders 
on management efficiency 5.4 5.9 5.8 4.9 S 1% S 1% NS 
11. Auditors are not made adequately 
accountable for their work 4.5 3.8 3.0 3.3 S1% S1% S1%6 
12. Friendships and relationships with 
senior corporate management usually 5 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 NS NS NS 
govern the appointment of external auditors . . . . 
N5 = Not Signiticant, 5, % = 5igniTicant at wo, 55% = SignITmcant at ow 
In terms of absolute ratings, this part of the questionnaire showed a high level of 
satisfaction with auditing and external auditors in Kuwait, with some instances 
users expressing more positive views that those of audit firms. For example, in 
the statement "too much is expected of auditors by the investing community", 
both users and respondents from the Audit Bureau agreed to a larger degree with 
the statement than did respondents from audit firms. The four groups generally 
agreed that the quality of company audits has increased since 1982, that audits 
provide protection against fraud and that too much is expected of company 
auditors. The satisfaction across groups can also be demonstrated in their 
disagreement with the notions that the company audit is of a little benefit and that 
auditors do not understand the problems of business. The groups also believe 
that auditors should provide more services, namely identifying ways to improve 
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management efficiency and report on such efficiency to the shareholders. 
Somewhat surprisingly, a large number of external auditors accepted the idea of 
expanding their duty to improve and report on management efficiency. This is 
clearly incompatible with the position of auditors in Anglo-American countries 
where auditors have been quite strongly opposed to such duties (for example, in 
discussions over Corporate Codes of Governance and the work of the Cadbury 
Committee). 
The generally positive views held of the quality of auditing in Kuwait were 
expressed even though there were some worries in terms of the nature of auditor 
independence. More than half of directors (61%) and users (56%) concurred that 
auditors are too concerned with keeping company management happy. The 
Audit Bureau and audit firm respondents were more divided on this issue, but for 
42% of auditors from audit firms to think that auditors are too concerned with 
keeping management happy does suggest that it is a significant problem area. 
The strong consensus among the four groups that friendships and relationships 
with management usually govern the appointment of audit firms is a further 
reflection of such worries about independence - with 76% of respondents from 
audit firms, 71% from the Audit Bureau, 76% of users and 69% of directors 
agreeing with the statement. 
9.3.2 The Role of the Auditor in the Private and Public Sectors 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement with a 
combined total of twelve statements about the role that should be played by either 
the external auditor (Table 9.10) or the Audit Bureau (Table 9.11) in auditing 
companies in the private sector and government owned corporations or 
organisations. Significant differences were observed on five of the seven 
statements on the role of the external auditor towards the audited company (four 
at the 1% level of significance). Interestingly, these differences were clearly 
being driven by the views of audit firm respondents - as Table 9.10 shows there 
were no significant differences in the responses of directors, users and Audit 
Bureau respondents. Further, even when the audit firms were included in the 
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analysis, there was only one statement where their views were of a significantly 
different opinion than the other groups (this being on the statement that auditors 
should detect all significant fraud). On all the other statements with significant 
differences, the difference was one of emphasis rather than opinion (i. e., all 
groups agreed with the statement, with the audit firms' respondents being either 
stronger or less strong in their level of agreement). 
Tnhla Q10- Th Rnlp of F. xtArnnl Aiidit. nrc 
The auditors' role with respect to Dir User AB AF KW 
KW 
w/out 
KW 
w/out 
the audited company should be to AB AF 
ensure that: 
1. all significant fraud is detected 5.6 5.9 5.7 3.6 S S111,10 NS 
2. company financial statements 
contain no significant deliberate 6.7 6.6 6.7 5.9 SIOI; SI% NS 
distortions 
3. a satisfactory system of internal 6 5 6.6 6.8 6.1 NS NS NS 
control is being operated . 
4. the future viability of the company 5.8 6.1 5.3 5.6 NS NS NS is not in doubt 
5. the company is being run 5.2 5.5 5.5 4.4 S1% S1% NS 
efficiently 
6. the appropriate regulatory 
authorities have been informed of any 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.1 S5% S5% NS 
significant malpractice 
7. the company's accounts give a 6.0 5.7 5.7 4.6 S I% S I% NS reliable indication of its market value 
N5 = Not Significant, 51% = 5igniticant at h o, 55% = signmcant at o7o 
The results are striking because, in absolute terms, they show auditors' agreeing 
with controversial issues that the profession in Anglo-American countries has 
long been fighting against. For example, 86% of external auditors accepted that 
they should have a role in ensuring that a satisfactory internal control is in place, 
while 76% felt that the auditor should ensure that the viability of the company is 
not in doubt. 
The one clear difference of opinion was, as noted above, in the area of fraud 
detection - with 56% of respondents from audit firms believing that auditors do 
not have a duty to detect all significant fraud, while 76% of financial directors, 
82% of users and 81% of the Bureau's auditors felt that they did have such a 
duty. The so-called "red rag" phenomena identified by previous researchers 
(e. g., see Garcia Benau et al, 1993) was seemingly evident here in that 56% of 
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external auditors believed that they did not have a duty to detect all significant 
fraud (Question 1, Table 9.10), yet 83% of them agreed that auditors did have a 
duty to ensure that their client's financial statements are free from significant 
deliberate distortions (Question 2, Table 9.10). 
The responses to the five statements regarding the role of the Audit Bureau with 
respect to its audits of government owned corporations (including shareholding 
companies) and organisations produced some significant differences (see Table 
9.11), but these were very much differences in emphasis - with the majority of 
respondents across the groups being in agreement over the role of the Audit 
Bureau. For instance, 74% of external auditors, 82% of directors, 89% of users 
and 97% of the Audit Bureau agreed that the Bureau's auditors should ensure 
that the company is being run efficiently - while at least 71% of respondents in 
each group felt that the Audit Bureau should be detecting all significant fraud. 
Tahla Q11- Tha Rnla of tiro Auirlit. R»rpaii 
The Audit Bureau's role with respect KW KW 
to its audits of government owned Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
corporations and organisations 
AB AF 
should be to ensure that: 
1. all significant fraud is detected 6.2 6.3 6.4 5.4 S1% S1% NS 
2. Company financial statements 
contain no significant deliberate 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.1 NS Ss% NS 
distortions 
3. a satisfactory system of internal 6.5 6.8 6.9 6.6 SSo; NS S5% 
control is being operated 
4. the company is being run efficiently 5.8 6.3 6.5 5.5 Sjo S1% Ss% 
5. the appropriate regulatory 
authorities have been informed of any 5.9 6.5 6.2 6.4 SS.; SI.; 5J, ß 
significant malpractice 
N5 = Not 5ignmcant, 5, % = bignmcant at i -/o, bs% = 5ignmcant at io 
An interesting finding emerges when comparing the -results of the audit firms 
with those of the Audit Bureau - for the Bureau's auditors are the more willing to 
accept responsibilities. For example, 91% of the Bureau's auditors felt that they 
have a duty to detect all significant fraud, while only 37% of external auditors felt 
that they should have a similar role on company audits. Moreover, audit firms 
also felt that the Audit Bureau should have more responsibility than themselves 
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(e. g. 71% believing that the Audit Bureau should detect all significant fraud on its 
audits and 74% believing that the Audit Bureau should ensure that government 
owned corporations are being run efficiently - compared to 49% of auditors who 
saw this as a responsibility for the company auditor). This was generally the case 
with the other groups (the one exception being in relation to the responsibility for 
making sure that the financial statements do not have significant deliberate 
distortions). Finally, the Audit Bureau's auditors did not seem so concerned by 
the term fraud - with virtually the same percentage of respondents feeling that 
they should detect all significant fraud (91%) and also ensure that the financial 
statements are free from significant deliberate distortions (90%). 
9.3.3 Auditor Responsibility 
The respondents were asked about the extent of their agreement with the 
company's external auditors being responsible to existing shareholders and to 
potential shareholders for any loss arising from their reliance on the audited 
financial statements. The majority of respondents in each group generally agreed 
that external auditors should be liable for both existing and potential 
shareholders, as outlined in Table 9.12 (although support for potential 
shareholders was significantly less than that for current shareholders). 
Respondents from audit firms were the most divided of the four groups over the 
auditors' responsibility towards potential shareholders - with 45% supporting 
such a responsibility and 37% against. Of the four groups, auditors from the 
Bureau's were the most supportive of such a responsibility (88% in favour). 
Tahle 9.12 - Aiuditnr R. PCnnncihility 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
AB AF 
1. Existing shareholders 5.9 6.0 6.1 5.0 S1% 10 NS 
2. Potential shareholders 4.8 4.4 5.6 4.1 Sm NS S1% 
N5 = Not 5igniticant, 51% = 5igniflcant at 1%, 5s% = 5igniticant at 511/o 
9.3.4 Auditor Independence 
The questionnaire asked respondents to rank auditors (from the Audit Bureau, 
Big Six audit firms and non-Big Six firms) from those they saw as the most 
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independent to those they regarded as the least independent (see Table 9.13). The 
analysis shows that respondents were split in their perceptions of the most 
independent auditor in Kuwait. Of the respondents who assigned a ranking to the 
Audit Bureau, 49.6% chose to rate it as the most independent auditor in Kuwait 
(21 % of respondents chose to rank it as the least independent). Of the 
respondents who chose to rank the audit firms associated with the Big Six, 52.7% 
saw them as the most independent auditors in Kuwait (11% of respondents 
ranked them as the least independent). Firms not associated with Big Six firms 
were clearly seen as the least independent (only 3.2% of respondents awarding 
them a ranking, chose to rate them as the most independent). Such a result is 
interesting as it shows that firms associated with Big Six firms clearly have a 
significant reputational advantage over their counterparts not associated with 
such multinational audit firms, but that the reputation of the Audit Bureau for 
independent work is almost as strong as that of firms associated with the Big Six. 
Indeed in Analysing the responses of the individual groups users chose to rank 
the Audit Bureau as being more independent than firms associated with the Big 
Six (not surprisingly this also the view of the Audit Bureau respondents, while 
respondents from the audit firms and financial directors chose to rank firms 
associated with the Big Six as the most independent). 
Tah1p Ql 
.q- 
Rank of Tnrdpnandanra of Aiirlit. nrc in Kvwtiit. 
Most Least No. of Total Answers for 
Independent % Independent % each group 
Audit Bureau 49.6 29.4 21.0 252 
Associated with 52 7 4 36 11 0 264 
the Big Six . . . 
No Association 
3.2 2 30 66 5 248 
with the Big Six . . 
9.3.5 Statutory Requirement for Two Independent Auditors 
Attitudes towards the recent amendment to the commercial law (article No. 161) 
discussed in chapter 8 concerning the statutory requirement for two independent 
auditors for listed companies were examined through six questions in the 
questionnaire. The reason behind the examination of this change was to see what 
the various groups thought of this development given that the amendment to the 
law was introduced by the parliament as an indirect response to the financial 
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scandals surrounding the collapses of major Kuwaiti organisations. This section 
was of particular value in that a similar change had been rejected in Spain but has 
long been accepted in France. The results (see Table 9.14) show three significant 
differences at the 1% level of statistical significance and one at the 5% level, 
although again the differences tended to be ones of emphasis rather than basic 
opinion. There was majority support in each of the four groups for the claims 
that two set of auditors would: make fraud detection easier; enhance the overall 
independence of audit work; not hinder auditors in gaining a clear picture of the 
financial position of the company; and not lead to unnecessary duplication of 
work. The only major split in opinion across the groups related to the claim that 
the appointment of two auditors would not generate a significant benefits to 
shareholders. External company auditors were split among themselves 
concerning the generated benefits gained from the appointment of two auditors, 
with 49% in agreement and 42% disagreeing with the statement. Similarly, the 
Bureau's auditors were split with 47% disagreeing while 41% agreeing. Users 
(69%) and directors (56%) were generally stronger in their disagreement with the 
statement. 
Table 9.14 - Statutory Reouirement for Two Tndenendent Auditors 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
AB AF 
1. Having two external auditors will 
make the detection of material fraud and 4 6 4 5 5 5 4 1 Slo; SI% S5% 
errors much easier . . . . 
2. The appointment of two external 
auditors will enhance the overall 4 8 5 7 5 6 4 3 S S1O S, ai independence of audit work . . . . j% , 
3. The use of two external auditors will 
limit either auditors' ability to obtain a 
clear picture of the financial position of 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.6 NS NS NS 
the company. 
4. The appointment of two external 
auditors will lead to unnecessary 3.7 3.2 3.1 2.8 S5% S5% NS duplication of audit work 
5. The requirement to appoint two 
external auditors will increase the share 
of the audit market held by large 5.4 5.1 5.7 5.0 NS NS NS 
accounting firms in Kuwait 
6. The appointment of two external 
auditors will generate no significant 3 6 3.0 4.0 4.2 S 1% S 1% S iii benefits for shareholders . , 
N5 = Not significant, 5, % = Significant at 10/6,55% = Significant at 5"/o 
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The respondents from audit firms tended to be the least supportive group (but 
also the most divided) towards this new requirement in Kuwait. Thus, claims that 
the new requirement would make the detection of fraud much easier were 
supported by a majority (51%) but rejected by a very significant `minority' 
(40%). Likewise, 55% of auditors agreed that the amendment would enhance the 
independence of audit work, while 38% disagreed. Such division is intriguing in 
that the audit firms are the party most likely to benefit the most from such an 
amendment to the law. For example, 72% of directors, 63% of users, 81% of 
respondents from the Audit Bureau (and 62% of respondents from audit firms) 
thought that the amendment would lead to an increase in the market share of the 
large accounting firms in Kuwait. The roots of their opposition to the claimed 
benefits to shareholders is not that easy to understand. It may be said that they 
are the ones closest to the audits affected by the amendment and that their 
rejection of such an amendment was, admirably, on (selfless) grounds that it will 
not produce better audits. However, this is hard to accept given that 70% of audit 
firm respondents did not think that it would lead to unnecessary duplication of 
audit work and 70% thought it would not prevent auditors from getting a clear 
picture of the company's financial position. On possible explanation is that a 
significant proportion of respondents from audit firms thought that the 
amendment was very much about image management (improving perceived 
independence) but not really about improving the actual effectiveness of audit 
work. However, this is not something shared by other groups (nor by half of the 
audit respondents) with clear majorities of users, directors and respondents from 
the Audit Bureau believing the reform will generate real benefits to shareholders. 
9.3.6 Prohibitions and Regulations Governing the Activities of Audit Firms 
This part of the questionnaire laid down eleven propositions about what auditors 
should be allowed to do and what they should not do (see Table 9.15). The 
analysis revealed just three statistically significant differences across the four 
groups - these related to statements that: audit appointments should have a 
specific time limit; audit firms should be self-regulated; and should be allowed to 
own shares in audit clients. On two of these there was evidence of groups taking 
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very different overall opinions. Thus, in relation to auditor rotation, the majority 
of external auditors (56%) were opposed to it while 57% of financial directors, 
53% of users and 66% of the Bureau's auditors were in favour of such proposal. 
Similarly, with the establishment of a self-regulatory system for auditing in 
Kuwait, 63% of external auditors were in favour while the other groups only gave 
it a minority support (41 % of the Audit Bureau respondents, 34% of users and 
42% of directors). 
Tah1 9.15 - Prnhibitinn and RPnilstinn on the 
Activities of Audit Firms 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
Audit firms in Kuwait should: AB AF 
1. be able to provide management 5 6 5 6 3 5 5.9 NS NS NS 
advisory services to their audit clients . . . 
2. be allowed to own shares in their audit 2.5 1.9 1.6 1.4 S1% Sig,, Ss% 
clients 
3. not be able to earn more than 10% of 4 5 4 7 4 0 4.4 NS NS NS 
total income from any one audit client . . . 
4. have a specific time limit to act as an 
external auditor of any client (e. g. no 4.5 4.6 4.8 3.5 SSA; S5% NS 
more than 5 consecutive years) 
5. be self-regulated instead of being 4.1 3.7 3.2 5.0 Sýý Sýý. ö NS regulated by the Ministry of Commerce 
6. not act primarily to make a prof it 3.6 3.8 4.6 3.9 NS NS NS 
7. have their appointment and fee 
determined by a body independent of the 5.4 5.4 5.1 4.9 NS NS NS 
client company 
8. have limited liability determined by 4.0 3.9 4.4 3.9 NS NS NS 
statute 
9. have their audit methods checked by a 5 7 6 0 8 5 5 7 NS NS NS 
professional standards body . . . . 
10. be required to be associated with a 5 8 5 7 3 5 4 5 NS NS NS 
major international audit firm . . . . 
11. not have close personal friendships 4 8 0 5 4 9 5.0 NS NS NS 
with their audit clients . . . 
N5 = Not Signiticant, 51% = 5igniticant at r°/o, b5% = Signiticant at 5°ßo 
In analysing the responses to this section, however, it was interesting to see that 
in several instances where there were no statistically significant difference across 
groups (in terms of the distribution of responses), the propositions were ones on 
which all groups were very much divided. For instance, all groups were split on 
whether audit firms should have limited liability determined by statute. 48% of 
auditors disagreed with such a position, while 44% agreed (the comparative splits 
for the other groups being: users (41% disagreed, 39% agreed), directors (39% 
disagreed, 46% agreed) and the Audit Bureau (32% disagreed and 52% agreed). 
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Similar division was evident over the proposition that audit firms should not act 
primarily to make profit. 47% of audit firm respondents agreed with the 
proposition (44% disagreed) - the comparative splits for the other groups 
being: 
directors (34% agreed, 51% disagreed), users (32% agreed, 42% disagreed) and 
Audit Bureau (53% agreed, 40% disagreed). 
The above views of directors and users are worth a second look - because on a 
number of statements in this section, they were less accepting of prohibitions on 
the activities of auditors than the audit firms themselves. Audit firms showed the 
strongest support (93%) against owning shares in their clients, the strongest 
support (62%) for auditors not having close personal relationships with their 
clients and the strongest support (49%) for auditors not to earn more than 10% of 
total income from any one audit client. Users and directors were also very much 
in favour of auditors being allowed to provide management advisory services to 
audit clients (83% and 77% respectively in favour - with audit firms, on this 
issue, being slightly more supportive, with a 85% support rate). This has been a 
perennial debate in Anglo-American contexts and it is striking to find that it is 
something of a non-issue in Kuwait. Recent global auditing developments have 
seen the auditing profession promoting more consulting-oriented audit services 
(under labels such as "value-added auditing"), arguing that this is what audit 
clients want. While there have been questions raised as to whether such a process 
is largely supply-side driven, the evidence in Kuwait does suggest that clients are 
wanting to receive a broader-based audit service. Another issue which has 
proved to be very controversial in Anglo-American contexts (whether audit 
appointments and fees should be determined by a body independent of the audit 
client) similarly proved to be not so controversial in Kuwait. All four groups, 
including the audit firms, were supportive of such a body carrying out these 
functions - (64% of auditors, 70% of users, 72% of Audit Bureau respondents 
and 75% of directors). This is further evidence that while auditing may 
becoming more global in its practice, the expectations gap debate is not as 
uniform as earlier work may have suggested. 
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9.3.7 How Successful are Auditors from Audit Firms and the Audit Bureau 
Respondents were asked to indicate how successful they think audit firms and the 
Audit Bureau are on 19 specific activities. The responses on the success of audit 
firms (see Table 9.16) showed 15 significant across group differences (12 at the 
1% level and 3 at the 5% level). For the Audit Bureau (see Table 9.17) 
significant across group differences (at the 1% level) were observed on all 19 
activities. At first sight, such a large number of significant differences implies a 
big performance gap. However, it has to be recognised that auditors were rating 
their own performance, so the results are always going to be susceptible to claims 
of a self-rating bias. Indeed, on most activities, both the audit firms and the Audit 
Bureau, perceived themselves more successful than the other groups saw them. 
Further, it is also important to look at the absolute ratings being given of auditors' 
performance. On most questions, users and directors gave positive ratings to the 
audit firms and the Audit Bureau. For instance, 71% of users thought that audit 
firms were providing a useful service to society, 79% thought they reported 
truthfully and 78% thought they were successful at detecting errors and 
irregularities). The significant differences tended to arise because the 
respondents from the two auditor groups tended to rate their performance even 
more highly than did users and directors. 
Mann Whitney tests were run to compare the differences in responses of pairs of 
respondent groups. These showed that respondents from audit firms and the 
Audit Bureau had pretty similar views on the successfulness of audit firms. 
Directors and users were also quite similar their rankings of the success of audit 
firms at the 19 specified tasks, a result which serves to undermine the traditional 
claim of the audit profession in Anglo-American environments that users have 
unreasonable and uneducated expectations of auditors (i. e., it is hard to 
substantiate claims of ignorance if the views of users are very similar to the views 
of people - directors - who deal directly with auditors on a constant basis). 
269 
Walid AiHusaini Chapter 9 
mm., 1kln a14. ` un, *r Cttnnooofitý Arn At, r1ifnre 
frnrn Au dlit. Firms? 
------- ---- --- 
Dir User AB AF KW 
KW 
w/out 
AB 
KW 
w/out 
AF 
1. Diagnosing problems 4.9 4.9 5.2 5.8 S1% SI% NS 
2. Prescribing remedies to problems 4.7 4.6 5.0 5.8 S10,0 S1% NS 
3. Acquiring information 5.6 5.5 5.7 6.0 S5% SJ% NS 
4. Coping with risk and uncertainty 4.1 4.6 5.1 4.6 S5% NS S5% 
5. Predicting the future 4.2 4.0 4.6 4.4 NS NS NS 
6. Making a profit 4.9 5.2 4.6 5.1 NS NS NS 
7. Detecting errors and irregularities 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.6 NS NS NS 
8. Preventing errors and irregularities 4.6 4.8 5.3 4.9 NS NS NS 
9. Complying with professional rules 5.6 5.2 5.9 6.3 S1% S1% Ss% 
10. Enforcing legal requirements 5.6 5.3 6.1 6.2 S1% S1% Ss% 
11. Forming correct judgements 5.2 5.2 5.7 5.9 Ste S1% NS 
12. Acting independently without regard 
to self-interest 
5.0 4.7 5.2 5.8 S1% S1% NS 
13. Communicating effectively 5.2 5.2 5.6 6.0 S1% S1%,. NS 
14. Reporting truthfully 5.6 5.4 5.7 6.1 SI% S1% NS 
15. Providing cost-effective audit 
investigations 
5.1 5.0 5.5 5.6 S1% Sio NS 
16. Being even-handed with the interests 
of others 
5.4 5.1 5.7 6.0 Sj% Si% SI% 
17. Limiting their own legal responsibility 5.0 5.2 4.7 5.2 NS NS NS 
18. Providing a useful service to corporate 
management 
5.1 5.4 5.7 5.9 S5% SI% NS 
19. Providing a useful service to society 4.7 5.1 5.0 5.7 S1% S1% NS 
20. Providing protection for Kuwait's 
public funds 
4.8 5.0 5.5 5.7 S,.  SI% NS 
N5 = Not 5igniticant, 51% = 5igniticant at h w/o, b5% = 5igniticant at o io 
Further Mann Whitney tests were undertaken to examine the different group 
perceptions of the success of the Audit Bureau. Audit firms were more critical of 
the Audit Bureau than were respondents from the Bureau (all activities bar one 
producing significant differences - at the 1% level - between the two sets of 
auditors). However, most of these differences were ones of emphasis - with the 
Bureau's audit staff seeing themselves as highly successful while the external 
auditors saw them as successful, but less so. User and directors also differed on 
their respective views of the Audit Bureau - with 9 significant differences (8 at 
the 5% level) being revealed - with users tending to rate more highly the 
Bureau's performance. 
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To1,1o a17- T-i.,.:, C,,. ". "oýýf1 Ara A»rlitnrc frnm the Audit Bureau? 
------ -- --- - 
Dir User AB AF KW 
KW 
w/out 
AB 
KW 
w/out 
AF 
1. Diagnosing problems 4.4 5.0 5.9 4.5 S1% SS % S1% 
2. Prescribing remedies to problems 4.0 4.4 5.6 4.3 S1% NS S1% 
3. Acquiring information 4.7 5.2 5.9 5.3 S1% NS S1% 
4. Coping with risk and uncertainty 3.7 4.3 5.6 4.2 S1% NS Sig; 
5. Predicting the future 3.6 4.2 5.3 3.7 S1% NS SI% 
6. Detecting errors and irregularities 4.6 5.3 5.8 4.7 S1% Ss% S1% 
7. Preventing errors and irregularities 3.9 4.2 5.6 4.5 S1% NS S1% 
8. Complying with professional rules 4.7 5.2 6.3 5.4 S1% NS Sias, 
9. Enforcing legal requirements 5.1 5.4 6.4 5.6 S1% NS S1% 
10. Forming correct judgements 4.3 5.0 6.1 4.8 Sj% Ss% S1% 
11. Acting independently without regard 
to self interest 
4.8 5.1 6.4 5.3 Si.  NS S15; 
12. Communicating effectively 4.7 5.1 6.1 4.7 Sj% NS SI% 
13. Reporting truthfully 4.9 5.4 6.4 5.2 S1o, NS S1 %, 
14. Providing cost-effective audit 
investigations 4.3 4.7 
6.2 4.3 S1% NS S1% 
15. Being even-handed with the interests 
of others 
4.6 5.0 6.4 4.9 Sj% NS SIe 
16. Limiting their own organisational 
responsibility 
4.3 4.5 5.6 4.7 Sj% NS SM 
17. Providing a useful service to corporate 
management 
4.3 4.8 6.1 4.7 51%; NS SI 1614, 
18. Providing a useful service to society 4.7 5.2 6.4 5.0 Sio NS Sie 
19. Providing protection for Kuwait's 
public funds 
4.9 5.1 6.5 5.0 5, %; NS 5, ý; 
N5 = Not Signiticant, 5, eß = 5igniticant at i,, /o, 55% = 5igniticant at wio 
Overall, financial directors, users of financial statements and respondents from 
audit firms all thought that the audit firms are generally more successful than the 
Audit Bureau. Interestingly, directors and users all rated the Bureau as more 
successful than audit firms in providing protection for Kuwait's public funds. 
Moreover, users seemed happier than directors with the performance of audit 
firms on several issues, including detecting and preventing errors/irregularities, 
providing a useful service to corporate management and providing a useful 
service to society. As with respondents from the audit firms, the Bureau's 
auditors rated their performance higher than that of audit firms. However, the 
Bureau's respondents gave higher ratings to the audit firms than respondents 
from the firms gave to the Audit Bureau. For instance, while 83% and 71% of 
auditors from the Bureau saw audit firms as being successful in detecting fraud 
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and preventing fraud, only 53% and 58% of external auditors perceived the 
Bureau's auditors as successful in such activities. 
9.3.8 The Role of External Auditors at the KIO 
The questionnaire asked respondents whether KIO was audited by an external 
auditor before the collapse of its Spanish investments (see Table 9.18). The aim 
of this question was to help explain the lack of debate about the role of auditors 
in the aftermath of the KIO scandal. If people did not know that KIO was 
externally audited, then it might explain the lack of debate or criticism of the role 
of auditing and audit firms. The findings lend some support to such a perspective 
in that 60% of respondents did not know that KIO was externally audited. Users 
were the group which contained the largest number of respondents (66%) who 
did not know that KIO was externally audited. This was significantly higher than 
the percentage of respondents from audit firms (53%) who believed that KIO was 
not externally audited. 
Tahla 91R- KT(1 was Fxtprnnlly Aiirlitarl 
Directors Users Audit Bureau Audit Firms Total 
Yes 43% 35% 46% 47% 40% 
No 57% 66% 54% 53% 60% 
Given that KIO does not publish any financial information nor an audit report on 
its operations, propositions about the degree of information that should be made 
public by KIO were explored in the questionnaire (see Table 9.19). A basic 
majority of directors and users (58% and 54% respectively) wanted KIO to 
publish both the auditor's report and summarised financial statements, while an 
additional 21% of directors and 19% of users wanted KIO to publish full audited 
financial statements. The majority of respondents from audit firms also 
supported greater publication by KIO, with 27% favouring the publication of full 
audited financial statements and an additional 48% wanting publication of the 
auditor's report and summarised financial statements. The group which, 
surprisingly, took a different view was the Audit Bureau respondents. 37% did 
not want KIO to publish any financial information, while a further 26% had no 
opinion on the issue - leaving just 11% in favour of full audited financial 
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statements being published. Given that the official role of the Audit Bureau is to 
aid parliament in enhancing transparency and promoting accountability, one 
could have expected the Bureau's respondents to have been more supportive of 
moves designed to enhance transparency and give more information to the 
Kuwaiti public. 
Table 9.19 - Level of Information to be Published 
Directors Users 
Audit Audit Total 
Bureau Firms 
1. KIO should publish full audited financial 21% 19% 11% 27% 21% 
statements 
2. KIO should publish the auditor's report 58% 54% 26% 48% 52% 
and summarised financial statements 
3. KIO should not publish any financial 10% 13% 37% 9% 13% information 
4.1 have no opinion on this issue 11% 14% 26% 16% 14% 
As discussed earlier (see Chapter 8), there has been no public explanation about 
the objectives of KIO's external audit. Accordingly, the questionnaire sought to 
explore perceptions of a list of possible objectives of the external audits of KIO 
(see Table 9.20). 
TahlP A 20 - 
(1hiprtivPC of KTf's Fxfornnl Aiiclit. 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
AB AF 
1. Detect all significant fraud 5.9 6.1 5.3 4.9 S 1% S io, NS 
2. Detect any major breaches of legislation 6.5 6.6 5.8 6.2 NS NS Ss% 
governing KIO's operations 
3. Report to the appropriate regulatory 6.2 6.6 5.9 6.2 S5% NS S5% 
authorities on significant malpractice 
4. Assist in preparing financial statements 5.0 5.7 5.1 5.2 NS NS NS 
5. Evaluate management performance 5.1 5.7 5.4 4.9 S5% SSA; NS 
6. Attest that KIO's financial statements 
comply with Generally Accepted 6.5 6.7 6.0 6.8 S, % NS Ss% 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
7. Assist in minimising KIO's tax 5.1 5.7 5.3- 4.7 NS Ss% NS 
obligations around the world 
8. To ensure that public funds managed by 6.4 6.4 5.6 6.1 NS NS Ss% KIO are adequately protected 
NS = Not 5igrnticant, 51% = significant at r%, S= Significant at b'Yo 
While the analysis revealed four significant across-group differences (2 at the 1% 
level and 2 at the 5% level of statistical significance), it is apparent that these 
differences were very much ones of emphasis. Clear majorities in all four groups 
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saw the external audit of KIO having all the objectives listed in Table 9.20). The 
support for each objective ranged from 65% to 96% for directors, 76% to 96% for 
users, 69% to 88% for the Audit Bureau and 57% to 98% for respondents from 
audit firms. The least number of respondents agreeing with an objective was in 
the case of respondents from audit firms, where 57% thought that the KIO 
external audit should detect all significant fraud. Interestingly, this compared 
favourably with the views that such respondents had of the external company 
audit, with only 37% of them seeing this as a company audit objective (see 
Question 1, Table 9.10). Audit firms, though were not alone in such rankings, as 
both greater percentages of directors and users saw the external audit of KIO as 
having a responsibility to detect all significant fraud compared to their views with 
respect to the limited company external audit. The only exception was the Audit 
Bureau respondents, where 81% of respondents attributed such an objective to 
the limited company external audit, compared to 69% for the external audit of 
KIO. 
9.3.9 The KIO Scandal 
The questionnaire included eleven statements about differing aspects of the KIO 
scandal and respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement with 
them (see Table 9.21). On many of these issues, respondents seemed to have 
similar views - for instance largely believing that: KIO's auditors should be 
legally liable if their work was deemed to be substandard: people responsible for 
the collapse of GT's were not held adequately accountable; international audit 
firms have the capacity to understand fully the type of complex investments and 
transactions undertaken by KIO; and that having power and good connections 
make it easier to get away with corporate fraud. Only three statements generated 
significant across-group differences (2 at the 1% level and 1 at the 5% level of 
statistical significance). There was disagreement as to whether the secrecy at KIO 
prevented auditors from detecting and reporting breaches in laws and regulations. 
Respondents from audit firms were more certain than the other three groups that 
traditions of secrecy had not hindered the auditor's work in these regards. For 
instance, 57% of auditors felt that secrecy traditions had not prevented auditors 
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from detecting breaches in the law, while 55% of users felt that the had. 
Likewise, 75% of auditors felt that secrecy traditions had not prevented auditors 
from reporting breaches in the law, while 50% of respondents from the Audit 
Bureau felt that they had. Respondents from audit firms were also the least 
supportive of the claim that scandals on the scale of GT/KIO are unlikely to 
happen again. 50% of them supported such a statement, compared to 55% of 
directors, 62% of respondents from the Audit Bureau and 77% of users. 
Tal-da Q 91 - 
(la is ral Tcciit ahmif tha KTC) 'Reantdal 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
AB AF 
1. In the "GT" affair, auditors generally 
placed too much reliance on the assurances 5.0 5.1 4.9 4.0 NS NS NS 
of corporate management 
2. Auditors should be legally liable for the 
collapse of KIO's investments in "GT" if 5.8 5.6 5.8 5.7 NS NS NS 
their work was substandard 
3. People responsible for the collapse of 
KIO's investments have not yet been held 6.0 6.4 6.4 6.3 NS NS NS 
adequately to account 
4. People responsible for the collapse of 
KIO's investments will never be held 4.0 4.5 4.2 3.2 NS Ss.; NS 
accountable. 
5. Traditions of secrecy at KIO prevented 
auditors from detecting breaches in 4.2 4.8 4.2 3.1 S5% S,, NS 
corporate law 
6. Traditions of secrecy at KIO prevented 
auditors from reporting discovered breaches 3.4 4.3 4.3 2.3 S1% Ste NS 
in corporate law to the appropriate 
authorities 
7. International audit firms generally have 
the capacity to understand fully the type of 2 6 5 9 5.6 5.8 NS NS NS 
complex investments and transactions . . 
undertaken by KIO 
8. The Audit Bureau generally has the 
capacity to understand fully the type of 3.8 4.5 4.2 4.6 NS Sj% NS 
complex investments and transactions 
undertaken by KIO 
9. KIO's Spanish investment problems are 
an isolated incident, not reflective of the 5.1 4 7 5.4 4.6 NS NS NS 
general way in which Kuwaiti institutions . 
manage their investment portfolios 
10. In Kuwait, power and good connections 
make it easy to get away with corporate 5.3 5.8 5.3 5.0 NS Ss% NS 
fraud. 
11. Scandals on the scale of "GT" and 
"Kuwait Oil Tankers Company" are likely 4.6 5.5 5.2 4.7 Ste S1% SI% 
to re-occur in Kuwait in the future 
N5 = Not 5igniticant, 51% = signiticant at 1%, 55% = Significant at 57o 
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Viewed in the broader context of the KIO scandal, the responses to several of the 
statements included in this section of the questionnaire are worthy of more 
reflection. Large number of participants from the four groups did not believe that 
people responsible for the collapse of KIO's investments had been made 
accountable for their actions. The majority of respondents, excluding those from 
the audit firms, seemed also to agree that the people responsible for the collapse 
of KIO's investments would never be held accountable. This sceptical attitude 
towards seeing justice served might be explained by the large agreement among 
the four groups that in Kuwait power and good connections, which was indeed 
evident in KIO, might make it easier to get away with fraud. However, a big 
majority in each of the four groups agreed that auditors should be legally liable 
for the collapse of KIO's if their work was deemed to be substandard. Ironically, 
the work of Coopers & Lybrand, the auditor of GT, was deemed to be 
substandard and the firm was duly fined by the Spanish regulator. However, the 
Kuwaiti authorities does not seem to agree with the views of respondents - as it 
has not pursued Coopers & Lybrand in any shape or form. 
The findings in this section also tend to support the notion that, despite the 
shortcomings of international audit firms involved in the KIO case, the four 
groups of respondents still have a high regard for these firms. While at least half 
of the respondents from each group accepts that scandals on the scale of KIO 
(and the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company) are likely to re-occur in Kuwait, they still 
strongly believe that international audit firms are capable of understanding the 
type of complex investments encountered in the KIO case. A larger number of 
directors (88%) and users (90%) rated the audit firms higher than the audit firms 
(77%) rated themselves in having the capacity to understand complex 
investments. Further, all four groups (including the Audit Bureau) were far more 
confident that audit firms had the capacity to understand complex investments in 
comparison to their perceptions of the Audit Bureau (e. g. 90% of users felt audit 
firms had such a capacity, while only 55% had such a belief in the Audit Bureau 
- the comparative figures for directors were 88% and 36%, while for the Audit 
Bureau, 79% of its respondents agreed that the audit firms had such a capacity, 
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while just 47% had such a belief in the Audit Bureau). This strong faith in the 
international firms seems rather unfounded when one looks at the role played by 
auditors in the KIO case, their levels of understanding of the Spanish investment 
process and the critical findings of ICAC, the Spanish audit regulatory body. 
9.3.10 Blame for the Collapse of GT and Causes of Financial Scandals in 
Kuwait 
Respondents were asked in the questionnaire to attach (to a list of eight parties) a 
degree of blame for the collapse of GT (on a scale of 1 equalling no blame, 4 
equalling some blame and 7 representing total blame). The four groups virtually 
blamed everybody for the collapse of GT, with managers at GT, KIO and KIA 
being assigned the highest degree of blame and the Spanish government seen as 
the least to blame. The responses only produced one significant difference across 
the four groups - relating to the degree of blame attached to the Audit Bureau. 
While clear majorities of directors, users and respondents from audit firms placed 
a significant degree of blame on the Audit Bureau, 58% of respondents from the 
Audit Bureau attached little blame to the Bureau (see Table 9.22). 
Table 9.22 - Blame for the C, nllanse of Grunn Torras 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
AB AF 
1. KIO's External Auditors 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.2 NS NS NS 
2. GT's External Auditors 5.7 5.8 6.6 5.5 NS NS NS 
3. Audit Bureau 5.2 5.5 3.3 5.0 Sj% NS S1%; 
4. Managers at Kuwait Investment 6.5 6.7 6.5 6.4 NS NS NS 
Office Of 
5. Managers at Grupo Torras 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.6 NS NS NS 
6. Managers at Kuwait Investment 6.0 6.2 6.0 6.0 NS NS NS 
Authority 
7. The Spanish government 4.1 4.3 5.1 4.0 NS NS NS 
8 The Kuwaiti government 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.2 NS NS NS 
N5 = Not 5igniticant, 51% = significant at 1k'/o, 55% = significant at 5% 
It is worth noting that all the groups blamed the Kuwaiti government more than 
they blamed the Spanish government. The degree of blame attached to auditors 
fell somewhere between the blame attached to management and to the Spanish 
government - in some cases being quite similar to the blame attached to the 
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Kuwaiti government. Representatives from audit firms, not that surprisingly, 
were the group of respondents who placed the least blame on the external 
auditors of KIO and GT, while respondents from the Audit Bureau placed the 
highest degree of blame on such auditors. It would be unwise to make too much 
of such distinctions, as basically the respondents were not that discriminating in 
their views - everyone, as noted above, was seen to be to blame. However, 
it 
does serve as another reminder of the ability of the large multinational firms to 
manage to avoid serious reputational damage in notorious corporate scandals. 
While they were attributed some considerable blame, this (as the previous section 
has shown) was not damaging significantly the degree of confidence that people 
had in the effectiveness of their working methods. 
The questionnaire also sought respondents' views on the possible causes of the 
various financial scandals to have occurred in Kuwait since 1991 (see Table 
9.23). The four groups of respondents generally agreed that the proposed causes 
could all have been responsible for the financial scandals. The four groups 
seemed to rate the absence of adequate accountability as the most important 
cause, with poor management as the second most important cause. There was 
only one significant across group difference (at the 1% level). Audit firms were 
significantly less in agreement with the claim that the absence of the parliament 
between 1986 and 1992 was an important factor (just 54% agreed compared to 
61% of financial directors, 78% of users and 80% of the Bureau auditors). The 
perception of each group that sub-standard external audits were a major cause of 
the financial scandals looks rather strange given the groups' apparent satisfaction 
with auditing and auditors in the first part of the questionnaire. It might suggest 
that the groups feel that the sub-standard audits in these scandals were isolated 
incidents which do not represent the overall quality and status of auditing. 
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TQh1n 0 9q 
- 
i'! a»eoe of Finnnnia1 qt-nnrlnlq 
in Kuwait. 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out 
AB AF 
1. Excessive secrecy in Kuwait's 5.4 5.2 5.6 4.5 NS Ss% NS 
government institutions 
2. Absence of adequate 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.1 NS NS NS 
accountability 
3. Absence of the Kuwait National 4.9 5.8 6.2 4.6 S1% S1% S1% 
Assembly (1986-1992) 
4. Poor management 5.9 6.2 6.2 5.7 NS S5% NS 
5. Failure to maintain adequate 4.5 5.1 5.5 4.7 NS NS SS,; 
accounting records 
6. Sub-standard external audits 5.5 5.4 5.7 5.1 NS NS NS 
7. Failure to enforce existing Kuwaiti 5.3 5.6 5.6 5.3 NS NS NS 
corporate laws and regulations 
N5 = Not Significant, 5l% = 5igniticant at 1 Mio, 55°% = , ignmTmcant at ow 
9.3.11 The Future of Corporate Governance in Kuwait 
The last part of the questionnaire focused on improving the future of corporate 
governance in Kuwait. It consisted of ten proposals to change long-standing 
practices, traditions or regulations in the current corporate environment in Kuwait 
and respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the various 
proposals. The analysis of this section revealed significant across group 
differences on 8 (6 at the 1% level and 2 at the 5% level of statistical 
significance) out of the 10 proposals (see Table 9.24). However, only one 
proposal showed a clear difference in overall opinions rather than differences in 
emphasis. This related to the proposal that the Audit Bureau should be 
responsible for appointing and setting the fees of external auditors in government 
owned organisation and companies, where 54% of respondents from audit firms 
disagreed, compared with 61% of financial directors, 70% of users and 84% of 
the Bureau's auditors agreeing with the proposal. This endorsement by three of 
the groups of respondents for an expansion in the Bureau's role is backed up by 
majority support from all four groups for the Bureau to play a greater role in 
evaluating the efficiency of corporate management (supported by 79% of 
directors, 88% of users, 98% of respondents from the Audit Bureau and 66% of 
respondents from audit firms). The responses to this part of the questionnaire 
showed a strong support for more audit services and for more extensive audits. 
All four groups generally were against the proposal to abolish the requirement for 
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two independent auditors to audit shareholding companies. They also quite 
strongly agreed that such a requirement should be extended to government owned 
organisations and corporations not listed on the stock exchange (such as KIO, 
KIA, KPC). The four groups all supported the proposal that Audit Bureau reports 
on government owned organisations/corporations should be publicly available. 
They also strongly opposed the proposal for abolishing the statutory requirement 
for external audits and the proposal to abolish the Bureau's audit of shareholding 
companies. 
Talk1n 0 9,4 - 
F»trnro of fnrnnrnfA (Invarnnnea in Kuwait 
KW KW 
Dir User AB AF KW w/out w/out AB AF_ 
1. Legally require that external audits of 
companies and organisations with a capital 
above KD 5 million are audited by 5.9 5.6 4.3 5.6 SI. ". NS S1610 internationally affiliated audit firms 
2. Increase audit fees to enable more 
extensive audits to be performed 5.1 5.0 4.4 6.0 SJ. ". S1616 NS 3. Change the law to allow companies listed 
on the stock exchange to be audited by just 3.6 3.0 3.6 3.4 NS NS NS one Audit firm 
4. Require that government owned 
corporations and organisations not listed on 
the stock market (such as Kuwait Petroleum 5.9 6.0 4.8 5.1 SI S5% S11110 Corporation (KPQ KIO, and KIA, ) are 
audited by two different external audit f inns 
5. Place directors of Kuwaiti corporations on 
performance-related contracts 6.2 6.3 6.1 5.7 S5% S51116 NS 6. Allow the Audit Bureau a greater role in 
evaluating the efficiency of corporate 5.8 6.1 6.7 5.2 SI% S1010 S M, 14, management 
7. Allow the Audit Bureau a greater role in 
appointing audit firms and setting their fees for work on government owned companies 5.0 5.2 6.0 3.3 SI. ". S11116 S5% and organisations I 8. Require that all stockholding companies, listed on the Kuwaiti stock exchange (and in 
which the government hold 50% or more of 2.5 2.6 1.7 3.3 SI% NS S11 1 the equity capital) are exempted from any 1 0 Audit Bureau attestation 
9. External audit is abolished as a mandatory legal requirement for Kuwaiti companies 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 NS NS NS 
10. Require that all reports prepared by the Audit Bureau on government owned 
organisations and corporations are publicly 5.8 5.8 4.7 5.2 S5. ". NS S501; 
available I I 1 -1 N5 = Not Significant, 81% = Significant at l"/o, 5s^ß = 51gniticant at 5w 
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Table 9.24 also shows that all four groups were in favour of paying higher fees to 
enable more extensive audits to be performed and they also support the proposal 
that all companies with capital above KD 5m should be audited by internationally 
affiliated audit firms. This again shows a strong belief in the role of international 
audit firms even though the KIO case has highlighted the limitations of these 
firms to function properly in complex and deceptive environments. 
9.4 Key themes 
The final part of this chapter combines findings from different parts of the 
questionnaire survey in order to highlight several key themes emerging from the 
responses received. Such themes will help to draw out more clearly some of the 
policy implications of the thesis. 
9.4.1 Strong Belief in Auditing and the Need for More Audits by 
International Audit Firms 
The analysis has shown that people in Kuwait believe that auditing has improved 
since the collapse of the Al-Manakh stock market in 1982, a time when auditing 
work was criticised and blamed for aiding the crises. People also seemed to be 
satisfied with the current level of services provided by auditors in Kuwait. This 
can be seen in their disagreement with the statements that: "too much is expected 
of auditors"; "the audit is of little benefit to a company"; "auditors do not 
understand the problems of business"; and that "auditing be abolished as a 
mandatory legal requirement in Kuwait". Directors and users in Kuwait even 
appeared more relaxed than audit firms about certain reductions in audit 
regulation in Kuwait. This was evident in the smaller percentages of directors 
and users (in comparison to the percentage of respondents from audit firms) who 
were against audit firms owning shares in their audit clients and acting primarily 
to make profit. 
Analysis of the questionnaire results has revealed that respondents wanted more 
extensive audits and were supportive of extending the statutory requirement for 
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two auditors to attest the financial statements of listed companies in Kuwait - so 
that it covered other organisations that are not listed in the stock market (e. g. 
KIO, KIA, KPC) (see Question 4 in Table 9.24). The respondents also wanted to 
keep the current arrangement where listed stockholding companies, in which the 
government hold 50% or more of the equity capital, are audited by the Audit 
Bureau and also by two external auditors (Question 8 in Table 9.24). 
The respondents were clearly supportive of local audit firms being associated 
with the Big Six international audit firms - 79% of financial directors, 82% of 
users, 69% of the Bureau's auditors and 71% of audit firms supporting such an 
association (see Table 9.15). This support was compatible with the general 
acceptance that statute should require that companies with a capital of KD5m are 
audited by internationally affiliated audit firms. This is not surprising given the 
more positive image associated with audit firms (in comparison with the groups' 
ratings of the performance of the Audit Bureau - see Tables 9.16 and 9.17) and 
the fact that 88% of financial directors, 90% of users, 79% of the Bureau's 
auditors and 77% of respondents from audit firms feel that international audit 
firms have the capacity to understand fully the type of complex investments and 
transactions undertaken by KIO (Question 7 in Table 9.21). In contrast, the four 
groups, including the Bureau's auditors, saw the Audit Bureau as much less 
capable of understanding complex investments and transactions such as those 
undertaken by KIO (Question 8 in Table 9.21). However, these beliefs are rather 
contradicted by the degree of blame that all four groups place on auditors of both 
GT and KIO for the collapse of GT (Questions 1&2 in Table 9.22) -a finding 
which provides a very useful practical illustration of the international accounting 
firms' relative immunity to corporate scandals and any ensuing audit failure. 
9.4.2 Auditors to Provide More Services 
Although, the survey shows that people in Kuwait were satisfied with the level of 
services provided by the auditors, it also shows that people wanted auditors to 
provide more services. The type of services fell into two categories - namely, 
those that the international audit firms have traditionally declined to accept as a 
282 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 9 
part of their duty as external limited company audit and those that they strongly 
support providing to their corporate audit clients. 
The first category of services includes fraud detection, reporting on internal 
control, evaluating and reporting to shareholders on management efficiency. 
The 
findings of the survey were similar to some previous audit expectation gap 
surveys in revealing the apparent sensitivity of obligations of auditors regarding 
fraud detection (auditors declining such responsibility but accepting a duty to 
ensure that the financial statements are free from significant deliberate 
distortions). However, audit firms were seen by 70% of financial directors, 83% 
of users and 84% of the Bureau's auditors as providing significant protection 
against fraud. Interestingly, only 55% of audit firms agreed with such a 
statement (Question 8 in Table 9.9), although all four groups tended to agree that 
audit firms are successful in detecting errors and irregularities (Question 7 in 
Table 9.16) and, to a lesser degree, successful in preventing errors and 
irregularities (Question 8 in Table 9.16). Directors, users of financial statements 
and external auditors rated the Audit Bureau as less successful than audit firms in 
both detecting and preventing errors and irregularities (Question 6&7 in Table 
9.17). 
These findings raise two interesting points. The first is that while external 
auditors deny responsibility for detecting fraud they are claiming to be successful 
in detecting fraud (a claim supported by the other groups). In contrast, while the 
Bureau's auditors agreed that they have responsibility to detect fraud (Question 1 
in Table 9.11), the other three groups saw the Bureau's auditors as less successful 
than audit firms in detecting and preventing fraud (Question 7 in Table 9.17). 
The second point, is that if audit firms are providing significant protection against 
fraud and are successful in detecting errors and irregularities, then why did they 
not discover scandals before they happened in cases like those of KIO and 
Kuwait Oil Tankers Corporation? 
International audit firms have often been against having a responsibility to report 
(publicly) on the effectiveness of internal controls and the efficiency of 
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management. Auditors in Kuwait, however, did not seem to share this view - 
with there being mutual agreement among respondents that auditors should 
identify ways to improve management efficiency (78% of financial directors, 
77% of users, 67% of external auditors and 61% of the Bureau auditors 
supporting such a development - see Question 9 in Table 9.9). The four groups 
also supported auditors reporting to shareholders on management efficiency and 
should ensure that a satisfactory system of internal control is being operated. 
The second category related to the controversial issue of providing management 
advisory services to audit clients. There have been frequent claims in the 
international auditing literature that the provision of such services by auditors to 
their clients compromises auditor independence and should be outlawed or 
suspended. However, in this survey all groups were unanimous in their support 
for auditors to have the right to provide such services to their audit clients 
(Question A51). Currently, under Kuwaiti regulations, audit firms can not 
provide management consulting services to their audit clients. One possible 
reason for the stance taken by survey respondents relates to the general standard 
of management in Kuwaiti organisations. The Kuwaiti government controls the 
public sector and most of the private sector, using employment in Kuwait as part 
of the welfare system to distribute the country's wealth among its citizens. 
Therefore, there is virtually no relationship between performance and 
employment in government-owned organisations. In addition, employment 
policies, especially in Kuwait's prestigious organisations, are based more on 
relationships and friendships (usually known as Wasta) rather than on candidate's 
qualifications. Consequently, respondents might see a management consulting 
service from accounting professionals as an aid to poor management teams. This 
argument is reinforced through the agreement, although audit firms agree to a 
lesser degree, across the four groups that directors of Kuwaiti corporations should 
be placed on performance based contracts (over 90% of financial directors, users 
and respondents from the Audit Bureau agreed with this statement in comparison 
to 81% of external auditors - Question 5 in Table 9.24). The respondents general 
support for the Audit Bureau to be allowed a greater role in evaluating the 
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efficiency of corporate management (Question 6 in Table 9.24) can also 
be seen 
as an indication of concern with the standards and standing of management 
practice in Kuwait. 
9.4.3 Auditor Independence in Kuwait 
The positive perception of the role of auditors in Kuwait and the support for audit 
firms to provide management consulting services to their audit clients is 
undermined or contradicted by the worries expressed over auditor independence. 
All groups agreed that auditors are usually appointed in Kuwait through 
friendships and relationships with senior corporate management (76% of 
respondents from audit firms, 69% of directors, 76% of users and 71 % of 
respondents from the Audit Bureau holding such a view - see question 12 in 
Table 9.9). This finding is consistent with parliamentary debates in Kuwait and 
comments by the general secretary of the Kuwaiti Association of Accountants 
and Auditors. Such appointments could lead to cosy relationships between 
auditors and their clients, which could impair auditor independence (as is usually 
claimed in the auditing literature). This argument was effectively supported in 
the survey as majorities of each respondent group felt that audit firms in Kuwait 
should not have close personal friendships with their audit clients (Question 11 in 
Table 9.15). The majority of financial directors and users saw auditors as being 
too concerned with keeping management happy, although auditors from both 
sectors were reluctant to implicate auditors in this way - 47% of respondents from 
external audit firms disagreed with such a claim (while 42% agreed); Audit 
Bureau respondents were split in their view, with 38% disagreeing with the claim 
and 38% agreeing (Question 3 in Table 9.9). All four groups also strongly 
believed that audit firms in Kuwait should not own shares in their audit clients 
(Question 2 in Table 9.15), although this view was most strongly held by auditors 
and not users and directors. 
The implications of the above views and some of the inconsistencies within them 
are basically twofold. At one level, it could be argued that people in Kuwait are 
not as well informed about the threats to independence if auditors are allowed to 
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provide management advisory services. However, the likelihood of this may not 
be that high. For instance, the existence of a legal provision preventing such 
service provision does suggest that the issue has been given some previous 
consideration at senior policy making levels of government. Alternatively, it may 
be that people are far more relaxed about notions of auditor independence and do 
not place so much faith on rules governing the appearance of independence, 
placing more value on the underlying strength of personal relationships. This, in 
some ways, is similar to the stance recently advocated by the AICPA in the USA 
(for a discussion, see Klarskov Jeppesen, 1998), in seeking to reduce the 
restrictions and prohibitions on audit behaviour - although, such an argument has 
clearly received some major setbacks following the SEC's recent ruling that 
PricewaterhouseCoopers had wholeheartedly breached an ethical guideline 
governing share ownership by auditors. It has to be doubted whether such 
arguments have penetrated debating circles in Kuwait - meaning that the stances 
are probably a reflection of Kuwaiti business traditions and/or a certain naivety 
about the quality and fundamental underpinnings of external audit practice. 
9.4.4 The Image of Audit Firms Against that of the Audit Bureau 
The questionnaire survey clearly showed that audit firms were more highly rated 
than the Audit Bureau in Kuwait. Financial directors and users of financial 
statements perceive audit firms as more successful than the Audit Bureau in the 
majority of tasks listed in the questionnaire. Even in the cases where the Audit 
Bureau was rated higher than audit firms, this rating difference was not 
statistically significant. For instance, 61% of directors and 72% of users 
(Question 18 in Table 9.17) saw the Audit Bureau as providing useful services to 
society in comparison to the 57% of directors and 71% of users who saw audit 
firms providing such a service (Question 19 in Table 9.16). The strong belief in 
audit firms, especially international ones, can also be seen in the way the four 
groups saw these firms as having the ability to understand complex investments 
and transactions like those undertaken by KIO (Question 7 Table 9.21). The 
Audit Bureau was not seen as equally qualified to understand the complex 
investments of KIO (Question 8 Table 9.21), even by the Bureau's own auditors 
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(only 47% of Bureau's respondents felt that their body was able to understand 
complex transactions undertaken by KIO). This relatively poorer image of the 
Audit Bureau might be attributed to the fact that most of the shareholding 
companies and government owned organisations are audited by audit firms 
associated with the big international firms. These firms appoint auditors from 
Anglo-American countries and rely on the resources and the expertise of their 
international counterparts whenever they are needed. In contrast, the Audit 
Bureau has to rely on Kuwaiti's and Egyptians with probably less experience and 
training. The low salaries of the Bureau's employees also does not usually attract 
the promising new graduates to seek employment at the Bureau. 
Although audit firms, directors and users perceived the Audit Bureau as inferior 
to the audit firms, the majority of respondents from the four groups believed that 
the Audit Bureau should have a larger role than that of audit firms. In all the 
propositions concerning the role that should be played by auditors from both the 
Audit Bureau and audit firms, a higher number of participants from the four 
groups felt that such propositions are the responsibility of the Audit Bureau. 
Interestingly, at least 90% of the Audit Bureau's auditors agreed that such 
propositions are among their duty - something which was not evident in the case 
of the external auditors (see Tables 9.10 and 9.11). Rather the audit firms felt 
that they did not have a duty for some of the propositions. For instance, only 
37% felt that they had a duty to detect all significant fraud and 49% felt they have 
responsibility to ensure that the company is being run efficiently. 
9.4.5 Audit Reporting and the Role of the Auditor at KIO 
The fact that KIO does not publish any financial information about its operations 
might explain why 60% of respondents did not know that KIO was audited 
externally by KPMG. The secrecy that surrounds KIO and its operations might 
also explain respondents' lack of awareness of KPMG's role. As consequence 
this might explain the lack of discussion and blame in Kuwait for auditors in 
detecting the Grupo Torras scandal. 
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The questionnaire analysis shows clear support from financial directors, users and 
external auditors for publication of some financial information about KIO's 
operations, as 21% of respondents said the KIO should publish full audited 
financial statements while 52% of respondents wanted KIO to publish the audit 
report and a summary of the financial statements. On the other hand, the Audit 
Bureau seems to support KIO's position for not publishing any financial 
information as 37% of them said KIO should not publish any financial 
information while 26% said they had no opinion on the issue. The Bureau's 
position might be explained by their close relationship with the government 
especially during the period when the parliament was suspended by the 
government. Another reason might be attributed to the fact that the Bureau does 
not publish its audit reports of KIO and therefore does not expect the external 
auditor to publish his report. The Bureau was also less supportive of publishing 
its audit reports of government owned organisations and corporations - only 56% 
supporting such publication in comparison with 78% of financial directors, 81 % 
of users and 63% of external auditors. 
Respondents across the four groups seemed to agree that the eight objectives 
given in the questionnaire are the main reasons behind having an external audit of 
KIO's accounts (see Table 9.20). Some of these objectives, however, were clearly 
not met in the case of the KIO scandal. The external auditor did not detect 
significant fraud, did not detect major breaches of legislation governing KIO's 
operations and did not protect the public funds managed by KIO. As such, it is 
rather paradoxical that respondents from the four groups, especially from the 
audit firms, believe that the traditions of secrecy in KIO did not prevent auditors 
from detecting fraud and reporting it to the appropriate authorities (Questions 5& 
6 in Table 9.21) - particularly when the agreed that KIO should be more open 
and publish financial information. 
9.4.6 Corporate Governance in Kuwait 
The majority of respondents across the four groups seem to be sceptical about the 
issue of accountability in Kuwait. The four groups rated the absence of adequate 
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accountability (Question 1 in Table 9.23) as the highest factor behind the string 
of financial scandals that emerged in Kuwait in the post-Gulf war era. They also 
felt that the people responsible for the collapse of KIO's investments had not 
been made adequately accountable (Question 3 in Table 9.21). However, they 
were divided on whether they will ever be held accountable (Question 4 in Table 
9.21). This sceptical attitude towards accountability might be explained in the 
agreement among the four participants that power and good connections (Wasta) 
in Kuwait make it easier to get away with fraud (Question 10 in Table 9.21). 
Other reasons might be attributed to the agreement of the majority of respondents 
across the groups that the absence of the parliament (Question 3 in Table 9.23) 
and the failure to enforce laws and regulations (Question 7 in Table 9.23) were 
among the factors responsible for the financial scandals in Kuwait. 
The survey also highlighted the importance of the issue of management 
performance. The respondents seem to agree that poor management was one of 
the reasons behind the collapse of KIO's investments. They also wanted 
managers to be placed on performance related contracts, something that is 
unheard of in Kuwait. Managers in Kuwait in many cases are evaluated and 
promoted not on performance but on social aspects (such as 'Wasta' factors or, as 
revealed by Tetreault (1995), a mechanism for getting rid of unproductive 
employees). An interesting question raised by the KIO case is whether it was an 
isolated incident or a reflection of how Kuwaiti institutions manage their 
investment portfolios. 63% of financial directors, 58% of users, 64% of Audit 
Bureau respondents and 48% of audit firm respondents support the argument that 
KIO scandal is an isolated case (Question 9 in Table 9.21). However, this is 
contradicted by their agreement that Kuwait will encounter scandals in the scale 
of KIO scandal in the future (Question 11 in Table 9.21). Moreover, the groups 
agreement that power and good connections in Kuwait make it easy to get away 
with corporate fraud gives strength to the claim that the KIO case is not likely to 
be a one off (Question 10 in Table 9.21). 
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The above findings support some of the concerns and debates that usually emerge 
in the aftermath of revelations of financial scandals or allegations of corruption 
and mismanagement in Kuwait, such as those echoed in Kuwaiti press coverage: 
"... the main reason in all the disasters that have faced our investments 
abroad are related to the absence of public control (parliament) and 
accountability.. . the absence of control and accountability provides 
the 
environment for violations and irresponsibility" (Saoud Al-Samakah, Al- 
Qabas, 14/7/1992). 
"What happened to our investments in Spain was no accident, it is part of 
a continuous serious of mismanagement, malice, concealment of 
information from the public, absence of accountability, the obstruction of 
the role of the judiciary" (Ahmed Al-Rubi, Al-Qabas, 15/7/1992). 
"The governmental administration works, without relation/relevance to 
qualification criteria, to kinship and political discrimination in granting 
positions which worsen performance and increase the internal divisions in 
society. " (Al-Saadoun, 1993, p. 46). 
The questionnaire findings make several issues stand out - namely the role of 
management, accountability and social norms in Kuwait, which all have 
implications for auditing in Kuwait. Poor management might lead to several 
problems such as inability to install proper control mechanisms to combat fraud, 
inability to compete in the market, leading to losses which might lead to an 
indulgence in creative accounting schemes. Such factors can place pressure on 
the audit function and reduce its effectiveness. The social constraints in Kuwait 
(such as the role of `Wasta') and its influence on the accountability process might 
have also some influence on auditing. For instance, the difficulty in holding 
members of the elite accountable for their mismanagement of corporations or 
their blocking of access to information might undermine the work of auditors. 
The respondents expressed concerns about these difficulties are inconsistent with 
their apparent general satisfaction with the audit function in Kuwait. However, 
this very much reflects the tendency in Kuwait for public discussions in the 
aftermath of scandals to focus on the failings of Kuwaiti society and employment 
practices without linking them to existing accountability mechanisms such as the 
auditing function - and what auditing achieved or did not achieve. 
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9.4.7 Regulation of the Audit Profession 
Proposals for self-regulation of the accounting position in Kuwait do not seem to 
have a strong support other than from audit firm respondents (Question 5 in Table 
9.15). In contrast, there was large support for an independent body appointing 
audit clients and setting fees for audit work (Question 7 in Table 9.15). 
Surprisingly, at least 64% of auditors supported this idea (although they clearly 
did not want such task being delegated to the Audit Bureau - as evidenced from 
their response to the proposal that the Bureau would have a greater role in 
appointing and setting their fees for auditing government owned companies and 
organisations, see Question 7 Table 9. ). The audit firms refusal to accept such a 
role by the Bureau is clearly likely to be related to the way they perceived the 
Bureau as less successful than themselves at various auditing activities. The 
findings also show the willingness of the audit firms and the other groups (with at 
least 78% agreeing) to have the audit methods of audit firms checked by a 
professional standards body. This task might be performed by the PTCSAR, as it 
the only committee responsible for dealing with accounting standards in Kuwait. 
Alternatively, another body or committee could be established to set acceptable 
auditing standards and supervise the firms' audit methods. 
9.4.8 The Perception of Big Six Audit Firms Against Other Firms 
The survey has shown that audit firms in Kuwait are willing to accept some tasks 
as a part of their responsibility (e. g. reporting to shareholders on management 
efficiency, ensuring that a satisfactory system of internal control is being 
operated) - tasks that the profession in Anglo-American countries and other parts 
of the world has been rather reluctant to accept. This different stance of audit 
firms in Kuwait might suggest that the Big Six in Kuwait have less of an 
influence on the profession in Kuwait. Accordingly, the views of respondents 
from the Big Six audit firms were examined against those of non-Big Six audit 
firms using a Mann Whitney test. The results of this test did not show any 
difference in opinion between auditors from Big Six and non-Big Six on the vast 
majority of questions. Even with questions where the test showed a difference at 
the 5% level these were generally not indicative of a difference of opinion but 
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rather one of emphasis. For example, 78% of the Big Six auditors agreed that 
they should have a responsibility to ensure a satisfactory system of internal 
control is being operated, compared to 92% of non-Big Six auditors. The few 
clear issues where the two types of firm seem to have a difference of opinion are 
related to the issue of fraud and error detection. Only 37% of Big Six auditors 
see audits as providing significant protection against fraud in comparison to 70% 
of non-Big Six auditors. Similarly, only 39% of Big Six auditors saw themselves 
as successful in preventing errors and irregularities in comparison to 85% of non- 
Big Six auditors. The Big Six audit firms also largely (70%) disagreed that they 
have a duty to detect all significant fraud, while the non-Big Six auditors were 
divided with 46% disagreeing and 44% agreeing. On the other hand, at least both 
types of audit firms (76% of the Big Six and 90% of the non-Big Six firms) 
agreed that they have responsibility to ensure that the financial statements did not 
contain significant deliberate distortions - highlighting the sensitivity of the 
'fraud' issue to both types of audit firm. Differences in opinion were also 
evident in relation to the auditor's responsibility to ensure that the audited 
company is being run efficiently (55% of Big Six firms disagree, while 66% of 
non-Big Six agree) and that its accounts give a reliable indication of its market 
value (55% of Big Six firms disagree, while 71% of non-Big Six agree). 
It is important, however, to remember that the above are exceptions and that, 
overall, these findings suggest that the responses of auditors from both Big Six 
and non-Big Six firms do not seem to be influenced by the `international' 
arguments of the Big Six firms - adding weight to arguments increasingly being 
advanced that the Big Six firms are not as similar as their global marketing 
campaigns suggest. 
9.5 Conclusion 
The survey has shown a very limited audit expectations gap in Kuwait - despite 
the clear question marks that have been placed over the audit function in the 
KIO/GT scandal. Many of the statistical differences shown in the Kruskal Wallis 
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test related to differences in emphasis rather than to differences in opinion. It is 
clear from the findings of this study that, as with previous audit expectation gap 
studies, some sort of gap is inevitable given the fact auditors or accountants will 
usually rate themselves higher than how other people rate them. Generally, the 
study has shown people to be satisfied with auditing and auditors in Kuwait. The 
results also contrast with claims that users do not have reasonable expectations of 
auditors. Additionally, not only were people satisfied with the work of auditors 
but they also wanted more auditing (e. g. extending the `two auditors' requirement 
to government owned corporations and organisations) with preference for such 
auditing to be performed by audit firms affiliated to international audit firms. 
The respondents want audit firms to provide more services to their clients. These 
services fall into two categories - those that audit firms usually are reluctant to 
provide or to consider as part of their duty and those that the profession usually 
has lobbied to Provide. In the first category, the respondents from audit firms 
tended not to accept that the detection of significant fraud was a part of their 
duty. Interestingly, audit firms in Kuwait seem to accept service obligations that 
the profession in Anglo-American contexts has fought against (e. g., reporting on 
internal control and management efficiency). The second category of services 
involves providing management advisory services to audit clients, something that 
audit firms are not legally able to provide to their clients currently in Kuwait. A 
clear majority of respondents from each group supported the removal of such a 
legal restriction, suggesting their desire to have auditors provide such services to 
their audit clients. 
The survey shows that despite the apparent satisfaction of respondents with 
auditing in Kuwait, there seems to be a cause for concern over auditor 
independence, with a large number of respondents from each group (including 
audit firms) agreeing that friendship and relationship with senior corporate 
management ('Wasta') usually govern the appointment of auditors. Despite, this 
the majority of respondents preferred auditors not to have a close relationship 
with their audit clients. The survey also showed audit firms, directors and users 
of financial statements perceiving audit firms to be more successful and more 
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technically competent than the Audit Bureau. The Audit Bureau respondents also 
rated the audit firms higher than the audit firms' respondents rated the Audit 
Bureau. Despite the Audit Bureau having a less glamorous image than that of 
the audit firms, the four groups felt that it has a larger responsibility than that of 
the audit firms (especially in controversial issues such as fraud detection and 
whether the company is being run efficiently). 
The questionnaire findings show a considerable number of respondents were not 
aware that KIO has an external auditor. However a large number of respondents, 
except those at the Bureau, wanted KIO/KIA to publish at least summary of the 
financial results and the audit report. The findings also showed people in Kuwait 
are concerned with issues related to corporate governance, especially a lack of 
corporate accountability and the quality of management performance. 
Self-regulation of the profession was only supported by the audit firms, with the 
other groups either divided on this issue or against such a form of regulation. A 
larger degree of support from the four groups was given to auditors being 
appointed and having their fees set independently (although audit firms did not 
want the Audit Bureau to perform such a function). The chapter also examined 
the respective responses of Big Six and non-Big Six audit firms, which showed 
few major differences of opinion. 
Overall, the survey results provide clear evidence of the ability of the 
multinational audit firms to preserve their reputational standing in the aftermath 
of major corporate collapses. However, they also question the claimed 
inevitability of an audit expectations gap and show that perceptions of auditing in 
Kuwait have some quite distinctive qualities - with auditors much more willing 
to accept certain functions than their counterparts working in Anglo-American 
contexts. 
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10.1 Introduction 
The collapse of GT raises doubts about what auditing can achieve in practice. In 
Kuwait, international audit firms from both the UK and Spain did not play a 
major role, if any, in the detection of fraud and illegal acts and struggled to 
provide a true and fair view of GT's operations. The same conclusion can be 
extended to Spain where most of GT's operations took place. Two of the 
international audit firms based in Spain (C&L and PW) were fined for audit work 
relating to the GT group, while other firms have exhibited some unusual practices 
- including KPMG's ex-post alteration to its opinion on a preceding year's set of 
financial statements. Despite the shortcomings of these audit firms and their 
practices, there seems to be a belief in Kuwait that more auditing is better or is 
going to resolve any shortcomings of audit. This feeling is strongly 
communicated in the questionnaire where people support the appointment of two 
auditors for stock holding companies and would willingly pay more for auditors 
to provide a better service. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section starts by highlighting 
the response of people and the profession, in particular, to the KIO scandal in 
both Kuwait and Spain. It also examines the general finding from the 
questionnaire survey on the audit expectations gap in Kuwait. The second 
section highlights the main issues of relevance to the practice of auditing beyond 
Kuwait and the KIO case. The third part mainly contemplates the future of 
auditing and corporate governance in Kuwait, while the final section addresses 
the research implications of the study. 
10.2 The Fallout from the Scandal on Auditing and Auditors in 
Spain and Kuwait 
Although, auditing in Kuwait does not seem to be enjoying the same popularity 
experienced in Anglo-American countries, it has also not experienced the same 
criticism that surrounds auditing in other parts of the world. This might be 
attributed to the corporate and business structures in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti 
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government used to control many of the shareholding companies, enabling it 
appoint government representatives to the boards of these companies. The Audit 
Bureau has also been required to audit corporations where the government 
holdings exceeded 50% of ownership. It seems that the involvement of the 
government and the Audit Bureau led to traditionally less reliance on the external 
auditor and less blame being attached to such a function in times of crisis. 
Another important factor is related to the fact that the Kuwaiti government 
usually supports shareholding companies and other government owned 
organisations. Therefore, it is very rare to see these companies collapse 
regardless of the financial difficulty they face. Kuwait has experienced very few 
major corporate collapses that have significantly affected shareholders or have 
cost a large number of jobs. Accordingly, people did not pay much attention to 
auditing given that they felt safe that no matter what happens to a corporation, the 
government will intervene and save it from collapse. This government 
involvement and its effect on the status of auditing function bears some similarity 
to the situation in countries like Japan and Poland. For example, Gottlieb (1999) 
claimed that there was no concern in Poland, before it transformed into a free 
market economy, about loss making companies going bankrupt because the 
government would provide funds in times of crisis. On the other hand, auditing 
in Spain started to receive more attention in the aftermath of Spain joining the 
EEC in 1986. Different laws were introduced to bring the Spanish regulations in 
line with those of the EEC. Most importantly the laws increased the number of 
companies that were required to have statutory audits. There was high hope and 
belief that auditing would enhance transparency and accountability in Spain. 
There was not much evidence of an audit expectation gap and concern about the 
practical possibilities of the auditing function. 
Both Kuwait and Spain witnessed a string of financial scandals and collapses in 
the early 1990s. The emergence of such scandals in Anglo-American countries 
has historically seen criticism and doubts being directed at the audit function and 
the role of auditors, with perennial talk of an audit expectations gap. The collapse 
of KIO's investments in Spain provided a useful opportunity to examine what 
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kind of response would be directed at auditors in the non-Anglo-American 
environments of Kuwait and Spain. In Kuwait, auditing traditionally 
had not 
generated much interest and concern, while in Spain auditing was something new 
and relatively exciting. Spain's response was examined solely in a case study 
while the response of Kuwait was examined both through a case study and a 
questionnaire survey on auditing expectations. 
The response in Spain to the string of scandals that emerged in the early 1990s 
was one of outcry, with blame primarily attached to corporate management - 
although several of the scandals had clear political dimensions. The role of 
auditors and that of the auditing function initially received less attention and 
criticism. Very few studies have examined the role of auditors in these collapses 
(for an exception, see Garcia Benau et al, 1999). The work of auditors in such 
collapses, however, came to receive considerable attention from ICAC, the 
Spanish regulator, who fined several Big Six audit firms. The profession did not 
feel happy about ICAC's actions and launched attacks on it and campaigned for 
professional self-regulation. The change of government in 1996 saw the 
profession's desire for self-regulation come closer to reality but the rivalry 
between the three Spanish bodies helped to prevent it from happening. However, 
the new goverrunent did ban ICAC from publishing the results of investigation 
before any judgements had completed the full appeals process. The profession 
also launched a campaign to limit auditor's liability, even though to date, no 
courts have found in favour of third parties in any actions against auditors. The 
Spanish profession also attributed criticism of the role of auditors to the audit 
expectations gap rather than to their performance. The case showed that the 
scandals in Spain did not lead to huge debates about auditing and a string of legal 
cases against auditors, as is usually the case in Anglo-American countries - the 
most visible response was disciplinary activity of ICAC. The profession's 
response, nevertheless, seemed to take on a number of the characteristics of their 
counterparts in the UK and the USA, being primarily concerned with the pursuit 
of self-interest rather than the protection of the public interest. 
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The collapse of KIO's investments caused a lot controversy in Kuwait. The 
debates and press coverage focused mainly on issues such as mismanagement, 
lack of accountability and secrecy. Very limited attention, however, has been 
given to the role of auditors either in the KIO case or in other scandals such as 
that of KOTC. The results of the questionnaire survey tend to support such a 
pattern of behaviour, with respondents generally being content with the quality of 
auditing and the role of auditors. The survey in Kuwait represented one of the 
few studies that have examined the issue of the audit expectations gap in a 
developing country and a non-Anglo-American context. The general conclusions 
from the survey is that a limited expectations gap is evident in Kuwait in relation 
to both audit firms and the Audit Bureau. However, generally this limited gap 
seems to result from differences in emphasis rather than from basic differences of 
opinion - and with the absolute ratings of auditors being generally positive. The 
four groups in Kuwait believed that auditing has improved since the Manakh 
Crises in 1982, when the unofficial stock market collapsed. They also seemed to 
be generally satisfied with the level of services provided by audit firms in 
Kuwait. In some cases even users and directors seemed more relaxed than 
auditors in Kuwait about issues that might be in the profession's self interest 
rather than the public's interest. The responses also endorsed the recent changes 
in Kuwaiti law requiring two audit firms to audit companies listed on the stock 
market. Survey respondents also supported extending such requirements to 
government-owned organisations (such as KIO and KPC). The respondents' 
desire to have more audit seems to correspond to a typical response to audit 
failure noted by Power (1993) 
"Audit failure paradoxically but inevitably leads to a reintensification of 
audit. At the point where systemic doubts about audit might be possible, 
the response is to have more of it. " (p. 283). 
However, there are also some very distinctive elements in the views of 
respondents to the questionnaire. While supporting the greater involvement of 
international firms, respondents generally seem to want a different form of 
auditing - something that goes beyond information credibility assessment to an 
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involvement with assessments of value for money and management efficiency. 
Somewhat surprisingly, respondents from audit firms were clearly willing to 
provide such services in Kuwait - something that is not seen by audit firms in 
Anglo-American countries as a normal part of the statutory limited company 
audit function. The analysis of the questionnaire also revealed a larger 
acceptance by respondents from all groups (including those from the Audit 
Bureau) that the Bureau has a larger responsibility than audit firms, especially in 
relation to issues like the detection of fraud and making sure the company is 
being run efficiently - see Chapter 9. This feeling seems to support the recent 
moves by the parliament to extend the responsibility of the Bureau to investments 
where the government has stakes of more than twenty five percent. 
Sikka ef al (1998) have argued that it is impossible to eliminate the audit 
expectation given the difficulty of establishing an all embracing and 
encompassing definition of the audit. Power (1998) seems to agree that the 
temptation for auditors "to create expectations for what they can achieve" makes 
it difficult for the expectations of auditors and society to coincide. Indeed, an 
examination of audit expectations gap surveys in several countries suggests that a 
gap is always there. It almost seems inevitable to have such a gap if auditor self- 
interest can easily be in conflict with the public interest. However, the size of the 
gap seems to be an important distinction across the various national surveys. In 
some surveys the gap is not wide, limited to few issues, and most of the 
differences are in emphasis (such as the case in Kuwait) - while in other surveys 
the gap is very wide, spans many issues and most of the differences are in 
opinion (as in the case of the UK). This difference might be explained by 
different factors in these countries such as the length of the history of auditing, 
the size of the private sector in the whole economy, the rate of business collapses 
and the litigation environment. These factors may make the expectations gap in 
some countries easier to bridge than in others. 
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10.3 Key Findings in Relation to the Existing Literature (or the 
General Implications for Auditing) 
10.3.1 Regulation of the Profession 
The government rather than profession largely undertakes the regulation of the 
profession in both Kuwait and Spain. While this type of regulation seems to be 
working in Spain it failed to provide a proper regulation in Kuwait. The Spanish 
regulator, ICAC, was successful in disciplining improper audit work in the 
aftermath of a string of financial scandals in the early 1990's. However, the 
profession thought that it was improper for a non-professional body to investigate 
its actions and impose fines on it. The Spanish accounting profession clearly 
prefers to be in charge of disciplinary procedures. Governmental regulation in 
Kuwait has failed to discipline any firm in the post-liberation period (1991 and 
after). Despite the widespread awareness of several parties in Kuwait (Ministry 
of Commerce, the Audit Bureau, audit firms, banking lenders) that many small 
audit firms in Kuwait are engaged in questionable practices (e. g., signing audit 
reports without conducting any audit), not a single firm has been disciplined for 
such actions. This shortcoming of governmental regulation, however, has not 
lead to calls for self-regulation of the profession. The questionnaire analysis 
showed audit firms are the only group that has a strong support for self-regulation 
of the profession, while financial directors, users of financial statements and 
Bureau's auditors were less supportive of self-regulation of the profession. This 
finding is not surprising given that the support of governmental regulation is 
endorsed by Shuaib (1995), an academic but also the managing partner of Arthur 
Andersen in Kuwait. Significantly, the survey showed that a large number of 
respondents from each group supported the idea of an independent body being 
entrusted with the job of appointing auditors and setting their fees. The lesson 
from the KIO case is that whatever the type of regulation, it is crucial that the 
regulatory body is willing to improve the efficiency of the services provided and 
the parties providing them. In Spain, ICAC clearly had such an intention, while 
in Kuwait the governmental regulator failed to act, probably because most abuses 
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were limited to the audit of small companies and did not present large problems 
for the Kuwaiti economy. 
The successful merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand has been 
heralded as creating the first global audit firm (although other firms such as 
Arthur Andersen make similar claims). This belief has also led KPMG to set up 
an international committee with the intention of making the firm an international 
one in the true sense. Global business processes and global audit firms means that 
the probability of having financial scandals that affect several countries around 
the world increases - which, in turn, presents considerable challenges for national 
accounting and auditing regulatory bodies. This was well illustrated in the BCCI 
case, where the principal audit firm of the bank, Price Waterhouse-London, 
refused to comply with US congressional investigations - claiming that the 
American Congress does not have jurisdiction in the UK. In addition, Price 
Waterhouse-London also stated that "it does not do business in jurisdictions in 
which people have been injured by its handling of audits" (US Congress, 1992). 
Given the globalisation trend, it will be more difficult for regulators and users of 
financial statements in the future to establish their jurisdictional rights over 
'global' audit firms. It will also be very difficult for regulators with limited 
financial resources to investigate and discipline such firms - especially when 
regulators in the past were restricted in their attempts over several years to pursue 
them. A clear example of this can be seen in the way Coopers & Lybrand stalled 
the attempts of the Joint Disciplinary Scheme to investigate the Mirror Group 
case in the UK for several years. The difficulties for national regulators in 
regulating or disciplining global audit firms can also be seen in the way ICAC in 
Spain was heavily attacked by campaigns headed by the Big Six audit firms. 
These firms heavily attacked ICAC, claiming that it is not the job of 
bureaucratic/governmental institution to investigate the role of auditors. They 
also depicted ICAC's disciplinary procedures as a personal crusade by the 
Chairman of ICAC against the Big Six. The Big Six's publicity machine in Spain 
seems to have scored some successes as the chairman of ICAC was replaced and 
ICAC's right to publish its findings from the sanctioning process were heavily 
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restricted. The doubts about the ability of national or international bodies to 
regulate the profession were well expressed in some recent articles: 
"For self regulation to work the regulator must surely have the ultimate 
power to suspend or repeal a firm's license to audit. But the size of the firms - and their grip on the listed audit market - is such that the use of such a sanction would cause chaos in the markets. In a very real sense, the Big Five are already too big to punish. " (Jim Kelly, FT, 4/2/1999, p. 11). 
"The size and scope of the multinational practices of these firms raises the 
question of whether the disciplinary practices of state, or even national 
governments and professional institutes are any longer competent to 
effectively control a multinational practice that transcends all former boundaries. " (Baker and Hayes, 1997, p. 335). 
10.3.2 Fraud Detection 
The KIO scandal and that of others in Kuwait did not lead to debates or doubts in 
Kuwait about the role of the auditors in detecting of fraud, nor it did lead to 
public calls for them to detect fraud. Nevertheless, the findings of the 
questionnaire survey showed that, with the exception of the audit firms, a clear 
majority of respondents from each group felt that audit firms have a duty to 
detect all significant fraud. The ma ority of respondents in all four groups also 
felt that auditing provides protection against fraud (auditors being the most 
sceptical but still having a majority support). 
However, the findings from the KIO case seems to contradict/undermine the 
ability of the auditing function to detect and protect against fraud. The KIO case 
has highlighted three elements that make it difficult for auditors to unravel fraud 
in any company or organisation. The first element relates to the involvement of a 
number of senior managers in KIO and GT in the frapd, including the chairman 
of KIO and deputy general manager (who were both members of the ruling 
family in Kuwait). Such involvement not only made it easier for them to commit 
fraud but it also enabled them to block investigations by auditors and inquiries by 
one of KIO's managers. The presentation of fake documentation and evidence in 
the KIO case is also another element undermining the ability of auditors to detect 
fraud. The auditors were presented with false documents from several members 
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of GT and a string of shell companies aiming to cover or legitimise transactions 
related to the funds embezzled from Grupo Torras. Even a bank in one of the 
transactions, under instructions from GT's managers, presented false information 
to an auditor of GT's subsidiary. The third element in the case that made 
detection of fraud even more difficult relates to the role of accounting firms and 
accountants in constructing complicated offshore schemes. The diversified 
investments by KIO via different channels around the world seem to make the 
work of auditors very difficult. This was evident in the way it took several 
auditors and law firms to figure out what was happening with KIO's investment 
in GT. The case has shown audit firms, including one of the Big Six, as 
complicating and contradicting the work of each others. That is the role of audit 
firms advising on offshore schemes to minimise taxation or to conceal the 
identity of the shareholders. The main scheme used by KIO to invest in Spain via 
the Dutch Antilles was devised or proposed by Touche Ross of Spain. The case 
has demonstrated how an accounting firm in Jersey and a former accountant with 
Touche Ross played a major role in setting the offshore companies, fronting these 
companies and designing the transactions in ways to deceive auditors - 
conclusions arrived at by the Judge in the civil case in London filed by GT, 
against its former mangers. This finding supports the conclusions of Mitchell et 
al (1998) and Robinson (1999) that complicated schemes for moneylaundering 
require or are conducted with the help of accounting fin-ris. Concerns about the 
role of accounting firms in relation to the issue of moneylaundering were the 
focus of recent press commentaries in the UK,. indicating that audit 
firms/accountants are either playing a part in moneylaundering or are turning a 
blind eye to such practice. Auditing and auditors will no doubt struggle when 
faced with some or all of the above elements - which, in turn, questions the belief 
or faith of people in the survey that auditing can provide a significant protection 
against fraud. 
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10.3.3 The Role of the Big Six Audit Firms in Setting the Audit 
Agenda/Influencing the Audit Environment 
The case study and the questionnaire analysis have revealed different responses 
in Spain and Kuwait. The recent string of financial scandals in Spain has created 
similar concerns and criticisms of the auditing function and the auditor role to 
those experienced in Anglo-American countries after the breakout of such 
scandals. Furthermore, the profession response to recent financial scandals in 
Spain is along the lines of what is established in the Anglo-American context. 
The profession attributed criticisms of the profession to the audit expectations 
gap rather than to the performance of auditors. That is, while the profession is in 
crises it is more often seen to act in its self-interest rather than in the public 
interest. The Spanish profession denounced any responsibility for the detection 
of fraud. It also called for self regulation in a time where government regulation 
seems to be working. The profession was also campaigning to limit liability 
when there wasn't any legal threat for the audit firms. This self interested 
response to the crises in the Spanish auditing can be attributed to the involvement 
of the Big Six audit firms in controlling the debate and setting the agenda. The 
Big Six in Spain control the biggest Spanish accounting associations and, 
therefore, represent a major source for change in that country. This domination is 
vividly evident in the calls for self regulation of the profession - with Big Six 
representatives rather the public stating that they were not satisfied with 
governmental regulation and calling for change. This is clearly different from the 
position in Anglo-American countries where the public is the critic of the 
regulation of the profession and is calling for change from self regulation to 
independent or government regulation - calls which the auditing profession 
seems increasingly willing to accept. The campaign for limiting audit liability in 
Spain is perhaps the clearest evidence of the Spanish profession following the 
international strategies of the Big Six firms. 
In the Kuwaiti context, the collapse of KIO's Spanish investments and other 
financial scandals in Kuwait did not create the usual criticisms of auditing and 
auditors. It might be argued that the collapse of KIO's investments mostly took 
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part in Spain and could therefore have been expected to more influence the 
accounting profession in Spain rather than in Kuwait. However, the collapse of 
GT took place at a time in Kuwait when other major scandals or collapses of 
Kuwaiti organisations was taking place and such a range of scandals could have 
been expected to have had an impact on people's perception of auditing and 
auditors in general. In all of this, it is intriguing that the fines imposed on GT's 
auditors in Spain for substandard work did not generate a desire on the part of the 
Kuwaiti government (representing or represented by KIO or KIA) to sue Coopers 
& Lybrand. There might be several explanations for this attitude in Kuwait. One 
explanation is that the people seem to feel that management is an important party 
responsible for such collapses (although in the survey reported in Chapter nine, 
blame was also attributed to several other parties, including auditors). The 
Kuwaiti press commentaries and the statements made in the Kuwaiti parliament 
also mostly seem to blame the management for such actions. The questionnaire 
survey seems to show that the majority of people also did not know that KIO was 
externally audited. Further, the issue of C&L being fined by ICAC was either not 
reported or not prominently reported in Kuwait - all in all meaning that the lack 
of blame for auditors did not require the accounting profession or the Big Sixi to 
move on to the defensive. 
However, it would be wrong to say that the Big Six firms play a dominant role in 
influencing or controlling debates and proposals for change in auditing in 
Kuwait. The recent change in the commercial law in 1994 requiring two auditors 
to attest the financial statements of stock holding companies was enacted based 
on a proposal by the parliament - not y the Big Six firms. The recent attempt to 
change the audit law was also at one, time instigated by the Ministry of 
Commerce, the profession's regulator, while another attempt was initiated by the 
KAAA. The Ministry of Commerce's proposal no longer required accountants to 
' The only time the profession was questioned in a symposium about the Protection of Public 
Funds law in 1993. In that day a partner in Ernst & Young-Kuwait was questioned about the 
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pass a professional licensing exam to conduct audit work. Clearly the profession, 
including the Big Six, were not consulted about such proposed changes and 
opposed them. Likewise, the KAAA's proposed amendments to the law where 
auditors will be jointly responsible to their client and others for losses resulting 
from negligence, comes in contrast to calls in Anglo-American countries for the 
abolition of Joint and Several Liability (e. g. IFAC, 1996; London Economics, 
1998). Accordingly, these recent changes and proposals appear to be initiated by 
parties other than the Big Six firms, potentially creating some major threats to the 
profession's standing and status. 
Further evidence that the Big Six's influence on auditing debates in Kuwait and 
the nature of the debate itself is different in Kuwait than in Spain or elsewhere is 
reinforced by certain results in the questionnaire survey. These showed audit 
firms in Kuwait accepting specific tasks (such as identifying ways to improve and 
report on management efficiency) as part of their duties, which are not normally 
accepted by Big Six audit firms in Anglo-American contexts. 
10.3.4 Image of International Audit Firms and their Immunity to Scandals 
The questionnaire survey showed that a larger number of financial directors, 
users of financial statements and audit firms perceived audit firms to be more 
competent and more successful than the Audit Bureau on most tasks. The survey 
also showed the Bureau's auditors rating audit firms higher than audit firms rated 
the Bureau. Such attitudes might be explained by the belief that the Audit 
Bureau's auditors do not need to acquire a professional qualification to be 
employed. It also has failed to attract the best qualified/talented accountants in 
Kuwait given its low salary levels (a position which led the parliament to double 
the Bureau's salaries to attract a better accountants) -*although it has to be said 
that the performance ratings of auditors from audit firms and the Audit Bureau 
were generally high (the former just being higher). 
failure of the audit firms in detecting fraud in the case of KIO. He response was that detection of 
fraud is not a duty of auditor (for details see Al- Qabas, 3/2/93). 
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It also seems that people in Kuwait see the Big Six audit firms in a different light 
as they are representing international firms. The survey has shown that 
international audit firms in Kuwait were seen as highly competent and 
professional -a point emphasised by respondents being in favour of a mandatory 
regulation requiring all companies with capital above KD5rn (fl0m) to be 
audited only by international audit firms. Such perceptions of international audit 
firms go someway to explaining the trend in Kuwait wherein many local firms 
are forming some kind of relation with intemational audit firms (either Big Six or 
other international firms). More importantly, a large number of respondents from 
the four groups thought that intemational audit firms generally have the capacity 
to understand complex investments and transactions such as those undertaken by 
KIO while a lesser number of the four groups felt that the Audit Bureau has a 
similar capacity. However, this strong belief in the ability and capability of the 
international audit firms seems to be misplaced when one look at the role of such 
auditors in the KIO case. Clearly, they had difficulty in understanding and 
tracking the labyrinth of offshore/shell schemes used by KIO and GT. 
The differential influence of the Big Six in Kuwait and Spain might support the 
claim that these firms are not the same all over the world. The case has shown 
that KIA probably does not view Big Six firms in Kuwait in the same light as Big 
Six firms operating abroad in countries such as the UK. In 1987, KIA preferred 
to hire KPMG-London rather than KPMG-Kuwait to audit both KIA and KIO. 
This position has some similarity with the recent attempt of a Japanese Bank, Fuji 
Bank, to have part of its Japanese accounts audited by Ernst & Young-UK rather 
than Ernst & Young in Japan - in an apparent attempt to improve the credibility 
of the Bank's accounts (see Accountancy Age, 15/10/1998). KPMG's recent 
attempt to make the firm a global one highlights the view that the offices of these 
international audit firms are not necessarily uniform throughout the world. The 
recent Asian crisis has also raised doubts about whether the quality of Big 
Six/Big Five practice is the same across the world -a question that led the World 
Bank to call on these firms to refrain from associating their names with accounts 
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prepared using sub-standard accounting standards (for details see, FT, 
19/10/1998). 
10.3.5 Comparisons with other Scandals 
The KIO case shows some patterns and tendencies that historically have usually 
been evidenced in other financial scandals with respect to the role of auditing. In 
many scandals and corporate collapses, a dominant senior management group 
usually compromises the work and independence of auditors. The dominance of 
the management in KIO can be seen by the way very few people were 
undertaking most of the influential decisions that shaped the future of KIO and 
GT. In Torras it was obvious that Javier de la Rosa took most of the crucial 
decisions. He was able to make controversial decisions that were in direct 
confiict with the recommendations of KIO's executive committee in early 1990. 
A clear example was de la Rosa's decision to buy a paper company called Sarrio 
in 1991 despite the decision of the executive committee to liquidate the Torras 
group and the findings of a feasibility study which chose not to recommend such 
an acquisition. In interview, one of the new Kuwaiti managers of GT appointed 
before de al Rosa resigned explained that in a board meeting of GT when he 
opposed one of de la Rosa's decisions, everyone was clearly surprised as this was 
the first time it had happened. The chairman of KIO, Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah, 
was also very dominating and was undertaking very crucial and controversial 
decisions without much reference to Kuwait or to the auditors. Indeed the 
resignation letter of KIA's managing director and two members of KIO's 
executive committee shows the chairman controlling funds of excessive 
magnitude. The letter also showed the chairman was blocking the 
implementation of KIA's instruction to KIO's auditor to investigate KIO's 
Spanish investments. The ability of the chairman of KIO to channel funds to GT 
to the magnitude of $1.2bn (when this was against the regulations of KIA) shows 
the dominant power base of -Senior management. It is difficult to imagine how 
audit firms can maintain independence in this type of environment where such 
dominating managers having the key to lucrative management consulting services 
for the auditors (on top of their audit fees). The case also questions the auditor's 
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evidence collection process in practice. ICAC's findings in its sanctioning report 
on Coopers & Lybrand showed the audit firm relying on evidence that was only 
available after the date of issuing the audit report. The case also showed KPMG 
taking the evidence provided by KlO/GT managers at face value without 
undertaking any further investigation of the accuracy of evidence provided to 
them. 
Comparisons of the KIO case with others like Maxwell, Banesto, Lincoln 
Savings & Loans has revealed that while prominent figures behind the scandals 
in these cases had questionable pasts, the auditors were not duly concerned about 
that and did not appear to take it into account in carrying out their audit. The 
controversy that surrounded Javier de la Rosa's role in the collapse of Banco 
Garriga Nogues and the government's concerns about de la Rosa managing GT 
did not seem to influence GT's auditors in conducting their work. This pattern 
was similar to the Maxwell scandal where Robert Maxwell illegally channelled 
funds from the pension funds for the Mirror Group to his private business. Again 
the auditors did not take into consideration the findings of an investigation of the 
Department of Trade and Industry in 1975 were it was deemed that Maxwell was 
unfit to manage a public company. A similar case is the near collapse of the 
Spanish Bank, Banesto, where Mario Conde the flamboyant chairman was 
thought to have acquired a stake in the bank using highly deceptive tactics. This 
management ethos again did not seem unduly to caution the auditor - with Conde 
embarking on a supposed wide scale process of fraud and mismanagement that 
eventually led to him being charged and tried by the courts (a case which is still 
continuing). 
It appears that it is more difficult for these audit firms to deal with organisations 
where a sovereign government or a head of state is closely involved. This 
problem can be clearly seen in the collapse of KIO as well as in cases like those 
of BCCI and the failed automotive manufacturer, De Lorean Motor Company. In 
the GT case, the auditors claimed that they accepted deficiencies in a provision 
on the understanding that KIO was supporting GT. Similarly, it was reported that 
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Price Waterhouse's acceptance of the promise by the Ruler of the United Arab 
Emirates to support BCCI was behind their refraining from a qualified audit 
report. In a similar vein, Arthur Andersen dismissed the legal charges filed by 
the British government against the firm for the collapse of De Lorean. 
Andersen's indicated that the British government's desire to boost the Northern 
Ireland economy by supporting the factory (despite its difficulties) was the reason 
behind the collapse. The above would all suggest that the involvement of such 
sovereign bodies in the organisations being audited is troublesome. 
The collapse of KIO's Spanish investments shows the difficulty of obtaining 
information about what really happened and more importantly, for the purpose of 
this study, what the auditor did or failed to do. This can be seen in the attitude of 
KPMG-London, KIO's external auditor, whom refused to discuss any matter 
related to KIO - including basic issues such as if they were the auditors or not and 
if so from what period to what period. Rather the London-based audit firm 
referred me to KIA, who represented by its managing director refused to talk 
about the role of KIO, sighting a doctrine of secrecy. In a similar fashion, contact 
with representatives from ICAC, REA and ICJCE, via a Spanish colleague, met 
with their refusal of an interview to discuss the issue of ICAC's sanctioning of 
Coopers & Lybrand. All these obstacles in the collection of information about 
the role of auditors in examining the accounts of GT resembles the difficulties 
experienced by investigators in examining the role of auditors in other collapsed 
organisations (and, in many ways, symbolises the problems that auditors can face 
in politically charged environments). A clear example can be seen in the case of 
BCCI, where congressional investigators in the USA claimed that they were 
unable to obtain documents and testimonies from, Price Waterhouse, BCCI's 
principal auditor (US Congress, 1992) due to disputes over legal remits. 
The KIO case, importantly, has revealed something that was not widely seen in 
other corporate scandals. Most scandals or collapses of corporations seem to take 
place either immediately or a reasonably short period after the issue of a clean 
audit report (an 'unqualified' audit report). The collapse of GT does not conform 
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to this pattern as the groups' accounts were qualified for several years before the 
collapse of the group. Audit report qualifications were also evident in some of 
the subsidiaries of KIO such as Ercros. In contrast, cases like those of BCCI saw 
auditors choosing not to qualify their audit reports - on the grounds that a 
qualification for a bank could spell the end of that institution. However, this 
attitude was criticised by Moizer (1995) who was critical of auditors judging 
qualifications on a rather arbitrary, consequentialist approach. The problem in 
GT was that auditors had a number of other things on which their reports should 
have been qualified -a state of affairs which ultimately raises questions as to the 
real practical significance of audit qualifications in Spain. 
The actions of Price Waterhouse in the BCCI case raise questions as to whom the 
auditors have a duty of care? Price Waterhouse's dilemmas seem somewhat 
similar to the position of KPMG's first evaluation of Grupo Torras in 1991. 
KPMG duly responded to the criticism of its evaluation after the collapse of GT 
by indicating that it had had some reservations about the evaluations but believed 
that it did not have a duty to communicate such findings to the CNMV, given 
that GT had been transformed into a private company by KIO. The KIO case also 
highlights an important point concerning whom KPMG have a duty to in Kuwait. 
While the money invested by KIO represents public funds, were KPMG hired for 
the benefit of the public in Kuwait? Is such a claim sustainable if the public is 
not even allowed to know: what type of services KPMG is providing; what type 
of reports KPMG is providing; nor anything to do with the role of KPMG. 
Ironically, in theory, the external auditor's task could be expected to be to make 
the KIO accounts transparent and its operations more accountable. However, it 
seems that the role of KIO's auditors is itself not transparent, with no public 
indication of what they are doing, or what they need to do. For that matter, the 
auditors do not seem to be accountable themselves, even though the accounts 
they are investigating are public accounts and the work of KIO is deemed to be in 
the public interest. 
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The case also highlights the problem of accounting evaluations -a long-standing 
dilemma encountered by auditors. This point is seen in the way GT's draft 
accounts for 1991 showed the group making profits of Pta3.9bn, although this 
was transformed to losses of Pta44.4bn when the new managers of GT ordered 
C&L to use market values and remove extraordinary items. A huge difference in 
valuation was also seen in KPMG's two different valuations of the Spanish group 
- it first placed it as $4.5bn in 1991, followed by a significant negative value of 
$4bn in 1992. Similar differences in valuations can be seen in other recent 
Spanish scandals such as those of Grand Tibidabo and Banesto. The cases all 
show how subjective accounting valuation can be and how crucial these 
valuations were to the fate of the companies concerned. This finding seems to 
support the feeling that imprecise accounting standards seriously undermine the 
auditing process and create what is usually referred to as creative accounting. 
The majority of respondents from each group in the questionnaire survey seem to 
share this view in contrast to the 1993 Spanish survey, where the majority of 
respondents did not view it as problem. The reason behind such view in Spain 
might be due to the fact that the Spanish survey (see Garcia Benau et al, 1993) 
was conducted before the breakout of the ma or scandals. i 
The case clearly shows the role played by family and friends especially in senior 
positions in complicating the role of the auditors and making them unable to 
detect fraud. The case shows how the Chairman of KIO allegedly being 
responsible for channelling KIO funds to his accounts and those of his friend 
(Fouad Jaffar) and members of his family (Khalid Al-Sabah). This practice does 
not seem limited to KIO, given the nature of Kuwaiti society and the role of 
'Wasta' in Kuwait. The practice of appointing friends and family members 
(known as amigoismo) in Spain seems to have also had some detrimental effect 
on the work of auditor. In the case of KIO, de la Rosa appointed several friends 
in different parts of the groups. These friends were playing a crucial role 
authorising and orchestrating the fraud taking place in the group. This type of co- 
ordination among senior managers in a corporation makes it very difficult for 
auditors to detect significant fraud. The involvement of senior management and 
313 
Walid AlHusaini Chapter 10 
family relationships among directors or officers was also evidenced in fraud cases 
in the USA. The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) sponsored study on fraudulent financial reporting between 
the periods of 1987 and 1997 was based a sample of 200 Companies that 
allegedly had been involved in fraudulent financial reporting (COSO, 1999). The 
study revealed that top senior executives were involved in the fraud, including the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), in 72% of the cases. The study also found that 
family relationships among directors and officers were evident in 40% of the 
fraud cases. All these facts highlight the difficulties that auditors face in 
conducting their audits. 
10.4 The Future of Auditing and Corporate Governance in Kuwait and the Implications for Kuwaiti Democracy 
The questionnaire survey in this thesis has clearly shown the satisfaction of 
people in Kuwait with auditing. The responses also endorsed the recent changes 
in Kuwaiti law requiring two audit firms to audit companies listed on the stock 
market. Extending such requirements to government-owned organisations (such 
as KIO and KPQ was also supported by survey respondents. International audit 
firms in Kuwait were seen as more competent or professional than the Audit 
Bureau and other audit firms -a point emphasised by respondents being in favour 
of a mandatory regulation requiring all companies with capital above KD5rn 
(fl0m) to be audited only by international audit firms. Such perceptions of 
intemational audit firms goes someway to explaining the trend in Kuwait wherein 
many local firms are forming some kind of relation with international audit firms 
(either Big 5 or other international firms). While supporting the greater 
involvement of international firms, respondents generally seem to want a 
different form of auditing - something that goes beyond information credibility 
assessment to an involvement with assessments of value for money and 
management efficiency. Somewhat surprisingly, respondents from audit firms 
were clearly willing to provide such services in Kuwait - something that is not 
seen by audit firms in Anglo-American countries as a normal part of the statutory 
limited company audit function. 
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An important issue concerns the basis underlying this apparent demand for more 
auditing'and different kinds of audits. Why is auditing seen as such a desirable 
part of Kuwaiti approaches to corporate governance, especially in the light of the 
questionable role of auditing in major corporate collapses like KIO and Grupo 
Torras? What is auditing capable of achieving in Kuwait? Such issues and 
questions have to be considered in the wider context of Kuwaiti business and 
social traditions. A longstanding, significant aspect of Kuwaiti society has been 
the importance of family and friends in all parts of business and social life. As 
pointed out in Chapter 4, this is generally referred to in Kuwait as the notion of 
"Wasta", wherein social connections and influence are felt to matter more than 
ability. Thus, it is often stated that people have been employed on the grounds of 
"Wasta" rather than on who has the best qualifications of prospective 
candidates. Promotion (and the maintenance) of positions in organisations is also 
usually influenced by "Wasta" rather than performance. Likewise with business 
contracts and negotiations. It is also to be expected that the appointment of 
external auditors is influenced by "Wasta" -a point confirmed by responses to 
the questionnaire survey discussed in Chapter 9. 
This type of social environment seems to create some difficulty for auditing. 
Employment through "Wasta" usually leads to members of elite families in 
Kuwait being appointed to the highest positions in government-owned 
corporations - which effectively means that top-level decision making is 
unchangeable by others down the organisational hierarchy. This pattern of 
behaviour was evident in the case of KIO where the chairman of KIO was 
embarking on investments and decisions that were against the regulations 
governing KIO's operations - but it was clearly very difficult for any arguments 
to be made against such decisions. The resignation of the managing director of 
KIA and two members of KIO's executive committee on the cited grounds of 
serious mismanagement and a string of breaches in regulations was submitted to 
the prime minister (and Crown Prince) of Kuwait, but even this did not lead to 
any action against the management of KIO. Given such circumstances, it is hard 
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to imagine any influential role for auditing in making sure that senior corporate 
management is held accountable for its decisions. 
In considering the likely future effectiveness of a corporate audit function in 
Kuwait, it is also important to reflect on the dominant role played by government 
in Kuwait. Most of the major corporations in Kuwait are government owned and 
the goverm-nent also has significant stakes in the majority of 'public' companies 
in Kuwait. This has several implications for the auditing function. First, it means 
that the government has considerable channels (in addition to the audit function) 
to find out the 'true' position of any such major corporation. The Audit Bureau 
will audit all institutions where the government holds investment stakes of more 
than fifty percent of share capital. The government also has representatives 
sitting on the boards of these corporations/companies - and, therefore, does not 
need to rely solely on the report of the external auditor. Secondly, the Kuwaiti 
goverriment will usually provide significant financial support to Kuwaiti 
organisations and corporations faced with financial difficulties. This policy 
makes it very rare for shareholding companies and other government-owned 
institutions to collapse. It also might explain the lack of blame attached to 
auditors (in both the business and general media and in the responses to the 
questionnaire) - with people feeling that they do not need to rely that much on 
the auditors' report as the corporations will never be allowed to fail. This 
situation can be compared to the status of auditing in Japan, where auditing does 
not have the same importance that is attached to auditing in Anglo-American 
context. The Japanese government's support for the ailing banking sector and 
western calls for the Japanese government to suspend such support might explain 
the unpopularity of auditing in Japan. Japanese people's belief, similar to those 
in Kuwait, that the government's support will not lead to any financial failure 
might explain the disinterest in auditing in both countries. Thirdly, it leaves 
government with a significant role in regulating corporate and social affairs in 
Kuwait. The fact that most regulatory matters (such as regulation of the financial 
markets, medical practice, law practice etc. ) are the responsibility of the 
government seems to affect the perception of people towards regulatory reform - 
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in that they are pretty sceptical of any reform process which is not government 
led. The responses to the questionnaire tend to reflect such a position, with the 
majority of directors, users and auditors from the Audit Bureau all being opposed 
to the establishment of self regulation for the audit profession -a view 
maintained even though the government has failed to discipline even one of the 
smallest audit fin-ns in Kuwait (who, from interviews conducted in Kuwait - see 
Chapter 8- are generally believed to be engaged in questionable auditing 
practices). 
Recent developments after the liberation of Kuwait (following the Iraqi invasion) 
might change the role and perception of auditing. The government's privatisation 
of many of its stakes in shareholding companies could play a major role in this 
change. That is, if the government stake falls below 50% of capital, then it no 
longer will have a representative on the board of directors and the Audit Bureau 
will cease to audit the company. Accordingly, there will be more reliance on the 
role of the external auditor. The government is also studying/considering (in a 
bid to attract foreign investment in Kuwait) removing restrictions on non- 
Kuwaitis holding stakes in Kuwaiti shareholding companies. In order to attract 
such investors, reporting needs to be more transparent and trustworthy. This 
again places more emphasis on the role of external auditors. In addition, the 
financial difficulties facing Kuwait in recent years as a result of the Iraqi invasion 
and the sharp fall in oil prices might make it more difficult for the government to 
sustain its supports for ailing companies and corporations. This will eventually 
lead to more attention being directed to the audit report - and, possibly to 
criticism of auditors (and maybe lawsuits) when corporations or companies fail. 
Reliance on informal channels for investment decision in Kuwait might also 
explain the disinterest in auditing. It has been argued that investors gather 
informal information about the financial position of corporations via informal 
channels such as the social gatherings in 'dawaniya' and through 'Wasta' or other 
social connections. These channels, culturally, might be perceived to be more 
accurate than financial statements and audit reports. 
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This study shows that auditing in Kuwait is generally perceived to be a crucial 
part of any sound economic system and a crucial part of any so-called 
'developed' society - although it appears to be a belief held without any genuine 
sense or awareness of what auditing can achieve. This can be seen especially in 
the way that problems with the accounting profession in Kuwait are not 
concerned with what can and cannot be achieved by auditors but rather with 
deficiencies in the technical skills of auditors and accountants. A requirement for 
continuing education for certified accountants is being promoted in Kuwait as an 
essential element to advance the quality of audit services. As such, accounting 
and auditing education/training are the problem, not any limitations on the part of 
the audit function. In a developing country like Kuwait, there is little doubt that 
reaching the education and training level for auditors available in Anglo- 
American countries is seen to be key in terms of improving the quality of audit 
work. This assumption, however, clearly assumes that the Anglo-American 
auditing model is working well - and recent debates over auditing regulation and 
professional accounting education in the UK, for instance, would suggest that 
there are still strong concerns over how effectively such a system is working. 
Another important factor that can be expected to have a significant impact on the 
practice and future of auditing in Kuwait, especially with respect to the work of 
the Audit Bureau, is related to the strength of Kuwaiti democracy. The history of 
democracy in Kuwait is a very unstable one, with democracy being 
4 unconstitutionally' dissolved twice (in 1976 and 1986). In recent years, several 
disputes between the government and the parliament have led to talk of 
parliament being dissolved - but the government either resigned or a compromise 
was reached. The function of democracy through parliament plays a crucial role 
in supporting the work and independence of the Audit Bureau. Dissolving the 
parliament would place the Bureau under the direct' control of government - and 
it was when it was in such a position that the Audit Bureau was restricted from 
examining the accounts of organisations like KIO and KIA (between 1986 and 
1992). Proper accountability can only be exercised with strong democracy and 
the strength of democratic traditions will clearly play a crucial role in 
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determining the strength of the audit function - after all, there is no sense in 
having auditors report on corporate wrongdoing if their findings (e. g., on illegal 
acts or mismanagement) are not acted upon. 
What are the chances of such a state of affairs being established in Kuwait? And, 
if they are established, what are the chances of auditing being able to deliver what 
is expected of it? On the first question, much depends on one's view of the 
nature of Kuwait society and the forces seeking or resisting change. Those who 
feel frustrated with the failure of government, parliament and auditors to 
eradicate or diminish the widespread corruption in the Kuwaiti organisations 
might be able to become influential voices in the pursuit of change. Such change 
can be seen in the recent attempt to establish the Kuwaiti Society for the 
Protection of Public Funds to combat the apparent relentless abuses in managing 
public funds. 
On the second question, one has to look both to the international auditing 
literature and also to the experiences to date of auditing practice in Kuwait. With 
respect to the auditing literature researchers have questioned the ability of 
auditing to deliver (e. g. see Mitchell et al, 1993). With respect to the experiences 
of auditing in Kuwait, there is still very little evidence on which to base any such 
judgement. The evidence from the KIO case clearly shows the difficulties that 
auditors face in working in Kuwait. What seems beyond doubt is that the spread 
of auditing in emerging democracies like Kuwait is not as natural, direct and 
predictable process as is often portrayed in articles referring to the global auditing 
profession. It is not clear whether an accountability mechanism rooted in the 
notion of independence is suitable in a society where dependence seems to be a 
fundamental way of ordering social behaviour, both at home and in corporations. 
It may be that auditing in Kuwait is doing little more than placing an artificial 
gloss on corporate activities - and is a function which, if truth be known, is not 
highly valued. Alternatively, it may be a function which people genuinely want 
developing (and developing in a special way in Kuwait) and which they see as a 
natural companion to, or element of, a democratic society. Whichever 
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perspective one takes, it is vital to know much more about the day-to-day 
auditing practices in countries like Kuwait. If the pursuit of democracy is being 
coupled with the promotion of 'better' auditing, it is essential that the democratic 
contributions claimed for auditing are properly assessed and examined - 
especially, given that it is just such claims that are repeatedly coming under 
criticism in Anglo-American countries with long auditing traditions. It may be 
that for nations like Kuwait, that the auditing function of the future will look a lot 
different than it does in the West. Perhaps the answer lies in the promotion of the 
risk-based management assurance services being advocated in the United States 
and elsewhere (e. g. see AICPA, 1997). Altematively, it may be that what Kuwait 
needs at this stage in its development is a more performance oriented auditing 
function, which is actively involved in the management process rather than just 
an assessor of the credibility of financial information. Or, ultimately, it may be 
that auditing's future rests very much in the hands of those 'non-auditors' seeking 
constitutional reform and the establishment of some basic democratic rights (such 
as votes for women, and greater control over the activities of major international 
corporations and governments seeking to invest or expand in Kuwait and other 
gulf states). It might just be that the soundest future for auditing will only be 
secured once the tradition of "Wasta" is broken - which view one takes, will 
depend on what you know (or maybe 'who you know')! It seems doubtful that 
'Wasta' will be eradicated in the near future given the apparent unwillingness of 
the government and the parliament to tackle such problem. Recently members of 
the parliament were split in their debates over the use of 'Wasta' in employment. 
While some members were calling for an end to such practice, others felt it was 
an inevitable practice given the government's failure to address the problem of 
unemployment in Kuwait (Al-Qabas, 5/2/1997, p. 1). What also makes it difficult 
to eradicate 'Wasta' is that senior officials in the govenu-nent tend to deny its 
existence - in short, it is difficult to solve a problem without admitting that you 
really have a problem (especially when people in Kuwait believe that tile), have a 
duty to help families and friends). 
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10.5 Research Implications 
It has often been argued that financial scandals or collapses are the outcome of 
economic downturns and do not have any reflection on the general status of the 
auditing function. The KIO case undermines such claims as it shows the collapse 
of the group was not due purely to a downturn in the economy but rather was a 
consequence of a range of factors. The strategy of KIO using external accounts 
and offshore companies to acquire shares in Spanish companies and then selling 
them to Grupo Torras at inflated prices paid for with bank loans overburdened tile 
Spanish group with shares at inflated prices and high levels of debt. Other 
reasons for the collapse of the group included mismanagement and fraud, with 
the latter being undertaken in schemes designed and participated in by accounting 
firms and accountants. 
The depth of the KIO case study and the range of issues and fundamental 
questions raised over audit practice shows the value of studying financial 
scandals - they provide a fairly rare opportunity to explore and enhance 
understanding of auditing and corporate management/governance mechanisms in 
action. Overall, the thesis has shown the importance of not just relying on 
empirical surveys of audit expectations. The contrast in the findings of the two 
research methods used in this thesis reinforces the need to concentrate more on 
what is being achieved in practice in the name of auditing - especially given that 
people in Kuwait have views of auditing performance which do not match well 
with the fundamental lack of achievements in cases like GT/KlO scandal. This 
probably shows that views of auditing are very much influenced by more general 
and less tangible factors such as the profession's image and its claims that it can 
deliver what the public needs. The benefit of the methodology used in the thesis 
is being able to come out with different insight about auditing between what is 
believed to be and what it is in practice. The future research should move beyond 
opinion surveys that are more concerned with how big a gap to case studies 
which examine what auditing is delivering in practice - not just in scandals and 
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high profile cases but also in the routine, everyday audits of private and public 
organisations in Kuwait and other emerging democracies. 
This study has shown that the Kuwaiti environment, with its social, political and 
economic aspects, has had a strong influence over the way auditing has 
functioned in Kuwait. The way 'wasta' influenced employment policies, and to 
some extent auditor appointments showed that the concept of dependence is more 
widespread than that of independence. Further, the Kuwaiti govemment 
domination of the private sector and its financial support for companies in 
difficulties may well have made people less reliant on auditing in Kuwait. This 
study has also highlighted that changes in (and attempts to change) Kuwaiti laws 
relating to the work of auditors were carried out by the government and the 
parliament without much reference to the profession or users of financial 
statements. These seem to have been politically motivated rather than based on a 
clear vision as to what such changes could contribute to audit performance in 
Kuwait. 
Accordingly, this study strongly suggests that future research on auditing in non 
Anglo-American contexts will be more productive if it gives due consideration to 
social, religious, political and economical influences on the audit function. The 
type of auditing being promoted by the large multinational firms and various 
regulatory bodies and associations was mainly established and designed to work 
in Anglo-American contexts. Cultural values here can be very different from 
those in non Anglo-American contexts, as this thesis has clearly illustrated 
through its analysis of auditing developments in both Spain and Kuwait. These 
values should be considered when conducting research (e. g. case studies and/or 
questionnaire surveys) or when interpreting research findings in non-Anglo 
American contexts. For instance, the questionnaire survey findings in this thesis 
showed people in Kuwait wanting auditors to provide management advisory 
services and find ways to improve management efficiency. It is hard for these 
findings to be attributed purely to an acceptance of the claims of auditors in 
Anglo-American contexts that providing consulting services improves the quality 
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of auditing. Rather, it is likely that such findings are a more direct and basic 
reflection of recent debates and concerns in Kuwait about the poor standing of 
management in Kuwait - especially in relation to the recent string of financial 
scandals. The evident degree of mismanagement here has been such that 
anything which can be held out as offering to improve management will be seen 
as a good thing, without the validity of its claims being subject to much informed 
and detailed investigation. 
Therefore, in conclusion, it must be stressed that future research in non-Anglo 
American contexts must be conducted in a way which is both sensitive to tile 
contexts in which it is being conducted. It also must be equally a'. vare of the need 
to review with care the applicability and relevance of the debates and research 
studies which have taken place in Anglo American contexts on the subject under 
investigation. 
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Appendix I- Translation of the Resignation Letter of the Managing director 
of KIA and two members of the Executive committee of KIO in 30/12/1990. 
Your Highness Sheikh Sa'ad Al-Abdullah AI-Sabah, the Crown Prince and the 
Prime Minister. 
We were glad to meet you during your visit to London and discuss the working 
and operational conditions in the KIA - particularly KIO in London. Also our discussion regarding the resignation of Mr Yacoub Yousef AI-Humaidhi from the Executive Committee in London and the content of his resignation letter that included some very serious concerns. A copy of this letter is attached for your 
attention. 
Your Highness the Crown Prince. 
The participation in the responsibilities of the KIA was far from easy. On the 
contrary, it required a great deal of effort and perseverance in addition to a high degree of patience and flexibility without compromising the minimum 
requirements imposed and necessitated by the great nature of the responsibility 
entrusted upon us, the members of the board of directors and the Executive Committee, aimed at guarding the funds of the General Reserves and the Reserves of the Future Generations, and achieving growth of these funds within the guidelines and bylaws agreed by KIA's board of directors. 
And with regard to the above objectives we would like to raise your attention to the following: 
1) Under Management Account. 
The account was established in 1979 with $150 million and is managed by the President and Vice President of the London office and supervised by only one 
person. The funds in this account have been increased on annual basis and 
currently stand at $1,900 million that is kept at Lombard Odier and Volksbank. Further, this account is not subjected to revisions made by KIA's accounting department or the internal auditor. The return on this account did not exceed an 
annual average of 15.5% between 1979-1987, and an average of 7% between 1988-1990. The annual return on similar assets to those included in this account for the same time periods was estimated at 12-18% according to different market indices and assets. 
2) Currency and Indices Speculations. 
Until July 1990, the firm specialised in the above activities in the Bahamas was 
not dissolved inspite of Minister of Finance and the Executive Committee's 
request to do so due to the very high risks associated with such activities and the Office's pervious experiences that led to huge losses in the Future transactions. Such transactions led to huge profits for the foreign partner from currency 
speculations and very limited returns to the Office in addition to its financial and 
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legal commitments. The capital of the firm is set at $500 million. In December 1989, the Executive Committee decided on terminating and dissolving the 
account. 
3) Torras Holdings 
$1 million has been invested in the company and the shareholders were 
purchased based on recommendations by the Office on the viability of the firm 
and the restructuring possibilities in case of a complete take-over. However, in May, the Office provided the company with $450 million due to the latter's low liquidity after the reduction of the credit lines provided to the company by some banks. Neither complete facts truth nor proper justifications were provided for 
such financing and no approval was obtained from the Executive Committee. 
4) Real Estate Project in Arizona. 
$175 million has been invested in this project representing 45% stake in a 
partnership with an American partner. Recently, the project was declared 
enviable and it was bought at a much higher price than it actually worth. The American partner has also been investigated and tried by the American 
authorities and all his relevant ventures, including our partnership, were under 
scrutiny. It has been disclosed that the partner has paid $17 million, through a Swiss bank, for facilitating the completion of sale to the Office. 
5) Fosterlane Company, USA. 
Fosterlane Company participates in real estate projects with the partner Gerald Hines who owns 20% of the value of all the real estate projects that exceed $1,200 million in value without contributing any assets in the capital of these 
projects. The agreement with the partner has been modified so that the Office forgoes its priority in income distribution (at 8%) in return for concessions that do not match the return priority which is considered to be indispensable condition 
with financial and legal importance for investments. 
6) London Bridge City Venture. 
The management of the Office decided to invest in the second phase of this 
project that is estimated to cost E500 million. No sufficient information or 
consulting sources for evaluating this project was available within the decision 
making channels despite being essential elements of the norms of operation 
within the Office. The project was presented to the Executive Committee based 
on demands by the former Finance Minister. The committee rejected it. 
7) Participation in DowHeng Bank. 
The Office participated with $50 million in this bank plus transferring deposits 
worth $150 million. The Office was asked to get rid of its participation in this bank due to the exposure of many of these deposits and financial transactions 
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with the bank without proper consideration to financial position or risks involved. The Office also acquired shares in another bank without the Executive Committee's knowledge and approval. And according to the external auditor's 
report, Mr Fouad Jaffar the former manager, was found to own shares in DowHeng Bank. 
8) Dealings and Trading in Financial Securities. 
It has been discovered that many trading transactions in financial securities were 
conducted without following the procedures and documentation requirements 
needed to register and authenticate these transactions at the time of trading. The internal auditor showed concerns and reservations on the manner of these deals due to the massive size of these dealings that exceeds $20 billion. 
9) General Motors Building, New York. 
More than $200 million has been invested in this building, however, the 
correspondence and communications between Fosterlane's board member in the US Mr Saleh Al-Zouman and the head of the company's board of directors and 
the president of the Office show that not all the financial and technical issues 
needed for investment evaluation of the project were considered. 
10) Western Resources. 
More than $300 million was invested in this company that was thought to be 
over-priced. The company is a petroleum business and is not listed at the stock 
exchange. 
11) Investment in Portugal. 
$40 million was invested in some Portuguese firms through the Spanish partner 
without the knowledge and approval of the Executive Committee. 
12) The decisions and recommendations of the former Finance Minister and the Executive Committee were not implemented with regard to delegation and 
allocation of roles and specialisation among the Kuwaiti leaders within the Office. The latter were kept away from the actual investment activities. 
13) Failing to present the monthly and quarterly accounts and to the Executive Committee and not applying the committee's decision regarding the full and 
continuos revision of direct investments by the auditor including the Spanish Torras Group in order to clarify ambiguities and cover-ups. 
14) Liquidating large portions of the securities portfolio managed by the headquarters and transferring them to the Office's cash portfolios in London in 
order to manage them without the knowledge of the Executive Committee and board of directors. 
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15) No meetings of the board of directors and the Executive Committee were held since last July despite the presence of the majority of the members abroad. The role of the Executive Committee and the board was frozen during that period 
as they were not involved in any decision. The decisions were made by the head 
of the board of directors, the Minister of Finance. 
16) Using the services of people from outside the London office and members of 
the head office abroad and appointing the former general manager of the London 
office as a consultant for the London office in defiance of the decisions of the Executive Committee and board of directors. He continuos to represent the Office in the board of directors of several companies inspite of the Executive Committee's decisions with regard to this issue. 
17) Inspite of the Amiri Decree on 21-11-1990 with regard to the renewal of the 
appointment of the board of directors of KIA for another three months, the head 
of the board of directors, the finance minister, failed to inform us about such a decision which we just discovered during our meeting with your Highness. 
18) The Office failed to follow the standards set out for the selection of the brokerage houses and the size of the dealings with them according to the working bylaws and procedures within the Office aimed at distribution of risk. 
19) The Office failed to follow the working procedures and bylaws regarding the 
membership of the board of directors in different companies and the invitation of the Kuwaiti members to attend the meetings within these companies. 
We hope, your Highness, that we have managed to present before you some of the facts and problems that highlight the serious situation in this very important institute. These abuses clearly shows the absence of good will and intentions and lack of cooperation on the side of the head of KIA's board of directors, the Minister of Finance, and the board of directors of KIO in London. 
As result, we find ourselves unable to continue to serve as members of the KIA 
as remaining there will held us responsible under the current circumstances and these practices for decisions that we have never participated in and we lack full knowledge about. 
Your Highness the Crown Prince, we were always and still are ready to serve our dear country. 
Yacoub Yousef Al-Humaidhi 
Fahed Abdul Rahman Al-Baher 
Dr. Fahed Mohammed Al-Rashed 
Source: Al-Qabas, 6/l/199.3, p. 9. 
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Department of Accounting & Finance 
Department of Business Studies 
Department of Economics 
12 April 1996 
Head of Audit 
KPMG Peat Marwick 
8 Salbusry Square 
London EC4Y 8BB 
Dear Sir 
Cbairmcm D). F. A 
Director (? I'Teacbing Ilr G I'Mar'ball 
Ilead 1) 1. Ouol 
Head qf Department P/ -qlessor A, I Pa Iý it, 
lie, Id off)eparlment Pro&s. sor's HoIll 
I am a doctoral student in the Management School at Sheffield University and I am currently 
conducting research. with Professor Christopher Humphrey. on the role of accounting and 
auditing in processes of corporate governance in the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO). An 
important element of my work is concerned with a historical examination of the development 
of auditing in both KIO (in Kuwait and London) and in KIO's Spanish subsidiary, Grupo 
Torras. 
From my research to date in Kuwait. Spain and Britain. it appears that KPMG was the auditor 
of KIO between 1952-79 and has been the incumbent auditor since 1986, although this 
position is disputed in some newspaper articles. It has also been stated that KPMG carried 
out an examination of Grupo Torras's financial position in 1991 and 1992. 
I am Writing in this instance to enquire whether it would be possible for me to visit your 
offices in London to hold a short interview with a relevant member of your staff. I am a ware 
of a number of criticisms in the Kuwaiti and Spanish press of the role of auditors in KIO, but. 
unfortunate Iy, I have been unable to come across inuch inforination v, -hich puts the auditors' 
side of the story. It would be a great help to me. especially in terms of ensuring that I present 
a balanced and informed view of the case, if I could speak with someone in KPMG who has 
been involved with KIO. 
The issues I am mainly concerned with are largely factual and concern the need to clarify the 
nature of KPMG's involvement with KIO. in particular its responsibilities with respect to the 
9.1i(IPI)iii. Iý1)-Cel l'elep17ojie: 011-128252,12 
1-*cic.,; iiýtile: 011--12-2 510., ' 
1 *lli fc, ii Küýg(lom Direci Lffie: 011-1282 57,2 ;r1 
Dr FA 
Director qj"Teachi)ý,, Mr G P. 1/(lr&(I// 
Department of Accounting & Finance Head qf Department 1) /. Ole '/I 
Department of Business Studies Head ql'Department Prolýssor RL 11(owt, 
Department of Economics Head (? I'Department. ProluSsol-S HoIll 
audit of KIO and the extent to which such responsibilities involved KPNIG in auditing 
transactions between KIO and Grupo Torras. I would anticipate any interview lasting no 
more than 40 minutes and I could provide a list of my questions in advance. 
Thank you for your kind attention to this matter and I look for-ward to hearin2 from you in the 
near future. 
Yours faithfully, 
Walid All lusaini 
WeIress. 9.11appil/Sireci Telepbolie. - 011-12825282 
Shelfich't Sl -iDT Facsimile: 011-12772 51Q 
I'll i ted Kilý,, Idom 1-)il'eL't Lille: 1) 11-1282 5*, 2 
Uclirmwl. Dr FA Freli(ell-Donviiii, 
D, n. -ctor (? f Tead-Oij 111- 6 11.1jell-shell/ 
Department of Accounting & Finance lkad rýf Department PrqliNsor 1) [ Olcull 
Department of Business Studies Hý-atl ol'Department. Professor RL Palwe 
Department of Economics Ilead (ýf Department. Professo 1-Sf /01ý1 - 
31 May 1996 
Mr David Smith 
PO Box 695 
8 Salisbury Square 
London EC4Y 8BB 
Dear Mr Smith. 
I am writing with regard to Mr Gerry Archer's letter (dated 23/4/96) which stated that I 
could expect to hear from you conceming my request for certain information regarding 
KPMG's involvement with the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO). 
I would like to emphasis that I appreciate the issue of client confidential ity. However, I 
think, that there are a number of factual matters that could be ans-""-ered without any 
breach of client confidentiality. These are as follows: 
I. From what date and until when were KPMG the extemal auditors of KIO? 
From what date and until when were KPMG the extemal auditors of KIA? 
3. Did any audit role involve KPMG commentinQ on the truth and fairness of 
KIO/KIA's financial statements? 
4. Did KPIMG ever assist in the preparation of financial statements for either KIO or 
KIA? 
5. Did KPNIG ever had a joint external audit responsibility with Kuwait Audit Bureau 
for the external audit of KIO/KIA? 
6. Has KPNIG ever had any responsibility for auditing Grupo Torras in Spain? 
7. Why did the Spanish government demand the removal of KPINIG as the receiver for 
Grupo Torras? 
8. The Kuwaiti parliamentary committee investigating the Grupo Torras affair claimed 
that KPNIG did not present their audit report of KIO for the years 1990 and 1991 ? is 
this true? and. if so, why were KPMG's reports were not presented" 
9. Does KP, IG offer consulting services to KIO (Taxation. Management AdvisorN, 
Services)" 
I am sure you will agree that answering the above factual questions is not damaging to 
any client confidentiality. Your answers will help to ensure that my thesis on KIO is 
accurate and not misleading. I would be very willing to visit you in London if it easier for 
you to discuss these matters fact to face. I also have some questions relating to the 
9.11appill s1rect Telephow: 011-12825282 
Vx1liel(ISI -IDY Facsimile: 011-12-2 510.5 
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Department of Accounting & Finance 
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establishment and development of KPMG's audit practice in Kuwait. These are as 
follows: 
* What was the role of KPMG in relation to foreign oil companies (e. g. Shell. BP and 
Gulf Oil) working in the 1950's in Kuwait? 
* What motivated KPMG to establish an office in Kuwait in 1975? 
* Why did KPMG close their office in Kuwait in 1981 and then re-establish another one 
in 1986? 
I would really like to hear from you soon with regard to the above matter. Thank you, in 
advance, for your kind attention and effort. 
Yours sincerely. 
, kA" usaini 
Address. 0.11appinSlivel Telephow: 011-128252,,? 2 
Sbelficltl Sl -4DT Facsimile: Oll--j27251Q-, 
Uyiiied DirectLine: 011-1282 
Department of Accounting & Finance 
Department of Business Studies 
Department of Economics 
25 June 1996 
? Vfr Ali A Al-Bader 
Manacina Director 
zn 
Kuwait Investment Authority 
P. O. Box 64 
Safat, 13001 
Kuwait 
Dear Mr AlBader, 
Chairman.. Dr F. 4 Freticell-Dotvniýý,,, 
Director of Teacbing. - Wr G P. Ilarshall 
Head of Department: Professor DL Ou -en 
Head of Deparinient: Py -ofesso P-RLAi, 1-ne 
Head ofDepartment: Pýofesso)-SHollv 
I am a Kuwaiti doctoral student at Sheffield University INfanagement School conducting a 
research project with Professor Christopher Humphrey on the role of accounting and 
auditing in processes of corporate governance and accountabilip- at the Kuwait 
Investment Office (KIO). A major part of my research is concerned with examining the 
history of auditing in both KIO (in Kuwait and London) and in KIO*s Spanish subsidiary, 
Grupo Torras. 
I have contacted KPNIG in London to clarify the nature of their invoh, -ement%vith KIO in 
order to present a balanced view of the case. However, KPMG suggested that I should be 
in a direct contact with KIA to acquire such information. Therefore, I am enclosing a list 
of questions that I have presented to KPMG which I think are related to factual matters 
and do not breach KPNIG's client confidentiality. These are as follows: 
I- From what date and until when were KPMG the external auditors of KIO? 
2. From what date and until when were KPMG the external auditors of KIA? 
Did any audit role involve KPMG commenting on the truth and fairness of 
KIO/KIA*s financial statements? 
4. Did KP%IG ever assist in the preparation of financial statements for 'either KIO or 
KIA? 
5. Did KPMG ever had a joint external audit responsibility with Kuwait Audit Bureau 
for the external audit of KIO/KIA? 
6. Has KPINIG ever had any responsibility for auditing Grupo Torras in Spain? 
7. Why did the Spanish government demand the removal of KPMG as the receiver for 
Grupo Torras? 
8. The Kuwaiti parliamentary committee investigating the Grupo Torras affair claimed 
that KPINIG did not present their audit report of KIO for the years 1990 and 1991? Is 
this true? and, if so, why were KPMG's reports were not presented? 
9. Does KPMG offer consulting services to KIO (Taxation. Management Advisory 
Services)? 
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I am confident that you will agree that addressing these factual questions in no way 
breaches KIA regulations. I would be very willing to visit you in Kuwait or London if it 
is easier for you to discuss these matters personally. 
I would really like to hear from you soon with regard to the above matter. Thank you, in 
advance, for your kind attention and effort. 
Yours sincerely, 
Walid AlHusaini. 
Address: 9. Vl, -ippiii Sireet Telepbone: 01142825282 
Sbeffield Sl 4DT Facsimile- 01142725103 
United Kingdom DirectLine. - 0114282 
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Appendix 3- Chronology of ICAC's Process for Sanctioning Coopers & Lybrand 
Date Action 
9 March 1993 The presidency of ICAC informed C&L that it was starting 
a technical investigation relating to C&L's 1990 & 1991 
audits of GT 
8 June 1993 C&L wrote to ICAC formulating their response to the 
charges 
II June 1993 ICAC wrote to C&L informing the firm that an agreement 
had been reached to file for sanctioning after the technical 
control process relating to the 1990 audit had been 
concluded 
Findings of the technical control and the corresponding 
response were presented in six charges that were potentially 
constitutive of a breach in some of the articles of Audit Law 
1988 
27 August 1993 ICAC requested an opinion from CNMV concerning the 
sixth charge 
7 September 1993 ICAC received CNMV's response and sent a copy of that 
response to C&L 
3 September 1993 C&L respond to ICAC formulating the same response to 
the charges (expressed previously on 8 June 1993) and 
requesting the dismissal of all charges 
22 October 1993 The instructor at ICAC formulated a proposed resolution, 
retaining all the charges except the fifth one 
12 November 1993 C&L made another response after being informed by ICAC 
of the proposed resolution, requesting a technical opinion 
on the charges from one of the professional bodies in Spain 
9 December 1993 C&L present to ICAC a report prepared by REA 
concerning the charges 
9 December 1993 The proposed resolution and the corresponding allegations 
and other documentation were submitted to the Advisory 
Committee of ICAC for consideration 
21 December 1993 C&L submitted to ICAC a report by ICJCE relating to the 
charges 
7 January 1994 ICAC sanctioned C&L for their 1990 audit of Grupo Torras 
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Appendix 4- Main Findings of ICACs Investigation of Coopers & Lybrand 
While the auditors specifically claim that article 16.2. c of Law 19/1998 might be 
unconstitutional, ICAC responded that even though the question of 
constitutionality was not relevant in these proceedings, the issue was resolved by 
the constitutional court in 1989. The auditors alleged that "the guilt principle 
requires the existence of fraudulent conduct or culpability in performing the 
violation" and the "conviction principle" requires the presumption of innocence. 
ICAC responded that the Law 19/1988 does not propagate a special requirement 
of deceit, blame or other circumstances for establishing the non-fulfilment of the 
auditor procedures that could cause economic prejudice to third parties or to the 
company being audited. 
The first charge: 
The first charge was related to L100m convertible bond into Torras Hostench 
shares issued in July 1988 by Phoneix Finance International Ltd and due in 1998. 
ICAC claimed that the Pts3bn provision prepared by GT to meet the potential 
losses that it might incur as result of the guarantees it offered for the convertible 
bond was underestimated. The auditors in their response to ICAC's charges 
indicated that the provision for the guarantees was established as follows: 
Provision = The total risk - Projected shareholders' 
(bonds and equity value of Phoenix 
interest) to the date of 
redemption 
Pts6bn guarantee by 
- companies holding 
shares in GT 
ICAC attributed the deficit in the provision to two factors. The first factor was 
related to the financial capacity of Phoenix that was based on the value of its 
shares in a Prima Inmobiliaria portfolio, which was estimated on the basis of a 
projection of value of the real-estate assets of Prima to the date of redemption of 
the bonds in 1998. ICAC indicated that such projection presumably recognised 
probable future benefits to the value of those assets in 1990. This consequently 
affected GT's financial statements of 31/12/1990 as it led to a decrease in the 
above provision, which constituted a clear non-compliance with the "prudence" 
concept. C&L responded that there is more than one method for calculating the 
provision, while ICAC countered that the method adopted by GT was in no way 
acceptable because it did not comply with the prudence principle. 
ICAC had another problem with the way C&L accepted the validity of the 
guarantees of Pts6bn granted by two companies (PHILIBY and CAOS) that held 
shares in GT. C&L based its decision on the evaluation of the payment capacity 
of these two companies and the support of KIO, which C&L considered as 
fundamental. ICAC's examination revealed that the evaluation study in C&L's 
working papers of the capacity of these two companies only showed the 
following: 
risk 
and 
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Assets Liabilities 
Grupo Torras Shares Loans from Grupo Torras to 
finance the acquisition of GT 
shares 
Moreover, the technical control report issued by ICAC indicated that both 
companies did not have the ability to meet the guarantees. In addition, ICAC 
concluded that the guarantees did not exist given that four companies owned by 
de la Rosa, Philiby, CAOS, Mira and Folma, were under contract with GT to buy 
the group's shares and then sell them to GT. C&L's claim that the support of 
KIO was prominent in accepting the reduction in the provision did not seem 
credible. Although, ICAC claimed that it did not find evidence of that support in 
the auditors work papers, C&L referred to a letter from KIO dated 3/3/1992. 
ICAC dismissed this letter pointing out that GT's financial statements were 
issued in 20/6/1991 and therefore there was no way that C&L would have used 
this letter as evidence in their audit. 
Accordingly, ICAC found C&L's failure to include a qualification in its report 
given the different problems with provisions as representing non-compliance with 
the Technical Procedures on Reports, issued by ICAC's resolution of 19 January, 
1991, especially in relation to points 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 on opinions with 
qualifications and to points 3.7.5 and 3.7.6 that regulate the "mistakes or non- 
compliance with generally accepted accounting principles and standards" as 
circumstances with possible effect on the opinion of the auditor. 
The Second Charge 
This charge related to the transfer of some of GT's loans so that they appeared as 
capital increases. GT received from its principal shareholder, KIO, loans for a 
total amount of Ptsl67,499,643,664 in 1990 (as detailed in Table 1). The notes 
of GT's 1990 accounts revealed that the principal shareholder intended to seek 
approval from the Extraordinary General Board of GT (to be held in July 1991) 
to transfer a large amount (Ptsl62,912,190,000) of these loans to capital. 
Accordingly, an amount of Ptsl 15,413,549,589' was capitalised through a charge 
to reserves in the balance sheet of the 1990 accounts. Then out of this amount, 
which was set for future capital increases, GT deducted Ptsl4,472,629,000 from 
the share premium account and transferred this to THL to settle obligations 
towards third parties. 
Table 1- Calculation of How Loans were Transferred to Capital Increase 
1 Even though the principle shareholder sought approval for transfer of Pts162,912,190,000 into 
capital. The only capitalised amount in the financial statements of 1990 was Pts] 15,413,549,589 
(80,000,000,000 + 35,412,549,589) as these loans were expired in 31 December 1990, while the 
Pts47,499,640,41 I was not expired during that year. 
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Loans Received by To be Converted to 
GT Capital 
Loan in September 1990 80,000,000,000 80,000,000,000 
Loan in October 1990 40,000,000,000 35,412,549,589 
Operation of Letters transfer by the 47,499,643,664 47,499,640,411 
Spanish Public Exchequer 
Total 167,499,643,664 162,912,190,000 
Charged to 1990 reserves as 11 5ý413,549,589 
contributions for future capital 
increases 
Transferred to Torras Hostench 14,472,629,000 
London 
C&L explained that during the drafting of documentation for transferring 
liabilities to capital, the whole debt was capitalised then an amendment were 
made to the share premium account. In other words, initially capitalisation was 
for the whole amount and then an amount was transferred to the account of THL 
with the balance being charged to reserves. ICAC claimed that this treatment 
was right when priority were given to substance over form. However, rectifying 
the credit to the reserve account through the profit and loss account might not 
been the right treatment given that the company at all times acted as an 
intermediary. 
ICAC saw the auditor's failure to make an exception in their report as a non- 
compliance with the technical procedures on reports published by ICAC, 
especially points 3.6.3,3.6.4,3.7.5,3.7.6. 
The Third Charge 
The issue involved here was that GT made an adjustment in the annual accounts 
of 1990 which showed a 35% reduction in its own funds as of 31 December 1989 
in comparison to what was reported in the annual accounts of 1989. 
Consequently, the Balance Sheet and the Profit and Loss accounts of 1989 
(reproduced in the 1990 accounts for comparison purposes) differed from the 
ones originally issued in the annual accounts of 1989. 
1989 Figures as published in 1989 Figures as published in 
1989 accounts 1990 accounts 
Share Premium Account Pts 67,573 Pts 35,072 
Profit for the year Pts 5,665m Pts 7,477 
C&L's response opposed ICAC's resolution proposal and supported their 
position by making reference to the EU VII Directive's guidelines and to the 
International Accounting Standard, No. 22. ICAC dismissed C&L's claim 
indicating that such standards can not be adopted when there are local standards 
that can be applied. Moreover, ICAC claimed that these standards dealt with 
consolidated accounts and could not be applied to what was under examination as 
these were "individual accounts". Even though, C&L claimed that the 
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adjustment did not affect the 1990 accounts, ICAC indicated that, since GT did 
not issue new financial statements for 1989 to introduce such adjustments, there 
was no other understanding other than that the adjustment affected the 1990 
financial statements. 
Accordingly, ICAC concluded that the adjustment did not comply with GAAP 
and that it would have affected the accounts of 1990. Furthermore, the failure by 
C&L to make an exception in their report with regard to this issue resulted in 
their non-compliance with ICACs technical procedures on reports, especially 
points 3.6.3,3.6.4,3.7.5,3.7.6. 
Fourth Charge 
The focus of this charge related to the contract between Grupo Torras and four 
companies owned by de la Rosa to buy and sell GT's shares. Under this 
agreement GT had a commitment with four companies (Philiby, CAOS, Mira and 
Folma) to buy all the 21,960,553 GT shares they held at the date of signing the 
contract. In addition, GT were also obliged to buy all the shares acquired by 
these companies at the date of execution (between I and 10 December 1992). 
ICAC did not consider the contractual relationship between GT and the four 
companies as a merely "unilateral promise", as has been claimed by the auditors. 
The purchase price for the 21,960,553 shares was Pts47bn. These companies 
were also indebted to GT by the same amount of Pts47bn. 
C&L working papers incorporated a legal report in which an attorney argued that 
the funds intended for the acquisition of GT shares did not leave GT, meaning 
that the transaction was not prohibited by article 81 in the Formulated Text on 
Company Law. ICAC said that it was not possible to accept this legal report as 
evidence to support the auditor's acceptance of the validity of the transaction. 
ICAC's investigation of the contract and the operation that surrounded it led 
ICAC to conclude that GT had given financial assistance for the purchase of its 
own shares through these companies. ICAC attributed the motivation behind 
these operations as being to avoid the limits with respect to companies acquiring 
their own shares as established by articles 74 of the reformulated text on 
company law. The investigation also revealed that a memorandum in the 
auditor's working papers showed that there was as many shares in GT's hands as 
in the hands of the four companies. Accordingly, ICAC indicated that given that 
the auditors did not make reference to the non-compliance with section 4 chapter 
4 of the reformulated text on company law, there was a non-compliance with 
article 209.1 of this law. 
The price of acquiring GT's shares conveyed in the contract between GT and the 
four companies was higher than the accounting net value that corresponded to 
them. However, when considering the capital increase to take place in the year 
1991, this situation was indicative of a loss of shareholder's equity for Grupo 
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Torras, S. A. -a loss that the auditors should have declared in their report, unless 
they had obtained evidence that shares could be sold at an equal price or higher to 
that of acquisition. However, such evidence did not exist in the auditor's working 
papers. Nevertheless, the auditors did not include in their exception report in this 
regard, which constituted a non-compliance with ICAC's Technical Procedures 
on reports (published on 19th of January 1991), especially in relation to points 
3.6.3,3.6.4,3.7.5 and 3.7.6. 
The Sixth Charge: 
ICAC claimed that the working papers of C&L revealed that they had detected an 
undervaluation of Pts4.5bn in the portfolio provisions of the annual accounts of 
Grupo Torras for 1990. However, C&L made no reference to this in their audit 
report. The failure of C&L to make an exception in their report concerning this 
issue meant that the firm did not comply with ICAC's technical procedures, 
especially 3.6.3,3.6.4,3.7.5. and 3.7.6. 
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REA's response to ICAC report 
1" Charge 
REA stated that the consolidated accounts of the final shareholder are only 
representative in the case of interrelated groups. ICAC responded that it might be 
theoretically valid but it is the not position of the regulations to distinguish 
between the consolidated and individual accounts. Moreover, ICAC indicated 
that other aspects should have to be taken into account in the case of consolidated 
financial statements, aspects that REA had failed to highlight. 
2 nd Charge 
REA asserted that even if the right accounting procedures had been followed it 
would not changed the results for the year. ICAC disagreed with this statement 
indicating that the payment of Ptsl4,472,629,000 represented lost funds and 
should have been recognised in the profit and loss account. The way the 
transaction was reported was seen by ICAC as absurd, giving two outcomes for 
the transaction - an increase in capital, then a transfer to meet obligations 
3 rd Charge 
ICAC thought that REA had used a limited basis in reaching the conclusions in 
its report. REA claimed that the loss in value of the financial investments was 
reported before the 1990 accounts - but ICAC said it did not find any supporting 
evidence for such a claim. 
4 th Charge 
ICAC refused to comment on REA's claim that there does not seem to exist non- 
compliance in the accounting or in the annual accounts of the Company as of 31 st 
December 1990 with legislation on a company's own shares and the provision of 
financial assistance for athe acquisition of such shares - given that REA did not 
provide any reason for such a claim. ICAC also thought that REA provided little 
justification with respect to the possibility that shareholder's equity will decrease 
as a result of the financial assistant given by GT to acquire its own shares. 
6 th Charge 
REA denied the existence of an overvaluation of shares in Prima Inmobiliaria 
citing as an evidence that C&L-London, THL's auditor, did not mention such an 
overvaluation and the existence of an agreement between the related parties. 
ICAC responded that acceptance of the first argument indicates admission that an 
auditor knowing a situation affects the financial statements had not taken any 
action in this regard, in order to protect the report of another auditor. With 
respect to the existence of a private agreement, the working papers of the auditor 
at no time mentioned such a point. On the other hand, communications sent to the 
CNMV and the commentaries collected in the working papers seem to infer that 
the shares in Prima Inmobiliaria were overvalued. 
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ICJCE's Response to ICAC 
lCJCE did not disapprove of the charges laid down by ICAC but rather made 
reference to alternative accounting criteria that could have been employed by GT. 
They also refrained from commenting on the performance of auditors in reference 
to the criteria adopted by GT. Their response to the fourth charge was to 
emphasise its strictly legal aspect and to refer, as evidence, to documentation 
showing the subsequent date of the issue of the audit report. 
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41 Office of the Dean 
January 15,1997 
To whom it may concem: 
Mr Walid Abdullah AlHusaini holds a scholarship from Kuwait University to study for 
the Ph. D. degree of accounting at University of Sheffield in Britain. He is going to 
examine the role of auditing in processes of corporate governance and control in 
Kuwait's companies and financial institutions. His study will partly focus on the 
involvement of auditors, from the auditing firms and the audit bureau, in the activities of 
Kuwait Investment Office (KIO). 
Mr walid will distribute questionnaire to users of financial statements, directors, and 
auditors, from both the auditing firms and the audit bureau, to elicit the perceptions and 
expectations of these groups towards the work of the external auditor in Kuwait. In 
addition, the survey will seek the views of these groups on KIO's investments in Spain. 
I would really appreciate if you can help Mr. Walid distribute and fill the questionnaire 
as his study is vital for the development of accounting profession in Kuwait and the 
protection of the public funds. 
Thank you for your cooperation 
Best regards, 
Dr. Yousef AI-Ebraheem 
Dean 
College of Administrative Sciences 
>"_ - 
-t 
13055 ; "JI OLAI YZY A LVV,, ZLi-r. -ý 4-;. Ij ya yrý% % ; JI. L, 
Tel. 25 10101 - Operator 2523911 Ext. 3001 - Fax. 2528477 - P. O. Box 5486 13055 Ku%% ait 
EXPECTATION OF AUDITORS IN KUWAIT AND THE ROLE OF AUDITING IN THE KUWAIT 
INVESTMENT OFFICE INVESTMENTS IN SPAIN 
We are conducting research at the University of Sheffield in England on the role of auditing in processes of 
corporate governance and control in Kuwait's companies and financial institutions. A part of this study is 
focusing on the involvement of auditors fi-orn audit firms and the Audit Bureau in the activities of the Kuwait 
Investment Office (KIO). 
This questionnaire seeks to examine your general perceptions and expectations of external auditors in Kuwait 
and to elicit your specific views regarding KIO's operations in Spain through its involvement in the Spanish 
holding company, Grupo Torras (GT). In some parts of the questionnaire. you are required to express opinions 
on the respective work of external audit firms and the Audit Bureau. The questionnaire is also being sent to 
financial directors and users of financial statements and auditors from the Audit Bureau and the study will seek 
to draw comparisons between the views of different respondents. 
Responses to the questionnaire will be treated with complete confidentiality and will be reported in the form of 
general statistical summaries. These will not attribute responses to any named individual. 
We estimate that filling in the questionnaire will take less than 25 minutes of your time. The questionnaire will 
be collected bv Walid A]Husaini within a week. (After completing the questionnaire, please return to Walid 
AlHusaini in the stamped addressed envelope provided-this onlYfor the ones that I will send ki, mail) 
If you need more information on completing the questionnaire or have comments on it, please contact Walid 
AlHusaini at the following address: 
Accounting Dept., Kuwait University, 
P. 0. Box 5486. Safat 13055, Kuwait. 
Tel. 2543618 - Fax. 2533382. 
Your contribution is vital to the success of this study and is greatly appreciated. Thank you very much for your 
valuable time. 
WALID A. ALHUSAINI PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER HUMPHREY 
RESEARCH STUDENT SUPERVISOR 
MANAGEMENTSCHOOL MANAGEMENT SCHOOL 
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD 
UNITED KINGDOM UNITED KINGDO! 'vI 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY 
We would be very happy to make results of the survey available to Nou. Should you require a copý of such 
results, please fill in your name and address below. 
This form will be detached as soon as it receiNed and will be filed separately. You can also send it separately if 
you like. 
Name .................................................... 
Address .................................................... L 
................................................................. 
A. Questions relating to audit firms in ku, *vit 
Geimeral Directions for completing the questionnaire: Throughout the questionnaire, you will be required to 
circle numbers to indicate your opinion concerning particular statements and questions. For example. in the 
first set of questions below you are required to indicate the extent of your agreement with certain statements 
about auditing. If you strongly disagree with the statement circle 1, while if you disagree with it to a lesser 
extent circle 2 or 3. If you strongly agree with the statement circle 7. \, %hile if you agree to a lesser extent circle 
5 or 6. If you neither agree nor disagree circle 4 and if you don't know circle 8. 
A. QUESTIONS RELATING TO AUDIT FIRMS IN KUWAIT 
The following statements have been made about external auditors and the auditing process. Please circle a 
um 
11 
n ber for each statement to i nd i cate the extent of your agreem ent. 
II 
Strongly Neutral Strongly Don't know 
Disagree Agree 
I. The qualit-, of company audits has increased since 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
the Manalch crises of 198; 
2. Too much is expected of auditors by the investing 1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 
Community 
3. Auditors are too concerned with keeping companý, 1 2 4 5 
6 7 8 
management happy 
4. The auditing process is seriously weakened by 1 2 4 5 6 7 
8 
imprecise accountine standards 
5. An audit is of N ery little benefit to a company 1 2 4 
5 6 7 8 
6. Audits generafly take too long to complete 1 2 4 6 
7 8 
7. Auditors do not understand the problems of 1 2 3 4 
5 6 7 8 
business 
8. Audits provide significant protection against fraud 1 2 4 
5 6 7 8 
9. Auditors should be identifýing ways to improve 1 2 4 
5 6 7 8 
management efficiency 
10. Auditors should report to shareholders on 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 8 
management efflciencý 
11. Auditors are not made adequately accountable for 1 2 4 5 
6 7 8 
their work 
12. Friendships and relationships with senior 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 8 
corporate management usually govern the appointment 
of external auditors 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree that the company's external auditors should 
have a legal 
responsibility to the following groups for any loss arising from their rel ian ce on t 
he audited financial 
I 
statements. 
Strongly Neutral Strongly Don't know 
Disagree Agree 
1. Existing shareholders? 1234678 
2. Potential shareholders' 12 -1 
4i678 
1 Aidit Fimis questionmure 
A. Questions relating to audit firms in Ku%ait 
3. Please indicate what -, ou think of the following propositions concerning the role that should 
be playe 
by the external auditor. 
11 
Strongly Neutral Strongly Don't know 
Disagree Agree 
The auditors' role with respect to the audited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
company should be to ensure that: 
I- all significant fraud is detected 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2. company financial statements contain no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
significant deliberate distortions 
3. a satisfactory system of internal control is being 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
operated 
4. the future viability of the company is not in 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
doubt 
5. the company is being run efficiently 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
6. the appropriate regulatory authorities have been 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
informed of any significant malpractice 
7. the company's accounts gi-, e a reliable 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
indication of its market value 
4. A 1994 amendment to the Kuwait Commercial Companies Law (Article 'N'o. 16 1) requires that 
companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Market must be audited by two independent audit firms (instead 
of one as under the previous law). Please indicate to what extent Nou aerree or disauree with the 
followinc, related statements. 
Strongly Neutral Strongly Don't know 
Disagree Agree 
1. Having two external auditors will make the 1 234i 6 7 8 
detection of material fraud and errors much easier 
2. The appointment of two external auditors will 1 234 6 7 8 
enhance the overall independence of audit work 
I The use of two external auditors will limit either 1 234 6 7 8 
auditors' ability to obtain a clear picture of the 
financial position of the company. 
4. The appointment of two external auditors will 1 234 6 7 
8 
lead to unnecessary duplication of audit work 
5. The requirement to appoint two external 1 234 6 
7 8 
auditors will increase the share of the audit market 
held by large accounting firms in Kuwait 
6. The appointment of two external auditors will 1 234 
6 7 8 
generate no significant benefits for shareholders 
I Audit Finns queslionnairc 
A. Questions relating to audit firms in Ku%mil 
5. The following propositions relate to the regulation of external audit firms. Please 
indicate to what extent vou a2ree or disagree with each proposition. 
Strongly Neutral Strongly Don't know 
Disagree Agree 
Audit firms in Kuwait should: 
1. be able to provide management advisory 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
services to their audit clients 
2. be allowed to own shares in their audit 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
clients 
I not be able to earn more than 10% of 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
total income from any one audit client 
4. have a specific time limit to act as an 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
external auditor of any client (e. g. no more 
than 5 consecutive years) 
5. be self-regulated instead of being 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
regulated by the Ministry of Commerce 
6. not act primarily to make a profit 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
7. have their appointment and fee 12 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
determined by a body independent of the 
client company 
8. have limited liability determined by 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
statute 
9. have their audit methods checked by a 12 3 4 
5 6 7 8 
professional standards body 
10. be required to be associated with a 12 3 4 5 
6 7 8 
major international audit firm 
11. not have close personal friendships 12 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
with their audit chents 
I Audit F inm 41twsuonnwre 
A. Questions relating to audit rirms in ku%ait 
6. In relation to their external audit work, please indicate how successful you 
think audit firms in general at the following: 
Extremely Neither Extremely Not 
unsuccessful su ccessful nor 
Successful applicable 
u nsuccessful 
I- Diagnosing problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2. Prescribing remedies to problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I Acquiring information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4. Coping with risk and uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5. Predicting the ftiture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
6. Making a profit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
7. Detecting errors and irregularities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
8. Preventing errors and irregularities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9. Complying with professional rules 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
10. Enforcing legal requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
11 . Forming correct judgements 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
12. Acting independently without regard to 1 2. 3 4 5 6 7 8 
self-interest 
13. Communicating effectively 1 2 -13 
4 5 6 7 8 
14. Reporting truthfal. lý 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
15. Providing cost-effective audit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
investigations 
16. Being even-handed with the interests of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
others 
17. Limiting their own legal responsibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
18. Providing a useful service to corporate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
management 
19. Providing a useful service to society 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
20. Providing protection for Kuwait's 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
pubfic funds 
4 Audit Finns questimmmir 
B. Questions relating to the Audit Bureau in Kuwsil 
B-QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE AUDIT BUREAU IN KUWAIT 
Directions: Questions in this section relate to the corporate audit work- of the Audit Bureau in government o%med 
COmpanics (whether listed or unlisted on the Kuwait Stock Exchange) and other go%ernment profit seeking organisations 
(e. g. Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), KIO). 
In relation to its corporate audit work. please indicate how successful -, ou think the Audit Bureau general],, is at 
the following: 
Extrernelv Neitber Extrernelv 
' 
Not 
unsuccessiul 
s uccessful nor 
Successfu l applicable 
unsuccessful 
I- Diagnosing problems 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
2. Prescribing remedies to problems 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
I Acquiring information 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
4. Coping with risk and uncertaintv 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
5. Predicting the future 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
6. Detecting errors and irregularities 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
7. Preventing errors and irre, -3, ularities 
1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
8. Complying with professional rules 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
9. Enforcing legal requirern. -rits 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
10. Forming correct judgements 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
11. Acting independentl\ \ý; thout regard to self interest 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
12. Communicating effecti\ elý 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
13. Reporting truthfull) 1 2 3 -1 56 7 8 
14. Providing cost-effecti\ e audit investigations 1 2 3 4 i6 7 8 
15. Being even-handed ý\ ith the interests of others 1 2 3 4 i6 7 8 
16. Limiting their own oreartisational responsibility 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
IT Providing a useful ser\ ice to corporate management 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
18. Providing a useful ser\ ice to society 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 
19. Providing protection for Kuwait's public funds 1 2 3 56 7 8 
112. What do you think of the following propositions about the role that should be pla\ed b\ the Audit Bureau. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The Audit Bureau's role with respect to its audits of 1 2 
government owned corporations and organisations 
should be to ensure that: 
1. all significant fraud is detected 2 
2. Company financial statements contain no significant 1 2 
deliberate distortions 
3. a satisfactory system of internal control is being 1 2 
operated 
4. the company is being run efficiently 1 2 
5. the appropriate regulatorý authorities have been 1 2 
informed of any significant malpractice 
Neutral 
3456 
Strongly Don't know 
Agree 
78 
5 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
Audit Finns qtievipmuirc 
C. Questions relating to KJO's in, est men is in Spain 
C. ALL QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION RELATE TO THE OPERATIONS OF 
THE KUWAIT INVESTMENT OFFICE (KIO) AND ITS INVESTMENTS IN 
SPAIN 
1. Did you know that K10 was audited by an external audit firm before the collapse of its Spanish 
investments in 1992? 
1. Yes 2. No 
2. Although K10 is externally audited.. at present, it does not make any audited financial information 
available to the general public. Please indicate (by circling one number) the degree of information 
which you think K10 make publicly available. 
1. K10 should publish full audited financial statements 
2. K10 should publish the auditor's report and summarised financial statements 
3. K10 should not publish any financial information 
4.1 have no opinion on this issue 
3. From your understanding of KIO's investments in Spain and the fact that KIO does not publish any 
financial information, please indicate to what extent you think each of the following are a major 
objective of the external audits of KIO. 
Not an 
objective 
I. Detect all sismificant fraud 
2. Detect any major breaches of legislation 
governing KIO's operations 
3. Report to the appropriate regulatory authorities I 
on significant malpractice 
4. Assist in preparing financial statements 
S. Evaluate management performance 
6. Attest that KIO's financial statements comply I 
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) 
7. Assist in minimising KIO's tax obligations I 
around the world 
8. To ensure that public funds managed by KIO are I 
adequately protected 
Neutral 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 
Major Don't Knom, 
objecti% e 
68 
68 
678 
4. In your opinion, which of the following type of auditors provides the most independent audits of 
organisations which the government of Kuwait owns or has invested in? Please rank them in order, 
giving I to the most independent, 2 to the next one and 3 to the least independent: 
1. Audit Bureau -------- 
2. Kuwaiti audit firms associated with big international accounting firms -------- 
3. Kuwaiti audit firms not associated with international accounting firms -------- 
6 Audil Fimis 4ucsuvmirc 
C. Questions relating to KIO's investments in Spain 
From your understanding of KIO's involvement with GT in Spain, Please indicate the extent to which LE: you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
11 
Strongly Neutral Strongly Don't know 
Disagree Agree 
1. In the-GT" affair, auditors generally placed too 1 234567 8 
much reliance on the assurances of corporate 
management 
2. Auditors should be legally liable for the collapse 1 34567 8 
of KIO's investments in -GT- if their work was 
substandard 
3. People responsible for the collapse of KIO"s 1 234567 8 
investments have not yet been held adequately to 
account 
4. People responsible for the collapse of KIO's 1 24567 8 
investments will never be held accountable. 
5. Traditions of secrecy at KIO prevented auditors 1 24567 
8 
from detecting breaches in corporate law 
6. Traditions of secrecy at KIO prevented auditors 1 234567 8 
from reporting discovered breaches in corporate 
law to the appropriate authorities 
7. International audit firms generally have the 1 234567 8 
capacity to understand fully the type of complex 
investments and transactions undertaken by KJO 
8. The Audit Bureau generally has the capacity to 1 234567 8 
understand fuliv the type of complex investments 
and transactions undertaken by KIO 
9. K10's Spanish investment problems are an 1 234567 
8 
isolated incident. not reflective of the general way 
in which Kuwaiti institutions manage their 
investment portfolios 
10. In Kuwait. power and good connections make it 1 234567 8 
easy to get away with corporate fraud. 
11. Scandals on the scale of "GT" and "Kuwait Oil 1 234567 8 
Tankers Companyl' are I ikely to re-occur in Kuwait 
in the future 
Audit Fimis queslionnium 
C. Questions relating to K 10's investments in Spain 
From your understanding of the KIO case, what degree of blame would you attach to the following 
IE 
bodies for the collapse of Grupo Torras (GT). 
11 
1. KIO's External auditors 
2. GT's External auditors 
3. Audit Bureau 
4. Managers at Kuwait InN estment Office 
5. Managers at Grupo Torras 
6. Managers at Kuwait In% estment Authority 
7. The Spanish government 
8 The Kuwaiti government 
No 
Blame 
I 
I 
I 
Some 
Blame 
2 3 4 5 6 
2 3 4 5 6 
2 3 4 5 6 
2 
Total Don't know 
Blame 
7 8 
7 8 
7 8 
7 8 
7 8 
7 8 
7 8 
7 8 
7. After the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 several financial scandals occurred. Please indicate to what 
extent you think the following factors were common causes of such scandals. 
Strongly Neutral Strongly Don't kno% 
Disagree Agree 
1. Excessive secrecy in Kuýiait's government 12 3 4 6 
7 8 
institutions 
2. Absence of adequate accountability 12 3 4 5 
6 7 8 
I Absence of the Kuwait National Assembly 12 3 4 
5 6 7 8 
(1986-1992) 
4. Poor management 12 3 4 5 6 
7 8 
5. Failure to maintain adequate accounting records 12 3 4 5 6 
7 8 
6. Sub-standard external audits 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
7. Failure to enforce existing Kuwaiti corporate 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 
laws and regulations 
Audit Furrits quirmumnitire 
C. Questions relating to the future of corporate governance in Ku%mi I 
D. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN KUWAIT 
ru 
ges: t of 
F[Thefibli. 
lowing suggestions have been made as ways of improving the future of corporate govemance and 
S sug: 
regulati -ith each regulation of organisations in Kuwait. Please indicate the extent to which your agree or disagree k 
uggestio2. 
Strongly Neutral Strongly Don't know 
Disagree Agree 
I Legally require that external audits of 1 2345 678 
companies and organisations with a capital above 
KD 5 million are audited by internationally 
affiliated audit firms 
2. Increase audit fees to enable more extensive 1 2345 678 
audits to be performed 
3. Change the law to allow companies listed on the 1 2345 678 
stock exchange to be audited byjust one Audit firm 
4. Require that government owned corporations 1 2345 678 
and organisations not listed on the stock market 
(such as Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) 
KIO, and KIA) are audited by two different 
external audit firms 
5. Place directors of Kuwaiti corporations on 1 2345 678 
perform ance-related contracts 
6. Allow the Audit Bureau a greater role in 1 2345 678 
evaluating the efficiency of corporate management 
7. Allow the Audit Bureau a greater role in the 1 2345 678 
regulation to appoint audit firms and set their fees 
for their work in government owned companies and 
organisations as a measure to enhance the auditor 
independence 
8. Require that all stockholding companies, listed 1 2345 678 
at the Kuwaiti stock exchange, in which the 
government hold 50% or more of the equitý- capital 
are exempted from any Audit Bureau attestation 
9. External audit is abolished as a mandatory legal 1 2345 678 
requirement for Kuwaiti companies 
10. Require that all reports prepared by the Audit 1 2345 678 
Bureau on government owned organisations and 
corporations are publicly available 
Audit Ftmis qucsiwn=rr 
F. Questions relating to yourself 
E. QUESTIONS RELATING TO YOURSELF 
Directions : Please circle the appropriate number that represents your answer 
What is your position in your firm? 
I. Partner 4. Assistant Audit Manager 
2. Managing Partner 5. Auditor 
3. Audit Manager 6. Other - please specify 
............................. 
2. What is the area of activity on which you spend the largest proportion of your working week? 
1. Audit and Accountancy 5. Insolvency 
1. Taxation 6. Technical 
3. Corporate Finance 7. Administrative/Personnel 
4. Management consultancy 8. Other - please speciý, 
............................. 
3. What type of accounting firm do you currently work in? 
1. Lar2e audit fir7n 
2. Medium size audit firm 
3. Small audit firm 
4. Does , our firm have an association with any of the followinLy firms: 
1. Big Six accounting firms(Arthur Andersen. Cooperz & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche. 
Ernst & Youn2, KPMG, Price Waterhouse) 
2. Non - Big Six international accounting firms 
5. Please specify the approximate number of accountants in your firm? 
I. Less than 5 5.31 -40 
2.5 - 10 6.41 - 50 
3.11 -20 7.51 -60 
4.21 -30 8. Over 60 
6. What is length of time that you have spent working in a firm of professional accountants? 
I. I-2 years 4.11 - 14 ýears 
2.3 -4 years 5.16 - 2-ý ýears 
3.5 - 10 years 6. Over '5 years 
7. How familiar are you with 
Not familiar Verv 
Familiar familiar 
at all 
1. The activities of KIA 12345 67 
2. The activities of KIO 124 67 
13. The involvement of KIO in Spain through 124 67 
Gr upo Torras 
4. the activities of external audit firms in Kuwait 1245 67 
10 Audit Ferms Questionnaire 
E. Questions relating to yourself 
8. Have you ever worked at the Audit Bureau? 
I. Yes 2. No 
and if your answer is -Yes'% please specifý for ho%k long 
9. 
........................................ 
What is your age? 
I. 21 -24 5. 40-45 
2.25-29 6. 46-50 
3.30-34 7. 51 -60 
4.35-39 8. 61 -70 
10. What is ýour sex? 
1. Male 2. Female 
111. What is your national itý ? 
1. Kuwaiti 6. Egyptian 
2. Indian 7. Pakistani 
3. Lebanese 8. Syrian 
4. Jordanian 9. British 
5. American 10. Other - Please speciA 
12. What educational level ha%e ýou achieved? 
........................................ 
1. High School 4. Master 
2. Diploma 5. Doctoral 
3. Bachelor 6. Other- Please specitý, 
... 
13. Do you ha%e any professional qualifications? 
....................................... 
1. None 
2. CPA 
3 ACCA 
4. Member of one of the British professional accountancy bodies (e. g. CIMA or ICAE%k) 
5. Certification according to the Kuv aiti Law 
6. Other- Please specif, 
14. Have you studied abroad for more than one year? 
1. Yes 2. No 
15. Have you worked abroad for more than one year? 
I. Yes 2. No 
16. If your answer was --yes- in either question 14 or 15. please indicate when %ou studied or %%orked ubroad 
b% 
ticking the appropriate box. 
Studied Worked 
1960*s 
1970's 
1980's 
1990's 
Tkank youfor copVlering this questionnaire. 
Audii Firms QuLstionnairc 
PAGE 
NUMBERING 
AS ORIGINAL 
E. Questions relating to ý, )urself 
E. QUESTIONS RELATING TO YOURSELF 
Directions : Please circle the appropriate number that represents your answer 
I. Please indicate your position in the Audit Bureau? 
.................................................... 
v audit? Which type of organisations do you most frequentl, 
I. Shareholding companies 
2. Ministries 
3. Government owned corporations (Kuwait Air-ways, KPQ 
4. Government owned organisations (KIO. KIA) 
5. Other- Please specifý, 
.................................. 
What is the length of time that you have spent working in the Audit Bureau? 
I. I-2 years 4.11 - 15 years 
2.3 -4 %ears 16 - 
25 ýears 
3.5 - 10 years 6. 
Over 225 Nears 
4. Have you ever worked for an external auditing firm? 
I. Yes 2. No 
and if your answer is -Yes", please specifv for how long 
5. How familiar are you with 
Not 
Familiar 
at all 
1. The activities of KIA 1 
2. The activities of KIO I 
II I The involvement of KIO in Spain through 
Grupo Torras 
4. the activities of external audit firms in Kuwait I 
6. What is your age? 
I. 21 -24 
2.25-29 
3.30-34 
4.35-39 
7. What is your sex? 
I. Male 
6, 
7. 
8. 
familiar 
2 3 4 5 6 
40 - 4-5 
46-50 
51 -60 
61 -70 
I Fernale 
In 
Very 
familiar 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Audit Bureau quirvimirm-m 
E. Questions relating to yourself 
8. What is vour national it-,? 
I Kuwaiti 6. Egyptian 
2. Indian 7. Pakistani 
3. Lebanese 8. Syrian 
4. Jordanian 9. British 
5. American 10. Other - Please specify 
9. What educational level have you achieved? 
........................................ 
I. Hiizh School 4. Master 
2. Diploma 5. Doctoral 
Bachelor 6. Other- Please specify 
10. 
............. 
Do you have any professional qualifications? 
........................... 
I. None 
2. CPA 
3 ACCA 
4. Member of one of the British professional a ccountancý bodies (e. g. CIMA or ICAEW) 
5. Certification according to the Kuwaiti Law 
6. Other- Please specifý 
I]. 
------------------------------ 
Have you studied abroad for more than one year? 
I. Yes 2. No 
12. Have you \%orked abroad for more than one year? 
I. Yes 2. No 
13. If your answer was "yes" in either question II or 12, please indicate when you studied or worked 
abroad by ticking the appropriate box. 
Studied I Worked 
1960's 
1970's 
1980's 
1990's 
Thank youjor completing this questionnaire. 
Audit Bumau quesnonnium 
E. Questions relAting to ý ourself 
E. QUESTIONS RELATING TO YOURSELF 
Directions : Please circle the appropriate number that represents your answer 
pe of organisation do you work in? What ty 
I Commercial Bank 6. Industrial Company 
2. Insurance Company 7. Service company 
3. Investment Company 8. Food company 
4. Oil Company 9. Government agency 
5. Real Estate Company 10. Other - please specif, ý 
2. Please indicate your job title? 
3. Please indicate the degree of government ownership of your organisation's equity capital? 
I 1000 0 privately owned 
2. Less than 25% owned by the government 
3. Government ownership is bet%veen 25% and 509o 
4. Government ownership is more than 50% 
How familiar are you with 
Not familiar Ver-s 
Familiar familiar 
at all 
1. The activities of KIA 1 2 4 5 6 7 
2. The activities of KIO 1 23 4 5 6 7 
3. The involvement of KIO in Spain through 1 23 4 5 6 7 
Gr upo Torras 
4. the activities of external audit finris in Kuwait 1 23 4 5 6 
5. What is your age? 
I. 21 -24 5. 40-45 
2.25-29 6. 46-50 
3.30-34 7. 51 -60 
4.35 -39 8. 61 -70 
6. What is your sex? 
I. Male 2. Female 
I () Directors questionnaire 
F. Que-1tions relating to you melf 
7. What is your nationality? 
I. Ku%kaiti 6. Egyptian 
2. Indian 7. Pakistani 
3. Lebanese 8. Syrian 
4. Jordanian 9. British 
5. American 10. Other - Please speciý 
8. What educational level have you achieved? 
................................. 
High School 4. Master 
2. Diploma 5. Doctoral 
3. Bachelor 6. Other- Please specify 
.................................... 
9. Was your subject of study related to business studies? 
I. Yes 2. No 
and if your answer is "Yes", please give degree subject 
----------------------------------------- 
10. Have you studied abroad for more than one year? 
I. Yes 2. No 
]L Have you worked abroad for more than one year? 
I. Yes 2. No 
12. If your answer was "yes" in either question 10 or 11, please indicate when you studied or worked 
abroad by ticking the appropriate box. 
Studied I Worked 
196Ws 
1970*s 
1980's 
1990's 
13. Do you have any professional qualifications? 
I. None 
2. CPA 
ACCA 
4. Member of one of the British professional accountancý bodies (e. g. CIMA or ICAEW) 
5. Certification according to the Kuwaiti Law 
6. Other- Please specify 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
Difemirs questimumm 
E. Questions relating to yourself 
E. QUESTIONS RELATING TO YOURSELF 
Dimetions : Please circle the appropriate number that represents your answer 
What ty pe of organisation do ýou work in? 
Commercial Bank 5. Government Agency 
2. Insurance Companý 6. University 
3. Investment Company 7. Other - please specify 
4. Stockbroking firm -------------------------- 
2. Please indicate your job title' 
........... I .................. I ............. 1 
3. Please indicate the degree of government ownership of your organisation's equitý capital? 
I. 100% privately owned 
2. Less than 250,, 0 owned by the govemment 
3. Government ownership is between 2501/0 and 50% 
4. Government ownership is more than 50% 
4. How familiar are you with 
Not Familiar Very 
Familiar Familiar 
at all 
1. The activities of KIA 123 45 67 
2. The activities of KIO 123 45 67 
I The involvement of KIO in Spain through 123 45 67 
Grupo Torras 
4. the activities of external audit firms in Kuwait 123 45 67 
5. Do you rate yourself as 
1. an informed reader of annual corporate financial statements 
2. an average reader of annual corporate financial statements 
3. a novice reader of annual corporate financial statements 
6. In your opinion are external audit reports based on evidence collected from an investigation of a 
sample of client's accounts and records. 
I. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know 
7. What is your age? 
I. 21 -24 5.40-45 
2.25-29 6.46-50 
3.30-34 7.51 -60 
4.35 - 39 8.61 -70 
8. What is your sex? 
I. Male 2. Female 
I () Useri offinwwt3j 
F. Quentions relatiniz, to youmelf 
9. What is your national ity? 
I Kuwaiti 6. Egyptian 
2. Indian 7. Pakistani 
3. Lebanese 8. Syrian 
4. Jordanian 9. British 
5. American 10. Other - Please specify 
10. What educational level have you achieved? 
........................................ 
I. High School 4. Master 
2. Diploma 5. Doctoral 
3. Bachelor 6. Other- Please specify 
U. 
............................................ 
Was your subject of study was related to business studies? 
I. Yes 2. No 
and if your answer is -Yes", please give degree subject 
12. 
----------------------------------------- 
Have you studied abroad for more than one year' 
1. Yes 2. No 
Have you m orked abroad for more than one ear' 
1. Yes 2. No 
14. If your answer was -yes" in either question 12 or 13, please indicate when you studied or worked 
abroad by ticking the appropriate box. 
Studied 
I 
Worked 
1960's 
1970's 
1980's 
1990's 
15. Doyou have any professional qualifications? 
I. None 
2. CPA 
3 ACCA 
4. Member of one of the British professional a ccountancy bodies (e. g. CIMA or ICAEW) 
5. Certification according to the Kuwaiti Law 
6. Other- Please specify 
Thank youfor completing this questionnaire. 
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